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Abstract
This thesis aims to demonstrate that the Middle East was not, as so often depicted, a mere
peripheral concern as World War II progressed, but an integral part of President Roosevelt’s
goals as he planned for the postwar era. This thesis seeks to demonstrate how the administration
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt undertook an unprecedented policy of trade expansion and
corporate investment in the Middle East, a region previously an unchallenged British and French
sphere of influence. Using the Lend-Lease program to challenge the hegemony of France and
Britain’s imperial preferential systems, Roosevelt achieved American economic penetration and
dominance of the region’s oil as an economic keystone of a projected postwar non-colonial new
world order. This story is told in this thesis by following the 30-year career and writings of
William S. Culbertson. Yale Hamiltonian scholar and U.S. Tariff Commissioner appointed by
President Wilson, Harding and Coolidge, he was also minister and ambassador in the Coolidge
and Hoover administrations to two indebted countries threatening American corporate
investments. Legal counsel to the National Foreign Trade Council, the leading corporate trade
association of the time, Culbertson was corporate attorney in Washington, D.C. for such firms as
Standard Oil of New Jersey. A founder of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service
and educator of future diplomats, he served as one of two top exports control officers in the
administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. During World War II he was a Military Intelligence (G2) officer at the new Pentagon, then an OSS officer, and finally President Roosevelt’s Personal
Ambassador and Chief of the in 1944 U.S. Economic Mission to the Middle East, North Africa
and Italy for postwar American investments. Culbertson’s active career in trade diplomacy
spanned the Progressive Era, the so-called “isolationism” of the 1920s and 1930s, and the
wartime integration of military and covert intelligence into the State Department’s and War
Department’s postwar planning. He worked with some of the founders of the National Security
Studies academic discipline that would help guide and shape the Cold War. In following his
writings and career and the motivations behind them, this thesis incorporates a challenging broad
view of American history in order to demonstrate the market forces that shaped American
ideology, politics and foreign policy that influenced Culbertson, and the pattern of these forces
evident in American history that is too often ignored or not given its appropriate recognition. This
thesis also offers detailed glimpses into the secret collaborative plans of the OSS and Lend-Lease
administrators for the Middle East and the motivation for the extraordinary expansion of U.S.
corporate trade in the modern era. In their effort to avoid both a fundamental change in the
American political economy and a return of the Great Depression after the war, American leaders
broke through the European preferential imperial system. Anticipating ending their temporary
wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, American leaders in the last year of the war prepared to
meet the challenge of the rising Soviet system by extending the traditional Open Door policy of
expanding foreign markets. In this context, the Cold War did not begin in the postwar Middle
East, as so often claimed, but began before American oil companies were even in the Middle
East, with American military intervention against the young Bolshevik republic in 1917, as
Premier Khrushchev recalled to naïve disbelieving American reporters during his 1959 visit to the
U.S. This thesis examines the roots of the American “way of life” in the founding of an American
capitalist state designed brilliantly by Alexander Hamilton, a child of British mercantilism.
Through Culbertson’s master’s thesis on him, the thesis demonstrates that the continuum of an
evolving expansionist policy stretched back to Jeffersonian democracy backed by a strong
Hamiltonian State and endures up to the present day.
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Structure
The main body of this thesis is structured into four chapters:
Chapter One examines Culbertson’s emergence from rural Western America and
reviews his ideological evolution from a Socialist sympathizer into a Social Darwinist
and controversial Hamiltonian scholar at Yale University. Hamilton’s influence on
Culbertson’s political self-identity reflects the growing appreciation of the Federalists by
Progressive Movement leaders as they confronted the need for a stronger executive
branch to assert increasing control over foreign relations to achieve the perceived needs
of the industrial economy for more foreign markets for its “surplus” goods and “idle”
investment capital.
Chapter Two explores Culbertson’s rise within Washington D.C.’s foreign trade
circles during the Taft, Wilson, Harding and Coolidge administrations, as he struggled to
modernize trade policy to be more fitting to America’s rise as an industrial power
increasingly needing foreign markets for its perceived “overproduction” of goods and its
unprecedented accumulation of capital during World War I. The chapter reviews his
service as minister and ambassador to, respectively, Rumania and Chile during the
Coolidge and Hoover administrations, his activities as a corporate lawyer and lobbyist
opposed to the domestic reforms of the New Deal while yet defending many of the trade
and foreign policies of Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and his return, at Hull’s request,
to government service after Pearl Harbor in the new Export Control Office of the
reconstituted Council of National Defense; his membership in the then-exclusive Council
1

on Foreign Relations (CFR) which was preparing the American public for war; CFR’s
War and Peace Studies Project’s secret recommendations to President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull on foreign affairs.
Chapter Three recounts President Roosevelt’s evolving strategy for dealing with
both Britain’s crisis in the Middle East and Soviet Russia’s supplies crisis on the Eastern
Front, including the dispatching to the Middle East of Averell Harriman, William J.
Donovan, Lt. Col. Harold Hoskins, and Culbertson’s former top colleagues in exports
control, Lt. Col. Russell Maxwell and James Landis. After the successful 1942 U.S.
invasion of North Africa, Roosevelt, recognizing the importance of Middle Eastern oil for
American postwar planning, adopted two interrelated strategies, one for the war and one
for the post war that involved a dramatic turn in 1943 against British and French colonial
policies in the Middle East. His clash with Vice President Henry Wallace over the latter’s
public disputes with Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones that were undermining the
effectiveness of their roles in the war mobilization and Lend-Lease all but ended
Wallace’s political career and caused a shift of power to a new Foreign Economic
Administration that also served as a cover for OSS intelligence officers. To augment
American presence in the region by coordinating U.S. military and regional civilian needs
in the disbursement of Lend-Lease aid, Roosevelt had James Landis join his former
colleague at exports control, U.S. Military Commander in the Middle East General
Russell Maxwell, paving the way for American corporate penetration of Middle Eastern
markets. Simultaneously, Roosevelt built up U.S. intelligence capacities in the Middle
East even as the Axis threat to the region receded, leading to growing clashes with the
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French over Lebanon and Syria and with Churchill over Middle East oil and the Eastern
Mediterranean.
Chapter Four analyzes Culbertson’s work with National Security studies experts
from CFR’s War and Peace Studies Project in 1942 and 1943 in Military Intelligence (G2) seminars preparing for an expanded U.S. role in the Middle East, his report on the nonrevolutionary aspects of Soviet foreign policies under Stalin, and his secret OSS plans
and analysis activities. The chapter analyzes the importance to President Roosevelt and
Secretary Hull of Culbertson’s 1944 economic and political survey of North Africa and
the Middle East for prospects for postwar American corporate trade and investments
successfully penetrating and ending the French and British Empires’ control over Middle
East oil, a keystone in their evolving plans for the postwar world order.
The thesis concludes with an analysis of what was behind Culbertson’s sudden
decline in influence, and a brief summery and analysis of the patterns discerned in the
thesis’s narrated chain of events, including why, beyond concerns about Soviet ideology
and challenges to American postwar hegemony, United States leaders scaled down
Roosevelt’s previous Wilsonian focus on economic development and political reform.
While publicly advocating for the global free trade system which nationalists like
Culbertson opposed, Washington, despite its Marshall Plan and Point Four programs,
retreated to a trade policy toward the “Third World” with decidedly mercantilist imperial
tendencies rooted in the traditional blend of Hamiltonian strong-state and capital-forming
ideology and Jeffersonian expansionism. Sometimes recognizing foreign evils and often
externalizing domestic ones, America’s postwar leaders were, like their predecessors,
unable to reevaluate their endless search for markets for “surplus” goods and capital or to
3

overcome their fear of changing the traditional economic, social and political structure
which, in their view, had served them so well for over 170 years. This fundamental policy
legacy, while derived from unique factors in America’s social, political, and economic
development, was not exceptional in its general pattern in the modern age and has
continued now for over 240 years.

4

Introduction and a Note on Sources and Methods

Much of the historiography of U.S. policy evolution in the Middle East between
1941 and 1950 has centered on three factors: 1) the role of Saudi oil; 2) the impact of the
Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; and 3) the struggle between
Arabs and Jews over Palestine, including U.S. support for the founding and continued
viability of the State of Israel. Often, scholarship has focused either on the war in the
Western Mediterranean or on the decades after World War II within the context of the
Cold War or, since 9/11, the “war on terrorism.” 1
With the exceptions noted below, 2 most of American historiography on U.S.
involvement in the Middle East during World War II has too often been described only in
its military context as a minor theater supporting the Persian Corridor supply line to the
Russian front, bolstering the region’s regimes’ ability to resist German and Italian
economic and political influences, and resisting threats to the Allies’ access to Middle

See, for example: John Kent, British Imperial Strategy and the Origins of the Cold War 1944—1949
(London: Leicester University Press) 1993. (Kent 1993)Edward J. Sheehy, The U.S. Navy, the
Mediterranean, and the Cold War, 1945—1947 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992). Simon Ball, Bitter
Sea: The Brutal World War II Fight for the Mediterranean (New York: HarperPress, 2010). Barbara Brooks
Tomblin, With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942—1945 (Lexington,
Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004). (Tomblin 2004)

1

Exceptions over the decades have been few and far between: John A. DeNovo, “The Culbertson Economic
Mission and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1944—1945.” The Journal of American History
63, no. 4 (1977). Robert Vitalis, “The ‘New Deal’ in Egypt: The Rise of Anglo-American Commercial
Competition in World War II and the Fall of Neocolonialism,” Diplomatic History 20, no. 2 (1996).
Christopher O’Sullivan, FDR and the End of Empire: The Origins of American Power in the Middle East
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Andrew Buchanan, American Grand Strategy in the Mediterranean
during World War II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

2
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Eastern oil fields and refineries and the Suez Canal in Egypt. 3 With the latter concern,
scholarly emphasis has been on the struggle for control of the Western Mediterranean to
defend the Suez Canal, restore Allied shipping, and liberate North Africa as the
springboard for Allied invasions of Italy and southern France to support the longpromised cross-Channel invasion of northern France. The focus on the first full year of
American involvement (December 1941 to December 1942) has been on Lend-Lease
supplying of Britain, of Soviet Russia, and of British forces in North Africa, and on the
debates, preparations, and execution of the American-British invasion of French North
Africa. 4

See, for example: Edward J. Sheehy, The U.S. Navy, the Mediterranean, and the Cold War, 1945—1947
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992). Simon Ball, Bitter Sea: The Brutal World War II Fight for the
Mediterranean (New York: HarperPress, 2010). Pp. 263-270.

3

The literature is extensive on all three points. See, for example: 1) Wallace Stegner, Discovery! The
Search for Arabian Oil (Beirut: Middle East Export Press, 1974) (Stegner 1974). Anthony Cave Brown,
Oil, God and Gold: The Story of Aramco and the Saudi Kings (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1999). Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: The Free Press,
2003). Lloyd C. Gardner, Three Kings: The Rise of an American Empire in the Middle East after World
War II (New York and London: The New Press, 2009). \William A. Eddy, F.D.R. Meets Ibn Saud. (New
York: American Friends of the Middle East, 1954). Thomas W. Lippman, Arabian Knight: Colonel Bill
Eddy USMC and the Rise of American Power in the Middle East (Portola St. Vista, CA: Selwa Press,
2008). Simon Ball, Bitter Sea: The Brutal World War II Fight for the Mediterranean (New York:
HarperPress, 2010). Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1968). T. Charles Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper, 1952).
Harold Macmillan, War Diaries: Politics and War in the Mediterranean, January 1943—May 1945 (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984). Matthew Jones, Britain, the United States, and the Mediterranean War
1942—1944 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). Robert S. Ehlers, Jr., The Mediterranean Air War:
Airpower and Allied Victory in World War II (Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 2015).
Ian Playfair et al, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol. 1, The Early Successes against Italy (to May
1941) (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1954). Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World
War to Cold War, 1939-1953 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006). Anthony Cave Brown (ed.),
(New York: Berkley Medallion Books, 1976). Benjamin Shwadran, (New York and Toronto: John Wiley &
Sons, and Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973). Bruce Robellet Kuniholm, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1980). David S. Painter, Oil and the American Century: The Political Economy of U.S.
Foreign Policy, 1941—1954 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). Mark A. Stoller, (Stoler
2000)(Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000). C. Sykes: Crossroads to
Israel, (London: Collins, 1965); Bartley C. Crum, Behind The Silken Curtain: A Personal Account of
Anglo-American Diplomacy in Palestine and the Middle East (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947);
Halford L. Hoskins, The Middle East Area in World Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1954); William
Appleman Williams. America and the Middle East: Open Door Imperialism or Enlightened Leadership?
4
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The Eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand, has typically been the subject only
of specific studies in the context of the war in Greece and such strategic islands as Crete
and Rhodes, the defeat of Italian and German armies in Egypt, the British suppression of
the Vichy French colonial government in the Levant and the Axis-inspired coup in
Syria, 5 the British-initiated Middle East Supply Center 6, and the growing troubles
between Zionist and Arab nationalists and the British in Palestine. In the interior of the
Middle East beyond the Mediterranean coast, the focus has been on the British invasion
of Iraq and the British-Soviet Russian invasions of Iran, the development of the Persian
Corridor supply line to the Russian Front, 7 and the early hesitant but growing American
commitment to Saudi Arabia and access to its oil.8 The activities of the U.S. State
Department of State and British and American intelligence services in the Middle East

(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958); Leonard Mosley ((Baltimore: Penguin, 1973); Harold
Philby, Arabian Jubilee (New York: Day, 1953) (Philby, Saudi Arabia 1955) and Saudi Arabia (London: E.
Benn, 1955); George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York:, Capricorn, 1965); Karl S. Twitchell,
Saudi Arabia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947); Elizabeth Monroe, Britain’s Moment in the
Middle East (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1963); William Polk, The United States and the
Arab World (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965 ); George Kirk, A Short History of
the Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1958); B. Halpern, The Idea of a Jewish State (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961); and William R. Polk, Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle
for Palestine (Boston: Beacon. 1957); J. Parkes, Whose Land? A History of the Peoples of Palestine
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1970).
See, for example: Martin W. Wilmington, The Middle East Supply Center (Albany: State University of
New York Press, 1971).

6

See, for example: T.H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (Washington D.C.: Office of
the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952).
7

8 See,

for example: Irvine H. Anderson, Aramco, The United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the
Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933—1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). Michael B.
Stoff, The United States, and Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Dynamics of Foreign Oil Policy, 1933—1950
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1980). Michael T. Klare, Blood and Oil: The Dangers and
Consequences of America’s Growing Petroleum Dependency (New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt
and Company, 2004).
7

during the war have been mostly viewed in the context of those specific agencies and the
Cold War and the growing foreign oil dependency that followed World War II. 9
How these seemingly diverse stories fit together in Washington’s evolving global
grand strategy for postwar foreign trade and investment policy and global hegemony, as
well as the key role of secret intelligence in this evolution, has yet to be fully explored by
American historians. The increasing difficulty in getting the release by the intelligence
community of what may be crucial documents in the National Archives has alone been a
major obstacle for the development of primary and secondary sources in this regard. Even
the Department of Commerce, responding to a request on information on postwar
commerce between the U.S. and Lebanon and Syria, wrote that the Department’s
classification review of its documents relating to trade and investment by Americans in
these two countries from 1945 to 1948 would take “at least three years.” 10 Finally, there
is the difficulty posed by President Roosevelt’s opaque practice of usually forbidding any
notes to be taken during his meetings, except for formal international conference records,
formal minutes taken by the military at his meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
press statements. Historians have therefore had to rely on the memoranda, memoirs and
personal diaries of other participants in those meetings. The result has been the occasion
for contradictory judgements in scholarly works about Roosevelt’s decisiveness and

See, for example, Phillip J. Baram, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1978). Edward J.
Sheehy, The U.S. Navy, the Mediterranean, and the Cold War, 1945—1947 (Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press, 1992). (Reynolds, Kimball and and Chubarian 1994) (C. T. Smith 2014), Allies At War: The Soviet,
British, and American Experience, 1939-1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994).
9

10
Letter, Carrie Tallichet Smith, Archivist, Special Access and FOIA, National Records Administration, to
Gerard Colby, August 6, 2014, Re: Freedom of Information Act Request RD 43768. On October 30, 2018,
this request, according to archivist Hartman, had still not been processed. As of October 5, 2019, this FOIA
request has remained unprocessed. Recently, however, the document was totally declassified in 2019 at the
request of Ms. Dennett.

8

intentions. 11 For example, Mark M. Lowenthal in volume I of his two-volume Leadership
And Indecision: American War Planning and Policy Process 1937—1942 (1988) is
particularly critical of Roosevelt's alleged lack of decisiveness on a fundamental and
comprehensive policy direction for war preparations in 1940-41. Some later studies in the
following two decades took an opposite view. Steven Casey, for example, in his Cautious
Crusade: Franklin D Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War against Nazi
Germany (2001), argues that Roosevelt, aware of strong antiwar sentiment among the
public as the November 1940 elections approached, was politically very wise to be
cautious because of the strong anti-war emotions among the public that was reflected in
Congress.
Leading up to the elections in November 1940, Roosevelt let most of the battle for
public opinion on military aid to Britain and the initiation of a peacetime draft to be
mostly carried by others who were counselling the administration from outside the White
House, particularly the pro-preparedness groups that emerged out of the War and Peace
Studies participants in the Council on Foreign Relations (particularly the Century Group)
and such Republican allies as journalist William Allen White and the former 1932
Republican nominee for the New York governorship, war hero William “Wild Bill”
Donovan. Roosevelt’s view, no doubt schooled by the lesson of Woodrow Wilson’s
failure to involve Republican leaders in decision-making or to win enough public support
for the League of Nations before seeking Senate confirmation, was that public opinion

See, for example: Mark M. Lowenthal, Leadership And Indecision: American War Planning and Policy
Process 1937—1942, (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1988), volume 2, pp. 621-629.
Steven Casey, Cautious Crusade: Franklin D Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War against Nazi
Germany (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin
Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991).
11

9

was the bedrock of sound public policy in a democracy, requiring careful nudging of
public opinion to change before a president could change public policy.
Warren Kimball, in his The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman
(1991) takes this further, contending that rather than alleged weak leadership, Roosevelt
showed exemplary strong leadership in a democracy, proclaiming his sincere
commitment to try to avoid war, while heeding his presidential duty to make sure
America was prepared for it. In 1940, he appointed respected Republican critics to the
war-making offices of his cabinet, quietly built up the Army’s potential, redeployed the
Pacific fleet from its base in Portland, Oregon over 1,000 miles westward into the Pacific
to Hawaii’s Pearl Harbor, negotiated with the British for U.S. bases in the Caribbean to
protect the South Atlantic gateway to the Western Hemisphere, and, after Denmark’s fall
to the Germans, as the nation ventured into the growingly perilous year of 1941, prepared
to make an extraordinary extension of the Monroe Doctrine by U.S. armed occupation of
Iceland and Greenland to protect the northeast Atlantic gate to North America.

These

actions, culminating in his secret meeting in Newfoundland in August 1941 with British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill to draft an Atlantic Charter on mutual goals and to
agree on a “Germany First” strategy, evidenced not only clever political maneuvering but
also a foreign policy consistent in purpose: preparations for confronting Germany and
Japan with a “Germany first” priority for victory that revealed a presidential Grand
Strategy in evolution. In Chapter Three of this thesis, this will be explored further in
historical context as it ultimately impacted on his incorporation of the Middle East into
his wartime and postwar plans. Nevertheless, the image of Franklin D. Roosevelt as an

10

enigma or “sphinx”, as some contemporary journalists claimed, is not without reason,
since Roosevelt himself chose a political style that was not transparent.
Accordingly, besides cited secondary sources including the very brief (147 pages)
and only biography of William Culbertson by J. Richard Snyder (William S. Culbertson:
In Search of a Rendezvous (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, 1980) as well
as such standard biographical sources as various editions of Who’s Who in America, the
Biographical Register of the State Department, this thesis has had to rely upon primary
documentation from the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress, particularly the
papers of Lt. Col. William S. Culbertson, a leading G-2 and OSS analyst and ambassador
in charge of the 1944 Special Economic Mission to the Middle East seeking opportunities
for postwar investment and markets for American corporations; Cordell Hull, Secretary
of State who led the fight for free trade against British and French imperial trade and
investment discriminations; James Landis, Director of Lend-Lease in the Middle East
from 1943 to the beginning of 1945 who wrote a blueprint for Roosevelt’s policy in the
Middle East and tightened the squeeze on British control of the Middle East; Edward
Stettinius, former board member of J.P. Morgan & Company and U.S. Steel and
President Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease Administrator who became Undersecretary of State
and Secretary of State during World War II; Loy Henderson, former chief of the State
Department’s Eastern European Division who became President Roosevelt’s Ambassador
to Iraq and then Chief of the State Department’s Near East and Africa Division; William
Averell Harriman, President Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease facilitator who oversaw the
modernizing of the Trans-Iranian Railroad with his Union Pacific engineers to open the
Persian Corridor Lend-Lease supply line to beleaguered Soviet Russia; and James
11

Forrestal, Undersecretary of the Navy who, with Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, pushed
for U.S. ownership of the Saudi Arabia’s oil fields and a pipeline to the Mediterranean to
supply fuel for postwar Europe).
At the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland, the following record
groups were invaluable: RG59, the State Department’s Decimal files, Consulate records,
and Harry Notter’s Lot File on postwar studies; RG 169, the records of the Foreign
Economic Administration, which after 1943 took over administration of Lend-Lease;
RG165, the records of the Military Intelligence Division of the United States Army,
where William Culbertson was Chief of the Geopolitical (later Plans and Analysis)
Section of G-2; RG226 , the records of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which
expanded intelligence operations in the Middle East in 1943-45, exactly when the Axis
threat to the region was already passed, and the records of its powerful Strategic Planning
Group (on which Culbertson sat as an active observer), including the diary of James
Grafton Rogers, its Chair; RG648, the records of the Department of Interior and RG659,
its Petroleum Administration Lot Files, and the Office of the Petroleum Coordinator for
War (headed by Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes and his deputy, former Standard Oil of
California executive Ralph Davies); and the records of U.S. Naval Intelligence (which
was, before the OSS and Roosevelt’s use of Robert Murphy’s consulates to Vichy
France, the major U.S. foreign intelligence service in the French Levant, Palestine, and
North Africa) at the start of World War II.
Also very useful were records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park,
New York, including Franklin Roosevelt’s Personal files (particularly his business files),
his Official files as Assistant Secretary of Navy during World War I, his records as
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President during World War II, including the President’s Official, Secretary,
Confidential, Safe and Map Room files as they related to the Eastern Mediterranean and
the Middle East, and President Roosevelt’s papers on the Foreign Economic
Administration (FEA), including the papers of FEA legal counsel Oscar Cox and
Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Dean Acheson; the diary of Secretary of
War Henry Stimson, and the papers, including diaries, of Assistant Secretary of State
Adolph Berle (Roosevelt’s troubleshooter and constructor of the State Department’s
Intelligence Bureau) and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
At the Special Manuscripts collections of the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library
of Princeton University, especially helpful were the personal papers of OSS operative
Col. William Eddy, the first resident U.S. Minister to Saudi Arabia; of Johns Hopkins
University Professor Edward Mead Earle, an early scholar of the German penetration of
the Middle East 12 and a founder of National Security Studies and an active member of the

12
Edward Mead Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism, New
York: Macmillan, 1923). This book earned Earle an assistant professorship at Columbia University. A review
of his contributions by David Ekbladh in International Security International Strategy noted that “The book’s
scope still impresses today. Deploying German, French, and English sources, it explored the collision of
British, French, German, Ottoman, and Russian interests in the construction of a strategically vital railway
through the Middle East. Rather than depicting it as the pure product of ambitious statesmen or national
ambitions, the book acknowledged that the demand for the railroad sprang from the needs of modern
industrial societies and their urges for markets, raw materials, and influence.
In this, Earle’s work acknowledged that world affairs were influenced by a multiplicity of
interlocking actors. The politics of the railroad drew in industry, financiers, the media, religious groups, and
the public. The forces unleashed played out on a struggling Ottoman Empire, itself eagerly seeking to
modernize… The book is critical of imperial competition and the tensions it in-spires. Earle saw history
replaying itself as the United States extended its own commercial, diplomatic, and military interests in the
former Ottoman Empire. He feared that such commitments would invariably become a “menace...[if]they
should lead republican America in the footsteps of imperial Germany.” Over the next decade, a staple view
of Earle’s writing was that unwarranted and ill-considered policies seeking commercial gain and control of
raw materials would eventually lead the United States to grief.” David Ekbladh, “Present at the Creation:
Edward Mead Earle and the Depression-Era Origins of Security Studies,” International Security, Vol. 36,
No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), p. 112. Ekbladh’s quote of Earle on his concern about the prospects for the American
republic if it continues to follow the road of imperialism is drawn from Edward Mead Earle, “The Outlook
for American Imperialism,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 108 (July
1923), pp. 104–107; and The New York Times, May 14, 1926.
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Council on Foreign Relations and collaborator with Culbertson in G-2’s seminars; of Karl
Twitchell, mining surveyor and agriculturist who worked on behalf of Arabist Charles
Crane (previously of President Wilson’s King-Crane Commission to the Middle East)
and led the first U.S. agricultural mission to Saudi Arabia; the records of the Council on
Foreign Relations, including its War and Peace Studies Project and its leaders’ influence
on President Roosevelt and on the State Department’s own Postwar Studies and Planning
Program.
At the Army War College at Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the papers of OSS Director
William J. Donovan were important in examining the National Archives’ OSS records
from the Director’s perspective as well as providing some news sources on Siberia during
his special intelligence mission there for President Wilson in 1919 and his tour of the
Ethiopian-Italian battlefields in 1936.
Also used as sources of study and/or citation from previous research at the
Rockefeller Archives Center at Tarrytown, New York; at the Harry S. Truman Library in
Missouri; at the British National Archives (formerly, the Public Record Office) in
London, particularly the Middle East records of MI-6’s Special Operations Executive
(SOE) and double agent Kim Philby’s activities in MI-6’s Section IX covering Soviet
clandestine operations in the Iberian Peninsula and Turkey, including his subsequent
posting to Turkey and covert running of intelligence operations into Lebanon ; and the
records of the wartime Minister of State for the Mediterranean (Harold Macmillan). At
Cambridge University the papers of Prime Minister Winston Churchill were also perused,
as, at the Middle East Centre at St. Anthony College, Oxford University, were the papers
of Harold St. John Philby, former British intelligence officer in the Arab Bureau, father
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of Kim Philby, and the confidant of Saudi Arabia’s King Ibn Sa’ud (formally Abdulaziz
ibn Abdul Rahman ibn Faisal ibn Turki ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad Al Saud and
known throughout Arab lands as Abdulaziz and in the West as Ibn Saud; hereafter, Ibn
Saud will be used), who awarded Standard Oil of California its original Saudi oil
concession, warily accepted Nazi Germany’s courtship, and successfully played the
Allies against each other to pressure the Roosevelt administration for more aid for his
rule over his non-combatant but potentially unstable oil-rich nation.
Finally, the archives of Standard Oil of California (Socal), since relocated to San
Francisco, were also previously examined for internal company memoranda on Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia, its affiliation with Dillon Read investment banker James Forestall in
the 1936 merger with Texaco to market Saudi oil, the internal power struggle over the
company’s presidency between Vice President Ralph Davies and company officials who
had worked in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and the involvement in this struggle of Socal’s
largest stockholder, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and his secret briefing on Saudi oil in 1943
by his private attorney, Thomas Debevoise.
These sources are too diverse—and in the case of Franklin Roosevelt, too
opaque—to readily offer a means of effectively linking together the diplomatic,
economic, foreign trade, geopolitical and strategic military factors involved in the
unprecedented U.S. penetration of the Middle East during World War II. Accordingly,
this thesis narrows: 1) the lead protagonist to an American economist, foreign trade
expert, diplomat, and wartime intelligence officer in the Pentagon’s Army General Staff
and the Office of Special Services (OSS), William S. Culbertson. 2) the geopolitical

15

focus to two countries—Lebanon and Saudi Arabia—that served as the most sustainable
and enduring foundations for this penetration.
With a PhD in economics and a Djur (Doctorate in Jurisprudence) from Yale, as
Vice Chairman of the U.S. Trade Commission, as a minister and an ambassador
appointed by two presidents to represent the United States abroad, and as author of three
major books on foreign trade and a practicing trade and trial lawyer and corporate
lobbyist in Washington D.C., Culbertson was uniquely positioned to be an active
participant in the evolving economic recovery and “free trade” policy debates that raged
through the 1920s, the 1930s, and the 1940s. These debates were primarily between
European empires with colonial trade walls and the United States seeking access to the
world’s raw materials and markets.
Culbertson was also deeply involved throughout this period in the debate within
the United States between trade advocates who wanted to continue the traditional
awarding of conditional “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) designations through bilateral
trade treaties approved by Congress, with each treaty’s adjustment requiring
Congressional reapproval, and trade advocates like Culbertson who wanted to initiate a
policy of awarding unconditional MFN designations through unilateral trade treaties.
Under a unilateral trade policy, a trade treaty, once approved by Congress, applied
automatically to all U.S. trade treaties and therefore did not necessarily require
Congressional reapproval for each treaty adjustment when the President, acting through
the State Department, exercised his power as chief executive to administer Congress’s
policy without recourse to or reapproval by Congress.
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Although the unconditional MFN unilateral trade policy eventually won the day,
the debate has continued to be relevant up to the present time, as are the threat of trade
wars and their possible escalation into military conflicts over trade routes such as the
Baltic Sea and the Dardanelles/Bosporus before and during World War I, the Suez Canal
during and after World War II, and more recently the Strait of Hurmuz (the Arabian Sea’s
narrow entrance into the Persian Gulf) and the South China Sea, with U.S. warships
confronting, respectively, Iranian gunboats and Chinese warplanes, warships and newly
constructed “island” military bases. These more recent military encounters reflect the
global reach of American corporate trade and the military might protecting that trade, a
global reach that during and after World War II extended far beyond what had been the
U.S.’s trade during the previous 170 years.
While the origins of this global reach have been the subject of many scholarly
studies and deserving of much more than this thesis can expound upon, the role of the
Middle East, and particularly the tie of oil pipeline linkage between Saudi Arabia and the
French Levant to the postwar industrial recovery of Western Europe and the
unprecedented expansion that contracted Middle East oil and oil-in-the-ground reserve
estimates gave to American loan collateral, has often been overlooked by scholars of the
period.
Through recounting the U.S.’s deepening involvement with Lebanon and Saudi
Arabia, and the leading role played by Culbertson in building the foundations of a
multilateral free trade policy for the United States at a critical time in American history,
as well as Culbertson’s contributions to America’s trade diplomacy and building its
military intelligence capacities and their integration into the formulation of foreign
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policy, this thesis will demonstrate how President Roosevelt’s evolving grand strategy to
win the war grew into a strategy to win the peace. The Middle East’s oil emerged as that
strategy’s keystone and Culbertson as its diplomatic and military advocate and an
architect of the application of the Open Door policy to the Middle East.

The overlooked importance of the contributions of William S. Culbertson to the
expansion of U.S. foreign trade and investment.
William S. Culbertson’s personal papers at the Library of Congress, combined
with his official reports as Chief of the Analysis Section of Army Intelligence, as a
leading OSS geopolitical and economic analyst, and as President Roosevelt’s Personal
Ambassador and Chief of the Special Economic Mission to North Africa and the Middle
East, allow researchers a rare opportunity to surmount many of the difficulties described
above. Culbertson’s career and writings offers insights into the ideology and socioeconomic priorities that guided American policymakers. As they shaped grand strategy in
World War II.
The Culbertson Mission in 1944 was the early exploration for applying in the
Middle East and French North Africa the United States’ postwar strategy for President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s projected new world order, gathering seemingly unrelated
threads of evolving policy and weaving them into a focus on the Middle East as the point
of confrontation with the old European colonial world order and the rising challenge of a
newly powerful Soviet Russia.
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Culbertson’s was the only official mission President Roosevelt sent to North
Africa and the Middle East with the specific objective of seeking out prospects for
American postwar trade and investments in the entire region. This went far beyond
previous U.S. government interventions on behalf of American bond creditors and
companies operating in Latin America or in support of American corporate access to
specific resources like Rumania’s oil or Chile’s nitrate and copper, both of which
Culbertson had championed as U.S. Ambassador to these countries during the Coolidge
and Hoover administrations. Middle East oil was now seen by the Roosevelt
administration as a vital keystone for a global grand strategy for U.S. postwar hegemony
that required a huge investment in the region’s infrastructure to support the corporate
investment not only in oil as a fuel for the American war machine, but Americancontrolled oil as fuel for Europe’s postwar industrial reconstruction and as a revenue
source for allied governments to generate the prosperity that hopefully would inoculate
Europe, the Middle East and the entire non-communist “free world” from the spread of
communism
Culbertson’s survey of prospects for the re-establishment of American “normal”
commercial trade and investments included meetings with the region’s top political and
commercial leaders, as well as with U.S. government and American corporate officials in
the field, and his reports brought their opinions directly to President Roosevelt and
Secretary of State Cordell Hull without their having to be filtered first through the State
Department’s many-layered bureaucracy. While mindful of State’s jealousies and what
this might mean for Culbertson’s success, Hull and Roosevelt picked Culbertson because
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of his vast experience in trade and financial diplomacy and military economic
intelligence:
1) As Vice Chair of the U.S. Foreign Trade Commission during and after
World War I, Culbertson had advocated the postwar restoration of U.S.
diplomatic and reformed trade relations with Germany and the nationstates that emerged from the dissected Austro-Hungarian Empire;
Culbertson assisted in drafting the Webb-Pomerene Act and was the
architect of a modern U.S. trade policy that would become the norm after
World War II: dropping the 19th century’s high inflexible tariffs to protect
agriculture and nascent industries and replacing them with flexible tariffs
that could be adjusted for the needs of a modern industrial society. In the
interim between the world wars, Culbertson was also the major promoter
of replacing the bilateral Conditional Most Favored Nation clause in trade
treaties with the multilateral Unconditional Most Favored Nation clause in
trade treaties that could be applied across all trade partners, a policy
keystone for the postwar global trade order under American corporate
hegemony.
2) As the former U.S. Minister to Rumania and Ambassador to Chile during
the Coolidge and Hoover administrations, respectively, Culbertson
successfully advocated for American oil (Standard Oil of New Jersey) and
mining (the Guggenheims’ Chilean Nitrate Company (COSACH))
corporations that were threatened with nationalization and preferential
trade restrictions. Instead of the gunboat diplomacy that produced rage,
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cynicism and seething resentments, Culbertson helped President Hoover in
his lean toward solving problems through diplomacy rather that military
interventions, paving the way for what would be called the “Good
Neighbor” policy of President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell
Hull, the same policy Roosevelt later took as a model for implementation
in the Middle East. Culbertson had exactly the kind of practical diplomatic
experience that Hull and Roosevelt wanted, having earned a sterling
public reputation for sensitivity toward host governments’ national
sentiments. Culbertson took this style of economic diplomacy to a new
level as a founder of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service,
reaching out through his teaching to the next generation of young
diplomats.
3) As chief legal counsel for the private National Foreign Trade Council of
the United States, the major trade association of American commercial
exporters, Culbertson helped turn the Council into a national coordinating
body for regional and municipal foreign trade councils across the United
States.
4) As an attorney for Standard Oil of New Jersey, Culbertson was firm in his
demand for compensation by Mexico for nationalizing Mexico’s oil
industry. His successful defense against the New Deal’s antitrust lawsuits
during the 1930s set the stage for President Roosevelt’s retreat and
suspension of anti-trust suits during World War II, as well as the
increasing propensity by postwar administrations to tread very lightly
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when it came to mergers and joint ventures of American oil companies
operating in the Middle East.
5) As one of the two top exports control officers in Roosevelt’s Office of
Emergency Preparedness, Culbertson had worked with Major General
Russell L. Maxwell (later wartime Commander-In-Chief of U.S. forces in
the Middle East) and Harvard Law School Dean James Landis to
incorporate military intelligence and defense needs into wartime trade
policies and controls.
6) As Deputy Chief and then Chief of the (Geopolitical) Analysis Section of
the U.S. Army’s Military Intelligence Division, Culbertson helped
modernize the Army’s intelligence analyses by incorporating global trade
economics and training the new Pentagon’s General Staff in foreign affairs
with a global economic perspective, including a seminar on Islamic
countries with distinguished National Security scholars and area experts.
7) As Chief of the Plans And Analysis section of the Office of Strategic
Services (a predecessor 13 of the Central Intelligence Agency), Culbertson
incorporated trade analysis in the espionage and counterintelligence
strategies and objectives of the United States government in responding to
the diplomatic and military strategies and economic needs and abilities of

13
The immediate predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency was the Central Intelligence Group,
established by President Truman in 1946. Among its key officers in Washington was a former top OSS officer
in North Africa and the Middle East and the immediate past U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Col. William
Eddy. Like Stephen Penrose in Cairo, Daniel Dennett in Beirut, and other OSS officers in the Middle East,
Eddy was the son of American Protestant missionaries to the region.
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foreign powers. His emphasis on a permanent body of civilian experts to
examine national security issues for the President was, as Assistant
Secretary of War John J. McCloy admitted at the time, far ahead of his
time.
As President Roosevelt’s Personal Ambassador and Chief of the U.S. Special
Economic Mission to the Middle East, Culbertson entered into the direct diplomacy with
Middle Eastern governments and occupying European powers that helped steer U.S.
policy toward openly backing American corporate penetration of the oil-rich region
controlled by the British and French Empires’ imperial preferential trade systems.
Culbertson’s economic, military intelligence and diplomatic background signified, even
more than the appointment of Harvard Law School Dean James Landis as head of the
region’s Lend-Lease administration based in Cairo, that President Roosevelt understood
that there was a vital military and intelligence component in his incorporation of the
Middle East into a grand strategy that stretched beyond the world war to a new global
world order. This new global order would be based not on the old imperial closed trade
systems, but on global application of the Open Door policy’s “free trade” that, because of
the United States’ intact and unscathed newly modernized industries, would become the
instrument of a global American economic hegemony.
Finally, Culbertson, the son of a Midwestern farmer/dentist, personified a nation
in transition to more secular values informed by science and industry to become a modern
great global power. Culbertson recognized that because of the industrialization of the
American economy, foreign trade policy had to be modernized to accommodate the
greater need for foreign markets. He discerned that this need resulted from
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overproduction of industrial manufacturing and agribusinesses aggravated by
technological competition to improve productivity and the inability of effective demand
from the now-dominant wage system.
Culbertson was not alone in recognizing this need, but he was one of the most
persuasive and consistent voices spanning the thirty years between the late years (19121920) of the Progressive Era, the interim war years between 1920 and 1939, and the
World War II period that set the stage for the postwar world order. Equally important,
Culbertson’s grasp of economic history was complemented by his study of Alexander
Hamilton. Hamilton, Culbertson observed, made vital contributions to the founding of the
United States as a society resting initially on mercantile practices that needed a
deliberately designed strong centralized federal state that could facilitate the emergence
of a capitalist order which would later evolve into the modern corporate state Culbertson
served. As such, Culbertson’s career, culminating in the Economic Mission to the
Middle East, offers a rich source into not only the transition from the Progressive Era’s
growing commitment to paralleling domestic reforms with increasing reliance on foreign
trade expansion to resolve domestic economic, social and political crises, but also into
the very particular origins of what is too often taken as a universal in foreign policy: the
success of “the American way of life.”
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Saudi Arabia and the French Levant as Foundations of Regional Analysis
The choice of emphasizing Saudi Arabia and the French Levant 14 (now Lebanon
and Syria), the territories in the Eastern Mediterranean awarded to France by the League
of Nations, as the crucial foundations for a regional analysis of U.S. involvement in the
Middle East during the Roosevelt administration is not to deny but to explain the
interconnectedness of nations within the Middle East region. This interconnectedness was
manifested empirically in both Saudi Arabia and the Levant on many levels: in politics
through interest groups, parties and local and regional political goals, treaties and military
pacts and the more clandestine influences of foreign espionage; in economics through
commercial trade, correspondent private banking and regional and international credit
institutions, resources procurement and economic development projects such as transnational road linkages and railroads, harbor construction and improvements, and the
construction of canals, hydroelectric dams, and oil pipelines; in populations through
cross-border family ties, tribal cultures, kinships and personal loyalties; through
demographic changes caused by human migrations, both seasonal for Bedouin tribes and
massive permanent population dislocations caused by wars and economic development
projects; through business and trade and labor associations; through religious
affiliations and trans-national pilgrimages to holy cities and shrines; through education in

The term Levant can be traced back to medieval Venetian merchants who referred to the lands on the
Mediterranean east of Venice as the “Levante”, the Italian word for “rising”, meaning where the sun rises in
the east. Over the centuries it was narrowed to mean the Ottoman Empire’s lands south of Turkey’s Taurus
Mountains and north of the Arabian Peninsula, bounded on the west by the Mediterranean Sea and on the
east by Mesopotamia (today, Iraq) and the Arabian desert. Encompassing Ottoman Syria (which included
today’s Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Israel, and Jordan), these lands were divided up after World War I by
victorious France and Britain as “mandates” by the League of Nations, ostensibly to prepare them for eventual
self-governance. For the purposes of this thesis, the term Levant is employed to its narrowest meaning in
modern times, encompassing only Lebanon and Syria.
14
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mosques, state-sponsored schools, French colonial Catholic universities like Saint Joseph
University in Beirut, Maronite Christian schools, Greek Catholic and Orthodox Christian
schools, Armenian Catholic and Orthodox Christian schools, Druse village schools, and
the renown American Protestant universities system in Beirut, Istanbul, Cairo, and
Teheran that were sponsored originally by American religious denominations and funded
by various elite American institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mobil
Oil (Standard Oil of New York) Foundation. 15
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to adequately analyze each of these factors in
the entire Middle East Theater of World War II. Even Lebanon and Saudi Arabia posed
great difficulties, but because of their emergence as anchors of American investment
plans in the Middle East, with their postwar economic prospects literally linked by the
planned trans-Arabian pipeline to bring Saudi oil to postwar Europe, the French Levant
and Saudi Arabia offer unique opportunities to understand how U.S. policy toward the
Middle East evolved and sharpened into a strong commitment outside the usual focus on
the Arab-Israeli conflict.

See, for example, Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on
American Foreign Policy, 1810—1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971). The largesse by
the Rockefeller family’s foundations to American institutions in the Middle East (including the American
University of Beirut), can be found at the Rockefeller Archive Center at Tarrytown, New York. Interestingly
enough, a $100,000 gift to the (Northern) Congregational Mission Society by John D. Rockefeller, Sr.,
solicited for the American College for Women of Constantinople (Istanbul) by one of its missionary nurses,
Elizabeth Redfern of Massachusetts, became the source of scandal in 1905 when critics of Rockefeller’s
notorious business practices, led by Rev. Washington Gladden of the Social Gospel movement, denounced
the gift as “tainted money.” (See Washington Gladden, The New Idolatry and Other Discussions
(New York: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1905). After World War I, Rockefeller also donated to relief
organizations in Syria and Armenia. During my research in Istanbul in 2005, I photographed a plaque
commemorating the Mobil Oil Foundation’s gift to the American College for Women. Redfern was the
grandmother of my spouse and book collaborator, Charlotte Dennett, and mother of Dr. Daniel C. Dennett,
Harvard-educated Arabist, instructor at the American University of Beirut in the early 1930s, and later chief
of Counterespionage for the O.S.S.’s X-2 Division in wartime Beirut.
15
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Because of William Culbertson’s unique background and his wartime efforts to
bring U.S. intelligence agencies into direct service for advancing and protecting postwar
corporate expansion in the Middle East, this diplomat/soldier’s career brings together
many of the instruments that would be advanced to overcome the obstacles facing that
expansion –especially in the region whose oil would become the fuel for West European
capitalism’s industrial reconstruction and recovery, the economic basis of the successful
“containment strategy” against the Soviets’ command economy and postwar military
might.

The Application of the Culbertson Diplomatic Career to the Middle East in Postwar U.S.
Global Grand Strategy.
William S. Culbertson, in his diplomatic and military career, offers insight into
how a private commercial venture by Standard Oil of California (Socal, now known as
Chevron) and the Texas Company (Texaco, now a subsidiary of Chevron) into a strong
military foundation during the war for American diplomatic and espionage endeavors in
the Middle East in pursuit of the expanding goals and objectives of the Roosevelt
Administration’s evolving global grand strategy. Culbertson was a respected
international trade expert and a founder and professor of diplomacy at Georgetown
University’s School of Foreign Service, where he trained young scholars and diplomats
in the rigors of trade reciprocity negotiations to achieve goals vital to U.S. foreign policy.
Later, during the war, Culbertson added economic expertise in military intelligence while
serving as chief of plans in G-2 (U.S. Army Intelligence) and in espionage and research
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and analysis while serving in the Plans Section of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
a precursor of the present Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Culbertson’s career spanned the modernizing era of both the corporate age and
U.S. foreign trade policy. Moreover, because of his vital contribution to the creation of an
unconditional and multilateral Most Favored Nation trade policy with an integration of
intelligence more attuned to the needs of building a global economic empire,
Culbertson’s career helped to turn into reality Franklin Roosevelt’s vision of a postwar
new world order under U.S. hegemony. This thesis argues that that new order, not peace
per se, was the primary goal without which, Roosevelt believed, peace could not be
maintained.
This thesis is primarily and foremost a diplomatic history, but diplomatic history
must also consider what factors from the past influenced the development of U.S.
diplomacy. The exposition of these factors, however, are arranged chronologically in the
chapters to avoid jumps into the future that can be used to provide misleading hindsight
rationales for conclusions already made. This thesis is set mainly within a certain time
frame, from the latter years of the Progressive era to World War II. Yet, factors before
World War I created cultural and institutional values among the American corporate elite
(particularly those in the postwar exclusive Council on Foreign Relations, of which
Culbertson was a member) who advocated a deeper commitment to globalism in
American credit for foreign trade and military capacity, as well as an international
institutional framework within which to seek mutual security. As the views of this elite
were very relevant to contributions by William Culbertson and his colleagues during
World War II, as were the economic and political factors before and during the interim
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years between World War I and World War II, this thesis reviews relevant political
history, economic history, and military history.
By relevant, it is not meant to suggest that all factors have equal weight as key
factors that have a decisive importance for the period under study. To avoid jumps into
the future that can be used to mistakenly provide hindsight from conclusions already
made as to the supposed trajectory of events, the exposition of factors in this thesis is
arranged chronologically in the chapters, letting them emerge as they were experienced in
the real world and analyzed in their historical context. It is the job of the historian to
identify and examine all relevant factors, and to decide what factors can be derived as
relevant or even causative to the development of discerned general trends. Sometimes in
the study of any history an historian may discern a qualitative turning point and search
for those contributing factors that led to this turn that have been consistently present in
the past or are factors that were not consistently present in the past or not present at all,
although the latter, with the exception of disruptive natural phenomena, are typically rare
and often the result of chance or unexpected and spontaneous volition by influential and
powerful individuals or groups. Causality and chance both play their roles in human
history.
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Chapter One
The Culbertson Evolution: Resolving the Conflict between Conscience and
the Need for Recognition in Constructing a Self-Identity.
The life of William Culbertson had both consistent and contradictory elements in
the development of his economic and political philosophies. Originally from rural
western Pennsylvania, the Culbertson family, like many suffering from what was then
America’s worse economic depression since 1893, migrated in a covered wagon across
the prairies as far as the front range of the Colorado Rockies looking in vain for cheap
land. But the western frontier’s free and cheap land was already gone. Exhausted and
facing a blizzard amid the father’s relapse with consumption, they turned back along the
Arkansas River to the Syracuse River into Kansas, settling in 1897 in Long Island,
Kansas. Here they hoped to find a cure in Kansas’s dry air for the father’s consumption.
George Culberson had caught tuberculosis from Pennsylvania’s polluting coal mining
boom that made coke for the state’s growing steel industry. Kansas’s dry air enabled
George to recover and turned to cattle speculation out of a rented feedlot. With the
economic recovery finally underway by 1899, George prospered and for $1000 bought a
farm on the Elk Creek just north of the town.
Named for his paternal grandfather, William S. Culbertson was the eldest son of
four boys born to Sarah and George Culbertson. The father and mother were ambitious
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for all their four sons, exposed them to works by such writers as Longfellow, 16
encouraged visits to the local library and gave William a Christmas subscription to
Harper’s Round Table. True to their Scotch Presbyterian traditions, they instilled in all
their children the Calvinist belief that Christian faith and hard work would be rewarded
with spiritual growth and temporal success. But the incompetence of local medical
practitioners rendered a hard blow to the family when ten year-old Robert died after an
operation for acute appendicitis.
Although slight of build and afflicted by childhood stuttering and a series of
diseases then plaguing America—rheumatic fever, scarlet fever and exposure to polio and
pollution from western Pennsylvania’s coal mines and steel factories—young Culbertson
did not retreat behind books but adopted a relentless drive for recognition through
scholarship and sports, becoming quarterback of the football team of Emporia College, a
nearby Presbyterian college whose library was donated by Pennsylvania’s steel magnate
Andrew Carnegie. There, between studies of Greek and Latin, algebra, zoology, rhetoric
and participation in debate, he read romanticized fiction of heroes like Scott’s Ivanhoe as
well as such calls for tolerance and social justice as Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter
and Victor Hugo’s Les Misérables. He culturally absorbed the racism of white skin
privilege, including the belief that “race mixing” undermined Anglo-Saxon civilization,
as argued by Thomas Dixon in Leopard Spots. 17 His biographer J. Richard Snyder quotes

Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, an accomplished early nineteenth century American poet, was, like his
Harvard colleagues George Bancroft, Francis Parkman, Edward Everett, William H. Prescott and George
Perkins Marsh, all strong believers in Americans’ “Manifest Destiny” and the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon
“race”. See Reginald Horseman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial AngloSaxonism (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 182-183; 226.
16
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Culbertson as liking Dixon’s Leopard Spots because “it defends Anglo-Saxon civilization
against the mulatto or the mixing of negro and white blood.” Later, as editor of
Emporia’s college newspaper, he defended the enrollment of a black student from
criticism by “men from the South.” His growing progressivism, albeit paternalistic in this
case, nevertheless was consistent with Northern progressives’ support for Booker T.
Washington’s emphasis on the benefits to both blacks and whites of black education for
modern American society. It was a view shared by Northern corporate philanthropists
such as John D. Rockefeller and his abolitionist wife Laura Spelman Rockefeller, after
whom the Rockefeller-endowed Spelman College, founded in Atlanta in 1881 as a
Baptist seminary for black females, is named. Culbertson taught Sunday School and
became active in the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) led by Rockefeller
associate John Mott, but his determination to succeed by hard work would not allow him
to accept Calvin and Knox’s doctrine of predestination.
Eventually he came to the conviction that religious dogma got in the way of his
personal interpretation of the meaning of Christ’s life and teachings, what has been
traditionally described by Snyder as his “personal relation” with Christ. 18 Worried about
where all this was leading his soul, he attended Christian revivals and read works by
Mott’s modernist colleague Robert Speer, entertaining briefly thoughts of pursuing a
career as a missionary. But by 1904 his combined talent for writing, personal ambition,
and Social Gospel mission to better the world had led him to the editorship of the campus
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William S. Culbertson to George Culbertson (father), Aug. 30, 1908; William S. Culbertson to George
and Sarah Culbertson (parents), August16, 1908, Diary, Aug. 16, Sept 10, 12, 14, 1908; William S.
Culbertson to George and Sarah Culbertson, Sept. 10, 14, 1908. Culbertson Papers, Library of Congress.
Quoted and cited also in J. Richard Snyder, In Search of a Rendezvous, op. cit., p. 6; n19, p. 128.
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newspaper, College Life, and then to the offices of William Allen White, 19 the famed 20
editor of the Emporia Gazette, to get some newspaper experience. The experience he got,
however, was at first in the hard knocks of business: the revered White demanded that his
printing press should get the College Life’s business, a demand to which Culbertson
acquiesced. Personal ambition had won out over the Christian scruples he suffered over
this monopolist demand by White. Whatever bitterness he may have felt he suppressed
for the opportunities White’s patronage gave him.
Succeeding in college debates brought Culbertson some measure of fame for the
first time, and to prepare for the national college debating championship, he traveled to
Rockefeller’s new University of Chicago to study elocution to fight his stuttering. His
oration, Americanism, argued for Americans as God’s Chosen People to lead a secular
mission to uplift the world from anarchy and the destructiveness of war. This position, his
biographer noted, chimed with the current political orthodoxy of President Theodore
Roosevelt’s policies of Caribbean domination; i.e. U.S. imperialism, despite its
beginnings as a clearly colonial imperative in the Caribbean Basin and the Pacific islands,
is driven by the structural dynamics of the private marketplace to resolve the
contradiction between production of goods and services, with productivity constantly
spurred by competition, and the capacity of wage-earners to purchase and thereby
complete the realization of value that generates a profit level worthy of investment. The

William Allen White and literary historian Vernon Louis Parrington, who won the Pulitzer Prize in 1928
for his enormously influential Main Currents in American Thought, were among Emporia College’s first 100
graduates.
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resolution of the contradiction was only partly and inadequately provided by the reforms
of the Progressive movement which was personified by Theodore Roosevelt; deciding to
avoid deep social, economic and political structural changes that were too inconvenient to
political reformers, yet seeking to avoid the expense of colonial administration and a
large standing army and navy, they focused on economic and commercial expansion
rather than territorial expansion. In doing so, the old cumbersome laissez faire system
gave birth to a more efficient and consolidated corporate system that soon shed its
colonial trappings. Led by Progressive corporate reformers, the new imperialism emerges
as a liberal project.
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–
1783 (1890) and Wisconsin University historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s essay "The
Significance of the Frontier in American History" (1893) (advocating a “Frontier Thesis”
for American exceptionalism), together had an enormous impact on American
contemporary political thought, as it had on U.S. presidents and leaders of both major
parties throughout the 20th Century from Theodore Roosevelt to John F. Kennedy. To
ensure the domestic prosperity that had been threatened by the closing of the American
western frontier of free land and the crippling Depression of 1893 that had almost ruined
his father, Culbertson argued that progressive reforms and prosperity could resolve the
social tensions between classes that had been growing since the post-Civil War
industrialization and its Gilded Age of the new corporate elite’s extravagant balls, giant
yachts, and enormous “summer cottage” mansions at Newport, Rhode Island and other
seasonal gatherings of celebrated “high society”.
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Emerging from his stint at the Lincoln White House into a career with the
Pullman company’s railroad expansion, by the late 1890s Secretary of State John Hay’s
prescription for maintaining and growing domestic prosperity was the Open Door Policy.
This policy was not merely a continuation of traditional efforts to open and ensure access
to foreign markets such as Jefferson’s war on the Barbary States of North Africa to
secure access to Mediterranean trade, or Commodore Matthew Perry’s warships
“opening” Japan’s harbors to American trade in 1854. 21 Hay, by inserting the U.S.
Government between China and European powers and Japan seeking spheres of influence
through seizing Chinese territories, was venturing into a new diplomacy beyond the
Monroe Doctrine’s focus on Latin America and the Caribbean. It was more in keeping
with the American drive into the Pacific through the annexation of Hawaii (with the help
of American missionaries and fruit plantation owners) and McKinley’s supposedly Godinspired seizure of the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific—including the
crippling of the fledging independence movements of Puerto Rico and the Philippines by
brute force of arms and, in the case of hapless Cuba, by inserting the Platt Amendment in
the Peace Treaty authorizing U.S. military intervention to prevent Cuba from straying
from its obligations to Wall Street’s bonded dictates, all proudly symbolized by the

Commodore Matthew Perry had fought in the War of 1812 and the Mexican-American War. His use of
warships to secure Japanese signing of the Convention of Kanagawa for trading was followed up by a similar
naval expedition to Japan by Captain Samuel Francis Du Pont, whose career included sailing on U.S.
warships to the Caribbean, Brazil, the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Mexico, India, Arabia and China, mostly
as a display of American naval power backing foreign trade. He was also a Mexican-American War veteran
who transported General Fremont’s troops to capture San Diego, which earned him promotion as commander
of the naval blockade of California and northern Mexico. In the 1850s Du Pont was briefly commandant of
the Naval Academy at Annapolis, where he helped modernize naval instructions by emphasizing engineering
studies that would be crucial later in the Union’s blockade of the Southern Confederacy. His father, Victor
du Pont de Nemours, was the brother of Éleuthère Irénée du Pont de Nemours, the founder of the munitions
firm, Du Pont Company. In 1859-60 Du Pont was among the three top naval officers assigned to escort the
Ambassador of Japan on a visit that is credited with opening Japan to American trade and investments.
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brilliant fireworks display of a map of “Our Empire” shining against Buffalo’s night sky
during President McKinley’s fatal visit.
McKinley’s last speech, advocating commercial expansion and delivered only a
few hours before his assassination, was the subject of close study by many scholars and
admiring students of foreign affairs in later years, including William Culbertson. 22 “By
sensible trade arrangement which will not interrupt our home production,” said
McKinley, “we shall extend the outlets for our increasing surplus. Our system which
provides a mutual exchange of commodities is manifestly essential to the continued and
healthful growth of our export trade. We must not repose in fancied security that we can
forever sell everything and buy little or nothing…. Reciprocity is the natural outgrowth of
our wonderful industrial development under the domestic policy now firmly
established…. The period of exclusiveness is past. The expansion of our trade and
commerce is the pressing problem….” 23
In seeking an understanding with Japan and the European powers active in East
Asia (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Czarist Russia) over access to China for
American trade and investment, Secretary of State John Hay was venturing near the
diplomatic boundary set since President Washington of avoiding “entangling alliances”
with European powers and practiced by Lincoln during the Civil War when Hay was his
private secretary. But the commercial impetus predated Hay’s “Open Door” Notes to the

Snyder, op. cit., p. 37. McKinley’s speech, first read by Culbertson at Yale, so impressed him that years
later he quoted from it in his 1937 book Reciprocity: A National Policy for Foreign Trade (pp. 163-164).
(Culbertson, Reciprocity: A National Poilicy for Foreign Trade 1937)
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Japanese and European powers set on dismembering China. By 1899 China was the
largest consumer of American cotton mills’ products in the world. Almost half of the
worth of America’s total cotton exports, $10,290,981 of its total $24,852,691, went to
China alone that year, making the United States second only to Britain in China’s
markets. Equally important to continuing the recovery from the grueling Depression of
1893 was the over 120 per cent increase in the annual value of these cotton exports
between 1887 and 1897, when English cotton goods exports to China had declined almost
14 per cent. 24
John Hay, while mindful of the importance of protecting American cultural
penetration advanced by Christian missionaries (his family had direct ties to the
missionary movement, his cousin, George Washburn, being the influential president of
Robert College in Istanbul 25), grasped the simple fact that the dismemberment of the

Charles S. Campbell, Jr., "American Business Interests and the Open Door in China," in Daniel M. Smith,
ed., Major Problems in American Diplomatic History: Documents and Readings, Volume II (Boston: D. C.
Heath And Company, 1964), p. 337.
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Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Foreign
Policy, 1810—1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 45. Robert College was
founded as a high school in Istanbul by Christopher Rhinelander Robert, a prosperous New York trader in
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Chinese Empire might well endanger American commercial interests These included the
growing American trade of its troublesome surpluses with the Chinese market,
particularly cotton textiles and Standard Oil’s kerosene for the “Lamps of China,” as well
as prospects for banks’ financing investments such as the East Asian railroads envisioned
by Union Pacific’s Edward H. Harriman. Indeed, the hefty lobbying pressure and public
propaganda campaign by the American-China Development Company played a
significant role in the impetus for Hay’s Open Door Notes. 26 Founded in 1895 for the
purpose of obtaining railway concessions, it was controlled through shares owned by
Edward Harriman, Rockefeller-in-law James Stillman, the president of National City
Bank, George F. Baker, president of the First National Bank of New York, J.P. Morgan’s
Charles Coster, Kuhn Loeb’s Jacob Schiff , Metropolitan Life Insurance Company’s G.
R. Hegeman, Central Trust Company of New York’s vice president Frederick P. Olcott,
Manhattan Trust Company president John I. Waterbury, and by two noteworthy
politicians, Levi P. Morton, former Governor of New York and Vice President of the
United States from 1889 to 1893 and now president of the Morton Trust Company, and
U.S. Senator Thomas Collier Platt, political boss of the New York Legislature. Platt, like
Morton, had promoted Theodore Roosevelt’s political rise and later followed John Hay’s

On the American China Development Company’s campaign for State Department support in China and
the origins of the “Open Door” notes and John Hay’s elevation to the office of Secretary of State, see the
Department of State’s statement of Sept. 6, 1899, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s reply of December 18–30,
1899, Hay's instructions to the U.S. ambassadors in London, Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and Rome, and to
the United States minister at Tokyo, of March 20, 1900; Hay’s Note to the Great Powers of July 3, 1900, pp.
508–512; Whitney Griswold, "Writing the Open Door Notes." The Far Eastern Policy of the United States
(New York: Harcourt, Brace And World, 1938), Pp. 61–65, 67–69, 74–76, 77–86; Charles S. Campbell, Jr.,
"American Business Interests and the Open Door in China," The Far Eastern Quarterly, I (1941), pp. 43–58.
All reproduced in Daniel M. Smith, ed., Major Problems in American Diplomatic History: Documents and
Readings, Volume II (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1964), pp. 317–346. (e. D. Smith 1964)
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“splendid little war” against Spain by limiting Cuba’s sovereignty with an amendment to
the peace treaty giving the U. S. government the “right” to militarily intervene if the new
Cuban government couldn’t keep its house in order and pay its debts to the New York
banks.
Fearing a return of the Great Depression of the 1890s, Washington pressed on for
American corporate access to foreign markets. Hay’s Open Door Policy had already been
expanded beyond China by presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt to
include the prizes of the Spanish American War: the Philippines, as the naval stepping
stone to the great market of China, and Caribbean Sea, where Spanish tobacco plantations
were increasingly being replaced by American sugar plantations. Likewise, U.S. naval
bases were established for Marine Corps details and coaling stations for the Caribbean
Squadron to protect American trade and corporate investments, including the site of
Roosevelt’s planned trans-ocean great canal, Panama, once it could be ripped from a
resistant Colombian sovereignty. (Roosevelt, who angrily called the Colombians
“contemptable little jackrabbits,” expressed similar dismay during compensation
negotiations before his death; Colombia was finally compensated with $20 million by the
Wilson administration in the 1920 treaty).
The founding of the Panama Canal Company of America in 1899, with a $15
million infusion of capital by J.P. Morgan and Company (over one third of its total initial
capitalization of $40 million), was a step in that direction orchestrated by Levi P. Morton,
Kuhn Loeb and Company, August Belmont, and William Nelson Cromwell’s law office,
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the powerful Sullivan & Cromwell law firm of Wall Street fame. 27 In fact, the declaration
of independence and constitution were drafted at the office of Wall Street’s James
Seligman, and even the original Macy Department’s silk flag of the new Panama
Republic was sewn together at Seligman’s New York summer estate. Seligman was the
son of Jesse Seligman of Seligman & Company, the major commissioned broker along
with J.P. Morgan’s Philadelphia affiliate, Drexel, Morgan & Company, that sold the
stocks of the original scandal-ridden and defunct Panama Canal Company, which had
been a target of Congressional investigators and outraged investors when the company
went bankrupt. Prospects for the original company had been brightened for the hapless
investing public by the backing of the prestigious Seligman and Morgan names and that
of the project’s famous leader, Ferdinand de Lesseps, who had successfully completed
the construction of another project that had changed world maritime trade and navigation:
the Suez Canal. 28
The new Panama Canal Company was James Seligman’s chance to restore the
Seligmans’ prestige and his sizeable investments in Panama, including the Panama
Railroad. When the Colombian Congress refused to ratify a canal treaty negotiated by

United States Privileges and Elections Committee, Hearings before a subcommittee on campaign
contributions, 62nd Congress, Third Session, 1913, p. 453. Ferdinand Lundberg, America's 60 Families (New
York: Halcyon House, 1939), pp. 74, 548 n.62. (Birmingham 1967)
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Secretary of State John Hay, President Theodore Roosevelt used his “big stick” to
achieve what diplomacy could not, sending U.S. warships to prevent Colombia from
shipping troops to protect its sovereignty over the Panamanian isthmus. With the help of
the USS Nashville and other U.S. gunboats off the Caribbean coast of Panama, the
Panama Republic was born without the consent—or interference—of Colombia. “I took
the Isthmus, started the canal and then left Congress not to debate the canal, but to debate
me," Roosevelt boasted, despite protests that he had engaged in a war with Colombia
without a declaration of war by Congress as required by the Constitution. The New York
Times decried it as an "act of sordid conquest" and The New York Evening Post branded it
a "vulgar and mercenary venture." Nevertheless, Congress did not intervene, setting a
precedent of neglect of Constitutional duties that would render the American people what
historian Arthur Schlesinger later called “the Imperial Presidency.”
Instead, a year later, in 1904, Roosevelt had the United States Congress allocate
$40 million to purchase the dilapidated French buildings, equipment and excavations,
including the Panama Railroad, from Panama Canal Company investors. Some $30
million of that was supposedly related to excavations completed, primarily the Culebra
Cut, valued at $1 per cubic yard. Buneau-Varilla’s new Panama Republic was paid
another $5 million by Congress, an another $250,000 per year. In 1909 a white-suited and
hatted Roosevelt visited the Culebra Cut and was photographed proudly sitting in a huge
new American-made steam shovel. Two years after Roosevelt’s death in 1919, Colombia
finally accepted Roosevelt’s fait accompli and took $25 million from Congress, $5million
on ratification and $5 million in annual installments for four years, along with special
privileges in the U.S.-controlled Canal Zone. In return, Colombia recognized Panama’s
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independence. Panama, however, would remain, in the style of Britain’s control over the
Suez Canal similarly by force of money and arms, a “protectorate” of the United States
until 1939.
To Culbertson and ambitious nationalist Christians like him who had been won
over to Roosevelt’s “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, a well-armed democratic United
States was more suitably positioned than colonizing European empires to “wield the
scepter of the Prince of Peace.” 29 Culbertson was no pacifist, however. War, if necessary
for survival of a nation and protection of its interests and citizens, while unfortunate and
destructive, was acceptable. He accepted the Social Darwinist interpretation of the world
as a place where “survival of the fittest” prevailed through adaptation to existing realities.
In this context, he blamed neither farmers nor workers for their poverty; rather, it was the
State, which he saw as a neutral arbiter for the common good, that had to correct abuses
and regulate corporations’ behavior in the marketplace through reforming rules.
He admired Theodore Roosevelt’s progressive domestic reforms, such as
conservation and trustbusting, but was wary of his Caesarian ambition. “I am a
Progressive,” he wrote William Allen White, because Americans had lately “been voting
for the traditions of the past instead of voting for the ideals of the future. We have
allowed our very social environment to become our masters; very social environment to
become our masters; we have allowed the vast genius of the age for combination and
corporation… To produce fortunes for a monied aristocracy… Whatever faults the

William S. Culbertson, excerpt from his “Nationalism” oration, Unbound Correspondence, April 1906.
See also Diary, April 15-30, 1906, Papers of William S. Culbertson, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress.
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Progressive Movement may have, it has the supreme and all dominating virtue of having
stepped out from the debris of the old and voiced clearly and unequivocally the needs of
our time.” 30
Culbertson by then had left behind much of the previous sympathy that he had for
Socialists by reading the arguments of New York’s The Call on weekends (to balance, he
explained, his daily reading during the week of the more conservative The New York Sun)
and now deplored laborers who became “fanatic and wild.” The rise of the Socialist
movement and the steady electoral gains of Socialist Party candidates across the country
were worrisome developments to many of the upper class and upper middle class
professionals. 31 To Culbertson, Socialist Party presidential candidate Eugene Debbs
appealed to “the emotions of the ignorant, rather than to the intellects.” 32 He accepted
that American society had to become more socialistic, but through the kind of milder
political reforms espoused then by journalist Lincoln Steffens, author of The Shame of the
Cities (1904). 33

William S. Culbertson to William Allen White, September 4 16, 24, October 29, 1912; Diary, November
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Culbertson placed a disappointing third in the national college debating
championship contest, however, and then, seeking the opportunities of the cosmopolitan
East, sought and failed to win a Rhodes scholarship, depriving him of an Oxford
education; but he did win acceptance for study at Yale and Princeton. He chose Yale,
which would be the turning point in his life.
Yale, like the other Ivy League colleges, 34 by the late 1890s had found a new
president to lead it into the new age of applying scientific methodology to the liberal arts.
Under 43-year-old Arthur Twining Hadley, Yale shed much of its “Old Time” religious
traditions and Greek and Latin as freshman requisites while requiring passing grades in
each course rather than a cumulative average of four years to gain a degree. Culbertson,
while maintaining his affiliation with the modernist YMCA on campus and preparing to
lead a series of YMCA seminars on Christianity, now came under the influence of
Adolph Harnack’s What is Christianity? 35 which emphasized social justice, and Yale’s
Professor of Biblical Literature, Charles Foster Kent, who taught Christ and his teachings
from a historical perspective and emphasized the new rational criticism of the Bible and
Saint Paul’s evangelical mission. Culbertson concluded that what Christians needed was

bribes and a politically active local working class that was increasingly elected Socialists. Steffens’s book
was useful to well-heeled reformers like young Franklin Roosevelt, who began his career in the New York
Legislature as an upstate Democratic reformer opposed to New York’s powerful Tammany Hall.
Other examples included Charles Eliot of Harvard, who was the first of this kind among the Ivy League
colleges, and Woodrow Wilson of Princeton. Eliot was the pioneer of this science-based educational reform,
becoming Harvard’s president in 1869. Wilson emerged in the 1890s as a prominent political scientist and
U.S. historian before being chosen president of Princeton University in 1902 with the help of former
Princeton classmate and University trustee Cleveland H. Dodge, a rich heir of the Phelps, Dodge mining and
munitions fortune and one of Princeton’s major benefactors.
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“more emphasis on teachings of Jesus about social relation” and less concern for
individual piety. 36 His literal Bible days over, he now fell increasingly under the
influence of economist Henry Emery, who eschewed ideology for pragmatism, the
current philosophical rage championed by William James and Thomas Dewey.
Armed with Emery’s practical approach, he entered the Gordon Bennet Essay
Competition, advocating that the demands of labor for more of a share of the wealth it
produced would have to be gradually integrated into the American political structure to
avoid the social unrest that had mounted with the closing of the frontier’s opportunity for
free land and the rise of industrial capitalism. With the disappearance of the frontier as a
safety valve for the crowded cities, the urban working class became the permanent fixture
that Hamilton had hoped for to advance America’s industrialization. Culbertson believed
the Socialists’ demands could be accommodated and tamed once they were steered into
the mainstream of American political parties, although he also believed that American
workers, like the European working class, would soon erect their own party standards and
contend with the capitalists for power
If this was an overestimation of the sustainability of American workers’ political
class consciousness (as opposed to mere trade unionism) in the face of unanticipated and
unprecedented political repression of the Socialist Party during the World War and the
extraordinary economic recovery fueled by Allied war orders and Wilson’s war
mobilization, it was also a failure to take his own theory about nations’ increasing rivalry
over foreign markets being a cause of war far enough to anticipate the imminence of

William S. Culbertson, Diary, November 11, 1908. These sentiments can also be found in his diary entries
for Nov. 30, 1908 and June 2, 1909.
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world war. But it was also, thereby, his failure to take his analysis of the benefits of
foreign markets for domestic prosperity far enough to anticipate the war’s enlarging
American corporate capital capacities to such an extraordinary degree that they would
reverse the United States’ long-standing debtor status and provide postwar investment
opportunities abroad that could keep American capitalism’s ability to provide decently
paid jobs for enough of the working population to retard social unrest and the necessity
for politicization.
These theoretical failures were not due to lack of intellectual ability, however.
Modern empiricism and the convenience of pragmatism made for a short-sightedness not
unknown among some of the best scholars and political leaders of that day and today. But
whatever its shortcomings, Culbertson’s conclusion about the political efficacy of taking
the wind out of the Socialist movement by taking and implementing the Socialists’
suggestions for milder reforms than a change in the whole mode of production and
distribution of wealth that might reduce the rush to more markets and war was quite
conducive to academic acceptance at an elite institution such as Yale, where the concept
of preparing future rulers as Christian statesman was still accepted as a given in its
educational mission. If the American working class would not be sustained in its
evidently growing politicized class consciousness, and if the American professional
middle class would reflect the illusion that the upper class to whose corporate system
they pledged loyalty did not exist as a ruling class, the upper class themselves were not
confused about their own power and assumed entitlements as a social class nor about why
they sent their sons to be trained at exclusive preparatory schools like Philips Andover
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and Ivy League colleges like Yale, Harvard and Princeton. Yale’s stated tradition of
preparing their students for government service had a purpose.
Culbertson’s essay on socialism won first prize and social acceptance by his wellto-do classmates. He was appointed Secretary of Yale’s Political Science Club and, by
being allowed to drop a course so his grades were high enough, gained entry into Phi
Beta Kappa, finally graduating from Yale in 1910 with Special Honors in the social
sciences. Impressed, his father sent him to Europe as a graduation present to take a
gentleman’s tour of the mother continent’s cultural delights, familiarize himself with its
many peoples, and spend the summer studying German, then the language in which many
of the advances in sciences were written, to help his preparation for his PhD thesis. On
the trip over the Atlantic in the S.S. Kroonland, the young Yale graduate encountered for
the first time “very poor” people in steerage living “like animals” in unsanitary
conditions, and in Germany at Leipzig University he again found unsanitary conditions,
poor food, boring teachers as well as Germans “who do nothing but gossip and waste
time sitting around their beer-gardens.” 37 But when he returned to Germany a second
time in 1910, he would be deeply impressed by Wagner’s nation-binding folklore operas
and the formations of German Army cavalry and goose-stepping infantry marching in
review before their proud mounted Kaiser, Wilhelm II: “Never have I seen such a sight.
Thousands of horses and riders—all in perfect order and dress…if the German war

William S. Culbertson, Diary, August 6, 1908; Culbertson to parents, August 27, 1908; quoted
also by Snyder, William S. Culbertson: In Search of a Rendezvous, p. 22.
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machine is as efficient in war, as it is skillful in drill, its enemies will have a difficult
time.” 38
He traveled to Wittenberg (where he visited Luther’s memorabilia-filled home),
then to Switzerland, Paris, and finally England in September. He made a pilgrimage to
Oxford, his previously unsuccessful Rhodes scholastic goal, and although painful it also
inspired him to conclude that Yale was a better choice for pursuing a public career in the
States, which he now embraced as a Christian stateman’s duty that would be cowardly to
avoid.
Returning to the States, Culbertson was now a committed American nationalist.
Reflecting the muscular nationalism awakened by the Spanish-American War and the
hero images created by the press of Admiral Dewey’s utter destruction of the wooden
Spanish Fleet at Madrid and Col. “Teddy” Roosevelt’s charge up Cuba’s San Juan Hill,
Alexander Hamilton, the original apostle of American nationalism, became the subject of
many biographies during this period, including quite influential ones by Henry Cabot
Lodge, Frederick S. Oliver, 39 and Theodore Roosevelt himself. Hamilton’s fame as an
advocate of a central bank and the first Secretary of the Treasury was now augmented by

William S. Culbertson to parents, September 3, 1910; quoted by Snyder, (Kindle 1975) (Quigley 1981)In
Search of a Rendezvous, p. 33.
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Frederick Scott Oliver was a successful linen drapery manufacturer and political writer whose 1906
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the recent founding of the Federal Reserve system pushed into legislation by Rhode
Island Senator Nelson Aldrich, the father-in-law of John. D. Rockefeller’s only son, John.
D. Rockefeller, Jr., and a formidable advocate in the U.S. Senate for the Sugar Trust led
by the Havemeyer family’s American Sugar and Refining Company.
Culbertson chose the popular Hamilton for his thesis. His thesis’s citations
displayed another strong influence, however: Friedrich List, the forefather of the German
historical school of economics and nationalism. A liberal on representative democracy
and civil rights when those political currents were sweeping through autocratic France
and Central Europe, List was born in the Duchy of Württemberg, a powerful German
feudal state that was then still part of the Holy Roman Empire. For hundreds of years, the
Württembergs had contributed through strategic marriages to Europe’s extensive network
of royal family ties. List’s birth year, 1789, marked the beginning of the end of royal
absolutism in Continental Europe that would finally be exploded by World War I. It was
the year when revolutions in France and the Netherlands rocked the Old Order, when
even the Holy Roman Emperor, Joseph II , abandoned the feudal system of labor
obligations the peasants owed their lords, settling for cash payments instead.
It was also just three years after 4000 armed farmers led by Revolutionary War
veteran Captain Daniel Shays rose up in Western Massachusetts in protest against taxes
imposed by the merchants-dominated Massachusetts legislature. While crushed, Shays’
Rebellion inspired such fears among America’s merchant class and slaveholders that
many of them, including retired General George Washington, became convinced of the
need for a strong central government along the lines proposed by (Brookhiser 2003)
(Meacham 2012) and James Madison. Historians have differed on how much the revolt
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influenced the writing of a constitution with a very powerful executive. It seems
plausible, however, that after the alleged failure in 1786 of the first conference at
Annapolis that Hamilton had promoted, the Rebellion’s continuing crisis into 1787
contributed to the success of the attempt to hold a second conference that year in
Philadelphia to replace, not just reform, the Articles of Confederation entirely with a
stronger federal constitution. That one year, 1787, saw, on the heels of the defeat of
Shay’s Rebellion, the hurried convening of elected and appointed state delegates in
Philadelphia, the drafting and ratification by enough state legislatures of the Constitution
to elect a propertied elite as an Electoral College legally free of popular mandate in
choosing a president, the unanimous election by this Electoral College of the popular
General Washington as the first President of the United States, and the seating of the new
government at Federal Hall in Hamilton’s hometown, New York City, where Washington
promptly appointed him the first Secretary of the Treasury.
All these events were the on the record when List studied Hamilton’s
contributions to the building of an American nationalism. After having risen in the
Württemberg chamber to ministerial undersecretary rank, the fall of his faction in 1819
required his resignation, but he retained his seat in the Chamber. His political liberalism
and push for administrative reforms, including a Germany-wide customs union and a
protectionist trade policy to shield infant industries, earned him expulsion from the
chamber, arrest and imprisonment, in 1822, escape into exile, and a return and release on
the condition of his voluntary emigration to America in 1825.
Purchasing large landholdings in Pennsylvania, he was rich enough from the
discovery of coal deposits on this land to switch from farming to journalism to promote
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his ideas, editing a German-language journal in Reading and assuming dual citizenship as
a naturalized U.S. citizen. In 1827 he published Outlines of American Political Economy
endorsing free trade tempered by a pragmatic approach toward protectionist trade policies
to encourage industrial development and the building of a truly national state. His
“National System,” as he called it, was mirrored by Henry Clay’s “American System”
and after returning to Germany with an appointment as U.S. consul to Hamburg, the lack
of Senate ratification obliged him to stay in Paris for a while before returning to
Pennsylvania. By 1833 he was back in Germany, living in Leipzig, where he secured
another appointment as U.S. consul. Four years later he was back in Paris where he
practiced journalism and wrote articles for Augsburg’s Allgemeine Zeitung (General
Newspaper) which were subsequently gathered into a book and published in 1841 as Das
nationale System der politischen Oekonomie (The National System of Political Economy).
His fame growing, he established a newspaper in Augsburg called
Zollvereinsblatt (Customs Union Sheet) to again push for a larger German customs union
and the building of more railroads to help unify Germany. In 1841 he was offered the
editorship of Cologne’s new Rheinische Zeitung (Rhinish Newspaper) but had to decline
because of increasingly bad health; the position was eventually taken by the young Karl
Marx. Despite declining health, List visited Hungary, Austria, and England during his last
two years, but the financial panic during these years deprived him of his major income
source, his land in America, and his unsuccessful attempt to develop a commercial
alliance between his German homeland and England drove him to despair and suicide in
November 1846.
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Yet, his influence as an economist who believed that liberalism and nationalism
could join together to serve humanity found growing reception, especially in America
after Abraham Lincoln answered Southern sectionalism with a nationalism that promoted
western expansion yet embraced the liberal policy of emancipation, and spurred
industrialism and transcontinental railroad communication during and after the Civil War.
While a strong believer in the universal benefits of trade, List was dubious about the
benefits to nations with an undeveloped industrial base engaging in absolute “free” trade
with industrialized nations, and questioned the honesty of its promoters: “Any nation
which by means of protective duties and restrictions on navigation has raised for
manufacturing power in her navigation to such a degree of development that no other
nation can sustain free competition with her, can do nothing wiser that you throw away
these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations. The benefits of free trade, and
to declare impenitent homes that she has hitherto wanted in the paths of error, has now
for the first time, succeeded in discovering the truth.” 40
It has been claimed that before World War I, List and Marx were the two best
known German economists; List’s The National System of Political Economy, claimed
one author, “has been more frequently translated than any other German economist,
except Karl Marx.” 41 By Culbertson’s Yale days, Friedrich List’s theory of “national
economics,” balanced development and balanced regulation, and promotion of the
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“National System” was one of the most influential economic doctrines of the 19th
century.
Culbertson cites three of List’s major works to support his argument on behalf of
Hamilton’s nationalism, starting with the concept of the nation. “To him [Hamilton], in
the words of List, ‘a nation is the medium between individuals and mankind, a separate
society of individuals, who, possessing common government, common laws, rights,
institutions, interests, common story, and glory, common defense and security of their
rights, riches, and lives, constitute one body free and independent, following only the
dictates of its interests, as regards other independent bodies, and possessing power to
regulate the interests of the individuals constituting that body, in order to create the
greatest quantity of common welfare in the interior and the greatest quantity of security
as regards other nations.’ The nationalist believes that deeper than man’s selfish interest,
deeper even than his loyalty to his class, is his loyalty to his nation and to the national
ideas under which she lives. Individuals and classes, he says, are led by wise statesman,
to cooperate within the nation in order to make their group powerful against other groups;
and the welfare of particular interest is thereby made subservient to the strength and
prosperity of the whole.” 42 In this, Culbertson finds inspiration also in Bismarck’s war
against France: “Some men believe, as has been pointed out, That the Franco German
War in the union brought about by Bismarck revolutionized the spirit of the German
people. Before 1871, the land was just as fertile, the resources just as rich, and the
opportunities potentially as numerous as after the war. But after the war the people,

William Culbertson, Alexander Hamilton, op. cit., p. 8, quoting Friedrich List, Outlines of
American Political Economy (1827), Letter 2.
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ambitious for the dominance of the German race and institutions, entered the
international struggle for military prowess, for colonies, and for commercial and
industrial supremacy. Here is the condition which seems partly ascribable to the revival
of the spirit of enterprise and national ambition among the people.” 43

Culbertson

ascribed at least part of the success of America to a “national consciousness” reawakened
“when credit was created, the finances reorganized, prosperity secured, commerce
protected, and industry encouraged. At this time, the temper of the American people
began to change from the easy-going temper which characterized the colonial times to the
strenuous, nervous, and enterprising spirit, which is now the proverbial feature of
American life. ‘Laws,’ asserts Say [a leader of the Physiocrats] ‘are not able to create
wealth.’ ‘Certainly, they are not,’ Lists answers, ‘but they create productive power, which
is more important than wealth.’ 44
“...In Germany, when power was taken from the local dynasties, the people were
given a central prince [Bismarck] on whom they could concentrate their attachment; in
America when the States were circumscribed within bounds, their citizens were given a
strong Republic which they might be loyal to. Each statesman fitted the government to
the needs and temperaments of his people, and both governments have endured because
their foundations are laid in racial tendencies which are psychologically sound.” 45 Guided
by a wise leader, only the State, whose growing conception in the minds of many upper
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class Germans was all-powerful, could rapidly move Germany beyond its agricultural
stage to the more productive industrial stage. “… as List has pointed out,” Culbertson
wrote, “agriculture is imperfect and a great part of the resources of nature remain
undeveloped.” 46 A strong state is measured not just by its military capacities, but
ultimately by its productive powers, and for that industry was indispensable.
Traveling to the Library of Congress in Washington D.C, Culbertson began his
study of Alexander Hamilton’s papers for his thesis, Culbertson discovered that he agreed
with Hamilton’s emphasis on the needs of the nation rather than Jefferson’s emphasis on
the needs and rights of the individual. He found that Hamilton’s theory of society as
being composed of competing nations was more compelling to him than Adam Smith’s
theory of competing individuals and Karl Marx’s theory of competing classes. In fact, as
biographer Snyder judged, “In Hamilton’s thought he found escape from class
warfare.” 47
Class warfare, indeed, was growing as laborers in factories, railroads, mines,
shipyards, logging camps, agribusiness farms and Southern cotton and tobacco
plantations, sought better wages and healthier and less dangerous working conditions by
attempting to organize themselves into collective bargaining unions. By 1914, the Wilson
administration’s Commission on Industrial Relations reported that in that year alone
35,000 workers were killed in industrial accidents and 700,000 more were injured; many
of these were women and children.
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As violence mounted through the World War I years despite no-strike pledges by
Samuel Gompers and the leaders of the American Federation of Labor (AFL), public
sympathy for labor rights forced legislation through Congress, which was then ruled
unconstitutional by the conservative Supreme Court. This was a hard lesson for
Progressives like Culbertson seeking reforms. The Supreme Court was not just an
impartial arbiter of law, a bulwark against “the tide of irresponsible democracy,” as
Culbertson quoted Hamilton in his thesis.48 Life terms in the Supreme Court could
engender justices who, being only human, could also be stuck in their ways of the past,
unable to adjust to the times, interpreting the highest law in the land, the Constitution, in
the most restrictive traditional ways.
Nevertheless, some of the wiser leaders of the larger corporations realized the
class struggles were ripping into the whole social and political fabric of corporate
capitalism. Working with the reformist National Civic Federation’s Welfare Department,
John Patterson’s National Cash Register Company in commission-run Dayton, Ohio, and
Julius Rosenwald’s Sears, Roebuck & Company in Chicago set up welfare departments
that gave services now associated as governmental responsibilities: training,
kindergarten, low-cost company housing, and recreational facilities. By 1914, the year
Culbertson joined the organization’s Washington D.C. chapter, the National Civic
Federation could report that 2500 surveyed employers had functioning welfare programs.
Nevertheless, paternalism which rejected labor’s right to control their own unions was no
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viable answer to questions of equity at the workplace, and confrontations over low wages
and dangerous workplace conditions continued to roil the nation.
This crisis in contemporary affairs had direct relevance to Culbertson’s view of
Hamilton. From what he had read of Hamilton, Culbertson concluded that in Hamilton’s
time, too, social injustices had shaped a nation in crisis. For the nation’s survival,
individual liberties such as those proclaimed by Adam Smith in An Inquiry into the
Wealth of Nations and by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, as well as the
needs of any one class, must be overridden by the needs of the nation as a whole. How
this national interest was defined and by whom was left to elected representatives of the
adult male voting population (excluding white women, African-American slaves of both
genders, Native Americans, and in many states males without property, all of whom
together amounted to a majority of the population). These elected delegates were
organized into a representive government with a lower proportional House directly
elected on a district level, a non-proportional Senate with two senators from each state
elected by the state legislators, and a Supreme Court appointed for life terms by the
President with approval of the Senate.
Unlike contemporary Columbia University historian Charles Beard, Culbertson
did not probe into how the social backgrounds and economic interests of the Founding
Fathers may have influenced their political views on the need for a strong central
government. Instead, he drew a broader if more abstract conclusion about governmental
power: government, to avoid structural weakness, should be centralized, as Hamilton,
Madison and other Federalists had argued. To prevent any move toward tyranny, the
centralized government must be composed of three competing branches – an executive, a
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legislature, and a judicial – with checks and balances structured into the Constitution to
mitigate opportunities for the development of domestic tyranny. Hamilton’s worry about
a tyranny of the majority, which might violate the property rights of the privileged
minority to which Hamilton ascribed, 49 was not Culbertson’s focus.

Although he

made no bones about his loyalty to the Lockean theory that equated property rights and
individual personal rights, he ignored any reference to Locke’s deriving his assertion of
the right to inhabit land deemed “unoccupied” by people who supposedly did not use
money in their “natural” state and were therefore still too uncivilized to claim title to land
that had not been improved by cultivation for exchangeable commercial farm products;
this was a convenient secular theory that supported mercantile colonialism’s seizure of
land in aboriginal North America. 50 Instead, Culbertson compared Hamilton’s task of

The founder of the Bank of Manhattan (which after World War II merged with the Rockefellers’ Chase
National Bank led through the 1930s by Sen. Nelson Aldrich’s son Winthrop, to become Chase Manhattan
Bank), Alexander Hamilton had married into the Schuyler and the Van Rensselaer families, the latter a rich
Upper Hudson Dutch clan who owned vast tracts of land in New York. His wife. Elizabeth Schuyler, was a
daughter of Catherine Van Rensselaer and General Philip Schuyler, hapless commander of the Continental
Army’s Northern Division, New York state senator who actively supported ratification of the Constitution,
and U.S. Senator in the first Congress until losing his reelection campaign against Aaron Burr.) Culbertson’s
Hamilton biography also ignores that in the 1790s, Hamilton became a supporter of what was popularly
decried as the Yazoo land swindle, when Georgia legislators, all but one of whom received kickbacks, sold
35 million acres of frontier land to Northern speculators. Enraged, Georgia’s citizens elected a new legislature
which voided the sale. Appeals were made by the Northern speculators in the courts and ended up in
Congress, where Hamilton argued that since the sale was a legal contract, that should end the argument. See
Richard Brookhiser, America’s First Dynasty: The Adams, 1735-1918 (New York: The Free Press, 2003), p.
159. While personally honest, Hamilton became suspected of pro-monarchical views because of his distrust
of the poor (“How can you trust people who are poor and own no property?”), his admiration for the British
constitutional monarchy form of government, and his advocacy for declaring war on Britain’s side against
the young French Republic, advice Washington wisely decided not to pursue. Vice President Thomas
Jefferson, his political opponent, feared that Hamilton’s financial projects as Treasury Secretary, including
his central bank, would entwine the Congress with the Treasury too closely. “This subtle form of corruption
troubled Jefferson,” writes historian Jon Meacham, “who saw it as the means by which Hamilton and his
allies could control the general direction of the government.” See: Jon Meacham, Thomas Jefferson: The Art
of Power (New York: Random House, 2012), p. 258.
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value through the marketplace, meaning that the goods produced have no realizable value unless they are
sold. This emphasis on labor and production of goods in the accumulation of value and its use as capital often
overshadowed Locke’s equal emphasis on the importance of money not just in the exchange process, but also
in the accepted social contract, written or verbal, necessary to make a commercial society.
Hamilton did not miss this Lockean lesson, as evidenced by the importance he attached as the first
Secretary of the Treasury to founding the first U.S. Mint to coin money with national standards to encourage
its use as a way of disciplining and training Americans in its use for property claims and to create, with
improved means of communication such as roads and canals, flourishing marketplaces necessary for nationbuilding resting on capitalist values. The reverse, as noted above, also applied in the case of people outside
the domain of the cash economy, including indigenous Americans: in Locke’s world view, there is no
obligation to recognize a social contract where one legally does not exist. This theory enabled Locke’s
mercantile world to reconcile legality and any residual Christian moral doubts about what in reality an
unacknowledged expropriation of lands and humans was.
Not surprisingly, Locke, besides being personally involved in England’s imperial expansion as a
member of the Board of Trade (thanks to support from Lord Shaftsbury, a primary architect of this
expansion), was an investor in the slave-trading Royal African Society and, through the agency of his
financial manager (and cousin) Peter King, engaged in “stock-jobbing” in the East India Company’s bonds
and probed the prospects for merchant profits in the Bahamas (1672-1676), a British slave-holding colony
in the West Indies. Locke’s theories derived not from mere abstract thinking but from a concrete historical
context: his living experience in and commitment to that mercantile world. His Second Treatise was designed
as a secular Natural Rights justification for the 1688 overthrow of the absolutist Catholic King James II by a
faction of Parliament intent on preserving the power that the House of Commons had won in the 1642
Revolution that beheaded King Charles Stuart I in 1649. In essence a Protestant merchants’ bloodless palace
coup against royalty’s reassertion of a traditional divine right to rule, the 1688 seizure of power replaced
James II with the more pliant Willian and Mary of Orange, Netherlands, and became hailed as “the Glorious
Revolution.”
Taking part through his investments in the mercantile exploitation of Africa and the New World,
owning shares in the new Bank of England that serviced British mercantile expansion, Locke formulated the
theoretical foundations of what became Classical Liberalism on solid mercantile ground (Muthu 2013) (Ince
2015), just as Hamilton’s adult life began first as a bookkeeper for merchants in the British slave-holding
colony of Barbados before being sent to King’s College (renamed Columbia College after the American
Revolution) in New York for a formal education cut short by the outbreak of the Revolution that would propel
him to power.
As political scientist Onur Ulas Ince argues: “Born of the colonial commodity chains comprising
the Atlantic economy, this vision justifies the English territorial occupation of the New World by sanctioning
a private, productive, and accumulative mode appropriation as the superior and morally exalted basis of
property. Locke’s arguments about money, its origins, and its implications constitute the linchpin of this
theoretical configuration. On the one hand, money’s capacity to store value unleashes the productive powers
of labor in a drive to “increase the common stock of mankind” and thereby secures a moral high ground for
capitalist appropriation by associating it with universal benefits. On the other, Locke’s paradoxical exclusion
of Native Americans from the “universal tacit consent” that he ascribes to the genesis of money places them
in a fiction of contractual deficit and undercuts their entitlement to their ancestral lands. Viewing Locke’s
theory of property through the lens of colonial capitalism brings into focus monetization, rather than labor,
as the principal axis around which possession and dispossession are entwined.” See: Onur Ulas Ince, “John
Locke and Colonial Capitalism: Money, Possession, and Dispossession,” a paper delivered to a session of
the 2015 convention of the American Political Science Association. See also: David Armitage, “John Locke,
Theorist of Empire?” in Sankar Muthu (ed.), Empire and Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013).
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building a national state out of a loose confederacy of sovereign states to that of
Germany’s Prussian “Iron Chancellor”, Prince Otto von Bismarck, whom Culbertson
admired. Like Germany’s competing principalities, the new United States was weakened
by boundary disputes and a decentralized approach toward a dangerous world of empires
and nations competing for natural resources, markets and colonial lands. Moreover, postrevolutionary America was facing a depreciated currency, severe economic depression,
war debts to its soldiers, popular rebellion, poor credit, trade rivalries both at home and
abroad, and disrespected treaties. Only a strong central government could face these
problems with any chance of saving the nation-building task from abject failure.
This was the purpose of the Constitution, not the amendments on rights later
attached to it to win ratification by the state legislatures, nor the similar draft of rights
rejected for the Constitution by the Philadelphia delegates. Hanging over the states’
delegates who convened in Philadelphia in 1787, however, was the harrowing specter of
the previous year’s Shays’s Rebellion of 4000 indebted and desperate armed farmers in
Massachusetts. Resolved to project federal power to directly collect tax revenues for the
new central government, Alexander Hamilton as the first Secretary of the Treasury
answered the next threat to his excise tax collectors: a rising of small farmers west of the
Allegheny Mountains who were dependent on distilled grain whiskey sales for income to
meet debts. Personally accompanying General “Light-Horse Harry” Lee with 12,000
federalized soldiers mustered from state militias, a larger army, it has been claimed, than
any raised throughout the Revolution, Hamilton crushed the Whiskey Tax Rebellion of
farmers in western Pennsylvania.
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Hamilton’s use of overwhelming armed force against tax resisters, who melted
away at the sight of Hamilton’s huge army, was applauded by Culbertson as crucial to the
national interest in asserting federal law and order. Assuming the states’ war debts and
founding a national bank to store federal tax receipts and pay federal debts was essential,
as was giving repayment of debts to foreign states and individuals first priority to
advance the nation’s credit reputation in world capital markets (which in Hamilton’s
mind, meant chiefly London); but all that was toothless without the central government’s
will and means to enforce its tax levies and laws. That the smaller states had already paid
off most of their war debts was not his concern; getting control from the states over
federal tax collections and establishing the principle of central control over federal
revenues, was.
Despite the scandal that arose when it was discovered that monied Northern
speculators, including many of the Constitutional Convention’s delegates, had bought
from desperate veterans at deep discounts much of the Confederacy’s certificates used to
pay soldiers during and after the war (a discovery that alarmed Hamilton’s political
nemesis, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson), Hamilton’s scheme to pay the speculators
at the certificates’ full-face value was accepted by Congress and President Washington.
And despite the example of his own family’s migration to more promising western lands,
Culbertson appreciated Hamilton’s opposition to Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase.
Hamilton saw westward migration as a drain on manpower that would be better utilized
for providing a cheaper workforce and consumer base for manufacturing development
that, with adequate tariff protection from foreign competition, he believed could provide
the nation with self-sufficiency.
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That Hamilton did not follow up on his Report on Manufacturers was excused by
Culbertson based on the greater importance Hamilton attached to profits and economic
recovery at a time when Europe’s landscape was being torn by rebellions and wars. For
this reason, Culbertson thought Hamilton right to insist on neutrality during the AngloFrench wars following the French Revolution because it offered a legal basis for
profitable trade with both belligerents, despite the treaty of mutual assistance that the new
republic earlier had signed with France. The young United States was still licking its
wounds from the devastation wrought on the rebellious colonies by British troops, and
the general opinion, including Jefferson’s and Washington’s, was that the new republic
was incapable of successfully taking on another war with the British Empire.
Culbertson did take exception to Hamilton’s seeming abandonment of industrial
diversification, however, calling it “anti-national.” If Hamilton was thereby guilty of
“meddling with the sacred laws of exchange,” 51 he believed it was justified to restore
production to build the wealth and power that came with it, strengthen the central State,
and discredit Jefferson’s following of restless farmers and artisans “imbued with French
ideas and prejudices of States Rights.” 52 Significantly, Culbertson did not deal with
Hamilton’s initial suggestion for a life term for the presidency, or Hamilton’s personal
family ties to his in-law land speculators, the Schuylers and the Van Rensselaers, or his
many political intrigues to try to keep the Federalists in power on both a national and
state level, one of which backfired literally when Aaron Burr challenged him to a fatal

51

William S. Culbertson, Alexander Hamilton (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), p. 152.

52

William S. Culbertson, Alexander Hamilton (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), pp. 11, 142-149.
62

duel. 53 But he did note Hamilton’s use of the federal government’s Northwest
Ordinances to reserve public lands for sale to well-heeled speculators at high prices in
order to help finance the federal debt and discourage the migration of labor from the
Northeast’s cities and towns to new farmlands further west. Hamilton thought farming
led people to laziness and a lack of enterprise and innovation, and boldly said so,
preferring manufacturing.
Culbertson wrote freely in the vein of the prejudices of the white professional
middle class of his time, adopting Social Darwinism and Herbert Spencer’s sociological
definitions and frames of reference (without accepting Spencer’s preference for laissez
nous faire mode of governmental domestic policy), 54 quoting Rudyard Kipling’s poem on
the Law of the Jungle, 55 imbuing nationalism with concepts of race and willpower in the
claw and fang interpretation of the evolution of civilization, 56 dismissing free traders as

Some of these intrigues are briefly reviewed in John H. Murton, Paul E. Johnson, James M. McPherson,
Alice Fahs, Gary Gerstle, Emily S. Rosenberg, and Norman L. Rosenberg, Liberty, Equality, Power: A
History of the American People, Sixth Edition, volume 1: To 1877 (Boston: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning,
2012), pp. 196, 203-206, 209-212.
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William S. Culbertson, Alexander Hamilton: An Essay (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911; London:
Forgotten Books edition, 2018), p. 111. Culbertson specifically quotes from Spencer’s Principles of
Sociology, refers to society as an “organism” (p. 105) containing not only people but “various species of
industry.” (p. 147). In this lies the implication that reforms are an adaptive mechanism to protect the rule of
the marketplace and that a more fundamental reorganization of production and distribution of wealth can
only lead to a nation’s decline. The political corollary would be the decline of the political rule of the
contented upper classes that Hamilton saw as indispensable to creating a nation’s wealth through what would
later be described in Twentieth Century neoliberal policies as “trickle-down economics.”
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Ibid., Pp. 7, 9, 10, 18, 31, 34, 35, 53, 105. Culbertson employed racial terms that Theodore Roosevelt and
other American leaders felt free to use, such as “racial ideals”, the “Anglo-Saxon race”, the “German race”,
even asserting that in Germany and the United States “both governments have endured because their
foundations are laid in racial tendencies which are psychologically sound.” (p. 35.) On another level,
Culbertson denied that there were classes “in the Socialist sense” during Hamilton’s time, by which he means
there were no industrial proletariat, although there were class struggles in the colonies before the American
Revolution between the propertied upper class in New England and indebted farmers, tenant farmers, and
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holders of “fantasies” that ignored history’s lessons on the occasional need for State
intervention in the marketplace to keep it functioning profitably and stable. 57 He saw
Hamilton like the Iron Chancellor Bismarck as a great unifying statesman and conscious
crafter of a nation-state more suitable to its stage of economic and political evolution, 58
and rising nine times, from his thesis’s second chapter to its last words, to offer attacks
on Socialism, which he identified with foreign European theorists whom he contrasted
with Hamilton’s and his own American nationalism. 59
Undoubtedly, Culbertson owed at least some of his racial views about nationhood
to his mentor, as evidenced by his praise for Emory and quoting of a particular passage
from, Emery’s 1902 essay “The New Protectionism” for the Yale Alumni Weekly: “

urban artisans that are amply documented in Professor Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United
States. There were also indentured servants who once freed ended up as the despised “poor white” working
as laborers on the sea and in both the cities and countryside, the struggles of artisans denied the vote in
Philadelphia, and, of course, revolts among the estimated 25,000 men, women and children kidnapped from
Africa every year between 1713 and 1780 who entered America as slaves that, among many others, some
desperately taking up arms against the revolutionaries in answer to British promises of freedom.
If Culbertson did not find in Alexander Hamilton’s papers references to these struggles or to the
English-originated class structure that gave them rise, there were nonetheless undisguised acknowledgements
to class conditions in public commentaries in the Continental Congress, such as John Adams remark in 1777
that “It is of no consequence by what name you call the people, whether they be freeborn or slaves; in some
countries the laboring poor are called freeman, in others they are called slaves; but the difference as to the
state is imaginary only. What matters it whether a landlord employing ten laborers on his farm gives them
annually as much money as will buy them the necessaries of life or gives them those necessaries at short
hand?...The condition of the laboring poor in most countries—that of the fishermen particularly of the
Northern states—is as abject as that of slavery.” Quoted in Charles and Mary Beard, The Rise of American
Civilization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930), p. 132. Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the
United States (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) and (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), latest edition.
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Ibid., pp.33-35.

Ibid., pp. 5, 6, 48, 48, 82, 102, 104, 111, 136, 151, 152, 153. Culbertson chose as spokesmen for socialism
Italian political economists: Ugo Rabbeno in his Protezionismo Americano (a book of essays on the history
of American protectionism in international trade, published by New York’s Macmillan in 1895; newest
edition titled The American Commercial Policy, Three Historical Essays (Delhi, India: Facsimile Publisher,
2018), and Achille Loria in his Le Basi Economiche della Costituzione Sociale (The Economic Foundations
of Constitutional Society (London: Sonnenschein, 1904). Loria was an early critic of Marx. His theories
attempting to understand capitalism were ridiculed by Marx’s collaborator, Frederick Engels.
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‘Seldom in history,’ Emery wrote in 1902, ‘has the feeling of the unity of a race, on the
one hand, and the antagonism of diverse races, on the other, been so consciously held, or
played so important role in actual politics as in recent years.’ ” 60 Emery ascribed this
racial identification to the rise of nationalism that accompanied unification of nations and
their imperial thrust outward in search of markets and natural resources which, though
seldom acknowledged since the formal declarations of the end of slavery in the 19th
century, included underpaid and even impressed labor in the colonies.

Yet, in the

safe refuge of the academic abstract, Culbertson did grasp the importance to a nation’s
productivity of Adam Smith’s emphasis on the division of labor and the diversification of
“various species of industry”, 61 but pointed out that while Smith focused on trade
between nations, Hamilton focused on trade within a nation that would create a home
market that made states and provinces economically interdependent and thereby nationbuilding, Hamilton’s ultimate political goal. In that national task, Hamilton unabashedly
relied on the top of the monied hierarchy of his society, and Culbertson followed suit in
his support for the new corporate elite in their triumphal bid for domestic and
international power, resting his case on greater and greater economic combination and
centralization of decision-making in the economic sphere as having the force of natural
law.
Culbertson’s thesis was not accepted by his Yale thesis committee, chaired by
Professor William Day; the committee criticized Culbertson’s opinionated tone and

William S. Culbertson, Alexander Hamilton, op. cit., p. 9, quoting from Henry C. Emery, Yale Alumni
Weekly, vol. 13, p. 53.
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Ibid., p. 146.
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documentation, including his use of Hamilton’s correspondence. Culbertson, shocked by
this refusal to acknowledge his entitlement by hard work to his PhD degree, ascribed the
thesis committee’s decision to his written opposition to the historical theory of the
revered elderly Yale scholar, William Graham Sumner, 62 and the committee’s alleged
animosity toward Emery. But when the thesis won Yale Law School’s prestigious John
A. Porter Prize, 63 the Porter award committee submitted it for evaluation to Simeon
Baldwin, Professor of Constitutional Law. Baldwin, who thought Hamilton’s economics
unsound, nevertheless praised it as the best accounting of Hamilton’s thoughts that he had

William Graham Sumner was Yale’s first faculty sociologist, teaching from 1872 to his retirement in
1909. He held strict Social Darwinist views regarding as innate inequalities of men and nations who did not
accept the Protestant work ethic of the Anglo-Saxon “race”, temperance, laissez-nous-faire economics
including free trade, and opposed government social welfare programs as a supposed breeder of laziness and
poverty among those inherently unable to adapt to change, a position Culbertson, defending the rights of
farmers and workers, rejected. It was Sumner who coined the term “the forgotten man” for the thrifty hardworking white middle class, a racial and class-biased euphemism that would later be called by President
Richard Nixon “the silent majority” as he implemented his Southern Strategy and prosecuted the Vietnam
War started by his Democratic predecessor, President Lyndon Johnson.
Culbertson rejected the theories of free traders like Sumner, and specifically criticized Sumner’s
assertion on page 175 of Sumner’s biography of Hamilton that Hamilton’s economics never rose beyond
mercantilism’s emphasis on the balance of trade: “To those who like Sumner believe that in his philosophy
of trade Hamilton never rose above the mercantilist’s balance of trade theory it must suffice here to answer
with one quotation: ‘It seems not always to be recollected,’ Hamilton says, ‘that nations who have neither
mines nor manufactures can only obtain the manufactured articles of which they stand in need by an exchange
of the products of their soils; and that if those who can best furnish them with such articles are unwilling to
give a due course to this exchange, they must, of necessity, make every possible effort to manufacture for
themselves; the effect of which is, that the manufacturing nations bridge the natural advantages of their
situation, doing or unwillingness to permit the agricultural countries to enjoy the advantages of theirs, and
sacrifice the interests of a mutually beneficial intercourse to the vain project of selling everything and buying
nothing.’ The assumption of some free-traders that, if one industry declines, under competition from without,
the existing capital and labor inevitably finds employment in other industries, would seem to imply that the
economic decay of the nation is not possible, – in implication, scarcely supported by the facts of history.
Hamilton, while understanding the laws which operate on the wealth existing in a society in a point of time,
was more interested in the causes which stimulate the production of wealth and the forces which cause nations
to rise and decline." (Pp. 150-151.)
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The John A. Porter Prize was founded in 1872 and named for Professor John H. Porter (Yale, 1842), one
of the founders of Yale’s Scroll and Key Society, which held copyright to its awarded theses under its
corporate name, the Kingsley Trust Association.
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ever read, and, much to the chagrin of Day’s committee, the award was presented to
Culbertson at graduation ceremonies.
After commencement and summer tour of Europe paid for by his proud father,
Culbertson went back to work on Hamilton’s papers at the Library of Congress,
resubmitted his thesis and completed his PhD in 1913. Published that year by Yale
University Press, it soon drew attention. After reading it, former president Theodore
Roosevelt invited the young scholar to lunch at his home in Oyster Bay, New York, and
Culbertson’s mentor, Professor Emery, found him a job on the Tariff Board of President
William Howard Taft, launching Culbertson’s career in trade diplomacy.
This first job experience in Washington, however, convinced Culbertson that
drafting of tariff laws by politicians in Congress was a needlessly corrupt practice in
“pork-barrel with a vengeance.” 64 In an article for the American Economic Review he
analyzed the weaknesses of the high Payne-Aldrich Tariff that President Taft had signed
into law. He called for the creation of a permanent federal agency, independent of
Congress and politics, to review tariffs not on the basis of the wants of specific industries
and special interests but based on the overall national interest as defined by the agency’s
appointed leaders.
After Taft was defeated for the presidency in 1912 by New Jersey Governor
Woodrow Wilson (with more than a little help by a severe recession and the largest votegetter, third party candidate Theodore Roosevelt, splitting the Republican vote as the
Progressive Party candidate), Congress replaced the Tariff Board with a new Federal
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Culbertson, Diary, October 5, 6, 1910; quoted also by J. Richard Snyder, op. cit., p.33.
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Tariff Commission that was empowered to make investigations and policy
recommendations, but not to set trade policy. President Wilson appointed Culbertson as
the youngest member.
Culbertson was then residing in Washington D.C., having culminated his fiveyear-long courtship of a student at Emporia College, Mary Hunter, by at last marrying
her. Soon they were joined by his mother and ailing father and after his father died in
November 1913, his mother continued to live with them. But working for a local D.C.
law firm that anticipated he would use his government connections to bring in clients did
not meet his expectations about using his talents. Gazing at the 18th century Hamilton
portrait he had invested in and placed on his office wall, he began to consider
alternatives. Despairing of Washington’s prospects, he seriously considered returning to
Kansas but was warned off by his old friend, editor William Allen White. He then went
to work as a legal consultant for the new major lobbying organization of large corporate
exporters, the National Foreign Trade Council.
Since Yale, he had abandoned laisse nous faire economics and rejected as
impossibly naïve and outdated Louis Brandeis’s call for a return to the small economic
units of America’s past. 65 Accordingly, like Wilson, he opposed the Supreme Court’s
dissolution decree against Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Trust. Now, with the

Louis Brandeis, although close to Wilson’s inner circle, was prevented from being appointed Attorney
General by the opposition of Cleveland Dodge because of Brandeis’s anti-trust views and active Zionism for
a Jewish State in Palestine. Although Wilson in 1917 privately accepted Britain’s Balfour Declaration for a
Jewish homeland in Palestine, he did not make his acceptance public until the end of World War I after
British use of Arabian guerrilla forces had taken Damascus and helped speed the Ottoman surrender. “Wilson
and House were nervous,” notes author Joseph Grabill, “that a Jewish homeland implied rejection of
Wilsonian self-determination concerning the Arabs.” Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy in the Near
East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971),
Pp.83, 126.
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responsibilities of providing for a wife and hopefully a family-to-be, William Culbertson
appears to have shed his earlier flirtation with socialism and the struggle for the rights of
the laboring classes, including a brief stint working for the Senate Finance Committee
advising Wisconsin’s liberal Senator Robert Lafollette on cotton and wool tariff
schedules for Lafollette’s farming constituency. He now fully embraced where the power
evidently really was – corporate power.
This was reflected in his expanding social life. He now held dinners for visiting
Kansas politicians and Congressmen, often lunched at Washington’s exclusive Cosmos
Club, and had joined the Washington Lawyers Club, Isaiah Bowman’s National
Geographic Society, and the National Civic Federation.
Being elected Secretary of the National Civic Federation’s Washington D.C.
council was a big social leap for Culbertson. A New York City-based think-tank
sponsored by corporate leaders and carefully selected labor leaders, the National Civic
Federation had become famous for its promotion of mediation between big business and
organized labor to avoid workers’ strikes. and to defeat the more fundamental class
power changes espoused by the Socialists. Dominated since its 1900 founding by
corporate elites such as Marcus Hanna, Andrew Carnegie, utilities tycoon Samuel Insull,
and Chicago banker Frank MacVeagh (who had been Taft’s Treasury Secretary), it
recruited conservative business unionists Samuel Gompers and his allies in the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) to its executive committee. Despite attracting Bull Moose
Progressives and social reformers like Chicago’s leading pacifist Jane Addams, the
National Civic Federation opposed the 1911 Standard Oil Trust dissolution ruling by the
Harlan majority of the Supreme Court. Outside of New York and Chicago, its most
69

important chapter was in Washington D.C, where federal laws are written, and
Culbertson was one of its leaders.
Culbertson was now in the big time, sharing the heady rare air of millionaires. He
was, in the words of Woodrow Wilson quoted by his biographer, “a man on the make.” 66
International trade served Culbertson’s ambition well, and the National Trade Council
lifted his horizons to a global level that thoroughly rejected “isolationism.” “We must
reverse this view,’’ he advised the Council, “and make the tariff a means for building up
a world-wide control. The time for preparation is now when industrial nations of the
world are absorbed in war.” 67 Such sentiments were in harmony with the new
administration’s emphasis on foreign markets. Not a month passed at the Council before
one of Wilson’s appointees to the new Federal Trade Commission, Ed Hurley, recruited
him to his staff. He never again looked back to rural Kansas for a career.
The Federal Trade Commission’s role was fact-finding, following Wilson’s desire
to use neutrality to penetrate the European markets opened by the world war, including
the financial markets. After the 1915 Pan-American Financial Conference in Washington,
Wilson’s son-in-law, Treasury Secretary William McAdoo, who had planned the
Financial Conference and hosted Latin American government and business officials,
asked the Commission to investigate custom laws and tariff regulations that hindered
expanding trade into Latin American markets previously dominated by European
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W.S. Culbertson, quoted in Snyder, op. cit., p. 26.

W.S. Culbertson to Robert Pachin, Secretary of the National Foreign Trade Council, October 12, 1915;
Unbound Correspondence, Papers of William S. Culbertson, Library of Congress. Also quoted in Snyder, op.
cit., p. 42.
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corporations and banks. The Commission sent Culbertson and Robert Voorfeld on a yearlong research tour south of the border.
By the time Culbertson returned with data for the Commission’s Report on Trade
and Tariffs in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Peru, 68 Senator Edwin
Webb of North Carolina was drafting a bill to make permanent the Supreme Court’s 1909
decision in American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company. This ruling had
granted American companies operating in foreign lands immunity from prosecution for
violations of the Sherman Trust Act of 1890.
The National Civic Federation’s leaders were worried about the Court
backtracking on its commitment to corporate concentration that was ostensibly
(Commission 1917) (Wheeler 2003)not engaged in “unreasonable” restraints of trade.
The Federal Reserve Act already had given American banks permission to buy banks
operating in foreign markets. This was “an effort to develop profitable outlets for surplus
capital,” wrote Culbertson biographer R.S. Snyder, “and to use American credit resources
to build up consuming markets for exports.” 69 To protect the Court’s anti-trust
immunities in the American Banana case beyond the reach of potential changes in the
Court’s opinions, Culbertson worked with Rep. Edwin Webb and Senators Albert
Cummings and Atlee Pomerene to write the Court’s Banana Case decision into law. Their
goal was to encourage the formation of more export associations and expand foreign
trade and investment, particularly in South America. Perhaps because of its restrictions

The report was published in 1917: U.S. Foreign Trade Commission, Report on Trade and Tariffs in Brazil,
Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and Peru (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917).
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against hurting the trade of other American firms, the Webb-Pomerene Act did not
achieve its goal. His role in the drafting it, however, won Culbertson accolades.
In 1918, Culbertson got his chance to wear a uniform and see the war firsthand,
but as a non-combatant inspector for the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA).
His Yale mentor, Professor Emery, had given him a secular approach toward combining
the appeal of the modernist Social Gospel movement with a hard-edged pragmatism.
Culbertson had been active in the campus chapter at Yale. The YMCA was then one of
the most active college Christian organizations in the foreign missions field, 70 its
recruitment of missionaries and support for missions bolstered by the campus-based
Student Volunteer Movement directed by John Mott, the author of the popular
premillennial evangelical book, The Evangelization Of The World In This Generation
(Pamuk Vol. 44, Issue 1, March 1984, McMeekin 2010)ŞŞ (1900). A close advisor to
daily Bible-reading President Wilson 71 (who would later offer him the post of Minister to
China), John Mott was an evangelical lay modernist whose message that Christian

During the Financial Panic year of 1873, YMCA donors, including Cleveland H. Dodge’s father, William
E. Dodge, Jr., Morris K. Jessup, and J. P. Morgan Sr., were also co-founders with postal inspector Anthony
Comstock of what Morgan biographer George Wheeler describes as “that ultimate in moral vigilanteism, the
New York Society for the Suppression of Vice.” (George Wheeler, Pierpont Morgan and Friends: The
Anatomy Of A Myth (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 2003), p. 131. Infamous for its censorship
and imposition on the public of Victorian Puritan values, the Society was responsible for arrests, convictions
and (boasted Comstock) suicides of violators of the Comstock Law passed during the Grant administration.
The Society spearheaded the seizure of thousands of books, and initiated campaigns against nudity,
homosexuals, and Margaret Sanger and Mary Louise Dennett for their advocacy of sex education. Among
the Society’s targets during the Society’s 77-year history (1873-1950) were the Broadway play Sapho, and
thousands of literary works, including James Joyce’s Ulysses, D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover,
Theodore Dreiser’s Genius, Francis W. King’s The Man In The Monkey Suit, Erskine Caldwell’s God's Little
Acre, James T. Farrell's A World I Never Made, Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate Count, and books by
Oscar Wilde, Frank Harris, and Clement Wood.
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Woodrow Wilson’s father had been a prominent Southern Presbyterian minister, as was his mother’s father
and the father of his first wife, Ellen. The Southern Presbyterian Church had been founded in 1861 as the
Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America by Southern secessionists as a result of the split
within the Presbyterian Church occasioned by the northern Presbyterians call for Union support in the War
for Southern Secession (the Civil War).
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missionaries should follow the flag abroad attracted strong financial backing by corporate
leaders. These included John D. Rockefeller and his son John D. Rockefeller, Jr. and
Phelps Dodge mining heir Cleveland H. Dodge, a major donor to and board trustee of
YMCA who personally paid for Mott’s travel expenses. 72 Dodge, of 1600s Salem,
Massachusetts Yankee heritage, was also Woodrow Wilson’s personal confidante and
major supporter for the Virginian’s political ambitions since Wilson’s presidency at
Princeton when Dodge was a high-donor trustee. When Wilson’s reforms at Princeton
aroused unbreachable obstacles from traditionalists among the faculty and the trustees,
Dodge financially supported Wilson’ switch to a political career in seeking the
governorship of New Jersey, his steppingstone to the White House. Since then, Wilson
relied on his Princeton classmate’s knowledge of the Middle East for policy guidelines on
the region.
Dodge’s interest in America entering the war had been given a strong moral
impetus by his involvement in the Middle East as a trustee of Robert College and the
American College for Girls in Constantinople (today, Istanbul). In fact, the Middle East
demonstrated the reverse of Mott’s assumption that Christian missionaries should follow
the flag. The truth was often the opposite: the flag often followed the cross; missionaries
were the vanguard of the West’s cultural penetration of the Orient, the Britain’s China
Inland Mission in the Chinese mainland and the American Board of Foreign Missions’
Congregationalists and Presbyterians in the Middle East being obvious examples. His
grandfather, William E. Dodge, the founder of the family’s mining company, was also

Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy in the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy,
1810-1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971), p. 84.
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instrumental in the founding of the Syrian Presbyterian College in Beirut; his father,
William E. Dodge, Jr., had been a trustee of the college; and his clergyman uncle, Rev.
D. Stuart Dodge was board chair from 1907 to 1921. Cleveland Dodge sent two of his
own children, Elizabeth and Bayard, to the Ottoman Empire as missionaries. Elizabeth
married Robert College’s vice president, George H. Huntington. His son, Bayard, married
the daughter of Howard Bliss, the second president of the Syrian Presbyterian College,
and would succeed Bliss as third president of the college in 1923.
Cleveland Dodge’s concern for Protestant missions in the Ottoman Empire was
therefore not simply a concern for their tens of millions of dollars invested in the Middle
East. He had personal family ties to the region, and little sympathy for Ottoman rule,
which had been financially hobbled since the 1873 Financial Crisis that threw the Porte’s
debts into default by 1876 and brought its finances under the control of a European
bondholders’ council (the Ottoman Public Debt Administration) whose demands on the
Porte’s treasury, combined with repatriated profits from European investments, outpaced
revenues drawn from the lower rate of increase in foreign trade that followed the
Financial Panic. 73 Repayments on debts retarded Ottoman economic growth, setting the

See: Şevket Pamuk, “The Ottoman Empire in the Great Depression” of 1873-1896,” The Journal of
Economic History, Vol. 44, Issue 1, March 1984, pp. 107-118 The Ottoman Empire was not the only power
distant from Europe to be adversely affected by the scandal and collapse of Crédit Mobilier (no relation to
the American company by the same name) in Paris. French and Dutch investors in American railroads called
in their loans and dried up American access to credit, aggravating the shaky condition of unsustainable
railroad overexpansion and overspeculated railroad stocks. Moreover, the German Empire had ceased
minting silver thaler coins in 1871, triggering a drop in demand and silver prices that threatened the new
silver mines that were mushrooming in Nevada after its recent conquest from the Native Americans of the
region. Congress tried to restore prices by passing the silver Coinage Act in 1873, restricting the minting of
silver dollars to exports for the foreign trade. Instead, the inability of the public to convert mined and finished
silver into silver dollars created a shortage in the money supply that raised interest charges on debts that hurt
most farmers that required seasonal loans and deepened the financial crisis spreading to small businesses and
manufacturers that depended on consumer demand. Although, among the causes of the financial crisis of the
1870s in the United States, the German financial crisis was not on a par with other factors (such as speculation
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stage for ongoing stagnation, political crises, wars and a desperate alliance with Germany
for access to capital for mining investments, arms, and railroad networks to
economically and militarily bind the Empire together in the face of Russian
encroachments.
Following the razing of Armenian villages during the second Russo-Ottoman war
in the 1870s, the Ottoman Empire had lost part of its Armenian territory to the Russians,
who set up a Czarist Armenia on the border. Viewing this and the Armenian insurrections
in Turkey directed by the new Armenian Revolutionary Federation as a threat to his
domain, Sultan Abdul Hamid II in the 1894 decided to put an end to troublesome
Armenian nationalism by carrying out brutal pogroms of Christian Armenians for
allegedly supporting Turkey’s age-old enemy, the Christian Czar of Russia. The attacks
caused the Armenian nationalists to increase their reprisals and even the brief seizure of
the Istanbul headquarters of the Ottoman Bank, hoping to induce a Western military
intervention. But the intervention did not come, and the attacks continued, causing
Armenian refugees to beg at the Christian colleges’ doors for safety and medical
assistance. This triggered the mission boards in the United States to launch a publicity
campaign that created the popular image of “the Terrible Turk.”

in the post-Civil War overexpansion of railroads), it did set off a series of factors that, with Congress’s
misguided legislation, reduced American and European confidence in the stability of U.S. monetary policy,
(a confidence already shaken by the 1869 Gold Panic scandal that involved Jay Cooke and James Fisk’s use
of President Grant’s brother-in-law Abel Corbin, to gain advance information about federal gold sales in an
attempt to corner the gold market). With riots by the unemployed and growing strikes by railroad workers
against drastic wage cuts, the financial crisis hastened Washington’s decision to withdraw federal troops from
the South, ending Reconstruction and abandoning African-Americans to the fate of renewed racial repression
and segregationist Jim Crow laws, and releasing troops to put down labor strikes in the North and Native
American resistance in the West. For the Republicans, it also resulted in the loss of the South to resurgent
racist Democrats in Congressional elections and the first post-bellum election of a gold-standard Democratic
presidential candidate from gold-loving New York, Governor Grover Cleveland, in 1884 and after a hiatus
as corporate lawyer more preoccupied with fishing, again in 1892.
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In 1908,seeking to restore the Ottoman Empire’s power, the Young Turks
(officially the Committee of Union and Progress), cooperating with the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation, deposed the Sultan as absolute ruler, restored the 1876
constitution which gave rights to minorities, pledged Armenian autonomy, set up a
parliamentary republic with Armenian representatives, and ushered in a brief four-year
period of relief to the Armenians. That ended, however, when a series of conflicts with
Italy, Bulgaria and Greece convinced the Turks to launch a nationalistic drive to Turkify
the Ottoman heartland, snipping the Armenians’ hope for autonomy. Despite Western
diplomatic efforts in 1913 and 1914, the pressure on the Armenians and other ethnic
minorities grew and skirmishes intensified.
When war broke out in Europe in August of 1914, the Ottoman Empire followed
its German ally into the bloodbath. Frightened, American commercial and missionary
organizations in Turkey petitioned the Wilson administration for protection and soon the
armored cruisers USS Tennessee and North Carolina appeared in the Eastern
Mediterranean but maintained a strict neutrality. The British invasion of the Dardanelles’
Gallipoli peninsula in 1915 threatened to take Istanbul and force open the Bosporus to
give Allied warships and supplies access to the Russian and Ottoman lands along the
Black Sea. Massacres of Armenians renewed with a horrific intensity when the Turkish
regime responded to Armenian insurrections in eastern Anatolia by carrying out mass
deportations to such an extent that German officials warned the Porte that the depletion of
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the Armenian population was jeopardizing their use of Armenian skilled laborers to
complete the German-directed construction of the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railroad. 74
The railroad carried more than the Ottoman Empire’s aim of more closely binding
and economically integrating its Arab domains and inspiring oil concessions and
developments along its route; it had the ultimate German goal of reaching the Persian
Gulf, threatening the British oil fields on the Persian side of the Gulf, the large British
refinery on the island of Abadan off the Persian coast, and, as noted by the Sultan’s
German general adjutant, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, bring the world war to a
“worthy and decisive conclusion” by making possible the conquest of India. 75
This railroad, constructed with German financing from Deutsche Bank of Berlin
and using German engineers, was one of the major triggers for World War I along with
the bank’s founding of Deutsche Petroleum A/G to control the German oil market and
exploit oil rights in Rumania and along the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railroad’s route through
the Ottoman Empire. Despite German warnings, the Turks deported Armenians en masse,
seizing and looting Armenian villages, depopulating whole areas. Armenians who
survived mass shootings were forced to march into the deserts where hundreds of
thousands of men, woman and children perished from heat, exhaustion, and starvation.
Many Armenian refugees fled into neighboring countries, over 150,000 to Syria alone.
Christian missionaries witnessed and reported the killings to a shocked world, all
confirmed by U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, Sr., who led the efforts for

Sean McMeekin, The Berlin to Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany’s Bid For World
Power, 1898-1918 (London and New York: Allen Lane/The Penguin Group, 2010), p. 254-255.
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international relief with President Wilson’s blessing. Later, critics and the Armenians
who had fled to Russia, Syria, Lebanon, and the United States and most credible
historians would claim that as many as one million Armenians died in a deliberate policy
that was later branded as genocide, a charge rejected to this day by the Turks. The fate of
the Armenians in 1915 became a rallying cry for war among many American
missionaries and their supporters in Protestant congregations at home, particularly on the
east coast of the United States, where the looming crisis with Germany took a more direct
turn for the worse.
In May 1915, ignoring German warnings published in American east coast
newspapers not to book passage on the British passenger liner SS Lusitania, heir Alfred
Gwynne Vanderbilt and other celebrities of the day set sail for Europe from New York,
eventually arriving off the southeastern coast of Ireland when they met their fate from a
German U-boat torpedo. The torpedo’s explosion was followed by another explosion,
prompting speculations as to whether the ship was carrying munitions, which was later
confirmed. 76 Nevertheless, Americans assumed that as neutrals they somehow could

The manifest of the Lusitania included 173 tons of rifle ammunition consigned by the Remington Small
Arms Company to Britain’s Woolrich Arsenal and 51 tons of 3-inch shrapnel shells and 18 cases of fuses
supplied by the Bethlehem Steel Company. Remington Arms, through interlocking directorships in National
City Bank, had ties to the Dodge family, owners of the Phelps Dodge mining interests, and the Rockefeller
family; Marcellus Hartley Dodge, son-in-law of William Rockefeller, was president of Remington Arms.
Bethlehem Steel, on the other hand, was controlled by Charles M. Schwab, former Carnegie Steel and United
States Steel executive and director of New York’s Chase National Bank; after 1913, Bethlehem Steel was
headed by Eugene G. Grace, a protégé of Schwab. For contrary views on Lusitania's carrying munitions, see
David Ramsey, Lusitania: Saga and Myth (New York and London: WW Norton and Company, 2001), p. 56.
Diana Preston, Lusitania: An Epic Tragedy (New York: Walker and Company, 2002), Pp. 389. Preston argues
that based on the weight of the shrapnel shells listed in the manifest, they did not contain explosives (pp. 390391. In 1940, when the Lusitania sinking was again raised in the context of whether President Roosevelt’s
aid to Britain violated America’s neutrality status, Roosevelt secretly reviewed the Lusitania’s manifest,
ostensibly for evidence of live munitions, although, strictly in legal terms, the rifle ammunition and shrapnel
shells were contraband. This, of course, made the Lusitania legally subject to inspection by the German Navy,
but not, according to pre-war laws of the sea, sinking without warning.
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claim the right to safety while traveling in a war zone on a vessel flying a belligerent’s
flag. Demands for war reached new heights, moving Assistant Navy Secretary Franklin
Roosevelt to opine that there was a limit to restraint before provocation, as evidenced in
the decision to go to war in 1812. 77
Wilson narrowly avoided war by pressuring the German government to backtrack on their policy of unrestricted submarine warfare in declared war zones. Unsatisfied
with what he perceived as Wilson’s weakness before rising militarism in his second stern
note to Germany, Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan refused to send it and
resigned in protest, being replaced by the Department’s legal advisor, Robert Lansing,
son-in-law of former secretary of state John Foster. The following year, 1916, Wilson
was reelected on the slogan “he kept us out of war,” but preparedness for war was written
into larger budgets for the Navy and Army and contributed to the kind of prosperity that
wins votes. Wilson, although apparently sincere in his desire for peace, thereby protected
his administration from attacks from nationalists led by former president Theodore
Roosevelt who claimed he was doing too little for national security, and from anti-war
leaders like Senator Robert LaFollette who claimed he was doing too much and drifting
toward war. Lansing took the lead in advocating U.S. loans to Britain to finance its
purchase of war munitions, and was joined by Culbertson’s National Foreign Trade
Council’s changing its 1916 Convention motto to “Commercial Preparedness.” 78 Allied
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purchases of American grain, munitions and other supplies had lifted the American
economy out of recession into prosperity, and the admitted fear of a return to recession
had convinced Lansing, Treasury Secretary William McAdoo, and Commerce Secretary
William Redfield to advocate a reversal of policy to permit banking syndicates led by
J.P. Morgan & Co. and National City Bank to extend loans to Britain and France to
finance their purchases, converting America from a debtor nation to a creditor. By the
spring of 1917, with the British Navy tightening its blockade against food reaching
Germany’s northern ports, the German government reinstated unrestricted submarine
warfare while making the fatal mistake of secretly offering Mexico an alliance in
exchange for the restoration of lands conquered by the Americans, almost 70 years
earlier. British intelligence intercepted German Foreign Minister Zimmerman’s telegram
sent via the Atlantic cable common carrier and passed it on to the Wilson administration,
tipping Wilson over in April 1917 to request Congress to declare war against Germany
and its central European ally, the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
Wilson, however, knowing the British were still trying to induce the Ottoman
Empire to withdraw from the war, and sensing that most Americans would not be willing
to go to war over the Armenians, 79 was unsure whether a declaration of war against the
Turks might ruin any chance for the Open Door in the Ottoman Empire’s vast domains
once the war ended. To the disappointment of the influential missionary lobby and many

78
Lloyd Gardiner, “Commerce Rivalry With One’s Allies As Well As With One’s Enemies,” in William
Appleman Williams, ed., The Shaping of American Diplomacy: Readings and Documents in American
Foreign Relations, Vol. II 1914-1968, 2nd Edition (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1970), p. 55.

Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant Diplomacy in the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy,
1810-1927 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1971), Pp, 164.
79

80

of their financial backers, Wilson did not include the Ottoman Empire in his request for
war. But propagating liberal rationales for his entry into the war was of great concern to
Wilson in order to hold on to his liberal political base, and Cleveland H. Dodge, while
accepting his friend’s decision, was encouraged enough to later try to get Wilson to
accept a U.S. mandate for an Armenian state under the League of Nations. YMCA
leaders supported Armenian relief, just as they did Belgian relief from alleged atrocities
by the invading Germans, and the YMCA and the Red Cross spearheaded relief services
in Belgium and France in coordination with U.S. Food Relief administrator Herbert
Hoover.
When asked to inspect these services and report on them to the YMCA board,
Culbertson, who like many young American had wanted to show his patriotism by
joining the boys “over there”, enlisted in the Army on special assignment to the YMCA.
He lost little time collecting letters of introduction from former President Roosevelt and
the influential progressives named above. One of the most influential progressive leaders
and chief intellectual allies of Wilson, New Republic magazine co-founder Herbert Croly,
also provided Culbertson with a letter of introduction. Like Culbertson, Croly was a
Hamiltonian who championed a conservative approach toward finding solutions to make
government more effective, influencing not only Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson, but also Wilson’s young Assistant Navy Secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who
would later incorporate some of Croly’s ideas into the New Deal.
Culbertson arrived in Europe in August 1918 in Army uniform but when
he visited the battlefield, he, like Navy Assistant Secretary Franklin Roosevelt, was
appalled by the bloodshed and vast destruction he saw. After completing his inspection of
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the YMCA’s work and noting certain deficiencies, he returned to London and used his
letters of introduction to gain meetings with influential leaders in British political life,
including Sidney Webb, leader of the Fabian Socialists, author H.G. Wells, Arthur
Greenwood of the Ministry of Reconstruction, and corporate leader William Lionel
Hichens. From his letters cited by Snyder, it seems he was very impressed by Hichens.
A veteran of the Boer War 80 who served in the civil service attending to the
financial affairs of the Crown colonies of South Africa and Egypt, Hichens was Chair of
the famous ship-building firm of Cammell Laird by the time he met Culbertson, and
would be a Member of the Carnegie Trust and a director on the boards of the
Metropolitan-Cammell Railway Carriage Company and the London, Midland & Scottish
Railway until his death during the German bombing of London in 1940. When Hichens
and Culbertson talked in 1918, their conversation focused on international trade,
reflecting a shared corporate geopolitical outlook. Culbertson was impressed by the
businessman’s worldly approach and his grasp of the fact that international competition
for trade and resources was a major cause of the war. Hichens, who had served as British
Colonial Treasurer of Johannesburg and the Transvaal, was a member of the group of
merchant bankers and investors in South Africa and India who since 1910 had published

Much of the Second Boer War (1899-1902) between the British Empire and the descendants of the Dutch
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The Round Table quarterly magazine covering developments in the British Empire. 81
Within a year 82 the Round Table group would found the Carnegie-funded Royal Institute
of International Affairs (later known as “Chatham House”, its headquarters in London’s
St. James’ Square).
Before leaving Britain, Culbertson returned to London to visit Alexander
Kerensky, the former Russian war ally who had been deposed by the soviets 83 of Lenin’s
Bolshevik evolution. Culbertson and Kerensky talked over Russia, then in the grips of
civil war between Trotsky’s Red Army and monarchists and Allied forces, including U.S.
troops sent by Wilson into northern Russia and eastern Siberia. The following year, when
Culbertson returned to Europe as a technical advisor on economic affairs for the U.S.
delegation to the International Conference on Trade.

Members of the Round Table group included Robert Brand (later Lord Brand, a prominent merchant
banker); John Dove; Richard Feetham (later Chief Justice of South Africa); Dougal Malcolm (later Chairman
of the British South Africa Company); and economist Harry V. Hodson, later the Editor of The Sunday Times
of London.
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Also, within that year, 1919, Hichens would marry into one of the most storied aristocratic families
involved in the building of the British Empire, the Lytteltons. Hichens would become the son-in-law of the
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82

The soviets (Russian for councils) were made up of soldiers’ councils, workers’ councils, and peasants’
councils. Weary of the bloody war with Germany, delegates from the soviets were holding a national
conference in St. Petersburg (Petrograd) in November 1917 (October in the Russian calendar) when it
supported Lenin’s overthrow, in their name, of the prowar liberal Kerensky regime that had taken power after
the revolution in the previous February that had overthrown the Czar, Nicolas II. This was the origin of the
new Russian government’s name, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the hammer and sickle on its
red flag (symbolizing the alliance of workers and peasants) which would last over 70 years until the USSR’s
break-up in 1991.
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In 1922, Culbertson was appointed by President Harding as Vice Chair of the
Federal Trade Commission for a twelve-year term. He accordingly elevated his social
status by joining the exclusive Chevy Chase Club in Maryland, where President Wilson
had golfed. Elected the following year as president of the annual dinner of Kansas
Congressmen and bureaucrats, he moved the dinner to Chevy Chase after its usual site,
the Knickerbocker Hotel, was damaged by a snowstorm.
That year was a busy one for Culbertson. He participated in a series of roundtable
conferences sponsored by the Institute of Politics at Williams College, a highly respected
college which would produce later some of the leading intellectual lights of the U.S.
intelligence community. He led an open conference, discussing “Problems of Raw
Materials and Foodstuffs in the Commercial Policies of Nations.” Finally, that year he
also published a major study of international economic policies after World War I,
favoring a policy of reciprocity that gained the attention of a future Secretary of State,
Tennessee’s Rep. Cordell Hull, Chair of the Democratic National Committee from 1922
to 1925. Culbertson coined the term the "new mercantilism" to describe the policies being
pursued by the great powers of the era, including the U.S. The underlying assumption,
highly suspect then and now by most academic scholars, was that state power relied upon
control and protection of domestic resources, raw materials, and markets. The new
imperialism of the era was the result of the international struggle between industrial
powers for these resources to achieve supposed economic security in which the ruling
doctrine was to take all one can take and give as little as possible.
Culbertson thought this foolish. In 1922 he pressed the Harding administration to
adopt the unconditional Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clause to undermine the
84

preferential trade restrictions of European colonialism that had previously been accepted
by the United States with conditional MFN clauses in trade treaties. In particular,
Culbertson offered President Harding, Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, Secretary of
State Charles Evan Hughes and protectionist Senators Arthur Capping of Kansas, Irvine
Lenroot of Wisconsin, and Reed Smoot of Utah a new angle with Section 317 of the
Fordney-McCumber Act which not only required the principle of the Open Door to, as
put by historian William Appleman Williams, “ be written into all enabling agreements
negotiated with foreign countries,” 84 but also gave the White House power to enact
penalties against nations engaged in discrimination against American trade.
This was a significant shift of power in American democracy from Congress to
the executive branch of government. Culbertson, in a May 31, 1922 letter to Secretary of
State Charles Hughes, explained the efficacy of this shift for the advancement of “the
open door in economically backward areas of the earth, including colonies. “These two
policies [the unconditional most-favored-nation policy and the Open Door policy] are
obviously closely related. The adoption of one implies the acceptance of the other.
However, since they relate to different groups of commercial problems, they may be
applied separately and at different times…”
Culbertson urged flexibility in adapting the unconditional form and interpretation
of the most-favored-nation clause in order to “ establish a basis on which to insist upon
equality of treatment in the markets of foreign nations and by which concessions in our
own tariff…will be automatically extended to all nations….The unconditional most-
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favored-nation clause is simply an application to commercial intercourse between nations
of the other equality of treatment principle –the open door–adopted by western powers to
regulate their competitive activities in certain third countries.” As to imposing more
duties to confront trade discrimination, he insisted such actions were left to “the
discretion of the executive [the President]” all in pursuit of further empowering the
“Open Door by expanding that policy beyond the Far East to anywhere in the world.
In this, Culbertson overstated the Open Door Policy as an “accepted feature” of
U.S. Far Eastern policy. He also claimed the recent disarmament conference and its
resolutions were “the most important step ever taken toward making this [Open Door]
principle really effective. Furthermore, our attitude toward the open door in mandated
areas has contributed substantially to liberalism in commercial relations.”
Culbertson then advocated a “field investigation” of the commercial policy that
was guiding leading foreign powers— in particular, Great Britain, France, the
Netherlands, and Japan— in colonial administration, “and especially the way in which
this policy is affecting the economic position of the United States.” The investigation
should address, he advised, “any tendency to put American interests at a disadvantage to
the development of marketing combinations.” These should be answered by
governmental “action” together with the possibility of “investment of American capital in
mines and plantations….” Furthermore, “…. The investigation of markets should include
a study of the possibility of enlarging American export trade by investment in banks,
shipping, railroads, and factories, and by obtaining contracts for public works and
government supplies….” Culbertson argued that “treaties are more than matters of law.
They are expressions of policy. Economic factors have altered our position... and our own
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interests, as well as the interests of world peace, require, in my judgment, the
incorporation in our treaty structure of the same principle of equality of treatment which
has distinguished our policy in the Far East and in the mandated territories.” 85
Culbertson’s goal was not protectionist. Section 317’s “elastic” clause gave the
President a “flexible” alternative to bludgeoning higher customs duties on imports from a
Europe still dislocated by the war, including making exceptions to penalties on nations.
Culbertson’s contribution to the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 had already made
American exporters immune to the Sherman Antitrust Act. Now was the time to use the
President’s new power and New York’s new role as creditor of the world to pressure the
European colonial empires to reduce barriers to American corporate access to their
markets, especially the markets and resources they held as colonies or the League of
Nations’ “mandates.” In his letter to Secretary Hughes, Culbertson pressed this issue.
Washington had become concerned about possible oil shortages created by the war’s
drain on supplies. As he explained to Hughes, the United States had a national interest in
gaining access to raw materials, especially petroleum. 86
Two years later, after testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
ensure that the new interpretation of the Most Favored Nation and policy was
incorporated into the new trade agreement with Weimer Germany, Culbertson was ready
to leave behind his mounting frustrations with the political nature of the Federal Trade
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Commission and its “unscientific” method of work. He sought a position in the State
Department’s Foreign Service. After the 1924 elections had reelected President Coolidge
and Culbertson failed in his attempt to be appointed ambassador to China, he accepted
Coolidge’s offer to become U. S. Minister to Rumania, a Balkan country where oil
discoveries had ignited fierce competition between the Rockefellers’ Standard Oil of
New Jersey and British and French oil companies. Standard had a major holding in
Rumania’s oil fields before the war, making a substantial investment to develop its
purchased share of the fields and build refineries, but when Rumania joined the Allies in
1916, German and Austro-Hungarian troops overran Rumania and, despite Standard’s
tardy compliance with Allied orders to demolish its operations in exchange for a promise
of postwar reparations, the Germans had restored the oil operations to their prewar
production levels by 1918. When the defeated Germans left that year, the British refused
to render the promised compensation. Foreign Secretary Austin Chamberlain, disclaiming
any responsibility for the Allied demolition order, told Standard to get its money from the
Rumanians.
Walter Teagle, who had risen during the war from overseeing Standard’s foreign
operations to become its president, responded by putting pressure on the Rumanian
government’s revenues by cutting Standard’s share of Rumanian oil production from
22% in 1920 to 7% by 1926. This did not help Rumania’s negotiations with Treasury
Secretary Andrew Mellon over settling Rumania’s $45 million war debts to New York
banks. Meanwhile, Teagle cast his eyes elsewhere, at oil-rich Mesopotamia, protesting to
the State Department when access was blocked by British officials then administering the
occupation of the former Ottoman country as a League of Nations mandate.
88

For Culbertson, Rumania was hardly an easy first job as a diplomat when he
arrived in Bucharest in July 1925 to present his credentials. He immediately sought to
establish good personal relationships with Rumania’s royal family and the country’s
major politicians, including John and Vintila Bratiano, leaders of the Liberal Party, which
in 1924 had enacted in parliament nationalization laws to reduce to below 50% foreign
control of Rumanian industries, including Rumania’s oil industry. This was a threat
identical to what Standard Oil of California would encounter later in Saudi Arabia: if a
foreign oil company did not work its concession in a host country, it could lose it.
Culbertson was not impressed by the Liberals’ policy, calling it “internal
imperialism.” 87 He was unable to arrange a comprehensive trade agreement with
Rumania, temporarily settling for a modus vivendi. With time and the turnover of
governments leading to the return of Vintila Bratiano to power in 1928, Culbertson saw
his chance to move matters positively for Standard Oil when he learned of France’s Jean
Monnet’s efforts to put together a consortium loan to Rumania with American
participation. He pressed against Secretary Kellogg’s reluctance to Culbertson’s
suggestion that the loan be tied to a settlement of Standard Oil’s contracted right to
Rumanian oil fields. “I am anxious to stabilize the commercial relations between
Rumania and the United States,” he wrote Kellogg, “… American trade is increasing in
this market and the present modus vivendi is from its very nature uncertain. The
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automobile industry, in particular, wishes to have its position in this market made more
certain.” 88 Culbertson’s informal suggestion to the Bratiano government that the loan
chances would be improved if it settled with Standard Oil bore fruit within six weeks
when Vintila Bratiano’s Ministry of Industry and Commerce agreed to recognize the
contracts previously signed with Romano-Americano, Standard’s subsidiary in Rumania.
By 1928, when Culbertson returned to the U.S. for a rest furlough, Standard Oil had won
a prominent position in the Rumanian oil fields, which soon would prove to be Europe’s
largest.
Culbertson’s rest in the States was cut short. Pleased with the results in Rumania,
Secretary Kellogg rewarded Culbertson with a promotion from minister to U.S.
Ambassador to Chile, in what was one of the first serious efforts by U.S. trade negotiators
to penetrate the British-dominated economies of South America’s Southern Cone. These
efforts were hampered, however, by the passage of the 1930 Tariff Act which increased
duties on imports and aggravated the decline of foreign trade that had resulted from the
onset of the Great Depression. The outstanding issue in Chilean-American relations was
similar to what Culbertson had encountered in Rumania: American corporate access to
markets and natural resources, in the Chilean case it was the Guggenheims’ American
Smelting and Refining Company’s access to Chile’s rich nitrate deposits in the province
of Tacna, Pan American Airways’ struggle against the attempt by the French airline
Latecoere to gain a monopoly from the Chilean government, and Curtiss Aeroplane and
Motor Corporation’s subsequent proposal to set up a joint airline with the Chilean
government for service within the country.
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Culbertson was convinced that U.S. assistance in getting Peru’s formal concession
of Tacna to Chile was the key to resolving all these disputes, pulling Chile away from a
threatened trade bloc with Brazil and Argentina, and avoiding U.S. military intervention.
To this effect in the fall of 1928 he counselled Washington against a scheduled visit by
the U.S. Navy to Chile, which the newly elected president Herbert Hoover cancelled,
opening the way to a negotiated settlement between Peru and Chile the following spring.
In September 1931, the ambassador had another opportunity to assert non-gunboat
diplomacy when the Chilean government, faced with the Coquimbo Mutiny, asked him if
a U.S. warship might be available to help crush it. Culbertson rejected the suggestion,
asserting neutrality in the internal affairs of his host country, noting, however, to
President Hoover that “if Communism and social chaos should come to Chile, we will of
course, have a special problem to deal with.” 89
Culbertson then turned his attention to the other issues. Backed by the State
Department’s insistence on the Open Door, Culbertson gained Santiago’s permission to
allow Pan American Airways to begin service to Chile, then concentrated on reversing
the Department’s policy of not favoring one American aviation company over another.
Culbertson argued that Curtiss was trying to appeal “to the national prejudices of the
Ministry of War. Pan Am, after all, had been awarded an exclusive contract to carry U.S.
mail, and whereas the Post Office Department had not previously extended its contract to
South America, Culbertson persuaded Hoover to reverse the policy, raising the specter of
European competition and that what was at stake was U.S. control of aviation throughout

William S. Culbertson to Herbert Hoover, October 30, 1930, Papers of Herbert Hoover,
Presidential Papers, Official Files, Foreign Affairs, Diplomats, William S. Culbertson.
89

91

South America and the Caribbean. 90 Hoover had his Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson
(Taft’s former Secretary of War), order all U.S. missions to Latin America to “support in
every proper way American companies which have been awarded contracts by the United
States Post Office,” meaning, of course, Pan Am. Chile, its economy hobbled by the
Depression and increasingly dependent on prospects for loans from New York’s powerful
banks, including Pan Am’s banking ally National City Bank, 91 gave in.
Following his Pan Am victory, Culbertson next tackled Chile’s threatened
nationalization of the Guggenheims’ nitrate holdings, organized under a joint 50%
interest with the Chilean government as the Chilean Nitrate Company (COSACH).
Because of the Depression, nitrate and copper prices had plummeted, endangering
COSACH’s survival. The only hope for the Guggenheims was to raise more than $100
million from New York’s banks to buy out smaller companies whose production
surpluses would further erode prices. This generated a furor and charges of American
control over the country’s resources. Under popular pressure, Chilean President
Alessandri cancelled the contract with the Guggenheims and turned to London’s Anglo
Bank, which promptly made the loan that would, with poverty-stricken Chile’s inability
to service its debts, contribute to its subsequent collapse. Culbertson could, like
Washington, afford to be philosophical about it all. As Assistant Secretary of State
William R. Castle (of the Castle & Cooke fruit fortune) explained to Culbertson: “Even
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should the Chilean Government take over nitrate and copper and other interests and
succeed in producing the commodities, they would still have to distribute them to make
this control of value. For international dealings, credit is of the essence …” 92
In a depressed world economy where scarcity of dollars made compensation for
nationalization of American corporate holdings an impossibility without having to face
the U.S. military might paid for by American taxpayers, the Open Door in Latin America
was increasingly seen as the Closed Door once American corporate interests had
penetrated borders. Marines, after all, were still in Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican
Republic, whatever the claim to a peaceful integration of the hemisphere’s markets and
resources into Culbertson’s projected “world system” under American corporate
hegemony. For Culbertson, there was no reward. The 1932 elections had restored the
Democrats to the White House with substantial Wall Street backing. 93 There was little
room initially for Republican ambassadors. Reluctantly, Ambassador Culbertson resigned
and left Chile to the praise of the Chilean Establishment’s El Mercurio and other
newspapers.
Culbertson returned to the U.S. with his family, bought and restored two farms in
in the Blue Ridge Mountains near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, opened a law office in
Washington D.C specializing in international trade, Culbertson & LeRoy, and prowled
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for corporate clients while also serving as residential industrial advisor to the ill-fated
National Recovery Administration in 1933. During this time, he took stock of his
personal life. He actively managed the two home farms in Pennsylvania and had four
daughters with his wife, Mary. In 1937, perhaps in a bid to return to the State
Department, he published Reciprocity: A National Policy for Foreign Trade in support of
Secretary Hull’s trade policies, which was then under fire by Sen. William Borah and
other conservative followers of former Sen. Reed Smoot and his 1930 Tariff Act.
Culbertson argued that the expansion of U.S. trade and investment abroad must became
the avowed cornerstone of a permanent foreign policy. He did not, however, address the
question of how, by demanding reciprocity, a powerful nation could avoid making
reciprocity into a hammer for unequal terms of trade and finance.
Culbertson was by then a major figure in U.S. corporate circles, a member of the
internationalist Council on Foreign Relations of New York, the American Society for
International Law, the International Law Association, a member of the Council of the
Inter-American Bar Association, the American Economic Association, and head of the
economics department and the executive faculty committee of the Georgetown School of
Foreign Service, where he groomed young diplomats in the intricacies of trade policy. In
1938 he attended the Pan American Conference of Ministers as an observer, and assisted
Secretary of State behind the scenes.
In 1939, as war approached, Secretary Hull pursued the “Good Neighbor” policy
to keep Latin America in the American orbit while Assistant Secretary Adolf Berle put
heat on Latin American countries trading with Germany and Italy. Culbertson was
General Chairman of the Conference on Economic Relations with Latin America hosted
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by the University of Michigan, became a member of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s
Committee on National Defense, and was a member of the U.S. delegation to the
International Chamber of Commerce’s conference in Copenhagen. But appointment to
governmental service still eluded him; undoubtedly, his ongoing criticism of Roosevelt’s
New Deal domestic policies and advocacy for U.S. military intervention against
Mexico’s reclaiming its oil holdings from his client, Standard Oil of New Jersey, did not
help. 94

Chapter Two
The Historical Context for Culbertson’s Work
for the Roosevelt Administration
In the summer of 1941, after being called up from the Army Reserve, William
Smith Culbertson took up duties at the President's new federal Exports Control office.
The office was part of a myriad of executive agencies that had recently concentrated
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unprecedented power over foreign affairs in the hands the President to meet the
impending threat of war.
Up to the outbreak of war in Europe in the previous September, Congress,
responding to the overwhelming sentiment among its voting constituents to not repeat the
World War's bloody involvement in another overseas major conflict, had been reluctant,
if not outright hostile, to President Roosevelt's very limited efforts to address the threats
to peace posed by Japanese, Italian and German militaristic expansions. His requests in
1937 and 1938 to update the Navy with new aircraft carriers and battleships were
accepted only with grave reservations and votes along party lines. This, even though it
was widely known in informed international circles that one of the most powerful
influences in Tokyo, the Imperial Japanese Navy, had adopted a strategic focus on
expanding Japan's military reach south into the Pacific. Japan’s thrust west had involved
Japan in one war with Czarist Russia in 1905 and since 1937 had mired the Imperial
Japanese Army in an expensive land war on the Asian mainland with China, with
attendant risks of another confrontation with Soviet Russia and the European and
American trade settlements and investments in China. 95
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See J. Charles Schencking, “The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Constructed Consciousness of a South
Seas Destiny, 1872-1921,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Oct. 1999), pp. 769-796. The Japanese
public’s sentiments were much more pacific than those held by the top officers of the Imperial Navy and the
Imperial Army. At least some of this can be traced as far back as the 1918-22 Japanese participation in the
British-Japanese-American military intervention in Siberia against the new Bolshevik government in
Moscow. The adventure was roundly denounced by newspapers across Japan’s cities for its expense, lack of
victories and dashed assumptions of a quick conclusion. Moreover, the Japanese companies promoting the
intervention—the Kuhara mining company and the Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Somitomo companies allied with
the Japanese–British Trade Corporation’s Lord Cowdray and Lord Farington—had to also accommodate
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J.P. Morgan & Company in 1917.
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After the September 1939 dismemberment of Poland by the joint invasions of
Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, however, and Stalin's invasions of Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia and Finland, President Roosevelt on September 8 declared a state of national
emergency. He established six new divisions in the Executive Office of the President,
including the Office for Emergency Management, a division to oversee the other five
divisions with a liaison officer reporting directly to the President. 96 Responding to the
overseas threats, the 76th Congress appropriated approximately $10 billion and
authorized an additional $6 billion in contract authorizations to increase the Army's
strength to 1.2 million men and equipment for an additional 800,000 men, and to build a
two-ocean Navy.
Facing a re-election bid in November for an unprecedented third term, Roosevelt
was wary of being tagged as a warmonger by pacifists, as well as hostile "isolationist"
Republicans, and the anti-new Deal press led by Chicago Tribune editor Robert
McCormick and the eclectic owner of the largest national newspaper and magazine chain,
Of the three, the most dangerous to Japanese ambitions was the far-reaching American International.
Its board was packed with some of the most powerful Americans in the corporate world: Stone & Webster’s
C.A. Stone, E. S. Webster and George Baldwin (also Chair of American International Shipbuilding), Kuhn
Loeb investment bank’s Otto Kahn, General Electric Chair C.A. Coffin, Pierre du Pont of munitions fame,
International Nickel Company and Midvale Steel and Ordnance director W.E. Corey, San Francisco shipping
magnate Robert Dollar, Federal Reserve Bank of New York directors A. H. Wiggin, William Woodward,
and Ingersoll-Rand Chair W. L. Saunders (a close wartime advisor to President Wilson), financiers and
Carnegie Foundation trustees H. W. Pritchett and, R. F. Herrick, National City Bank directors Frank
Vanderlip, James Stillman, Standard Oil heir Percy A. Rockefeller, Chicago meatpacker J. Ogden Armour,
Bethlehem Steel’s J. Peter Grace, former colonial Governor of Puerto Rico Beckman Winthrop (a descendant
of Massachusetts’ first colonial governor John Winthrop and a former Assistant Treasury Secretary and
Franklin Roosevelt’s predecessor as Assistant Navy Secretary), and copper king John D. Ryan.
For more on the opposition by the Japanese popular press, see Paul E. Dunscomb,” “A Great Disobedience
Against the People: Press Criticism of Japan's Siberian Intervention, 1918–22," Journal of Japanese Studies,
Vol. 32, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), pp. 53-81. For more on the Japanese-British Trade Corporation, see Arno
W.F. Kolz, "British Economic Interests in Siberia during the Russian Civil War, 1918–1920," The Journal
of Modern History, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sept. 1976, pp. 483-491.
For a contemporary explanation of the establishment of the Office for Emergency Management, see
William H. McReynolds, Public Administration Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Winter, 1941), pp. 131-138.
McReynolds was the Liaison Officer for Emergency Management.
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William Randolph Hearst. Roosevelt, however, could not wait until after the election to
deal with the mounting international crisis. To build a prowar coalition cabinet that could
rally the nation's corporate leaders to mobilization while widening his base of popular
support, Roosevelt recruited well-known "internationalist" Republicans who were also
concerned about the looming crisis to national defense. One of Roosevelt's first choices
was The Chicago News editor, Frank Knox. A former member of Theodore Roosevelt's
Rough Riders during the Spanish-American War, Knox had been the hapless Republican
vice-presidential candidate who was swamped by the Roosevelt landslide of 1936.
Appealed by Roosevelt to his patriotism, Knox was persuaded to accept appointment as
Secretary of the Navy on July 16, 1940. Knox joined the other five cabinet members of
the Council of National Defense that had been enacted in 1916 by Congress and President
Wilson during the earlier "preparedness" movement before the last world war: the
secretaries of war, interior, commerce, agriculture and labor.
That month, President Roosevelt made other similar top appointments from
corporate circles. Roosevelt approved Knox's choice of Republican Wall Street
investment banker James Forrestal as Undersecretary of the Navy, the largest single
consumer of oil. Forrestal was quite familiar with the potential of Saudi oil, having been
the Dillon Read investment banker who in 1936 had overseen the merger of Standard Oil
of California’s Saudi oil holdings and Texaco’s marketing operations in the Far East and
Africa to create the joint venture, Caltex. Also, in July, Roosevelt called upon Henry
Stimson, former Republican Secretary of War and Secretary of State, to accept
appointment once again as Secretary of War. To help the aged Stimson, Roosevelt
appointed New York's federal judge Robert Porter Patterson as Assistant Secretary of
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War; in December Patterson would become Undersecretary of War, with Wall Street
lawyer John J. McCloy of the Milbank, Tweed law firm that counted the Rockefellers as
clients, serving as Assistant Secretary. All these men would be involved in the
administration’s penetration of the Middle East.
Roosevelt's filling his new executive agencies' top positions with mostly
conservative corporate officials 97 dismayed many liberal New Dealers, but most of these
appointments were of men who had served in World War I, knew about war firsthand and
had widespread experience in organizing and running large business enterprises in
industries and finance crucial to the war effort. The real power in these agencies,
however, was in the Commission's Priorities Board composed of Knudsen, Stettinius, and
Henderson, with Donald Nelson appointed as Administrator of Priorities.
The urgent military priority of controlling exports for the mobilization priority
and the necessity for secrecy in its implementation was reflected in the fact that among

To coordinate commercial and cultural affairs with the hopefully "Good Neighbors" in the American
republics and dictatorships to the south, Roosevelt appointed Standard Oil heir Nelson Rockefeller as
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. To head up the Council's Bureau of Research and Statistics, Roosevelt
appointed Stacy May of the Rockefeller Foundation, who had helped Nelson Rockefeller draw up his
proposal for the job of Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Roosevelt also appointed the National Defense
Council's Advisory Commission on May 28, filling its divisions with corporate officials. He recruited
William S. Knudsen to head the Commission's Production Division. Knudsen was President of the General
Motors Corporation controlled by the Morgan banking interests and the anti-New Deal Du Pont family of
munitions fame who helped bankroll the 1936 Republican presidential race. By 1941, Knudsen would head
up's Roosevelt's Office of Production Management with its headquarters based at the War Department. To
head up the Advisory Commission's Industrial Materials Division, with responsibility for mining and mineral
products, agriculture and forest products, and chemical and Allied products, including sheet-metal armor
plate, Roosevelt again turned to New York City to recruit Edward Stettinius Jr., who had risen from General
Motors to J.P. Morgan & Company’s board before assuming leadership of the Morgans' U.S. Steel
Corporation. To oversee procurement duties at the U.S. Treasury, Roosevelt picked Sears Roebuck chairman
Donald Nelson, who became the Advisory Commission's Coordinator of National Defense Purchases in June
before assuming the helm of the Office of Production Management in January 1941 and then the War
Production Board in January 1942.
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these new defense agencies the Export Control office was the only one headed by a
career military officer, Army Lt. Colonel Russell L. Maxwell. 98 A man with an engineer's
organizational mind, Maxwell had risen through the ranks of the Army's Ordinance
Division. His appointment by President Roosevelt to oversee control over exports came
with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel befitting so sensitive a position. While the neutrality
acts’ prohibition against arms sales to belligerents had been lifted by a frightened
Congress in November 1939 after the Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland, allowing arms
sales to France and Britain and their allies on a cash-and-carry basis, Roosevelt treaded
carefully to avoid stepping on the political toes of Southern Democrats who had
supported the arms embargo and whose backing he needed in his November reelection
bid.
Yet, he was anxious that not only weapons and munitions but also strategic metals
and chemicals necessary for their manufacture not be exported to Germany or Japan,
reserving such materials to build American stockpiles. In this setting, secrecy about
defense priorities was all-important. Lt. Col. Maxwell's academic and practical
background in the Army’s Ordinance Department during and after the world war,
including graduation from West Point, the Command and General Staff School and other
Army postgraduate schools, made him a reliable choice to administer the President's
policy. But he was no trade expert. It was this knowledge gap that rescued William

Many years later, in 1976, co-author Charlotte Dennett and I interviewed General Maxwell's widow,
Nicole Maxwell, in South America in preparation for our book on what was behind the genocide of South
America's Amazonian indigenous tribe. Gerard Colby with Charlotte Dennett, Thy Will Be Done, The
Conquest of the Amazon: Nelson Rockefeller and Evangelism in the Age of Oil (New York: HarperCollins,
1995; Harper Perennial, 1996; Open Road, 2018). (Culbertson, "Economic Defense of the Americas: : Our
Foreign Commerce in Peace and War" September 1940)
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Culbertson from political oblivion.
That trade accords with foreign nations, particularly with Latin America, would
undoubtedly be disrupted by the war mobilization and exports restrictions was an issue
that deeply worried Secretary Hull, Undersecretary Sumner Welles and Assistant
Secretary Adolf Berle. All three had played a significant role in constructing the “Good
Neighbor” Policy of which Ambassador Culbertson and President Herbert Hoover had
laid the foundation stones.
Culbertson sensed the diplomatic crisis. In August 1940, two months after the fall
of France, Culbertson, then chairman of the economics department of Georgetown
University and professor at Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, wrote an article that
at first blush seemed to reflect much of the military’s and State Department’s focus since
1938 on building a “Fortress America” to defend the Western Hemisphere. Actually,
Culbertson used hemispheric defense to give trade its political import. Entitling the
article “Economic Defense of the Americas,” 99 Culbertson laid out an argument for a
strategic hemispheric defense on an economic basis, warning that “Nazi Germany made
foreign trade an instrument of political power.”
Culbertson explained how the Nazi regime had exploited Latin America’s
desperate need for markets by negotiating trade accords that were based effectively on a
barter system rather “traditional methods of international exchange.” German goods

(Culbertson, "Economic Defense of the Americas: : Our Foreign Commerce in Peace and War" September
1940)
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undersold American goods because they were heavily subsidized by the German State,
which set up government monopolies, carefully planned quotas and restrictions on
exports, and used currency manipulations. This intervention by the State was anathema to
most American businessmen who thought, like Culbertson, that Roosevelt’s milder New
Deal was already overstepping the rules of the marketplace with new government
regulations and enforcement agencies. Now, Culbertson was exposing to them a greater
menace of global implications. By having the Nazi state heavily subsidize German
production, German goods could be sold to the Latin Americans at prices below what
American exporters charged, allowing penetration of Latin American markets that
previously had been dominated by corporations from Britain and the United States. Nazi
Germany “subsidized her exporters and negotiated agreements with economically weak
countries under which she forced them to divert their purchases to Germany from
countries in which they would ordinarily buy. Trade was thus canalized and reduced in
substance to barter. The traditional methods of international exchange were set at
naught…”
All who were familiar with the traditional methods of international trade were
aware that such international cash exchanges were dominated by London and New
York’s international banking systems. Through barter, Hitler was able to circumvent
London and New York’s control over access to credit and capital. Rather than using the
traditional market exchanges, Hitler “…substituted subsidies, dumping, exchange control
and currency manipulation, government monopolies, quotas, and, in general, quantitative
restrictions on the movement of goods. The German state, in short, took over private
trade and finance to serve its political and then justified and supported its economic
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aggression with propaganda and other methods of its authoritarian state.”
Culbertson pointed out that Germany had been quick to extend her trade methods
to Latin American. “The exportable surpluses of food and raw materials of these
countries offered a ready basis for barter arrangements. The German trade offensive was
accompanied by a policy which sought control of industries, minds, and transportation,
particularly airlines, and which, by radio and other means spread Nazi doctrines. These
methods were not without effect on groups which profited economically, and on German
minorities.” Delegates to the Lima conference in 1938 were aware of this potential
danger. Hull had reminded the conference in his opening address ‘that armed force is not
the only instrumentality by which nations can be conquered…”
Hitler’s strategy was to create a European economic system unified under
Germany’s political power, to be in a position to deal with each Latin American country,
one by one, on his own economic and political terms. “If she [Germany] should continue
to use foreign trade as an instrument of a policy of crusade and conquests, her bargaining
power, if unopposed, might be a menace to the security of the Western World and a
challenge to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine…. An impoverished Europe would
seek markets at any cost. Refugees and the demobilized millions would produce goods on
the economic level of poverty and desperation, and Germany, if in control, would offer
these goods in return for the food and raw materials of Latin America.”
The effect on the American trade system would be catastrophic: “With these
offerings our manufactured goods could not compete. Faced by such a comprehensive
barter scheme, our investments in Latin America would be cramped and forced into
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retreat, foreign attack on our trade front would be inevitably followed by an attack on our
investment front. If the exportable surpluses of American-controlled industries in Latin
America were to be drawn into the orbit of Nazi barter, dollar exchange would become
less and less available to pay dividends and bond service in the United States. The
tendency would be to render sterile our property holdings in Latin America. Moreover,
Germany might take over the investments in Latin America of conquered European
countries. The vast power in securities and investments would add double strength to the
economic penetration at first implemented by trade aggression. Finally, political and
cultural ties would be loosened, and the solidarity of the American states would be
weakened if not destroyed.”
After describing how the economic structure of Latin America was particularly
vulnerable to this attack because it’s exports “almost entirely of industrial raw materials
and foodstuffs derived from agriculture, mining, forestry, and animal husbandry,”
Culbertson spelled out the most important exports: “petroleum, coffee, corn, copper,
nitrate, frozen and chilled meats, sugar, wheat, and wool.... Cacao hides and skins,
bananas, linseed, and cotton represent most of the balance…. To dispose of the surplus
raw materials and foodstuffs has been the major economic problem of Latin American
countries.” 100
Culbertson then delivered a stunning fact: in the previous five or six years
Germany had taken over from the United Kingdom second place in Latin America’s

William S. Culbertson, “Economic Defense of the Americas,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, Vol. 211 (September 1940), pp. 186-196.
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import trade. “In individual countries, such as Brazil, Chile, and Peru, Germany’s
advance was more serious than her general average for Latin America would suggest. If a
victorious Germany should now include in her economic system of buying and selling
power of all the countries of Continental Europe and possibly of Great Britain, her
economic strength in Latin America would become controlling, as will appear if ‘Nazi
Germany’ is substituted for ‘Europe’ in the attached table of trade statistics.”
Culbertson then described the inter-American trade measures by which Secretary
Hull had tried to maintain the principal of equality of treatment in trade and investment
between Americans and foreign nations, including use of government credit to the Export
Import Bank to finance American exports and support the exchange position of certain
countries. “The Reconstruction Finance Corporation offered financial cooperation to
develop enterprises in Latin America. A resolution of the Panama Conference in
September 1939 created an Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee
consisting of 21 experts, one from each of the American republics, ‘to increase health and
trade between us to improve the monetary and financial mechanism by which trade and
of commercial transactions of facilitated; to stimulate the employment of capital, in such
productive directions as may be found sound; to improve not only immediately but
permanently the means of transport and communication between us;’ One of the first acts
of this advisory committee was to set up the development commission to promote, with
mixed United States and Latin American capital, the formation and financing of such
enterprises that will undertake the development of new lines of Latin American
production for which a new and complementary market can be found in the United States
or in other republics of the Western Hemisphere,” wrote Culbertson.
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“The Inter-American Financial And Economic Advisory Committee also drafted a
project for an inter-American bank… to make long-, medium-, and short-term loans in
gold and silver; to buy and sell bonds of participating governments and agencies,
provided these are not in default; to buy, sell, deposit, and deal in precious metals,
money, and currencies; to underwrite government loans, to accept deposits, and to
conduct operations of discount and re-discount. Capital would be expressed in United
States dollars, in the amount of $100 million, consisting of 1000 shares having a par
value of $100 each to be paid for in bouldering dollars.... None of the shares would be
allowed to pass to other than governments of the American republics.”
Culbertson then turned to a proposal to establish a marketing cartel as a defense
against unified buying such as he feared a German-controlled Europe might impose. The
precedent for this proposal was the 1918 Export Trade Act, “which permitted American
exporters, and producers to cooperate in the promotion of export trade,” he continued.
“The act was designed, among other things, to protect American business against
combinations of foreign buyers.” But it was a wartime emergency measure, Culbertson
pointed out, fraught with dangers to his conception of democracy.
“It would be a long step toward the acceptance of the very authoritarian methods
which we deplore in Europe. It would invite further regimentation–-control of production
and investment. It has inspired the suggestion that the stamp-plan of the Federal Surplus
Commodities Corporation be extended to the Hemisphere. The storage and resale of
surpluses would be a vast venture of governments in business. Millions of dollars would
have to be provided by the United States. Moreover, the economic control necessary for
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the scheme could hardly be maintained successfully without some degree of political
control as well.”
There was also the danger if one or more of the American countries rejected
United States’ attempt to defend them against Nazi economic methods and joined with
the non-American country to nullify the Monroe Doctrine. Culbertson gave the example
of Argentina, where a suggested joint marketing organization was successfully
undermined by pressure groups in the United States which exaggerated the competition
of Argentine farm and livestock products in the American market. They applied the
prohibition under the 1930 Tariff Law against importation of animals and meat products
in a country in which foot-and-mouth disease exists anywhere in that country to regions
where the disease did not exist, such as Argentina’s Patagonia. Secretary Hull’s effort to
remedy this situation by a Sanitary Convention empowered with inspections by technical
experts was attacked by American livestock producers, leaving it unacted upon by the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and leaving the Argentines with a bitter taste and
vulnerable to German trade.
Culbertson argued that the only answer to the fascist masters of unified Europe
seeking to buy the surpluses of the Americas on their own terms, offering goods in barter,
would be a unified bargaining cartel in this hemisphere. “Like warships and bodies
started, it may become an undesirable necessity. It may be an instrumentality of
economic defense and warfare” that Americans might have to accept, and here
Culbertson saw a grave threat to the traditional American way of life and government.
“But the tragedy of a proposal such as the inter-American marketing organization is that
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it plays into the hands of those reformers who oppose the system of private enterprise and
who favor government control and operation. In this country they are the advocates of the
very methods which the marketing cartel would be set up to oppose.” 101
Here, Culbertson was talking about the New Deal domestic reformers, who
“blame private enterprise in foreign trade and finance as they have blamed it in domestic
business, and their objective is to extend the New Deal technique to foreign economic
relations–-the technique of ‘relief,’ ‘benefit,’ and ‘subvention.’ It is an easy technique for
the bureaucracy as long as the taxpayers’ money lasts. It has expressed itself in the InterAmerican Development Commission and in the proposed Inter-American Bank; and it
would try to perpetuate itself in a joint marketing agency which, once set up, would
create vested interests and inspire theories to support it, a sort of dole-economics. Let us
not forget that Nazi methods have the support of their own peculiar economic theory and
philosophy. Collectivism in the 19th century was a reaction from the excesses of a laissezfaire system. As time went on, the system of private enterprise profited by its criticism,
and government became a regulator and umpire in economic endeavor. Then collectivism
went further and set itself up as a system–-a substitute for private enterprise–-first in
Russia, then Italy, and then in Germany. In the United States it produced the program of
the New Deal.”
Culbertson, however, distinguished the domestic New Dealers from foreign
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policy leaders Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull: “Under the administration of
President Roosevelt the principles and methods of the trade treaties of Mr. Hull have
been almost the only vigorous expression of the system of private enterprise. They still
should remain the norm from which departures like the marketing cartel, if adopted in
any form, should be considered only as a temporary concession to collectivism....
justified as a means of defense–-as a political instrument, just as are our tanks and
airplanes. But just as with the passing of the emergency military disarmament becomes
desirable, economic disarmament becomes equally desirable.... Funds have just been
made available by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation to organize the Rubber
Reserve Company, and the Metals Reserve Company. They will acquire strategic raw
materials as an aid to our defense program. Private companies operating in Latin America
might be very useful in solving some problems of economic defense. In other situations, a
commercial treaty might be sufficient.
“Foreign trade and foreign investment historically and in a very special sense
belong to the field of private enterprise.... In an impoverished world, we may come again
to realize that property rights and personal rights are inseparable, and that personal
freedom does not last long after the power of government has taken over free enterprise.
Property rights may be the first to suffer in a regimented economy, but human rights are
inevitably brought within the orbit of state power. What I am trying to say is that the
postwar world cannot be rebuilt by marketing cartels, state loans, subventions, and relief.
By these and other governmental means we could patch up a sort of existence, but an
impoverished world will ask for something more. It will ask for an economic system
which will release the creative powers of man, and which will provide economic stability
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and a degree of prosperity necessary for peace and for free democratic institutions.” 102
This was not a new argument. In fact, it was the gospel that John Locke had
preached in defense of the propertied landed and mercantile interests that had defeated
the so-called Levelers of the English Revolution of the 17th century. It was the secular
gospel embraced by property holders who, fearing more populist rebellions like those of
Shays’s 4000 rebels in western Massachusetts in 1786-87, turned the 1787 convention in
Philadelphia for governmental reform into one writing an entirely new constitution that
gave Americans a centralized government with checks and balances and a very powerful
executive that could protect, in the words of Locke, “life, liberty, and property,”
including human slaves. Culbertson deplored slavery anywhere, dismissing its major role
in the early rise of mercantile capitalism as another aberration corrected later by reform
and, in America’s tragic anomaly within global capitalism, an unprecedented bloody civil
war. Culbertson, like most American Northerners, saw that conflict as part of America’s
march toward freedom.
At the annual meeting of the American Society of International Law the following
year, Culbertson joined Columbia University professor Edward Mead Earle in
commenting on a paper on international organization presented by Amos J. Peaslee and
other scholars that attempted to address the crisis in international law posed by fascism’s
aggressions against national sovereignty. Culbertson, however, had little to say about
Peaslee’s paper other than breezily agreeing with it; instead, he raised his concern about
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too much toleration in international affairs, likening it to what Gibbons described about
Rome just before its decline.
As war clouds grew darker during the summer of 1941, Culbertson was called up
from the Army Reserve to active duty for limited periods to work in the Export Control
office. 103 It was Hull who pulled in Culbertson, appealing to Culbertson’s patriotism. 104
The appointment to Maxwell’s top staff of William Culbertson, a conservative
Republican trade expert, economist, former diplomat in the Coolidge and Hoover
administrations and since then an international lawyer who had counted among his clients
some of the largest American corporations with investments abroad, gave the fledging
Export Control office needed negotiating skills and familiarity with the trade treaties that
would now be disrupted by exports restrictions. William Culbertson added a vast
knowledge of trade accords and diplomacy gained by the best tutor: experience.
Culbertson’s crucial role in Export Control was soon apparent. Appointed by
General Maxwell as Chair of a subcommittee to tackle the ticklish task of legally
asserting adjustment of trade controls over the Philippines, Culbertson used his
knowledge of the law to gently assert a legal basis for the controls. He also submitted a
report on the yellow licensing system. Maxwell was impressed, on July 5 praising his
report and on June 10, 1940 informing him that Public Law No. 75 of the 77th Congress
“extends export control not only to the Philippine Islands but to the Canal Zone, the
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District of Columbia, and all Territories, dependencies and possessions of the United
States. The contribution made by you and the subcommittee referred to above proved of
great value and enabled us to establish what we believe to be the most workable methods
for the extension of export control.” 105 Maxwell enclosed a copy of the proclamation that
implemented the law. In September Culbertson was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel.
What gaps Maxwell and Culbertson may have had in knowledge of federal
administrative, constitutional, contract and labor law were filled by the part-time able
consultation of the Dean of Harvard Law School, James M. Landis. A loyal Roosevelt
Democrat, Landis had wide experience in law, having clerked for Supreme Court Justice
Brandeis and coauthored a law book with future Justice Felix Frankfurter He had served
on Roosevelt’s Federal Trade Commission and as Chairman of the Securities Exchange
Commission, and had served on the National Power Policy Commission, the President’s
Emergency Board on the National Railway Strike in 1938, and most recently was a
special trial examiner for the Department of Labor. His latest book, published in 1938,
was The Administrative Process. Landis would later head up Lend-Lease in the Middle
East, paving the way for American commercial penetration of the oil-rich region. In this
context, the corporate networks he relied on is worth examining.
After being contacted and agreeing to serve as a consultant to the Defense
Council’s Advisory Commission, Landis phoned Louis Brownlow, former chairman of
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the Public Administration Committee of the Chicago-based Social Science Research
Council. Founded by the Rockefeller-endowed University of Chicago’s sociologist
Beardsley Ruml, the Social Science Research Council’s board of trustees included the
head of the Council’s Transportation Advisory Division, Ralph Budd. Nevertheless,
Landis turned to Ruml’s contacts in the Rockefeller circles. Landis wanted Brownlow’s
assistance in getting from the White House the enabling executive and administrative
orders and rules and regulations of the Council of National Defense governing the work
of the Advisory Commission, the Coordinator of Purchases and the Export Control
Administrator. Brownlow quickly called Guy Moffett, the chief executive of the
Rockefellers’ Spelman Fund, 106 who then sent Landis copies of two memoranda entitled
Emergency Administration and Civil Control of Military Authority prepared some months
earlier by New Dealer Lindsay Rogers, the former Deputy Manager of the NRA and
chairman of the Board of Labor Review of Roosevelt’s Public Works Administration.
Now the Burgess Professor of Government at Columbia University, Rogers was a
member of the board of directors of New York’s Council on Foreign Relations as well as

The Spelman Fund was founded in New York City by John D. Rockefeller in memory of his Abolitionist
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Rockefeller-endowed Spelman College. In the 1920s its president, Beardsley Ruml, University of Chicago
political science professor and president also of the Social Science Research Council, was a moving force in
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Rockefeller’s grandchildren John D. Rockefeller 3rd and Laurance Rockefeller as well as Charles Merriam
(chairman), Beardsley Ruml (President), Phelps Dodge munitions manufacturer and Woodrow Wilson
confidante Cleveland E. Dodge, Maine former Governor and Director of the U. S. Smelting Refining and
Mining Company William Tudor Gardiner, and University of Wisconsin President Clarence A. Dykstra, then
serving as Director of the Roosevelt’s Selective Service, the newly instituted peacetime draft of civilians for
the armed services, and also as chairman of the National Defense Mediation Board. The Spelman Fund
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106

113

a director of Ruml’s Social Science Research Council.
Brownlow also phoned James Rowe, Roosevelt’s administrative assistant at the
White House, asking for appropriate legal documents. Rowe immediately complied with
documents and a confirming letter to Landis. Brownlow also enclosed a confidential
document prepared for Secretary of State Hull by Sir Warren Fisher, until the previous
year the reformer-head of Britain’s Civil Service, and a memorandum on British Cabinet
organization prepared by Rogers for the President’s Committee on Administrative
Management.
Informed by these documents, Landis was now prepared for a dinner meeting in
Washington with the Advisory Commission’s Director of Priorities Leon Henderson,
arranged by Henderson’s aide, Milton Katz. At the last moment, however, Henderson
decided to defer meeting until “several uncertainties” were clarified. It took until the end
of October before the consultant’s contract with the Advisory Defense Commission’s
chief of personnel cleared the contracted per diem compensation for Landis at the request
of Commission’s Price Stabilization Division. Landis, however, had not waited to get to
work on legal priorities, accepting a temporary $5 per diem until the standard $25 per
diem reimbursement plus travel expenses by rail to Washington was approved. 107
By the following month, in December 1940, the amount of procurements for the
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war mobilization was staggering. The National Defense Council’s Advisory Commission
reported that more than $10 billion in contracts had been cleared, with the Army and
Navy having awarded approximately $9 billion of those contracts to private industry:
$3.3 billion for ships; $1.5 billion for construction of factory expansion and housing; $1.5
billion for planes and parts; $600 million for ammunition; $500 million for guns; and
$400 million for trucks and tanks. These contracts, plus such British and other foreign
material orders, called for 50,000 airplanes; 130,000 engines; 17,000 heavy guns; 25,000
light guns; 13,000 trench mortars; 33 million shells loaded; 9200 tanks; 300,000 machine
guns and ammunition; 400,000 automatic rifles and ammunition; 1,300,000 regular rifles
and ammunition; 380 Navy ships; 200 Mercantile ships, 210 camps and Cantonment’s;
and 40 Government factories. The contracts covered clothing and equipment for
1,200,000 men; the first mass production tank factory in the world; five smokeless
powder and high – explosive plants; six shell, bag, and ammunition–loading plants; five
new machine-gun plants; and 50,000 new trucks. The contracts called for about 18
million man-hours of labor, producing approximately 2400 airplane engines monthly;
approximately 700 airplanes monthly; over 100 light tanks monthly; more than 10,000
M1 semi-automatic rifles monthly; and one fighting ship for the Navy every 12 days. 108
This enormous arms escalation and the even larger wartime escalations to come would
have enormous bearing on giving Roosevelt an upper hand in negotiations with Prime
Minister Churchill over global strategy, and, with respect to the primary focus of this
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thesis, in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.
Behind the scenes, Roosevelt had powerful allies in the leaders and members of
New York’s foremost foreign affairs think-tank, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).
The result of a meeting at the Hotel Majestic in Paris in 1919 of American and British
staff participants and observers of the 1919-1920 Paris Peace Conference, the Council
was founded in 1920 and incorporated in July 1921 as the American counterpart to the
Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, founded also in 1920 as a result of the
same Paris meeting.
The CFR brought together some of the most powerful corporate leaders and
lawyers in the United States, men who had already been born or married into the leading
families of corporate ownership— J.P. Morgan Jr., John D. Rockefeller, Paul Warburg
(married to Nina J. Loeb and head of the Kuhn, Loeb investment bank), investment
banker Otto H. Khan (who married Addie Wolff, daughter of another early partner of
Kuhn. Loeb)— or had scaled the heights of corporate power through loyal service:
Norman H. Davis (who started his career in sugar and banking in 1902 in conquered
Cuba and moved up to become finance commissioner to Europe, advisor to Wilson at the
Paris Pease Conference on finance and war reparations and was Assistant U.S. Treasurer
at the time of CFR’s founding), Morgan bankers Russell Leffingwell and Thomas
Lamont, and a host of Wall Street lawyers. These latter included Elihu Root, President
Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State and President Taft’s Secretary of War, who,
despite having won fame by organizing the administration of the colonies conquered in
the Spanish-American War, became the first president of the Carnegie Endowment for
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International Peace, and despite his ardent opposition to Wilson’s reforms, was
appointed the CFR’s Honorary President as a bid to attract conservative Republicans;
John W. Davis, chief counsel for J.P. Morgan and Company, former Congressman,
Wilson’s first Solicitor General and former Ambassador to Great Britain, became CFR’s
first president; Paul Cravath, founder of the powerful Cravath, Swaine and Moore law
firm, became the CFR’s first vice president; George Wickersham, former Attorney
General in the Taft administration was one of CFR’s founders, as was Frank L. Polk,
former Assistant Secretary of State in the Wilson administration, who would become a
CFR vice president.
Academics who had been appointed by Wilson to his Commission of Inquiry into
the causes of the war and suggestions for the peace treaty also were among CFR’s
founders: David F. Houston, who, after a successful career in academia, was Wilson’s
Secretary of Agriculture and Secretary of the Treasury at the time of CFR’s founding,
and later a corporate leader in Morgan interests (Bell Telephone, AT&T); William R.
Shepherd (renown author of the Historical Atlas (1919) and Columbia University
historian who advocated for more scholarly attention to Latin America (an area of
particular interest for Wilson’s concern about capturing postwar markets from European
powers); Rhodes scholar Whitney H. Shepardson, who had been an attorney for Wilson’s
Shipping Board and assistant to Col. House at the Paris Peace conference and would later
help William J. Donovan recruit academics to the OSS’s research division; CCNY’s
Stephen P. Duggan, director of New York’s Institute of International Education, which
would advance from close collaboration with the State Department’s student exchange
program to a more clandestine relation with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) during
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the Cold War: Yale’s anti-Semitic Isaiah Bowman, the first director of the American
Geographical Society who put the Society at the service of the Wilson administration
during World War I and became the major American territorial expert on carving out
Europe’s new boundaries at the Paris Peace Conference, was also elected to CFR’s board;
Bowman would later head up the Territorial Group of CFR’s War and Peace Studies
Program during World War II. Corporate-owned newspapers in New York were also
represented on CFR’s board: John H. Findley, Associate Editor of The New York Times,
and Edwin Gay, former dean of Harvard Business School, planning and statistics director
of President Wilson’s Shipping Board, and editor of the New York Evening Post (then
owned by Morgan banker Thomas Lamont). Gay was a major player behind the founding
of CFR’s prestigious Foreign Affairs magazine, serving as CFR’s first secretary-treasurer
and then vice president. Foreign Affairs’ editor was Columbia University historian
Archibald Cary Coolidge of Harvard, an original member of Wilson’s Commission of
Inquiry into the causes of World War I.
By the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the social profile of CFR’s
leadership had remained the same: the Eastern Corporate Establishment and their
academic retinue. Still on the board of directors were Isaiah Bowman, Paul D. Cravath,
John W. Davis, Norman H. Davis, Stephen P. Duggan, Edwin F. Gay, Frank L. Polk,
Whitney H. Shepardson, Alan W. Dulles, and R C. Leffingwell (of these Cravath was
gone by 1940, as was Hoover advisor Owen D. Young, who had joined the board in
1927). Since then (1927), they had been joined by others who were still on the board in
1941: Hamilton Fish Armstrong, former wartime military attaché of the American
legation to Serbia and former editorial staff member of the New York Evening Post, since
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1928 had taken over the editorship of Foreign Affairs magazine. 109
When World War II broke out on September 1, 1939, Isaiah Bowman, mindful of
all the inner inadequacy for postwar planning that had been done by Wilson’s “Inquiry”
(of which he had been a member), argued strongly that if past mistakes were not to be
repeated, the CFR would have to take up the mission for which it had originally been
created: postwar planning. Less than two weeks later, Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton
Fish Armstrong appeared at the Washington, D. C. office of fellow CFR member George
S. Messersmith, now Assistant Secretary of State. Accompanying him was Walter
Hampton Mallory, CFR’s Executive Director.
A proud 12th generation descendent of William Brewster, leader of the Pilgrims
on the Mayflower, 48-year-old Mallory was an Episcopalian Mason and a member of the
Sons of the American Revolution. A member of exclusive social clubs including
Manhattan’s Century Club and Columbia University Club, Washington D.C.’s Cosmos

The CFR’s leaders were among the most powerful and influential men (women were excluded from
membership) in the United States: Frank Altschul, member of the Lazard Frères investment bank, president
of the General American Investors Company, the Commercial Investment Trust Corp., the Minerals
Separation North American Corp. and a trustee of both Yale and the Woodrow Wilson Foundation; Philip C.
Jessup, former US assistant solicitor for the Department of State and assistant to Elihu Root, was a Columbia
University professor of international law and a board member of the Institute of Pacific Relations, the Foreign
Policy Association, the American Society of International Law and the Carnegie Endowment’s Division of
International Law; Harold W. Dobbs, Leon Fraser, former legal advisor in the American delegations involved
in the drafting of the Dawes and Young Plans to help Germany pay its war debts, and a major figure among
Morgan corporate interests as a director of First National Bank of New York, General Electric, U.S. Steel,
New York Central Railroad, Federal Reserve Bank of New York and a trustee of the mutual life insurance
company of New York; John H. Williams, economist and Dean of Harvard’s Graduate School of Public
Administration, and former economic advisor to the Federal Reserve Board Bank Of New York; and two
noteworthy newcomers: Louis W. Douglas, President of the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York,
a decorated veteran of action in Argonne and Flanders during World War I, a former Democratic member of
Congress, and a former member of the board of directors of American Cyanamid, and former Vice Chancellor
of McGill University in Montréal; and Edward Warner aeronautical engineer, former Assistant Secretary of
the Navy for Aeronautics, a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board and soon to be appointed as a member
of Averill Harriman’s Lend-Lease staff in London in 1941.
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Club, and Vermont’s Dorset Field, Mallory was well known in American upper-class
society. He had been the leader of the Columbia Relief Expedition in 1915 to Serbia
(where Armstrong also served as wartime military attachè), first executive officer of the
Rockefeller Foundation-funded Near East Relief to the Armenians from 1915 to 1916,
and then served as a special assistant to the U.S. ambassador to Russia’s last Czar in
revolutionary 1917 Petrograd. After a year in 1918 on the Western Front as an artillery
lieutenant, he was appointed a representative to the U.S. Shipping Board and as
Executive Director of the China International Famine Relief Commission in Peking from
1922 to 1926, and then returned to Columbia as a special lecturer, where he was tapped to
become the highest staff officer in the Council on Foreign Relations in 1927 and a trustee
of the China Institute in America. A contributor to magazines on international affairs,
Mallory was a man whose opinion carried weight among the pedigreed Eastern
Establishment. When he and Armstrong had finished their conversation with
Messersmith, they had his support for a new postwar planning project by CFR, to be
called the War and Peace Studies Project.
Their visit was then immediately followed up by CFR President Norman H.
Davis, who spoke with his close friend Cordell Hull to assure the administration that the
studies by trusted experts would be secret, as would the recommendations CFR would
secretly be send on to the State Department and President Roosevelt. Hull,
Undersecretary Sumner Welles, and Roosevelt concurred. Backed by a $44,500 grant
from the Rockefeller Foundation 110 (the equivalent of $802,395 in 2018 dollars;
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ultimately, the Rockefeller Foundation would give the CFR project approximately
$300,000, the equivalent of $ $4,207,316 in 2018 dollars), a steering committee was set
up with Norman H. Davis as chair, Armstrong as vice chair, and Mallory as secretary,
with Harvard political economist Alvin Hansen and University of Chicago economics
professor Jacob Viner heading up the Economic and Financial Group, geographer Isaiah
Bowman leading the Territorial Group, New York Times military editor Hanson Baldwin
and Allen Dulles being co-rapporteurs of the Security and Armaments Group, Whitney
Shepardson chairing the Political Group, and Armstrong leading the last group set up
later in 1941, Peace Aims.
Each group leader was paid an honorarium and had a full-time paid research
secretary. Recruits to the groups represented various communities within the power elite.
The military was represented by Major General George V. Strong, Chief of the Army’s
Military Intelligence Division, where Lt. Col. William Culbertson would soon be
assigned, Admiral William Pratt, retired Chief of Naval Operations, and retired Major
General Frank McCoy, president of the Foreign Policy Association. 111

Resolution to fund the Council on Foreign Relations, December 5-6, 1939, Record Group 1. Series 100,
Box 99, Folder 893, Rockefeller Family Archives, Rockefeller Archives Center.
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The corporate community was represented by financiers Frank Altschul, former director of Chase
National Bank and president of General American Investors Company, a closed-end investment firm founded
by Lazard Frères and the Lehman Brothers (of whom he was an in-law) in 1927 at the height of Wall Street’s
speculative bubble; Leon Fraser, former president of the Bank for International Settlements and currently
president of the Morgan-associated First National Bank of New York and board member of U.S. Steel,
General Electric, and the Metropolitan Life Insurance and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Vermont
industrialist Ralph Flanders, president of Jones and Lamson Machine Company and director of Lovejoy
Tool Company, the National Shawmut Bank, the Rockefeller-funded Social Science Research Council, and
appointed in 1941 as Roosevelt’s Administrator of machine tools priorities for the Office of Production
Management; and of course, diplomat Norman H. Davis, member of the boards of Bank of New York, Pan
American Airways, Vanderbilt University and the American Red Cross. The Rockefeller Foundation was
represented by its director for social sciences, Stacy May, whom Roosevelt appointed director of the Bureau
111

121

After meetings throughout 1940, the CFR’s recommendations were coming into
the White House and the State Department. In this thesis, we shall deal only with those
recommendations that exemplified the expanding reach of global power that the CFR
sought. Bowman’s Territorial Group warned on May 21, 1940 that American interests
would be “gravely prejudiced” should Southeast Asia be controlled by an “unfriendly or
monopolistic nation, because of the need for access to rubber, tin and other resources and
because of the strategic importance of converging sea and air routes.” 112 The Territorial
Group also recommended that Denmark’s northwestern colony, Greenland, should be redesignated as part of the North American continent and militarily occupied as an
extension of the Monroe Doctrine in case Denmark fell to Hitler.
Britain should receive immediate aid, including financial assistance so it could
buy need the war materials and supplies it needed to continue fighting. From the evidence
of the record, including Roosevelt’s calling Bowman into the White House the day after

of Research and Statistics of the Council of National Defense’s Advisory Commission. Former New
Hampshire Governor John G. Winant and Admiral William H. Standley were also recruited, but Winant and
Standley, the retired Chief of Naval Operations, soon had to depart for London and Moscow, respectively,
as President Roosevelt’s new ambassadors.
The State Department sent economist and White House advisor Lauchlin Curry, a Canadian-born
graduate of the London School of Economics and Harvard University who had worked in the Treasury
Department with Harry Dexter White, and attorney Benjamin Cohen, a legal architect of the New Deal
reforms and member of Roosevelt’s “brain trust.” Corporate lawyers John Foster Dulles and Thomas K.
Finnletter were tapped, along with newspaper correspondents John Gunther and New York Herald Tribune’s
George Fielding Elliot. But the richest crop of recruits came from academia: Harvard’s William L. Langer,
Alvin Hansen, and Crane Brinton, Yale’s A. Whitney Griswold, University of Chicago’s Jacob Viner, City
University of New York’s Walter R. Sharp, University of Minnesota’s Arthur R. Upgren, Cornell’s Philip E.
Mosely, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy’s Eugene Staley, Princeton’s Winfield W. Riefler, Columbia
University’s James T. Shotwell and Grayson Kirk, aviation engineer and Civil Aeronautics Board member
Edward Warner, son-in-law of Morgan banker William Chapman Potter, manager of Guggenheim
Exploration Company and director of American Smelting & Refining Company and of Guaranty Trust, and
Johns Hopkins University’s geographer and president Isaiah Bowman. All were CFR members and recipients
of corporate and private foundation largesse, constituting an unparalleled academic powerhouse.
Memorandum T-B8, May 20, 1940, War and Peace Studies, Papers of the Council on Foreign Relations,
op. cit.
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the German army marched into Denmark and his taking the Territorial Group’s
recommendation into an emergency cabinet meeting convened to address the crisis, there
is little doubt that the CFR had a direct and decisive influence on Roosevelt’s decision to
send Marines to occupy Greenland.
In July 1940 a CFR spin-off, the Century Group, 113 took up Britain’s need for aid,
specifically old World War I U.S. surplus destroyers to protect supplies convoys from the
States and the English Channel from prowling German submarines. Century Group
founder Francis P. Miller and four others met with President Roosevelt and cabinet
members on August 1, spurring Roosevelt, who had already been exploring this idea, to
take up the issue with his cabinet the next day, who agreed to approach the British for the
negotiations that culminated in the destroyers-for-bases agreement in early September.
CFR’s Edwin Gay wrote his wife that month that he had been at a gathering of a small
group of Council members who had just “put across the fifty destroyer deal against the
opposition of the Navy and the reluctance of the President, who, they tell me, is playing
politics with the whole movement.” 114 But two months later, his re-election safely behind
him, Roosevelt was ready to act.
After a December 14, 1940 joint meeting of all CFR study groups, government
officials, and attended by guest Tyler Dennett, a Wilsonian expert on the Far East, the

The Century Group, named after the exclusive Century Club, where they met, counted top CFR members
among its most active members: Francis Miller, Whitney Shepardson, Stacy May, Edward Warner, Winfield
Reifler and Lewis W. Douglas.
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Territorial Group on January 15, 1941 issued a consensus Memorandum E-B26. Titled
“American Far Eastern Policy,” the aide-mémoire argued that not only American
interests, but Britain’s very survival would be jeopardized if it were deprived of its
colonial resources in Asia and called for more aid to China to encourage a Chinese
offensive that would prevent Tokyo from releasing its troops for an invasion of Southeast
Asia. In this memorandum, the Economic and Financial Group also recommended that
preclusive purchases should be made in Southeast Asia and Latin America to deprive
Japan of resources needed for its war-making capacities and attempt to deter Japan from
invading Southeast Asia. 115 This recommendation was passed on to Secretary Hull by
Pasvolsky on January 28, 1941. Despite some subterfuge on lead exports from Mexico by
the Guggenheims’ American Smelting and Refining Company (ASARCO) 116 and on
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Memorandum, Dean Acheson (Assistant Secretary of State and State Department Advisor on International
Economic Affairs), March 5, 1941 (on meeting with Emilio Collado of the Division for Latin American
Affairs, regarding American Smelting and Refining Company’s oral contract with Mitsubishi for delivery of
16,000 tons of lead produced in ASARCO’s Mexican mines and smelters. Acheson phoned ASARCO’s
Washington lawyer, John Laylin, and expressed his regret at learning about the contract and suggested
inserting in the written contract a clause allowing relief from contractual obligations should lead be needed
for the defense of the United States, Laylin phoned Kenneth Brownell, ASARCO’s president, who
complained that Mitsubishi’s pressure had put him “in real difficulty” to comply with the government’s
request but was willing to see” what could be done with the Japanese and suggested that the government’s
Metals Reserve Corporation buy the lead. At the end of the conversation, Brownell revealed that rival
American Metals Climax had just mailed a written contract for lead with the Japanese for delivery in May
1941.
Acheson requested that ASARCO “pass on the word” to American Metals to include a similar
national defense clause. On March 27, Brownell and Laylin came to the Department and met with Acheson,
Collado, Finletter, Carr and Corse. Agreeing to include the clause in all future contracts, they would limit
ASARCO’s lead production in Mexico (the company controlled 70% of Mexico’s lead production) to a
maximum 200,000 tons, restrict monthly sales to Japan and Soviet Russia to 3000 tons, and make no further
contracts without consulting with the Department. But the company planned to go ahead with the April
deliveries to Japan and asked for a license to ship 2000 tons of tons from Mexico and only 7000 from Selby,
California. Acheson made no commitment, saying the Department would prefer the entire 9000 be restricted
to domestic use. The company subsequently informed State’s Finletter that it had proposed to the Japanese
lowering the tonnage from Mexico to 6000 tons. In answer to a direct question, Brownell said that “52,000
long tons probably represented the annual surplus of pig lead which his company would have if the Japanese
market was cut off.” Finletter, in a prior meeting in Collado’s office, had presented figures on Allied surpluses
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leaded gasoline by the Ethyl Corporation (organized in the 1920s by Standard Oil of New
Jersey, General Motors, and Du Pont Company), control over exports was implemented
by Maxwell and Culbertson’s Exports Control Office and preclusive purchases by
National Defense Council’s procurement agencies with the able assistance of the
Treasury Department headed by Secretary Henry Morgenthau Jr. ( namesake son of
former Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau, Sr.), and the State Department’s
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Dean Acheson.
One commodity that Culbertson’s efforts could have no impact upon, however,
was chromite ore from Turkey’s mines. Chromium is derived as an alloy from chromite
and is essential in steel production. German industry’s capacity to produce tanks, armored
vehicles, guns, naval vessels, airplanes, steel-jacketed ammunition, bridges and steel-

beyond requirements of pig lead, estimating 50,000 tons; but he had failed to include some 63,000 tons of
surplus lead from mines and smelters in Peru. Bolivia and Argentina that had formerly been exported to
another lost market, Continental Europe. This raised the total surplus to over 100,000 tons, and now Brownell
was adding another 52,000 tons if exports to Japan were cut off. And then there were the surpluses from the
British Empire. The figures were dazzling, and it was still unclear exactly how much of this global market
the U.S. government would be able to absorb, much less use for military purposes.
Acheson, a former Undersecretary of the Treasury, realized a U.S. preclusive purchasing program
for the Allies could bankrupt the Treasury unless it found more sources of revenue than what had previously
been raised from taxes and trade duties. Doing nothing, however, was too awful to accept: the collapse of
Allied economies that depended on selling surpluses for survival, and that would mean desertions from the
Allied embargo and defeat in the war. Acheson knew that a viable alternative had already been tested
successfully during the last world war: the U.S. Government had no choice but to lend its allies the funds
they needed to purchase American goods, and that would require a huge increase in the national debt through
sale of government bonds in the name of the war effort. But first he had to secure corporate compliance in
each industry on government-controlled trade.
After reviewing the Department’s statistics on Mexican lead production and Japanese purchases
from ASARCO and American Metals as well as ASARCO’s sales of Vanadium ore to Berlin’s Gesellschaft
fur Electrometallurgie and resold to a Japanese firm, (Memoranda, March 27 (Division of Commercial
Treaties and Agreements, March 27, 1941; Memorandum, Acheson, March 27, 1941), Acheson decided to
call in the presidents of ASARCO and American Metals for a joint conference about lead exports. His staff
submitted a proposal whereby sales of surplus lead was guaranteed by the U.S. Government. Under the
President’s Unlimited National Emergency, the companies had little choice but to comply; moreover, with
guaranteed sales, they had little reason not to. This ensured ample stocks for war production and marked a
much larger commitment to deficit financing than previously seen in all the years of the New Deal’s domestic
pump-priming. (All memoranda noted above are located in the Papers of Dean Acheson, Franklin D.
Roosevelt Library.)
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reinforced buildings depended on a supply of chromite; Germany’s main source of
chromite was Turkey. Not surprisingly, Britain launched its own procurement policy to
replace Germany as Turkey’s main customer for chromite by inducing Turkey, which
feared that its dependency on Germany had made it vulnerable, to sign a two-year
agreement in January 1940 to sell most of its ore to Britain as a follow-up to its 1939
mutual defense pact under which Britain pledged to supply war materiel for Turkey’s
defense in case of an attack by Germany, Italy, or the always worrisome bear to the north,
Russia. But the end of the so-called Phony War and the loss of the British Army’s war
materiel on the beaches of Dunkirk made it impossible for Britain to fulfill its obligations
to adequately supply Turkey.
The fall of France and Italy’s entry into the war made prospects for future aid
from Britain doubtful. Facing the possibility of invasion from the north and east, the
Turkish government in Ankara could not respond affirmatively to the French and British
ambassadors’ request on June 10, 1940 for Turkey to declare war on Germany and her
allies. Churchill, reluctantly acknowledging Turkey’s “perilous situation” and in order to
preserve a strategic bulwark against a possible German, Italian or Russian attack on
British-controlled oil fields in the Middle East and the Suez Canal, accepted Turkey’s
decision to maintain her neutrality. Although the Montreux Convention of 1936 , signed
by Britain, France, Japan, Yugoslavia, British-backed Greece, and the Black Sea’s
riparian powers (Bulgaria, French-and British-backed Rumania, Turkey, and the Soviet
Union), declared the Turkish Straits open to international navigation for trade, it also
restored Turkey’s right to re-erect military defenses in the Straits and control the right of
passage by belligerents’ warships in times of war. Soviet Russians, with the 20-year-old
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memory still fresh in their minds of the Allied occupation of their key ports in the Black
Sea to provide aid to pro-czarist forces seeking the overthrow of the Soviets, was already
demanding the right to share control over the Straits to protect Russia’s southern flank on
the Black Sea. By November 1940, Italian forces had seized Albania, were marching
south against Greece, and were clashing against British forces in Northern Africa and the
Mediterranean, leaving the British fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean with too few
resources to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea and steam north to Rumania to try
to hinder Hitler’s march through Rumania to seize its oil fields. Rumania was left to its
fate, its government falling to local fascists.
Meanwhile. Soviet Russia’s Foreign Minister Molotov and Germany’s Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop were negotiating over Turkey’s fate. Von Ribbentrop had
attempted to draw the Soviets into a Four Power Pact. On November 25 Molotov
responded affirmatively but on the condition that the Soviets establish a leased military
base within striking range of the Dardanelles and Bosporus, that Germany recognize “the
area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf” as a legitimate
Soviet aspiration, and that Turkey would face invasion if she refused to join the pact. 117
The thrust of Molotov’s proposal was not unanticipated by the Germans. At the
signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact the previous year Molotov had hinted of Soviet interest
in pursuing Russia’s traditional drive toward the warm-water ports of the Persian Gulf.
Hitler had remained uncommitted, focusing on getting the Soviet Union’s support for
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their mutual invasion of Poland and on the real possibility that France and Britain would
live up to their mutual defense obligations with Poland. But now the situation had
changed dramatically. With the fall of France, almost all continental Europe was now
under his control, altering irrevocably, he believed, the balance of power in his favor.
With Goering’s Luftwaffe having failed to win control of the skies over the English
Channel, necessary for any viable invasion of England that year, Hitler had already begun
to prepare in earnest for the invasion of the Nazis’ hated host of Communism, Russia.
Having tired of von Ribbentrop’s endless negotiations with the Soviets and
wanting to divert the Russians from the Balkans, 118 Hitler decided the time had come to
be done with the Russians and seize their territories for settling by Germans as a resource
for continuing the war against Britain. He refused the Soviet conditions on Turkey. A
neutral Turkey could serve as a buffer to protect the southern flank of his attack on
Russia. England could wait until the expected quick conquest of Russia was completed.
So could the Middle East. And so could the Baltic states that had been left, along with the
Suez and the Middle East, to Mussolini’s charge.

Donovan’s not-so-secret mission to the Balkans and the Middle East.
President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull had already used the services of Wall
Street lawyer William J. Donovan in 1940 to assess Britain’s resolve to continue the fight
against Hitler and protect its Navy from seizure by Hitler. Donovan, who had represented
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Morgan legal interests, including Anaconda, in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s, was
acquainted with some of the most powerful men in Europe, including Hitler and
Mussolini. Famed as a war hero, he was allowed by Mussolini to visit the battlefields
during the 1935-36 Italian invasion of Ethiopia and observed German war maneuvers. On
his return, he reported to the War Department what he had seen, including Germany’s
new 88-millimeter cannon that could fire equally into the air and at targets on the ground.
Despite the American generals’ skepticism about the 88, Donovan continued his reports
and when war broke out in September 1939, he joined advocates of preparedness,
testifying for the introduction of a peacetime selective service draft in 1940 and
supporting Roosevelt’s efforts at mobilization.
To Roosevelt, Donovan had value as a strong Republican voice at a time when
anti-war sentiment was still strong. No one could question his honesty and his
qualifications. He had been a U.S. attorney during the Hoover administration and the
Republican candidate for New York governor in 1932, when his political career
succumbed under the Roosevelt Democratic landslide. When he returned from his first
mission to London for Roosevelt, his favorable report helped convince the President of
not only Churchill’s determination but of Britain’s capacity to win the war, although
Churchill would have preferred Donavan put more emphasis on Britain’s need for U.S.
help. By the beginning of 1941 Roosevelt needed no convincing that such help was
imperative. The British, despite stopping and rolling back the Italian armies in North
Africa, had been obliged to send 30,000 troops from North Africa to help Greece in its
war against Mussolini’s Fascist Italy, leaving British forces undermanned against a new
opponent, Germany’s master of blitzkrieg warfare, General Erwin Rommel.
129

Roosevelt needed a fresh update on Britain’s chances in North Africa, Greece,
and the Middle East. Since the United States, despite Congress having just passed LendLease to aid Britain, was still a neutral, Donavan’s mission, Roosevelt told him, would
have to be secret. It was not secret to British MI-6, however. The source of Donovan’s
mission, according to author Joseph Persico, was likely MI-6’s Stephenson, the trail
leading from “Stephenson urging Donovan, to Donovan persuading [his friend, Navy
Secretary Frank] Knox. To Knox convincing FDR. Supporting this explanation is the fact
that Donovan’s way was paid for by the British secret service,” 119 although Stephenson’s
accompanying Donovan might also explain this.
It did not take long, however, before Donavan experienced cracks in his cover. An
enterprising reporter at New York’s airport noticed that luggage with the initials “WJD”
belonged to a civilian passenger whose name did not match the initials. By the time he
arrived in England via Bermuda (where Stephenson revealed that the British with Vincent
Astor’s assent, were opening diplomatic pouches in violation of international law),
Donovan’s presence in London was known. After brief meetings, he flew to Spain, Malta
and Egypt and reconnoitered British forces. Then he flew across the Mediterranean to
Greece for meetings with British and Greek officials.
Donovan, seeking to buy time for the British to land troops from Northern Africa
in Greece, then traveled to the Balkan states of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Along the way,
he lost his passport, an embarrassment soon mockingly broadcast by Berlin radio. In both
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countries he met civilian and military officials in an attempt to persuade their
governments to resist Hitler’s demand that they allow German troops to cross their
borders to attack Greece. In this he had a small hand in Yugoslavia, although British
Intelligence officers undoubtedly played a greater role in the Yugoslav Army’s overthrew
of the King’s government for acceding to Hitler’s demand, fatefully delaying Hitler’s
timetable to begin the race to capture the Soviet Union’s key cities before the dreaded
Russian winter arrived in full force.
Donovan’s final destinations were Beirut and Jerusalem. In Beirut, he met with
his childhood friend from Buffalo, U.S. Chargé George Wadsworth, who, much to the
consternation of French colonialists, within a year would become the first U.S. minister
to newly U.S.-recognized independent Republic of Lebanon. In Palestine, Donovan was
pleased with the British use of combined Arab and Jewish forces to ensure security in the
region (including the security of the Iraq Petroleum Pipeline through Jordan and its
terminus at the British refinery at Haifa). While there, British officials convinced
Donovan to go on one final mission on their behalf to Iraq to pressure its leaders not to
ally themselves with the Axis. In this mission, he failed. In April, a pro-German coup
would overthrow the pro-British Hashemite king.
Donovan flew back to Cairo and reconnoitered British forces in Libya before
proceeding to Lisbon, where he secretly conferred with Averell Harriman, then on a
secret mission for FDR to determine British war needs. The two men compared notes on
how the U.S. could help Britain.
When he finally returned to New York on March 18, Donovan emerged from the
25,000-mile trip fully supportive of Churchill’s Balkan-Mediterranean strategy to try to
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keep the oil of Rumania out of Axis hands and prevent the Axis armies from moving
further south into the Mediterranean, threatening Britain’s vital supplies flowing from
India and the Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal. The next day he reported to the White
House for an appointment arranged by Knox, but he was given only 15 minutes to
summarize his findings to Roosevelt and the President’s most trusted aide, Harry
Hopkins.
The President evidently had much on his mind. Roosevelt did not precisely know
Hitler’s timetable for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Soviet Russia, but both he
and Donovan had been briefed on intelligence information that it was imminent. This
imminent invasion, despite the time Donovan’s efforts in the Balkans might buy for
Stalin, could become useless unless Stalin listened to the warnings from Churchill and
Roosevelt, and it was alarming that there was no indication that Stalin was taking heed.
Stalin remained suspicious of Britain, undoubtedly remembering Churchill’s stated
enmity toward the Bolsheviks, the Allies’ charge during World War I that the Russian
Revolution was a German plot deserving the Allied military intervention that followed,
and the failure of Britain and France to join his suggested stand against Hitler over
Czechoslovakia in 1938. He was convinced Germany’s need for trade for Soviet oil, ores
and grain would prevent Hitler from repeating the Kaiser’s fatal mistake of trying to fight
a two-front war in both the east and the west. Roosevelt had been sent the Council on
Foreign Relations’ secret “Grand Area” report. If Russia’s vast manpower, industries, and
huge resources, including the Baku’s oilfields along with Britain’s Middle East oil and
the Suez Canal, should fall into Hitler’s hands, the Allies’ chances were slim to none.
The disregard shown by the American military chiefs and FBI toward Donovan’s
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pro-British report did not help. Some thought it was a British design to push America into
supporting the British’s grim chances in the Middle East, and few appreciated the
President’s approval of Donovan’s subsequent radio broadcasts of a sanitized version of
his report. Then, on top of it all, came further reversals for the British in the Middle East
and the Balkans that shook the American public’s confidence in Britain. Within three
months, Iraq suffered a surprise coup by pro-German military officers and the former
prime minister, threatening the Iraq pipeline to British Palestine and attacking the British
military base and airport guarding it; German airplanes and troops, enjoying landing
rights in Syria given by Vichy France, then arrived in Iraq. In Southeastern Europe,
Germany’s Luftwaffe all but bombed Belgrade into oblivion, killing some 30,000 people,
and German armies pushed the resistant Yugoslavs into the mountains, swept through
Albania and Bulgaria, and conquered Greece. Most, but not all. of the British troops in
Greece managed to evacuate by sea and retreat across the Mediterranean back to Egypt,
only to have to confront Rommel’s panzer attack eastward through Tunisia and Libya
into western Egypt. His Balkan southern flank now secured, Hitler next attacked Soviet
troops across a wide eastern front, seizing both Poland’s and Rumania’s oil fields,
destroying the Soviet air force on the ground, and pushing deep into Russia and the
European nations of the Soviet Union. Churchill immediately pledged alliance with Stalin
and advised Roosevelt to do likewise and expand U.S. aid to include the communist state
both Western leaders abhorred.
Churchill’s first concrete proof of sincerity to the suspicious Stalin came not in
Europe, however, but in the Middle East. When the Shah of Iran refused to deport the
Germans, British and British-led Indian armies invaded southern Iran, securing its giant
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oil fields and the Abadan refinery, while Soviet troops occupied northern Iran. Both allies
then marched on Teheran, forcing Reza Shah’s abdication, and replacing him with his
more pliable young son, Muhammed Reza Pahlavi.
Roosevelt took initiative in supplying the Soviet Union by declaring it eligible for
Lend-Lease aid. He also indirectly did likewise informally with Saudi Arabia in 1941
when Standard Oil of California’s Max Thornburg and James Moffett in April made a
pitch to the President to have the U.S. taxpayer relieve them of the burden of subsidizing
the Saudi king, Ibn Saud, even though Saudi Arabia was a neutral and therefore ineligible
as a non-belligerent for Lend-Lease aid. Saudi Arabia, only a decade old as a sovereign
nation, was less a unified entity than an amalgamation of restless tribes kept pacified only
by the king’s largesse. But the king’s ability to hold things together was now severely
jeopardized by the reduction of his revenues from import taxes and Muslim pilgrim’s fees
and spending because of the world-wide economic depression and now the war. The
Socal emissaries argued that because of the war (Italian planes operating out of the
Rhodes in the Dodecanese Islands had bombed the Bahrain oilfield and Socal’s Saudi
headquarters across the bay at Dharan the previous October), the company had had to
shut down the Saudi field, leaving the oil in the ground as the only collateral for a loan
from Washington.
Continuing the traditional U.S. policy of deferring to British domination of the
Middle East as their sphere of influence, Roosevelt could not provide direct U.S. aid
without breaking the Lend-Lease law and his promises to a Congress with many
isolationist representatives. Knowing, however, that Jesse Jones’s Reconstruction
Finance Corporation was making a $425 million loan to the British, he had the British
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continue the oil company’s subsidy through the use of Lend-Lease funds to Britain.
Roosevelt, however, supplemented Moffett’s role as an informal advisor on the oil
industry by having Thornburg appointed as an official Petroleum Advisor to the State
Department. The fact that both Thornburg and Moffett were actually vice president and
chairman, respectively, of Socal’s Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) subsidiary
offshore of Saudi Arabia and that Moffett was also chairman of Socal’s joint marketing
venture with Texaco, CalTex, underscored the Roosevelt administration’s placing greater
importance on Middle East oil in the State Department’s deliberations.

The Integration of the Leaders of the Council on Foreign Relations’ War & Peace Studies
Project into the State Department’s Middle East Postwar Planning.
Undoubtedly, as authors Inderjeet Parmar and Robert D. Schulzinger have noted
in their histories of the Council on Foreign Relations, 120 the CFR was not alone in
offering recommendations, but it also must be conceded that no other organization
produced over 600 reports for the State Department or were given such privileged access
to the President and the State Department. Hull’s special assistant, Leo Pasvolsky, the
Department’s chief postwar planner, sometimes traveled to New York to attend the
meetings of the Economic and Financial Group and joined the CFR in 1940.
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None of CFR’s War and Peace studies, however, probably carried such longrange strategic weight for Washington after the shock of France’s fall as its study into the
United States’ capacity for self-sufficiency. By calculating the combined productive
capacity of the Eurasian land mass under the control of Hitler and his allies (which then
included the Soviet Union as supplier of ores, petroleum, and grain), the Economic and
Financial Group determined that neither the Fortress America planned by the American
military nor an economic combination with its Good Neighbors to the south could
compete successfully even in peace without the resources of the British Empire,
Southeast Asia and the Dutch Indies. 121
Out of this ominous analysis CFR’s planners developed a geopolitically wider
“Grand Area” as a more realistic economic defense perspective to meet the likely end of
free trade in a postwar Eurasia controlled by Hitler’s Third Reich, Vichy France and its
colonies in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia, Franco’s nationalist Spain backed
by royalists, fascists, and the army’s colonial troops from Spanish Morocco, Mussolini’s
Fascist Italy, Stalin’s vast Communist regime, and Japan’s Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere in the Far East. This alternative “Grand Area”, as it was called after
1941, was seen as vital to American trade and prosperity. The projected Grand Area
stretched beyond Latin America to encompass the British Empire (requiring the defense
of Great Britain as the front line against Hitler’s expansionist ambitions), most of the
Middle East, Africa, Southern Asia, the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), and Australia

121
The study included the net export and import statistics for approximately 95% of world trade in every
product and commodity. War and Peace Studies Memorandum E-B18 with Appendixes, September 6, 1940.
A summary of conclusions soon followed on October 19, 1940 as Memorandum E-B19 and was also sent on
to Roosevelt by Pasvolsky on January 28, 1941. Papers of the Council on Foreign Relations, War and Peace
Studies Project, Seeley Mudd Manuscripts Library, Princeton University.

136

and New Zealand. Defense of the Grand Area “necessarily will involve increased military
expenditure and other risks.” 122 Accordingly, the CFR and others pushed for aid to China
to resist Japanese closing of markets and resources and to encourage China to launch a
counteroffensive to tie down Japanese troops that would otherwise be used to invade
Southeast Asia, a vital source of rubber, tungsten, and tin and the gateway to the oil and
rubber fields of the Dutch East Indies. 123
But the horizon’s dark clouds also had a golden lining: “to set forth the political,
military, territorial and economic requirements of the United States in his potential
leadership of the non-German world area, including the United Kingdom itself as well as
the Western Hemisphere, and the Far East.” Britain’s preoccupation with the German
assault left “a great residual area potentially available to us upon the basis of which
United States foreign policy may be framed…the foremost requirement of the United
States in a world in which it proposes to hold unquestioned power is the rapid fulfillment
of a program of complete rearmament.” Since Britain was the major market for South
American agricultural exports and was the only great power still standing between Hitler
and the United States, Britain’s resistance to German expansionism had to be supported
immediately within the “ component parts of an integrated policy to achieve military and
economic supremacy for the United States within the non-German world.” This in turn
would require some sort of American-led international authority to settle disputes in the
non-German world.
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In June 1941, the Economic and Financial Group took pains to point out that “the
Grand Area is not regarded by the Group as more desirable than a world economy, nor as
an entirely satisfactory substitute;” 124 instead, it was to be the indispensable core for a
projected postwar world order under American leadership. In this new global order, a
unified Europe was not contemplated, whether German-controlled or independent,
because of its huge competitive potential to disrupt American hegemony. War with the
current German-controlled Europe was the only alternative, after which Europe would be
in no shape to unify. The British Empire’s colonial preferential trade barriers would also
have to go, although hint of this would have to wait until the month after the Grand Area
strategic economic plan was completed as Memorandum E-B34 and sent to Secretary of
State Hull and the President on July 24, 1941, just as a partial embargo on Japan was
being implemented.
In August 1941 Churchill arrived by warship off the coast of Newfoundland to
meet secretly with President Roosevelt for the first time. Churchill was already stung by
the sharp terms he encountered to secure the aid that the CFR and others had
recommended to Roosevelt. London’s fabled gold reserves had been depleted by the
strict cash-and-carry terms by which Congress agreed to end its Neutrality Acts’
prohibition on arms sales to belligerents. After Britain transferred much of its South
African gold to the United States Treasury, Roosevelt agreed to advance financial credits
to London. Roosevelt’s resulting Lend-Lease program circumvented Congress’s cash-
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and-carry policy for arms sales, but the gold-depleted British found it took some hard
bargaining. The sale of British assets in the U.S., particularly the hugely profitable
American Viscose Corporation, was said to be required to get Congress’s approval by
early 1941. Desperate, Churchill agreed to the sale of Viscose to a group of New York
bankers, who resold after the war it to Viscose’s American rival, Monsanto Corporation.
Churchill, who was a friend of Viscose’s former British owners, the Courtaulds 125, was
bitter. “As far as I can make out,” he told a cabinet minister, “we are not only to be
skinned but flayed to the bone.” 126
Once the Lend Lease Act was passed, Roosevelt appointed Morgan-in-law
Edward Stettinius, former partner of J.P. Morgan & Company and Chair of U.S. Steel, as
Director of Lend-Lease. Stettinius’s administrative skills had been tested as Director of
Civil Defense and been proven more than adequate; in addition, his personal ties to what
was still then the most powerful financial group in the United States could facilitate
marshalling the financial and administrative resources needed on so vast a global scale as
Lend-Lease. This was an unprecedented vision of U.S. aid around the non-German world,
one that far surpassed in complexity the financial aid that the Wilson administration had
been capable of marshalling. But then, so also were the resources the federal government
had gained since the first world war, especially since the onslaught of the Great
Depression through the New Deal’s reforms and regulations, to the point that some
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observers then and since have argued that the federal government was now more
powerful than Wall Street in America’s capitalist system. The Morgan financial group’s
control over Wall Street and the corporations allied with its loans had been severely
damaged by the Glass-Steagall Act’s breaking apart of commercial banks common
ownership with investment banks which had often dipped dangerously into commercial
deposits to fuel investment banks’ seemingly insatiable appetite for capital.
Yet, in the reorganization that followed the act’s passage, new financial groups
coalesced, including the Morgans’ great rising rival, the Rockefellers, who, in the person
of Rockefeller-in-law and Chase National Bank Chair Winthrop Aldrich, had openly
supported Glass-Steagall, testifying before Congress on its behalf. Still, above all the
rivalry, was the larger picture of inherently hierarchical financial groups dominating the
American economy as a corporate elite that Congress’s Temporary National Economic
Committee (TNEC) had scrupulously analyzed and revealed to the anxious public as a
threat to even its limited democratic rights. Fortunately for these elite groups, the effect
of the TNEC’s report in 1940 was overwhelmed by the tsunami of foreign crises that
threatened the very existence of not only the United States but democracy itself
throughout the world.
Although Stettinius, like most in the Morgan circle, was a sympathizer of
Britain’s plight, Churchill, while recognizing before most politicians the grave threat
Hitler posed to democracy, remained bitter about the loss of London’s hoard of empire
gold and its largest American asset, American Viscose. He worried about American
competition eating away the British Empire to which he had devoted his life. The
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Empire’s survival, he believed, depended on its Mediterranean lifeline to Middle Eastern
oil and the resources of India and the Far East. This was becoming a spurious strategy as
Japanese forces advanced through China and Southeast Asia toward India, and Italian and
German armies in North Africa struck east threatening to choke off the Suez Canal. Now
Hitler’s June attack on the Soviet Union raised the serious possibility of a German panzer
attack south through Turkey or the Caucuses threatening British control of the Suez
Canal and the vital British oil fields in Iraq and Iran, leading many British strategists to
seriously worry about the possibility of a fatal juncture of German and Japanese armies in
India or the Persian Gulf.
At Argentia Bay off Newfoundland, Canada, therefore, Churchill’s priority,
besides a vain hope he could persuade Roosevelt to agree to declare war against Japan for
its recent occupation of Southeast Asia, was to get Roosevelt’s agreement that Germany
should be the primary target in any coming war. But this, too, came at a price: Roosevelt
wanted to add to Churchill’s first draft of a formal statement of principles a more
concrete Wilsonian pledge of self-determination for nations after the war and the end of
preferential trade barriers in world commerce. The latter had long been a goal of
Secretary Hull’s trade policies and had been drafted into the statement by Undersecretary
of State Sumner Welles.
Churchill rose in protest, looking directly at Welles and asked if this was directed
at the Ottawa Agreements of 1932. The Ottawa Commonwealth accords were a desperate
effort to protect Britain’s markets from the international competition, imposing imperial
trade preferences that ended Britain’s long commitment to free trade when it had the
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advanced technology to generate profits and financial wherewithal to dominate such
exchanges.
Welles confirmed it did.
“I could not help mentioning the British experience in adhering to free trade for
eighty years in the face of ever-mounting American tariffs,” Churchill later recalled. 127
He had been opposed to the Ottawa Commonwealth, Churchill said, and favored free
trade, but before he could sign on, he would have to consult the Dominions, the
independent nations that had emerged from the Empire to constitute Britain’s more
liberal Commonwealth of Nations. That, he insisted, would take another week.
Would the Americans be willing, he offered, to strike Welles’s “without any
discrimination” in trade and substitute the hedging phrase “with due respect for existing
obligations”?
Seeing danger for the statement’s world impact if delay prevailed, Roosevelt
backed down. But he rejected Churchill’ provision for a postwar international
organization to keep the peace, believing it premature and subject to withering opposition
by “isolationists” in Congress who did not want to fund or tie down America to a
commitment to another debacle like the useless League of Nations. With Wilson’s failure
to get Senate ratification for the League of Nations in mind, Roosevelt insisted, instead,
on enforcement of peace on a bilateral level, with the United States and Britain acting as
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world policemen during the transition period immediately after the end of the war.
Though this dismayed Churchill and Undersecretary Welles, Churchill assented.
Once signed by the two leaders, the more moderate language of Atlantic Charter
still worried Churchill for its potential impact on the colonial world, including the Middle
East, where nationalism was rising, and Egypt’s King Farouk was particularly troubling.
In response to Roosevelt’s request on July 14 that Britain publicly dispel rumors of a
sphere-of-influence agreement between Britain and Russia, Churchill had used the
Atlantic Charter to foreswear that Britain had not engaged in secret agreements such as
the notorious Sykes-Picot agreement during World War I that secretly divided up the
Ottoman Middle East into British and French spheres of influence. But that did not stop
him from his traditional intent on saving the British Empire and using the war to extend
its sphere of influence, including into areas controlled by the Axis or still controlled by
the defeated French through the German-dominated Vichy France’s hold on the French
Levant, French North Africa, French Central Africa, and French Indochina. While
Churchill’s traditional English balance-of-power strategy toward Europe still included a
French Empire, Roosevelt’s vision for the postwar world order did not, and the
ignominious defeat of France did not offer any serious rebuttal to this perspective on the
future.
Churchill’s pressure forced Roosevelt to back down on the proposed elimination
of imperial trade preferences and on “no future commitments” on Lend-Lease aid, but the
Charter’s language in its second, third and fourth points still sent a message of hope not
only to the besieged British and Nazi-occupied European nations, but also to countries
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still under colonial yoke, perhaps more than either Churchill or Roosevelt realized:
“SECOND, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not
accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.
THIRD, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of
government under which they live; and they wish to see sovereign rights
and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of
them.
FOURTH, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing
obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or
vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials
of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.”
Some of CFR’s leading thinkers, including economists Jacob Viner and Alvin
Hansen, had doubts about the third point when the Charter was released to the public.
They worried that the restoration of national sovereignties would revive national rivalries
and protectionist autarky and weaken the principal of economic interdependence essential
to a free-trade-based world order. As historian Robert D. Schulzinger notes, Viner and
Hansen did not feel that postwar world trade and currency exchange had been adequately
addressed. 128 Hansen in the Financial and Economic Group had pushed for a postwar
system of payments based on the U.S. dollar and an international monetary institution to
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facilitate the free exchange of currencies. Roosevelt, however, wanted a Charter
statement that was simple, not an economic program that would require an explanation on
details. That could come later, at the Bretton Woods Conference when the end, not the
beginning, of years of hard fighting was in sight. “First things first,” he had said to
Welles about the latter’s proposal to include support for an international peace-keeping
body in the Charter, and it applied generally to Roosevelt’s approach on taking
initiatives: in a democratic republic, to be successful, they must rest on patient, careful
building of public support.
The Atlantic Charter, released after the two leaders were safely back in their
capitols, achieved that. It also achieved Churchill’s primary goal: an open American
commitment to Britain’s side in the fight against Hitler’s Germanized Europe. Within
weeks it was endorsed by a host of countries traditionally in the British and American
spheres of influence, as well as the besieged Soviet Union, generating the term “united
nations” for the first time.
In the Middle East, however, governments’ attitudes were mixed. Vichy’s Syrian
government remained uncommitted, as did Vichy’s North African and West African
colonies. Egypt’s King Farouk sympathized with the Germans as potential allies in
advancing Egypt’s independent development and looked forward to the British leaving
his country once and for all. Iran’s Shah, Reza Pahlavi, also favored the Germany, which
had become Iran’s largest trade partner and whose engineers had helped in the country’s
development, including its Trans-Iranian Railroad, celebrated by the Shah, in a tribute to
supposed common Aryan heritage, by hanging a swastika in front of Tehran’s railway
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station. Iraq’s politics were boiling with pro-German sentiments, influencing some of
Iraq’s top army officers. Saudi Arabia’s Ibn Saud, desperate for funds to keep his tribes
in line and ever-mindful of British support for his Hashemite rivals in Jordan and Iraq,
skillfully played both ends against the middle, entertaining courtships for oil concessions
from Germany, Italy and Japan while pressing Standard Oil of California and the British
for more financial aid.
Then, four months after the Atlantic summit, came the game-changer for all: Not
the platitudes of the Atlantic Charter, but the more concrete appearance of Japanese
fighter-bombers swooping over the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor. This was Japan’s
answer to the ultimatum sent by Secretary Hull in November conditioning resumed trade
and continued peace with terms that Tokyo’s hardliners now in power could never
accept: complete Japanese withdrawal from Southeast Asia and China. Getting word of
the attack, Secretary of State Hull abruptly ended his meeting with the hapless Japanese
ambassador who had, after following Tokyo’s cabled orders to burn embassy documents,
mistakenly had assumed he would have time to honorably deliver the war declaration
before the attack took place.
At the White House, President Roosevelt was shocked by the destruction wrought
on his prized Pacific Fleet. It was anchored at Pearl because of his decision the previous
year to move the fleet from Portland, Oregon as a forward projection of America’s naval
power deep into the Pacific to warn Japan from starting the war that CFR’s War and
Peace advisors mistakenly assured him would be discouraged by their advice to take a
more belligerent stand against Japanese aggression.
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Steadily ratcheting up the pressure on Japan, Roosevelt had imposed trade
restrictions on American exports of steel and scrap metal to Japan, a job handled partly
by the Export Control Office run by Lt. Col. Russell Maxwell and Lt. Col. William
Culbertson. When Japan finally had invaded French Indochina that summer and
demanded that Siam (today, Thailand) submit to hosting Japanese army bases, Roosevelt
froze all Japanese assets in the United States, depriving Japanese access to their banked
funds for purchases unless cleared by the U.S, government, which were not. Instead, precursive purchases by the U.S. government dried up Japan’s markets throughout the
Americas. In late November, with Roosevelt’s approval, Secretary Hull sent a stern
message to Tokyo calling for Japan’s withdrawal altogether from Indochina and from
China itself as the price for resumed normal trade. Tokyo, while continuing negotiations
with Washington, refused to reverse its foreign policy. Roosevelt then declared a
complete trade embargo against Japan, completely cutting off its vital oil supplies from
the United States and had the Dutch government-in-exile in London order the same
restriction on American, Dutch, and British oil firms operating in the Dutch East Indies.
Roosevelt’s CFR advisors had been convinced that Japan would back down under all
these measures.
Warned by Naval Intelligence MAGIC decoders that Japan intended to attack,
Roosevelt and the War Department reasoned that the Japanese Imperial Navy would
follow its decades-long Southern Pacific strategy and attack U.S. bases in the Philippines.
They did not anticipate that the major assault would be launched from aircraft carriers
secretly steaming thousands of miles to the west, toward Hawaii. Fortunately, the U.S.
Navy’s new aircraft carriers were at sea on missions and the Japanese warplanes did not
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follow up with a third attack wave, leaving the fleet’s huge oil depot intact. This oil and
the oil stored in the Philippines bases were not from the Middle East; their origins were
American-controlled oil fields in California, Venezuela, and the Dutch Indies.
Nevertheless, oil for America’s war machine was now critical to U.S. global strategy, as
it already was for the armies, tanks, warships, and planes fighting in East and Southern
Asia, Southeastern Europe, Russia, and the vast area stretching from North Africa to the
plains of Iran which the War Department now called the Middle East Theater.

Chapter Three
The Evolution of Roosevelt’s Middle East Policy
In February of 1942 executives of Standard Oil of California had just welcomed
the return to their San Francisco headquarters of company officials from the Middle East
when they were also obliged to host an official visitor from a new intelligence agency in
Washington, D.C. William Eddy, the former president of Hobart College and instructor
at the American University at Cairo, was there on a secret mission: to gather intelligence
on Saudi Arabia. The critical military situation in Egypt required a fallback strategy in
case Egypt succumbed to the combined assaults of Italian armies and Germany’s newly
arrived Afrika Korps under General Erwin Rommel. Eddy had been officially assigned to
Egypt as Ambassador Alexander Kirk’s military attachè but was also an agent of the
Office of the Coordinator of [Special] Information, the spy organization President
Roosevelt had appointed William J. Donovan to lead.
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Before leaving for Cairo, Eddy had been sent to San Francisco by Wallace
Phillips, a graduate of the Naval Academy and a survivor of the Lusitania torpedoing
who had assisted in the location of air bases during World War I in a civilian capacity.
Called back into service in May 1940 as head of the Navy’s sometimes illegal clandestine
domestic and foreign operations in intelligence collection, Wallace, working out of a
Manhattan office, secretly oversaw a global network of some 150 intelligence agents
while providing himself a cover as founder of the New York charitable organization that
sent ambulances to Britain. In September, he joined Donovan’s efforts to set up the
nation’s first civilian spy agency.
Donovan, after returning to the States from his 1941 tour of the Balkans and the
Middle East, had conveyed to Roosevelt Churchill’s warning that British intelligence
indicated that Hitler was planning to attack Soviet Russia. Hitler’s surprise attack
destroyed most of the Russian air force and its astounding success on the ground lent
urgency to the need for adequate intelligence of not only the Axis powers, but also of the
Soviet Union, where there were no American military attachés, Roosevelt having found
them unproductive for military intelligence inside Stalin’s closed society. Dismayed by
British reports that the lack of cooperation between British and American intelligence
services was jeopardizing supply convoys despite the President’s intention to deploy U.S.
warships to guard the convoys, Donovan, after conferring with White House advisors
Ben Cohen and Thomas Corcoran, worked on a draft with the British Naval Intelligence
head Admiral John Godfrey and MI-6’s William (“Intrepid”) Stephenson. Donovan then
sent the resulting memorandum in June to the President calling for the establishment of a
Service of Strategic Information with personnel drawn from the Navy, Army and other
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government agencies and a Coordinator reporting directly to the President.
Roosevelt, knowing how strongly the existing national security services jealously
guarded their institutional turf, anticipated opposition from the Army and Navy high
command and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. He wisely advised Donovan to draft a
military order for him and circulate within the services, knowing it would be best to let
their objections be aired before the head-strong Donovan proceeded any further. Their
firm objections convinced Donovan to drop all references to Army and Naval Intelligence
or the FBI to allay fears that his new organization would usurp the powers of the existing
intelligence agencies, including the FBI’s network of agents in Latin America.
Nevertheless, Hoover branded the President’s subsequent appointment of Donovan as
Coordinator of Information “Roosevelt’s folly” and insisted to MI-6’s Stephenson that he
alone would remain sole liaison between British and American intelligence. Unknown to
Hoover, however, Britain’s Admiral Godfrey had already secured Roosevelt’s approval
to begin the close intelligence cooperation that Donovan and Stephenson had
advocated. 129 Learning of Donovan’s appointment, Stephenson wired London that “our
man is in.” 130
Wallace Philipps and his network (including Eddy) along with Roosevelt’s old
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sailing friend Vincent Astor were among Donovan’s first recruits. While Donovan
continued to build his organization in Washington, he also continued Wallace Philipps’
secret operations. Eddy’s questions to Socal officials and their answers were the subject
of his secret report to Phillips on Saudi Arabia’s fallback capacities for the British in the
very possible British loss of the Alexandria naval base and the Suez Canal. 131
This reflected Roosevelt’s commitment to protect the exclusive 420,000 square
miles oil concession in Saudi Arabia, where Socal had doubled oil production between
1938 and 1940 from 65,628 long tons to 652,154 long tons, as well as exclusive
American ownership of grants in Bahrain and Ethiopia, Gulf Oil’s 50% holding in
Kuwait, the Near East Development Corporation consortium’s approximately 25%
interest in the Iraq Petroleum Company’s holdings in Iraq, Syria, Jordan, the Arabian
Trucial Coast, Oman, Qatar, and Dhofar, and exploration rights in Lebanon, Palestine,
Cyprus, and Aden. 132 From a strategic military perspective, it also indicated Roosevelt’s
commitment to keep the Red Sea supply-line from the South Atlantic around the Horn of
Africa open to Allied shipping vital to the British battlefront in Egypt. This was within
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the United States’ traditional diplomatic recognition of continued British control of the
Eastern Mediterranean. But it was also a nod to the possible need for the British to deploy
warships from Alexandria through the Canal and the Red Sea to offshore East Africa to
meet any Japanese naval advance west to control the Indian Ocean preparatory to an
attack on India itself. Indeed, as late as January 1941the Middle East was seen as the
front line of even of Australia’s defense by the Australian Institute of International
Affairs. 133
Eddy, a decorated veteran of World War I holding a Major’s rank in the U.S.
Marine Corp, then flew to Cairo to assume his intelligence responsibilities as military
attachè and air military attachè to U.S. Minister Alexander Kirk, for whom he also served
as the legation’s sole coding officer for communications. Accompanied by two U.S.
Marines observers, he inspected British fortifications and depots at the Suez Canal (then
under Axis aerial attacks) and the giant British naval base at Alexandria. At the
Alexandria naval base, he introduced himself to the British top brass: Chief of Staff
Admiral John Edelsten, his deputy. the Captain of the Fleet, the Director of Anti-Aircraft
defenses, and at Cairo the commanders of the Royal Marines headquarters. He also
visited by sea Cyprus and the crucial well-fortified Tobruk seaport in Libya
Eddy found need for improvements, which he reported to Washington, where
analysts had already concluded that the loss of the Middle East, the crossroads of three
continents, would be a of the first magnitude, cutting off Britain’s main source of oil and
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eliminating east-bound air routes, sea routes and other lines of communications to the
besieged Far East, and destroying any chance of supplying the Russian Front via the
Persian Corridor.
Hitler’s June 20 invasion of Soviet Russia added another dimension of threats to
the Middle East: for the next two years, British war planners, including the Chief of the
Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, as late as April 1942, feared that a
German attack south through Turkey or the Caucuses into the Middle East. German
legions making a juncture in Afghanistan or India with Japanese forces advancing north
through India was considered a real possibility. Roosevelt personally thought it unlikely.
(In fact, unknown to the Allies, Hitler had no intention of attempting such a juncture, his
top generals dismissing the idea as “fantastic.” 134) The crushing of the Iraqi military coup
and Vichy Syria in the spring of 1941, coupled with the Soviet Red Army’s and British
10th Army’s occupation of Iran in August lessened but did not eliminate the danger from
the north; the defeats and retreat of the Soviet army in Russia itself meant immediate
action was needed. Churchill had responded immediately with pledges of aid that he soon
tried to fulfill.
Roosevelt also recognized the advantage given the Allies by the Soviet Union’s
switch of sides in the war. But this was not an easy sell to Congress or the American
public, who had felt burned by the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 that strategically allowed
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Hitler to start the war, and by the 1939-1940 Russian attack on Finland which led to the
Soviet Union’s expulsion from the League of Nations. In fact, according to historian
Martin Wilmington, in early 1940 “the Anglo-French authorities in the Levant were
seriously planning for an attack on Russia through the Caucuses, and an expedition to the
Balkans.” 135 American diplomacy with Moscow was strained by an economic embargo
on U.S.-Soviet trade since the Hitler-Stalin pact, and only a week before Hitler’s June
1941 attack on the Soviet Union the U.S. Treasury put a freeze on $40 million worth of
Soviet credits. After the attack, however, The New York Times on June 24 reported that
the Roosevelt administration had lifted the freeze.
By July 9, the President was ready to act, telling Sumner Welles that he wanted to
send substantial aid to Russia at once, so that it would arrive before October’s snows
would hamper transportation. That month Roosevelt dispatched to Russia and Iraq his
Lend-Lease liaison to Britain, Averell Harriman, to assess the defenses and needs of both
the Soviets and the British in the Middle East. A committee was hurriedly set up in
Washington to devise a modus operadi for rendering aid to Russia outside Lend-Lease,
consisting of Harry Hopkins, the Soviet ambassador, and the Chair of the British Supply
Council in North America; by July 30 Hopkins was in Moscow to gather details and win
Stalin’s confidence. Until the Soviet Union was declared eligible for Lend-Lease,
however, U.S. aid had to be funneled through Britain.
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This was what was behind the Roosevelt’s issuing of the Middle East Directive of
September 13, 1941, the only Lend-Lease directive issued for a particular region,
underscoring the Middle East as what Churchill later called “the hinge of fate.” The State
Department had recommended that the President issue a statement that emphasized “the
application of the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the Near East, to end that the Arab
speaking world will be given independent sovereignty.” 136 The job of preparing a draft
was given to Robert Sherwood, the famous playwright now with Elmer Davis’s Office of
War Information. Ever mindful of public opinion’s importance in crafting policy in a
democracy, Roosevelt skillfully replaced the earlier draft’s words “expressed wishes” of
the British Government with “expressed needs” and made explicit that the aid was not to
be furnished by a U.S. armed expedition that would compromise America’s neutrality,
but as economic aid provided by American private contractors and civilian personnel
under supervision of the War Department’s Defense Aid Division. Secondly, the status of
the Americans was clearly auxiliary in nature through normal Lend-Lease procedure.
“The British authority should be consulted on all details as to location, size, and character
of depots and transport facilities. Their needs should govern.” Harry Hopkins in a secret
memorandum, however, had already spelled out that the aid was not only for the British
in the envisioned Persian Corridor. “The entrance of Russia into the war has given the
Iranian theater urgent priority…Diversions of material hitherto destined for Egypt are
being made to the new theater.” 137
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At the War Department, the War Plans Division was more specific, noting that
“the rapidly changing Russian situation with the threat of a German offensive south
through Turkey,” required extensive facilities not only for British forces in the Persian
Gulf, but also for the Soviets, necessitating a separate U.S. military mission commanded
by “an officer of broad engineering experience.” The choice fell on two officers to head
two military missions, one to oversee Lend-Lease aid in the Persian Corridor supply line
to Russia, and one based in Cairo to oversee Lend-Lease aid to British forces in North
Africa. Command of the U.S. Military Mission to Iran was given to the former Engineer
of Maintenance of the Panama Canal and Acting Governor of the Canal Zone, Col.
Raymond Wheeler, the Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4. Command of the U.S.
Military Mission to North Africa was assigned to the Chief of the Export Control Office
in Washington, Lt. Col. Russell Maxwell, who was directed to report to Cairo with a
promotion as Brigadier General. Replacing him as head of the Export Control Office was
not his deputy, Lt. Col. William Culbertson, but Frederick Winant, brother of U.S.
Ambassador to Britain John Winant. Culbertson, instead, was transferred to the General
Staff of the Army’s Military Intelligence Division, where he was sorely needed.
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William Culbertson and the Rebuilding of Army Intelligence.
By most accounts, the Army’s Military Intelligence Division was in a confused
state when the Pearl Harbor disaster was followed by Hitler’s declaration of war against
the United States. “In the first winter of the war,” General Dwight Eisenhower later
recalled, “these accumulated and glaring deficiencies were serious handicaps. Initially the
Intelligence Division could not even develop a clear plan of its own organization nor
could it classify the type of information it deemed essential in determining the purposes
and capabilities of our enemies. The chief of the Division [Brigadier General Sherman
Miles, son of the namesake general in the previous century’s wars against the Sioux and
other Indian nations] could do little more in come to the planning and operating sections
of the staff and in a rather pitiful way asked if there was anything he could do for us.” 138
This confusion for lack of leadership and information was especially true when it
came to the Middle East, where no reliable map of the region could be located in the War
Department’s Military Intelligence Division for planning aid shipments to the Soviet
Union through Iran’s Persian Corridor. Desperate for information on roads and routes
through Iran, military planners had to turn to the Library of Congress’s Consultant on
Islamic Archaeology. 139 Speakers fluent in Arabic and Farsi (Persian) were a rare
commodity in the Military Intelligence Division, much less readers of those languages.
Even the actual shipping logistics to send the aid were confused: Maxwell’s replacement
at Exports Control, Fred Winant, was at a loss in understanding what was holding up
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shipments to the Middle East until he discovered that the trail led back to the Middle East
Supply Center (MESC), a British control agency set up in London and Cairo in April
1941. Moreover, Winant learned from records of correspondence that the British twice
had offered membership in MESC’s executive committee to U.S. officials only to be
turned down for lack of interest.
That all changed after the President’s Middle East Directive. Within months, in
early 1942, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief of Staff General George
Marshall, concerned about the lack of continuity between intelligence collection,
evaluation, and dissemination revealed by Pearl Harbor’s intelligence failure, began a
reorganization of the War Department. This included a restructuring of the Military
Intelligence Division. Operating functions were separated from staffing functions and
assigned to operating agencies under a new Military Intelligence Service which would
handle the dissemination of information (raw intelligence). Analysis of intelligence
remained under the General Staff’s Military Intelligence Division, which was reorganized
into advisory groups and small policy-making groups.
In this reorganization, given the political sensitivities involved in coalition
warfare, the G-2 Geopolitical Group, now overseen by an Assistant Chief (and soon to be
Chief) named Lt. Col. William S. Culbertson. When General Nelson Miles objected that
the wordage in the Department’s Circular 59 defining the duties within the new setup was
confusing, pointing out that Military Intelligence Service’s dissemination of information
before it was evaluated and analyzed undermined the Military Intelligence Division’s
analytical mission, he was overruled by Generals Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower, who
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had been promoted to Chief of the War Department General Staff’s Operations Division,
the new replacement for the War Plans Division.
Miles’s reward was to be relieved of his command, which was given to his deputy
and critic, General George V. Strong, former chief of the War Plans Division. A man of
compelling personality, Strong moved forward aggressively, reshaping and reintegrating
offices, and soon discovered that Miles was right about bringing together the evaluation
and dissemination functions and let the Military Intelligence Service continue, bending it
to his organizational will. Major General George V. Strong, former chief of the Army’s
War Plans Division was now the undisputed head of G-2, the master of the Army’s
Military Intelligence Division. He also had an informal connection to corporate leaders as
a member of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Security and Armaments Group in the
War in the Peace Studies Project, having served in 1940 in that CFR group with Wall
Street lawyer Allen Dulles (chair of the subcommittee and a participant with Davis at the
interwar disarmament conferences during the 1920s and 30s), Naval Intelligence’s Rear
Admiral Roscoe E. Schuirmann, and New York Times military correspondent Hansen W.
Baldwin.
Historian Robert D. Schulzinger notes that the CFR’s approach toward avoiding
the mistakes of Versailles was to recognize that not all nations were equal. Disarmament
should start first with the enemies, then the smaller nations, and finally the great powers.
“This disarmament scheme was only example of the great power bias which permeated
the War and Peace Studies. The work of all the groups rested on the assumption that the
United States would have to play an active role in the war in the postwar period. The
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isolationism of the late 30s had been discredited by the rise of Hitlerism. Too many
centers of power or, worse, power vacuums were dangerous for the United States.
According to Dulles, United States needed a ‘predictable world.’ The best way to ensure
predictability was to have as few nations as possible in charge of the major questions of
world politics.” 140 By 1942, when General Strong was appointed to Roosevelt’s heavily
CFR-influenced Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, representing Secretary
of War Henry Stimson on the Advisory Committee’s security subcommittee chaired by
CFR’s president and Hull’s close friend Norman Davis, the CFR president surmised that it
was probable that “the British Empire as it existed in the past will never reappear and that
the United States may have to take its place.” enable us to impose our own terms,
amounting perhaps to a pax-Americana.” General Strong at that same May 1942
armaments subcommittee meeting was more to the point: The United States “must
cultivate a mental view toward world settlement after this war which will enable us to
impose our own terms, amounting perhaps to a pax-Americana.” 141
Strong’s appointment was part of the reorganization in the State Department’s
postwar planning. The result of a September 12, 1941memorandum drafted by Leo
Pasvolsky (with the help and approval, it should be noted, of Norman Davis, the
president of the Council on Foreign Relations), the Advisory Committee in December
had gotten the approval from Under Secretary of State Welles and Secretary of State Hull
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to organize itself into three subcommittees along the lines of the CFR’s War and Peace
Project’s committees: on security and armament issues, on political-territorial issues, and
on trade and financial issues. Assisting the State Department’s participation would be
other government agencies and non-government organizations. Noting that the CFR’s
cooperation had been “very useful” 142 in the past, the CFR’s participation in the
Committee’s research and drafting, advocated by the vice chairman of the War and Peace
Studies Project and editor of CFR’s Foreign Affairs journal, Hamilton Fish Armstrong,
was a given. 143
Authorized by President Roosevelt on December 28, 1941, the Advisory
Committee’s fourteen initial members were Secretary Hull (Chair), Undersecretary
Welles, Assistant Secretary Of State for Economic Affairs Dean Acheson, Assistant
Secretary of State Adolph Berle Jr., State Department international economics advisor
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Herbert Feis (former economic adviser to CFR member Henry Stimson when the latter
was Hoover’s secretary of state), State’s chief of commercial policy Harry C Hawkins,
State’s legal advisor Green H. Hackworth, presidential advisor Ben Cohen, Norman
Davis, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, New York Times editorial board member Anne O’Hare
McCormick, geographer and Johns Hopkins University President Isaiah Bowman, and, of
course, Pasvolsky, Chief of the Division of Special Research and special assistant to the
Secretary of State in charge of postwar planning. Six of these men (Davis, Armstrong,
Welles, Feis, Bowman, and Cohen were leaders or active members of the CFR
(McCormick was barred from CFR membership because of CFR’s membership policy of
gender discrimination against women). Taylor would join them as a CFR director in 1943
and Berle would become a CFR member in 1946 and Acheson by 1948.
Many of these men had participated in the CFR’s War and Peace Studies Project,
which was reflected in their choices for staff members for the new subcommittees:
William Diebold, the research secretary of the War and Peace Studies Project’s
Economic and Financial Group became research secretary for the Advisory Committee’s
economics subcommittee. Walter R. Sharp, research secretary of the War and Peace
Political Group, became research secretary for the political subcommittee. Grayson Kirk,
member of War and Peace’s Armaments Group and co-author with Sharp of
Contemporary International Politics (1940), became a consultant and rapporteur for the
security subcommittee. William P. Maddox, research secretary for War And Peace’s
Territorial Group, became a consultant to the territorial subcommittee, while Philip E.
Mosely, research secretary for War and Peace’s Territorial Group from March 1940 to
September 1941, became research secretary for the territorial subcommittee; in August
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1942 he resumed his role on the territorial subcommittee until February 1945, while also
accepting appointment in November 1942 as Assistant Chief of Pasvolsky’s Division of
Special Research in the State Department.
It was not long before the CFR’s hefty participation was perceived as domination
by career Department officials. Harley A. Notter, Pasvolsky’s Assistant Chief of the
Division of Special Research, in mid-July 1942 warned Pasvolsky that Walter Sharp,
consultant to the political subcommittee, was also attending meetings of Isaiah
Bowman’s territorial subcommittee, for which he had no expertise as a political scientist,
although it could be argued that Sharp did have some experience in governmental affairs
as chair of City College’s department of government studies and had been a member of
the Social Science Research Council during the 1920s. Nevertheless, Notter noted that
Sharp had produced materials for the Council, but not for the Department’s Advisory
Committee. He also reported that Bowman would often phone Philip Mosely to confer on
topics before chairing the territorial subcommittee’ meetings, giving the distinct
impression that the two men were devising prior plans. “The variety and number of
surprises constantly arising in territorial meetings owing to discussions between the
chairman and Mr. Mosely, of which I am not informed, and other divisions about which I
may have no right to be informed, are, regardless of other considerations productive of
embarrassed confusion on my part during these meetings. Perhaps because of your
absence. In recent meetings for considerable part of each, Mr. Bowman and Mr.
Armstrong have shown unmistakably that they wish to build up Mr. Mosely and the other
Council men. Their successful effort in regard to the Committee, and secondly the
Division, most unfairly disregards the contributions actually made by other members of
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our staff. In their name, a protest must be laid against that sort of treatment.”
Through close collaboration with Bowman and Armstrong were maximizing the
CFR’s influence on the Advisory Committee’s deliberations. There was a “limit to
patient endurance – in our case of the slights and rudeness inflicted upon the staff in order
to put forward the members of the Council. There is bound to be trouble in the staff, and I
feel obliged to report that it exists and will increase.” 144
In August 1942, Sharp’s elevation to a top State Department position, as head
research analyst of the Division of Political Studies, triggered another message of
concern from Notter to Assistant Secretary of State Howland Shaw. Notter’s choice of
Shaw for his appeal was apt. Gardiner Howland Shaw was a classic blueblood strippedpants diplomat from an old colonial line that reached back to the Mayflower. The son of
Boston Brahman Henry Russell Shaw and Grace Rathbone, his name carried the legacies
of three very rich merchant families— the Howlands, the Aspinwalls and the Shaws—
whose fortunes went back to the shipping trade before the Revolution and the very
lucrative China trade in tea, silks, porcelain, and opium. 145 Besides a penchant for
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consanguine marriages (a not uncommon trait among the early American rich, most
notoriously the du Ponts of Delaware 146), they counted among their relatives such famous
Boston Brahman names as Cabot, Lodge, and Russell, and New York’s Astor family.
Both the Howlands and the Aspinwalls were also related to the Roosevelts. President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s paternal grandmother was Mary Rebecca Aspinwall (Mrs.
Isaac Roosevelt), the daughter of William Aspinwall Jr. and granddaughter of shipping
magnate William Henry Aspinwall, co-founder of the Panama Railway and the Pacific
Mail Steamship Company that dominated America’s Pacific trade and was the
predecessor of the American President Line. In fact, the President had named one of his

William Henry Aspinwall, son of John Aspinwall and Susan Howland. After working for the merchant firm
started by his mother’s brothers, Gardiner Howland and Samuel Shaw Howland, Aspinwall and William
Edgar Howland (the son of Gardiner), formed their own partnership. Their firm grew tremendously after
Aspinwall became president, in 1835, expanding its trade from the Caribbean to Europe, the Mediterranean,
the British West Indies, South America, the Dutch East Indies, and China. By 1845, the firm owned the
fastest clippers in the world, but improvements in steamships meant the clipper’s days were numbered.
Aspinwall decided the steamboat was the future. While he kept his fleet of clippers bringing in profits, he,
Gardiner G. Howland and Henry Chauncy founded the Pacific Mail Steamship Company to tap the trade of
California, recently conquered from Mexico. It was an auspicious time given that the California gold rush
began the next year, keeping his steamships packed with hopeful 49’ers and cargo. The gold rush inspired
Aspinwall to build the first (and probably shortest) trans-continental railroad in the Americas across
Colombia’s Panama Isthmus.
Starting construction in 1850, it took five years for some 7000 laborers from around the world to
cut through the steamy tropical rain forest at a cost of $8 million and scores of lives lost to malaria and
cholera. But when it was completed, the railroad, later named the Panama Canal Railway, linked the ports of
the Pacific and Atlantic oceans and gave the United States a quicker and more reliable link to California and
to the west coast of Central and South America and the Far East’s resources and markets. When Aspinwall
died in 1875, his funeral at Manhattan’s Ascension Episcopal Church was attended by hundreds of
noteworthy Gilded Era mourners who admired not only his business accomplishments but also his role in
philanthropy, including the founding of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
(ASPCA) and the Metropolitan Museum of Art. His art collection was one of the world’s most impressive,
including works by Diego Velásquez and Leonardo Da Vinci. Aspinwall ‘s legacy as one of the richest men
in America was carried even into the lives of what would soon become the richest family in American history,
the Rockefellers, when his son sold his estate overlooking the Hudson to William Rockefeller, brother of
John D. Rockefeller, for $150,000. The estate was subsequently absorbed into the Rockefellers’ Pocantico
Hills.
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sons John Aspinwall Roosevelt.
Gardiner Howland Shaw had another important attribute besides powerful
relatives: he was the State Department’s top Near Eastern expert. After helping Grew
assist President Wilson at the ill-fated Paris Peace Conference, he had been posted to
Istanbul as Ambassador Joseph Grew’s Second Secretary and had been a member of
Grew’s observer delegation to the 1923 Lausanne Conference that divided up the
Ottoman Empire. He was First Secretary at the Istanbul embassy when, in 1926, he
replaced Allen Dulles as Chief of the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern
Affairs in Washington, where he oversaw the intense pressure that the Department put on
the British and French to allow Standard Oil of New Jersey a share of the profits from
Iraq’s oil fields.
Having won that oil access, Shaw was not happy about the growing enmity
aroused through the Middle East by Zionism in Palestine, rejecting Rabbi Wise’s plea for
American intervention during the 1929 Wailing Wall riots because eight American Jews
had been killed. “It was suggested to Rabbi Wise that you argue that because eight
American citizens have been killed in Palestine, therefore, the American Government
was under some sort of obligation to assist in presenting their side before the Commission
of Investigation was clearly fallacious reasoning. Why should the American Government
assist in presenting either the Jewish or Arab side? 147 During this time Shaw also served
on the executive committee of the Foreign Service Personnel Board. In 1930 he returned
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to Istanbul to serve another eight years as embassy counsellor before being appointed in
1941 as Assistant Secretary of State, assuming the Chair of the Foreign Service Personnel
Board of Examiners and the board of the Foreign Service School.
It was in this capacity that he received a memorandum in August 1942 from
State’s Harvey Notter formally putting in writing his concerns about Sharp’s new duties.
Notter called attention to Sharp’s continuing to work for CFR and New York’s City
College while also being Assistant Chief of the Department’s Division of Special
Research. While acknowledging that “amicable relations between Department and the
Council demonstrably seemed to require favorable consideration of Doctor Sharp for an
appointment,” Notter believed that “an officer – particular one of senior grade – should
give undivided attention to his work in the Department.” 148 But Shaw, a CFR member,
did nothing.
Finally, in mid-September 1942 the situation had become so untenable for Notter
he drafted a letter of resignation. In it, he pointed out that he had been receiving
contradictory instructions from Pasvolsky and Undersecretary Welles (who were engaged
in a power struggle within the department), but what really alarmed him , he explained,
was the inordinate influence that the Council on Foreign Relations’ leaders were
exercising over the framing of problems and solutions in the Advisory Committee on
Postwar Foreign Policy. “… I have consistently opposed every move tending to give it
[the Council] increasing control of the research of this Division, and, though you have
also consistently stated that such a policy was far from your objectives, the actual facts
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already visibly show that Departmental control is fast losing ground. Control by the
Council has developed, in my judgment, to the point where, through Mr. Bowman’s close
cooperation with you, and his other methods and those of Mr. Armstrong on the
Committee which proceed unchanged in their main theme, the outcome is clear. The
moves have been so piecemeal that no one of them offered decisive objection; that is still
so, but I now take my stand upon the cumulative trend.”
He did not want to implement policies that he was sure would be harmful to both
the Division of Special Research and the relations between the Division and the Advisory
Committee, and he feared that the Committee might be operating under the direction of
the Council, not the State Department. Therefore, he asked to be relieved of his post as
soon as possible, suggesting that the territorial subcommittee’s work should be taken over
by the Council’s Leonard Mosley, and that the political section of the Division’s work
should be taken over by Sharp, assisted by Grayson Kirk. “These three Council men at
present head the major units and are already so well put forward through the tactics of
their sponsors that they doubtless can assume the responsibilities in stride, so to
speak.” 149
Notter never sent the letter, electing to remain at his post, while nothing was done
about his concerns. The Council continued its influence over the Advisory Committee’s
decision-making on postwar recommendations to the Department. These included a very
limited commitment to Middle East policy, just when more serious deliberation was
needed. CFR records indicate the Council itself held a meeting in July 1941 on the Arab
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states, 150 but what impact that gathering might have had on Middle East postwar policy is
still not clear and worthy of future research. Bowman’s territorial subcommittee did
designate the Kurds of the region as having no national future 151 except as minorities
within the existing nation-states that occupied their territories: Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Iran,
and Afghanistan; but that was simply a continuation of an identical conclusion reached
by President Wilson’s earlier Inquiry, in which Bowman also served. Palestine’s Jewish
minority was not included, the United States already being on record as approving the
Balfour Declaration calling for a Jewish “national homeland.” Nevertheless, it should be
noted that the CFR’s Territorial Group’s William Westermann, surveying nationalist
movements in the Middle East, also included Jews and Armenians as “Near Eastern
peoples without a national future,” Jews because international Zionism spurred hatred
among Arabs toward sponsoring Europeans and Americans, and Armenians because any
attempt to carve a nation-state out of Armenian lands in Turkey, Iraq and Iran would
create animosities within all three existing nation-state. Westermann recommended that
Palestine remain under British control through an international organization and that the
Armenians should be relegated to the already-existing Armenian autonomous territory
within the Soviet Union. 152
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Westermann, of course, had a different approach for already constituted nations in
the Middle East. For Afghanistan and Iran, he argued in 1942 that “we can exercise
greater influence than the British, who have traditionally been distrusted there.” The
U.S., he recommended, should open full diplomatic and counselor offices in Kabul,
Afghanistan’s capital, to frustrate any German intrigue known to have been operating
there and to gain a foothold in the country that could be used after the war. 153 Iran,
however, had the major obstacle of the secret agreement between the Soviet Union and
Britain that the Shah has acceded to in the treaty that allowed Soviet and British military
occupation during the war. To Westermann, this smacked of the secret treaties that the
Allies had agreed to during World War I, and he urged the State Department should insist
that the terms be published so Americans would have a say in the future of Iran. “Now is
the time for the United States to put its foot in the door of Middle Eastern relations, while
that door is still open.” 154
A year later, Westermann turned his attention also to Syria and Lebanon, the two
French mandates of the Levant slated for independence that year according to the
provisions of the Atlantic Charter and having substantial American investments in
schools, universities, Rockefeller Foundation support for agricultural development in the
fertile Bekaa Valley, and a portion the profits generated by the Iraq Petroleum Company
consortium’s sales of Iraqi oil to France. Westermann recommended getting the British to
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accede to a U.S. request to send an American “military diplomatic team to investigate
conditions in the region.” The purpose would be “to get a fairly large number of men in
American uniform there… to be seen in as many parts of the region as possible.” 155 With
the exception of the Persian Corridor, however, the Near East Mission’s uniformed
presence was limited to General Strong’s G-2 military attachés attached to legations and
embassies.
Instead, State’s Postwar Advisory Committee’s main focus, with President
Roosevelt and Secretary Hull’s approval, switched to preparations for establishing a
postwar international organization to preserve peace through enforcing the principles of
mutual security, reconstruction, and economic, political and social development that
would hopefully replace the closed trading and investment system of colonialism and
protectionism with free—or at least freer— global trade and investment. Convinced that
German guilt could no longer suffice as an explanation for two world wars within 20
years of each other, as had been argued in the Versailles Peace Treaty, the looming
questions for the CFR leaders working with Secretary Hull’s State Department was 1)
whether the only remaining major European colonial ally, Great Britain, could be
persuaded to give up the white skin privileges and preferential trading advantages of
empire; 2) would the occupied colonial allies, Belgium and the Netherlands, do likewise;
3) to what extent would the Soviet Union, despite its closed communist system,
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cooperate? And, 4) what would it take to prevent the current military alliance, the United
Nations, from degenerating into an instrument for the major powers and the status quo as
had been the fate of the failed League of Nations?
One factor was considered indispensable: American leadership, not just
participation in a new world order, but leading it. That goal required a more imminent
objective: the defeat of any postwar attempt to resurrect what was perceived as pre-war
“isolationism” (a misnomer for what was actually unilateralism) in the domestic political
arena regarding foreign affairs. And that could best be achieved by what was clearly
missing before the last war had ended: planning. Inevitably, with growing recognition of
the powerful role that oil now played in fast modern warfare— fueling warships,
airplanes, tanks, armored cars and other mobile troop carriers, including landing boats for
amphibious invasions—and the persistent worries about having adequate oil supplies, the
eyes of long-range American military planners were increasingly cast toward the oil-rich
Middle East in expectation of using its most valuable resource to fuel what was expected
to be a long-fought invasion campaign in Japan.
The Middle East thereby came under the direction of the U.S. governmental
executive bodies with the most immediate wartime resources to put into effect: the new
Lend-Lease Administration under Edward Stettinius and the War Department under its
Commander-in-Chief, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
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Military Intelligence Takes Up the Middle East in Earnest.
In 1942, the Army’s Military Intelligence Division (MID) was preoccupied with
delivering intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that was needed to accurately assess the
weaknesses, strengths, and likely intentions of Axis enemies and the British and Soviet
allies. Middle East concerns were the province of military attachés assigned to embassies,
legations, consulates, and active military commands, particularly the Persian Gulf
Command based in Iran and the U.S. Armed Forces in the Middle East Command based
in Cairo, Egypt under Brigadier General Russell L. Maxwell.
Maxwell’s former assistant at the Export Control office, Lt. Col. William S.
Culbertson, remained in Washington at the new Pentagon building working as Assistant
Chief of the Geographical Section of MID’s new Military Intelligence Service. Over the
opposition of the Joint Chiefs, President Roosevelt had acceded to Prime Minister
Churchill’s appeal for an Allied invasion of French North Africa instead of the American
generals’ preference for a cross-Channel invasion of France from England. Roosevelt,
despite his promise to visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov to open a Western Front
in 1942, had reversed himself, convinced that U.S. forces, although building steadily in
England, were not of sufficient strength in numbers, training and equipment to carry forth
an invasion of France without significant risk of defeat, as evidenced by the disastrous
test of German defenses by Canadian troops on the beaches of Dieppe in August 1942.
In May 1942, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel launched a major attack on the
British Army’s Gazala Line of defenses in Libya. The attack was so typical of Rommel’s
tactical brilliance, yet also so typical of the weakness of Hitler’s grand strategy for the
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war, that these factors alone would warrant reviewing the attack. But what is of equal
significance is that, coming merely a month after the Japanese conquest of Britain’s
major base for its Pacific fleet, Singapore, Rommel’s rapid series of victories in Tunisia
and Libya, reversing the British 8th Army’s previous steady advance, so stunned Britain
that it sent a wave of deep alarm and, in some cases, demoralization that they threatened
the morale of the entire Allied war effort and inspired a Parliamentary motion of censure
against Prime Minister Churchill.
From the port of Tripoli and moving rapidly east along the Mediterranean coast,
Rommel’s armored divisions had joined up with the Italian armies and seized Benghazi.
Continuing east, Rommel had the two relatively immobile Italian infantry corps make
diversionary frontal assaults on the northern half of the Commonwealth forces’ Gazala
Line of defenses and the southern half of the Line to pin the British down while
Rommel’s two panzer divisions and his 90th Light Division, accompanied by the Italians’
more mobile XX Corps including the armored crack Ariete Division, sped south around
the Line’s southern edge and swung north. Encountering unexpected stiff resistance from
the 1st Free French Brigade and losing many armored units, Rommel suspended his
march north, used the British delay in counterattacking to prepare strong defensive
positions and circled to attack the numerous but scattered British tank defenses, picking
them off one by one. British tank counterattacks, lacking Rommel’s central command
structure for coordinated attacks, were fragmented, while the Luftwaffe attacked them
from hastily built airfields in the rear. Recently arrived American Grant tanks, despite
some successes, were blown apart by German anti-tank guns and the same 88 millimeter
anti-aircraft guns that Donovan had futilely warned American generals about in the 1930s
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after witnessing their unprecedented ability to fire powerful shells at land targets as well
as aircraft.
With the Italians finally overwhelming the obstinate defenses of the 1st Free
French Brigade in the northern sector of the Line, Rommel’s panzer divisions then struck
north again toward the Mediterranean coast to attack the strategic port of Tobruk from the
southeast, the opposite direction than what the British had expected. Surrounded and with
other British forces already retreating east and the bulk of the British 8th Army remaining
stationary and making no move to intervene, the South African commander of the town’s
huge garrison surrendered after just two days of street fighting on June 21, delivering
30,000 bewildered Commonwealth troops, including 19,000 British soldiers, into German
captivity.
Churchill was in Washington conferring with Roosevelt when the shocking news
of Tobruk’s fall arrived. Roosevelt, having received what historians later judged were
overestimations of German defenses in France, had already decided to give the untested
American soldiers their first bloody experience in French North Africa, where German
power was less strong and where the British 8th Army desperately needed not only
American tanks and warplanes, but also American boots on the ground. With Tobruk’s
fall and its large port now in his hands, Rommel had replaced his precarious long supply
line from Tripoli with a new closer base for the debarkation of supplies from Italy.
Leading from the front, unlike his British opponents, Rommel had personally delivered
fuel through British minefields to keep his panzer divisions moving east into Egypt,
pushing the British before him. But supplies from Italy had not yet arrived, his men and
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ammunition were exhausted, and the Africa Korps had already suffered the loss of over a
third of Rommel’s original 330-tank command. He had no choice than to stop the
advance, regroup, and wait for his pleas to Hitler for supplies to be heeded.
He did not yet realize that his needs could not be met by the drain on petroleum
supplies from Hitler’s adventurous opportunism in Russia, an opportunism that
Rommel’s own lead-from-the-front tactical brilliance in mobile desert warfare
exemplified, contrary to the well-planned strategies of the professionals of the German
General Staff before its Nazification purges.
Roosevelt immediately saw the danger of losing the Middle East to the Allied war
effort. On July 16, 1942, he wrote a secret memorandum to General Marshall, Admiral
King, and Harry Hopkins, giving strict instructions for the upcoming London conference,
reemphasizing the “Germany First” grand strategy, the importance of aid to Russia and
preparing Operation Sledgehammer, a diversionary attack on German-occupied Western
Europe to give relief on the Easter Front in the case of Russia’s faltering, and pressing the
case for the defense of the Middle East. “The Middle East should be held as strongly as
possible whether Russia collapses or not,” he insisted. “I want you to take into
consideration the effect of losing the Middle East. Such laws mean in series:
(1) Loss of Egypt and the Suez Canal.
(2) Loss of Spain.
(3) Loss of Mosul oil wells
(4) Loss of the Persian Gulf to attacks from the north and west,
together with access to wall Persian Gulf oil.
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(5) Joining hands between Germany and Japan and the probable
loss of the Indian Ocean.
(6) The very important probability of German occupation of Tunis,
Algiers, Morocco, take car and the cutting of the ferry route
through Freetown and Liberia.
(7) Serious danger to all shipping in the South Atlantic and serious
danger to Brazil and the whole of the East Coast of South
America. I include in the above possibilities the use by the
Germans of Spain, Portugal and other territories.
(8) You will [DELETED] the best methods of holding the Middle
East. Those methods include definitely:
(a) Sending aid and ground forces to the Persian Gulf, to
Syria and to Egypt.
(b) A new operation in Morocco and Algiers intended to
drive in against the back door of Rommel’s armies. The
attitude of French Colonial troops is still in doubt.”
After stating his opposition to an all-out effort in the Pacific against Japan at this
time (which the military had preferred, he signed the letter with intent: “Commander-nChief.” 156
In London, British resolve stiffened. Churchill easily defeated a motion to censure
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him in Parliament. U.S. naval victories at the Coral Sea and at Midway destroyed half of
Japan’s carrier fleet, stopping the Japanese advance in the Pacific, But the heavy losses of
over 1000 merchant ships attempting to reach northern Russia through Artic waters in
1942 underscored the vital importance of the Persian Corridor for supplying the besieged
Russian lines. For this reason, Roosevelt suggested that Americans take over the running
of the Trans-Iranian Railroad. Churchill agreed, and Averell Harriman brought in his
Union Pacific engineers to replace its narrow-gauge rails with wider standard gauge that
could carry more weighty cars of supplies. To help the young Shah more effectively
administer Iran’s government and finances, Roosevelt returned Arthur Millspaugh to Iran
as advisor and eventually sent Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Sr., (father of the
later namesake U.S. commander of President G.H.W. Bush’s Desert Storm war against
Iraq) to train and command the Shah’s gendarme to impose order.
With the British 10th Army stretched thin across the southern half of Iran and the
northern borders of Iraq and Syria, however, the British feared that a German attack south
through Turkey or the Caucuses might be imminent, especially after Stalin’s failed winter
(1941-42) offensive was answered by Hitler’s Spring offensive in the south, successfully
capturing Rostov and the eastern Crimea. Meanwhile, the German 6th Army threw
themselves against the huge industrial and rail center of Stalingrad to interdict the rail
lines and Volga River shipping bringing mostly U.S. supplies from Iran to Russia. Hitler,
faced with low oil stocks resulting from the invasion deep into Russia, made a fateful
decision. He ordered most of his panzer divisions to break off from the Stalingrad
offensive and strike further southeast with the object of seizing Astrakhan, southern
Russia’s major Caspian seaport for Russian oil supplies from Baku, while the 1st Panzer
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Army pushed further south into the Caucuses with the goal of seizing Russia’s Grozny oil
fields and the giant oil fields at Baku. If this drive south had been successful, the German
Wehrmacht would have cut off European Russia’s oil supply lines and could then strike
further south into oil-rich Iran and Iraq, perhaps, as the British feared, linking up with
Rommel’s projected capture of the Suez Canal and push through Egypt into Palestine and
Syria, the land bridges to Iraq and Iran’s oilfields. Fear that this might be accomplished
was what was behind Eddy’s 1941 mission to the San Francisco headquarters of Standard
Oil of California to evaluate Saudi Arabia as a potential fallback position for the Allies.
Seeing this danger to the Middle East, Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle,
with the approval of Secretary of State Hull, initiated meetings with OSS Director
William J. Donovan to make plans for a stay–behind guerrilla force in Lebanon if
German forces attacking from the north invaded Lebanon and Syria. Modeled after the
British Arab Bureau that gained fame during World War I from the guerrilla operations
by Arab irregulars led by Britain’s T.H. Lawrence (of Arabia) and Arabian Emir Prince
Faisal, the idea was to use Lebanon’s many limestone caves to store weapons and
munitions for sabotage and attacks. 157 To explore this possibility, Berle and Donovan
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picked Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins.
Like his cousin William Eddy, Hoskins was the son of prominent American
Protestant missionaries, grew up in the Middle East, and was acquainted with many local
businessmen and officials from his travels as a cotton broker for Cannon (Towels) Mills.
Cannon was a major buyer of cotton in Egypt, where the quality long-fiber variety of the
plant had been cultivated on a plantation style by the British since the 1860s, when the
Union naval blockade cut off Britain’s traditional source in the American South. 158
Furthermore, Hoskins was held with some regard because of his membership on the
board of trustees of the American University of Beirut, the former Presbyterian College
of Syria, with its network of graduates in high places throughout the Middle East. With
his business background, it was inevitable that the Roosevelt administration would also
employ his business acumen to explore the possibilities for increased American trade and
investment.
It was perhaps also inevitable that the British, once informed of this Economic
Mission to the Middle East, would be suspicious and eventually opposed. It.
Nevertheless, President Roosevelt, who took credit for originating the idea for the
Hoskins Mission, gave it his full approval once Hull presented Berle’s formal written
proposal. In many accounts, 159 Hoskins’s mission is described as an economic one, based
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in Cairo, where he pledged to the British to confine his investigation to Egypt, Lebanon
and Syria. In fact, however, he had another, more secret mission: to assess the
possibilities for establishing a network of spies in the Middle East under the direction of
Donovan’s OSS. It was for this reason that Hoskins proposed to Berle and Donovan that
Beirut would best serve as the headquarters for this network. Unlike most of the Middle
East, Lebanon, though occupied by British troops since the invasion of Vichy Frenchruled Lebanon and Syria in 1941, was still formally outside the British Empire’s sphere
of influence. The French Empire, holding a mandate from the League of Nations
ostensibly to prepare Syria and Lebanon for independence, still regarded both countries,
and in particular Lebanon because of its Christian Maronite population, as within the
French Empire’s sphere of influence. The Syrians remembered well how the French
introduced themselves – with bullets, cannon and aerial bombings – to those who dared
challenge their rule after World War I.
Under international pressure reacting to the French violence, France had granted a
nominal independence to Lebanon in 1924, but final decision-making was left to the
French colonial administrators, who assured worried Americans that they would honor
the integrity of American missionary and business properties, schools, and of course the
University of Beirut. Since the completion in the mid-1930s of Britain’s pipeline from
Iraq’s Mosul oilfields, participating American oil companies, Standard Oil of New Jersey
and Standard Oil of New York (Socony-Vacuum), shared in the revenues derived from
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the sale of Iraq’s oil that arrived by pipeline at the West Syrian port of Tripoli, where the
French had a small refinery. France was dependent on Iraq for most of its oil. France
backed this control of the Tripoli oil spout with 30,000 troops. 160
But when France lost the war with Nazi Germany, the Allies worried about how France’s
seceding new Vichy regime, which Hitler allowed to run France’s colonial empire, would
act. Those worries were heightened to alarm when the Vichy regime allowed German
airplanes to use Syrian airfields to supply the pro-Axis military regime in Iraq that took
power in 1941, triggering a British invasion from Palestine of both Syria and Lebanon
that resulted in the installation of Free French administration for both Syria and Lebanon
under the continuing mandate of the League of Nations. Although the 1941 British–
French accord reaffirmed Syria’s and Lebanon’s independence and guarantees for the
security of American properties to Washington’s satisfaction, the French still insisted on
the privileges and trading preferences that smacked of the old colonial imperialism.
Tensions rose between the British occupying authorities and the Free French
administration.
When the French began hinting that full administrative control could not be
handed to the Lebanese or the Syrians until after the war, the British became convinced
that De Gaulle was trying to retain the French Empire. The British responded by sending
an administrative mission under General Edward Spears to create a dual power situation
that made France’s hold over both countries untenable. With Spears’ British troops facing
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30,000 French colonial troops, a dangerous standoff was in place that created a political
stalemate in which the rising clamor for power from the Lebanese and Syrians became a
short fuse for a social explosion.
The State Department worried that this situation, if allowed to get out of hand,
would arouse nationalism that could destabilize the entire region. Mindful of German and
Italian propaganda encouraging Arab rebellion against the imperialist powers occupying
their lands, 161 the State Department and Donovan’s OSS agreed to send Col. Harold
Hoskins to not only assess British supply needs, but also examine how the U.S. could
constructively intervene. Hoskins was to be the spearpoint for a larger Near East Mission
designed as a wedge for an American intervention with goals beyond merely aiding the
British ally, goals that would change the face of the entire Middle East.

The Near East Mission
The Hoskins Mission, as most historians have referred to it, was not simply about
Hoskins. It was part of a larger mission to the Near East, or more accurately, beyond
Greece and Turkey, to the Middle East. This was explained to members of the
Subcommittee of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee at a secret meeting held on
July 29, 1942 under the auspices of the State Department and the OSS. A verbatim record
of the meeting offers a rare glance at the workings of the minds of some of America’s top

For a comprehensive survey of Nazi propaganda aimed at the Muslim world, see Jeffrey Herf, “Nazi
Germany's Propaganda Aimed at Arabs and Muslims During World War II and the Holocaust: Old Themes,
New Archival Findings,” Central European History, Vol. 42, No. 4 (December 2009), pp. 709-736.
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spies as they prepared to penetrate the Middle East to not only gather secret information,
but also to launch a program of psychological warfare against not only the Axis enemy
but also their allies and their host governments.
The meeting began at 11 AM with OSS Director William J. Donovan
introducing George Wadsworth, a diplomat with wide experience, including posts in
Jerusalem during the Arab Rebellion of 1936-39 and Rome when Mussolini
opportunistically joined Hitler in invading France. Wadsworth gave a detailed account of
the difficulties that had arisen in the Levant, encompassing Lebanon and Syria, since
British and Free French forces jointly occupied the Levant in the previous year and
ousted the Vichy French administration and replaced the Vichy appointees with a
president for each of the two countries who appointed their own ministries for the
administration of those areas. The source of the difficulties was that Churchill had
assigned his friend, General Edward Spears, with a special mission. The belief had grown
that Spears intended to push the Free French out of the picture altogether. “The Free
French had been trying to run the country,” said Wadsworth, “maintaining the prestige of
the French. The British under this Liaison Mission, and this particular Spears, had been
building up a parallel administration throughout the country to such a degree that our
consul, who reports from Beirut says that Catroux’s policies are to oust the Free French
from the government and to take over. Obviously, this isn’t an open British policy, but he
is afraid that if Spears is successful, it will be accepted as it is and welcomed by the
British government.
“We have felt that this was no way for allies to work in a country which is in that
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position,” explained Wadsworth, “ so we made representations in London asking our
ambassador there to take it up with Halifax. He told the Secretary of State why Churchill
sent Spears out there, and that it was time to get rid of Spears and start a new setup where
we can all work together. That is where the State Department stands. In that connection,
we want to do two things from a diplomatic point of view to help. One is to implement a
statement of last November that we made following that occupation, that we sympathize,
and that we have always held since the beginning of the mandate theory, that they should
obtained their full sovereignty. We want to implement that by appointing someone else as
diplomatic agent to Syria and Lebanon. The diplomatic agent is sent to a country which is
semi–independent. We had them in Bulgaria when Bulgaria was a semi-autonomous
province. They had a minister in Morocco until the establishment of the French
Protectorate.”
Donovan had a question: “What is his authority; letters of credence from the President
which he presents the same way as a minister does?”
“He is the lowest form of a diplomatic representative of his government,” said
Wadsworth, “and he deals on a factual basis with the authorities existent, exercising the
effect of his authority. General Wilson exercised his authority in the defense of the
country. The Free French exercised it. You have two governments exercising it. Our
policy has been, and we presented it to London – and we are taking it up with Cairo to
see if we can’t elaborate some sort of a plan whereby gradually these puppet governments
will take over the exercise of more of the functions of the sovereign governments
“If two new delegations are set out there,” Wadsworth continued, “we are going
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to have much more of a staff that has been there, a consul general protecting American
interests. What we want to add to that staff is several attachés. The idea is to have a
military then has been there six. The idea is to have a military attaché as a professional
observer. Certainly, they are going to send an economic attaché. I gathered that we are
taking over the supply of the Near East, not only military supplies, but also basic supplies
necessary for the civilian population. We are sending a food controller out to Persia. The
Persian Government has asked us for him. Mr. Winant’s brother has probably gone to the
Middle East supply center in Cairo, which has a job of getting from its representatives in
the different provinces in the near East the basic needs for basic commodities and seeing
that they are ordered and shipping space is furnished for these supplies. My theory is that
it is going to take on more and more of that control thing, and working through the
U.K.C.C. And the U. S., we will get the stuff out there on the basis of reports from our
own people. Therefore, we need quite a man for that. The facilities will be available to all
the different branches of the government.
“Next is the O.W. I. [Office of War Information 162]We have letters from [Robert]
Sherwood saying he wants to send three men there – a special attaché that would be
called a cultural attaché in South America. They don’t like the word “cultural” in the
Middle East. He is going to be a special attaché to do the direct newspaper, cinema,
photographs, propaganda, and things of that sort. We are going to send out match boxes
with a statement translated into French that the President says to the Free French, ‘We are

The Office of War Information, headed by Elmer Davis and his assistant, noted playwriter Robert
Sherwood, was then the Roosevelt Administration’s main propaganda arm.
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not forgetting you.”
O.W.I.’s director Elmer Davis had already recommended a man for the job.
“Attached to him... is this man Brown, five years archaeological work, and last head of
the Yale Mission. He is one of our very best and thoroughly sound archaeologists that we
have had out there. Since he came back, he has been a professor at Yale. Between these
two men they will make a good team.”
Wadsworth explained the importance of Beirut. “The two countries are under
mandate from Beirut. It is the seat of the High Commissioner. It is the seat of the Free
French. It is the seat of the Spears Liaison Mission. It is the seat of the Wheat Control
Board, which is functioning as the Middle East Supply Center to get supplies to the
country. But it is a port. It is Syrian, Lebanon; it is largely Christian. What we want to do
is get to the Arabs of the country, who are in the interior. We don’t have much difficulty
in appealing to the average Christian and Lebanon with our line of propaganda. What we
want to do is build up a relationship based on trust with outstanding people in the rest of
the country, notably the Moslems. Therefore, the theory is that I shall have a legation in
Beirut to the Lebanons, and Damascus to Syria, and there I shall have a secretary consul
in my staff. It is my thought that there is where this mission ought to function, primarily
on the Muslim area. We are going to erect buildings for all this. People will organize
what we have to do and what the mission should be.”
“I wonder if you could tell us,” asked Donovan, “what the facilities of propaganda
there are in Syria, newspapers, printing shops, radios, and so on.
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“There is the Free French radio which we could use in cooperation with them,”
answered Wadsworth. “There are two radio centers in Palestine. There is not only the
Palestine broadcasting but that new Middle East broadcasting station they put up. From
the point of view of getting out radio propaganda in Arabic, cooperation with the British
and French will be very simple, and they are delighted to have us. I was reading last
month’s several reports from Jerusalem where they welcome propaganda which we have
given them there.
“There is an American mission for us in Beirut which is first class. There is
lithographing stuff. They can do excellent sheets of photographs in Palestine and they
have all the modern Jewish technique. There is the Palestine Post. It is a bang-up modern
newspaper sheet. Generally speaking, this mission work is in Syria, but with the Arabs of
that western area.
Wadsworth then explained the political complexities of Syria’s relationship with
Lebanon. “Today we are beginning again to talk of a United Syria after the war. The
Arabs have argued for twenty-five years that it was a damn bad business to split Syria,
including Palestine, Trans–Jordan, and so forth. After this war they want to see all of
their country, North, South, East, and West, reunited under some form of federation. The
Arabs are talking unity. They are saying “kalam inglesi”, which means a oneness. That is
what they are getting at.
“There are many interpretations of how that unity is going to be brought about as
there are Arab leaders. They never can agree themselves on what kind of unity they want,
but each is in favor of it if they would rule. Emir Abdullah of Transjordan would like to
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see it, if it were under his control. The Alaouite area in the North would like to rule it all
also, and Iraq would be glad to have had it all one as long as their king would be king.
Trans-Jordan would work for it and for control of Trans-Jordan, Palestine and Syria, with
the capital as Damascus, and Syria–Lebanon wanted to unite in some form of federal
union.
“What most people seem to see coming now in all this, the trend of the unity
movement, is that with the end of the war you will have something in the nature of a
United States of Syria. You will have the different areas. There will be an Alaouite area
in the North; there will be the Christians; there will be an inner land in Syria, probably
Moslem; there will be Palestine, the settled Arab country. There will be Trans-Jordan,
which will develop its own special province, and a coastal area for the Jews in Palestine.
Over there the most barren soil–eroded country up there is not Jew country; it is Arab
country.”
Wadsworth went on to describe how the federation would work, with a senator
from each section, “a representative, will be set up. The holy places themselves, of
Jerusalem and Bethlehem, will be set aside. They are the bone of contention. They will be
removed and put under administration control. The Syria he wants to work with is not all
Arab; it is mostly Moslem. It has been no end in being supplied Axis propaganda. We
believe, and have reports substantiated from all sources we have, a first-class fifth
column is organized there already, and that, generally speaking, all those who are not
fifth columnists and prepared to jump any minute they are told, are on the fence
politically and tending to go down on the other side, taking the Axis side.
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“What we want to get are some of those people sitting on the fence now, some of
those notably trained in the schools and universities in the Near East who more
democratically minded, and who would like to see us win this war. We want to get them
organized ourselves to this mission in the Near East and they can help us in psychological
warfare with those people. We have to sell America to these people. The basic
proposition is you can fight a war better in the country where the people are with you
then when they are against you, even though they are not doing anything against you.
“Basically, our position in the Near East is still 90% good, ourselves, America, as
distinguished from the British. Before the last war when I first went out there the Arabs
would swear by the word of an Englishman. Today if two Arabs meet in the bazaars at
Jerusalem and one is telling a big story, the other one will say, ‘What, are you talking
English?’ The difference is between night and day. They do not trust British declarations
of policy anymore. They do not trust the Free French declarations of policy, because the
French have been trying to hang on to that country, hang on to the mandatory regime in
spite of the fact they have declared the independence of these two countries.
“There is only one of our United Nations they really trust, and that is the United
States. I say 90% instead of 100% because they are beginning to distrust us about 10%.
The reason for that is this: First of all, all through the last century we built up out there a
magnificent background of missionary and philanthropic work. There were hospitals,
missions, building up this great organization in Beirut, the other universities at Cairo,
Constantinople
“That educational system has given us today thousands of men in the Near East in
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responsible positions who know what our work is and that Americans come there for
centuries and give them the best America has to offer to any foreign people. There was
also the Near East Relief in the last war, $100 million. Our trade out there is good. We
had the automobile people, the typewriter people, the furniture and machinery business.
We have good trade out there, no shyster [sic.] trade. All of this plan the important factor
that we have had no political ax to grind in the Middle East, that we have had no political
or territorial ambitions – and they knew it – has made us in the Near East in the last
twenty-five years a great power.
“Today we are great power,” Wadsworth summed up, “a great power not only
because of what we did, but because of the example that they find in us and in our
democratic institutions, from what they adhere to themselves. They want independence.
They don’t believe they are going to get it without a fly in the ointment. There have been
first-class statements of policy from London, but they have seen them for twenty-five
years. Each one of those statements of policy, implemented and interpreted from London,
have always been interpreted and implemented, as the Arabs see it, in favor of the Jews.
The Arabs have been very much convinced that they are right because the local British
officials themselves did not like the interpretation of London that these general
statements of policy were given.
“Briefly, without oversimplifying it, there has grown up this feeling, not only in
Palestine, but generally throughout the Middle East, that British policy, the policy of the
British Government, the Colonial Office,, the Foreign Office, has been dictated by the
influential Jews in England, whose major theme has been the realization of Zionist aims;
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that is, the setup in Palestine of a Jewish State. Political Zionism means setting up in
Palestine a Jewish State. Zionism is defined as Jewish nationalism.
“The Arabs have felt the power of this nationalism, these people with a different
culture coming into their country. With their political aims, the establishment of the
Jewish State over all Palestine, has knocked the wind out of the Arabs no end. They have
seen and come to the conclusion right in a moment that British policy has been dictated
by influential leaders of that group. Little by little in the last five years there is been a
feeling that our policy, too, the American policy, with respect to them has also been
dictated by Zionist leaders in the United States.
Wadsworth emphasized the depth of Arab antipathy to the Zionists’ European
colonization that was stirring widespread anti-Semitism. There was little doubt that these
feeling about the loss of Arab land to European Jewish settlers were genuine, but such
sentiments also served the strategic ends of the local ruling classes by diverting attention
from wealth disparities that left the overwhelming majority of the populations in poverty.
Wadsworth’s concern, however, was what it was doing to the image of the U.S.
Government. “I saw the beginnings of that,” Wadsworth explained, “and I saw the first –
and this wasn’t Axis propaganda – time that Mr. Roosevelt was called ‘Mr. Rosenfeld’ in
the Arab press. The first was semi-humorous with rather nasty cracks that began to gather
as to our policy out there. I saw the Grand Mufti and others and they sort of laughed it
off. They didn’t think it was good policy with their own people. But a thing like that
starts and has been played up in a great big way by the Germans all over the world.
“They believe that our government policy is beginning to be influenced in favor
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of political Zionism, that is the settlement of a Jewish State, and they will never take it.
We have to get out a statement with respect to the Near East, a simple statement that the
principles of the Atlantic Charter apply, that those paragraphs in Mr. Hull’s speech last
week on liberty, and that our purpose in the past and now is that we shall use the full
measure of our import to support the freedom for people who by their acts show they are
capable of self-rule.
“I don’t know where all this political background is going,” Woodsworth
admitted, “but what can this mission do? We say in the Near East, and with the Arabs
more than anyplace I have ever worked, ‘you don’t get anywhere unless you have
personal relationship.’ There is no such thing as honesty as an abstract quality.
“I have got a relationship with you where we can trust each other, but somebody
else cannot trust you or me. A rug dealer I have known and dealt with for years is an
honest rug dealer with me. He is not an honest rug dealer. If I sent you there, he wouldn’t
take all your eye teeth, but he would take most of them. He has that chance; he has that
opportunity.
‘He is going out there with the right kind of people to work with and for. His job
is to sell America personally to those people and to the picked people to build up
something that I call in the nature of a counter-fifth column, a fifth column not only of
our own that will find out what that fifth column of the Axis is there for and encounter it,
but we will have a group of men who have these democratic ideas instilled in them from
our great background of prestige that we have had, men who can say, ‘this statement
means what it says. I have talked to this Secretary; I have talked to all of them. The
193

President sent me out here. He says to tell you what it says, that at the end of this war you
people are going to be independent, irrespective of what you think the British were going
to put over or the Free French.’ If he can do that and sell that idea and base it on the
condition that we are going to win this war, and if you will remove the threat– it is not a
nice word – the immediate threat of the Rommel attack on Egypt, you can get some of
these fellows after that to come out overtly and work for you and with you.. “
Col. Donovan then turned to Professor John A. Wilson, a former instructor at the
American University at Beirut and a protégé and successor of the University of Chicago’s
famous American Egyptologist James Henry Breasted, for his thoughts. “The general
situation.” said Wilson, “is that on top you have occupying powers in all these countries,
whether they are British or Free French. We are leaving out Arabia for a moment. At the
bottom you have nationalism which is opposed to the occupation. In between you may
have a puppet government which is not really a factor in the picture. It is a puppet under
the occupying power. It is necessary to put something else in between,” said Wilson.
“The only thing that we can put in is some American force which is still trusted. It may
not be within another six months because our position is slightly deteriorating. Mr.
Wadsworth said ninety percent trusted. We used to be one hundred percent trusted. We
can put that American force in between the nationalists who want their independence and
are opposed to the occupying forces, characteristically British, and the others. I think we
he said that. I just wanted to underline it. I think the important thing is Col. Hoskins’s
statement.”
“How are you going to convince them,” asked Lt. Col. V.H. Connor, “that you
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have the power to give them these things what you promise them in the face of the British
and French occupation?”
“That is a very difficult problem because we are bound politically and militarily
with the British and the Free French,” said Wilson. “We say we are in favor of their
independence and they say, ‘can you get it for us?’ There is a question. I don’t know
what the answer is going to be on that.”
“Of course, Colonel., the great difficulty in answering our question,” said
Donovan, “is that the conflict that may come between the British and the Free French on
the one hand, and ourselves on the other. I think that is one of the things that has got to be
worked out before there is any movement in there. We [OSS] have to come to some
arrangement with them, just as we have to deal with O.W.I.”
“That is what I was thinking,” said Connor. “Unless you have an agreement with
the British and the French, and they’re going to cooperate with us, you’re going to have
three types of propaganda and confusion there. “
“Yes,” Donovan agreed. “It seemed best, therefore, to try to lay this whole thing
before the Committee and then get some direction as to the approach with the British and
the Free French.”
Hoskins then offered to shorten his statement because of the extensive
background Wadsworth had given and leave copies of his memorandum with some of the
basic points.
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“The importance of holding the Near East is something that you are just as
familiar with as anyone, so there is no necessity of emphasizing it,” said Hoskins. “I was
impressed yesterday when I was over in the War Department with the increasing
seriousness of the point of view taken by the Army people in case this area is lost to the
United Nations. Some effort, even if it seems at a late hour and almost too late, still
seems to be worth doing if there is any possibility of it being of some use. Even though
the Near East is at present a British theater of occupation, of military occupations, and
even though we don’t have here in the United States sufficient troops perhaps at the
moment to be able to send out much military support, we feel that there is a job that can
be done in that area still along the lines outlined by Mr. Wadsworth, and it does go back
to this one basic factor, the prestige and influence which the United States has in that
area, gradually deteriorating, as outlined to you, but nevertheless still very strong. The
background is that we have had no territorial or vested economic interests out there to
tarnish the work of missions of educational and philanthropic groups who over a period
of years have not concentrated on proselytizing, sometimes, as you think of military
work, but education, philanthropic work. We were not dealing with help then, and it was
not put on that basis.”
“Excuse me,” interrupted Donovan. “I should have said that Colonel Hoskins was
born in Syria. He comes of a family which has been there a hundred years now, I think.
He is vice president of the American university out there. Colonel Hoskins himself was in
the 5th Marines in the last war, and was wounded, and he still has strong acquaintance
out there with many of the leaders today.” Hoskins pointed out that he had been vice
present of Cannon Mills in New York, “cotton goods. I have traveled out there. He
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corrected Donovan, however. “I am not vice president of the University; I am vice
president of the board of trustees.”
“The method that has been suggested,” continued Hoskins, “is that a group or
mission should go out to work in this area in support of the political phases of this thing
that has been outlined by Mr. Wadsworth. From the start I think you realize that to be
fully effective such a mission – and we will come to the difficulties that will result from it
– must with the prior agreement of the British, and necessarily the Free French, be known
and operated as an American organization. In other words, to take advantage of the
prestige and strength we have, our mission and operations must be definitely American
and not apparently tied to a British kite to such an extent that they no longer trust our
mission any more than they do the British or French.
This was a delicate operation, requiring the skills of a surgeon rather than the
impatience of a military commander who seeks enemy to butcher. It also required a
pragmatic approach to existing spheres of influence in the Grand Alliance with Britain.
“At the same time such a mission must be operated in accordance with agreements
already arrived at with the S.O.E. [Special Operations Executive 163] in London; Col.
Donovan and Col. Goodfellow were in London. It was agreed then that a mission should

An offshoot of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service (also known as MI-6, or "Broadway"), the Special
Operations Executive (SOE) had been created in 1942 to assist underground guerrilla resistance movements
behind the lines in Axis-occupied Europe in the war against Hitler, or, in Churchill's poetic phrase, to "set
Europe ablaze." The SOE were the initial trainers of the American OSS's Special Operations Branch, whose
principal "was to work with resistance groups of any political coloration provided that they were militarily
effective against the enemy." R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central
Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), p. 28. This was and continued to be a
point of contention with American conservative politicians who were opposed to working with communists
and socialists leading most of the fighting resistance movements.
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be sent out by OSS, to the British Middle East Command, and in harmony with the
general procedure of necessity, this mission would have to operate on the general
direction of the British military, and in cooperation with them.
“As regards actual operations, actual work aside from the building of local
organizations, which we would be free to do, would, as long as this remained a British
theater of military operations, naturally function under them and only with their approval.
This would relate primarily to the S.O. [Special Operations] operations, that is to the
setting up of sabotage and guerrilla organizations in case the whole Near East area were
lost. 164 The aim then, of course, would be to have information already set up before that
occurs that could continue to harass the enemy until that area could be rewon. It would
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particularly to the Syrian Plan. Other plans were also developed for infiltration of agents for psychological
warfare in Brazil, Italy, Burma, Thailand, and China. Specific to each plan, documented recipients and
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for Syria: Col. Donovan (OSS), Lt. Col. Hoskins (State and OSS), Major General Albert Wedemeyer,
General Strong (G-2), William A. Kimbel, Captain Grosskopf, Lt. Col. C.C. Blakeney, B.D. Meritt, and
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David Bowes-Lyon, Deputy Director of the British Political Warfare Executive, General John R. Deane
(Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff and subsequently Military Attaché in Moscow), Lt. Col. Ellery C.
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Wiley (on State Department telegrams on Syria), and Col. B.F. Fellers (Military Attaché, Cairo Embassy);
for Brazil (Planned Use of Brazilians for psychological warfare in Portugal, Spain and Northern Africa):
Admiral Train, Col. Duff of the Military Intelligence Service (G-2), Col. Thomason of the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI), and Col. Heard of the Latin American Section of the Military Intelligence Division; for
Italy: General George Marshall, Abdul King, General Arnold (Commander of the Army Air Force), General
Wedemeyer, Admiral Cooke, General Deane, Commander L. R. McDowell's (British), Admiral Leahy, and
the Executive of the Operations Division of the War Department’s General Staff.
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also contemplate setting up and S.I. [Secret Intelligence] organization for information,
strategic information in that area, both to work together under one head.
“The third [function of the Near East Mission],” Hoskins explained, “would be as
Mr. Wadsworth outlined, persist in countering the efforts of the Axis to infiltrate and
organize those areas for later military occupation. Those are the three specific and
definite jobs tied in to the functions, as I understand it, to the objectives of the O.S.S.
“The fourth function,” Hoskins continued, “is one that comes into the phases of
psychological warfare, working in the closest cooperation with the consular and
diplomatic officials in that area to get more active assistance, military, economic, and
moral, from the peoples of this area for our war effort. This phase of the thing is one, I
take it, that this Committee is primarily interested in. Obviously, it’s work will depend on
whether we hold the area militarily or not. On the assumption we do hold the area
militarily, active propaganda on the one hand, and personal contact with local leaders and
key people of all of that area, on the other hand, can, we believe, assist materially in
holding that area against the penetration of the Axis.
“The suggested area of operation then would be what used to be Syria. It would
be the Arab-speaking world at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, Syria, Palestine,
Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Iran for geographical reasons, and Saudi Arabia. Such a mission
would make its headquarters probably with the British Middle East Command, wherever
that might be. A second headquarters is suggested for Beirut, where with Mr.
Wadsworth’s organization, the Americans in Beirut, and the organization we have there,
would make the place most popular, the subsidiary headquarters in the various political
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areas. The suggested organization of such a mission would initially require twenty-five
men, including military and civilian members. In order to keep the competition and
duplication of existing British organizations in this same area to a minimum, it is
suggested that this American group aim preliminarily at enlisting the support of students
and graduates of American schools and colleges in the Near East as the backbone for all
our work, for sabotage and guerrilla work on the one hand in case that area were lost, and
for all forms of more active war work, on the other hand, in case we hold it. The students
of these institutions are the physical elite of that area. The older graduates are naturally
the key leaders all through that whole Near Middle, including Egypt and as far east as
India.”
The opportunities in exploiting these networks were many and far-reaching in
terms of both distance and time. “The possibility of gaining their support, as Mr.
Wadsworth has indicated,” Hoskins asserted, “ to a great extent does center – we must
have some time; we are going out there at a late date – but we have got a nucleus to go to
and work with almost immediately in these students and graduates; and Bayard Dodge,
who is the President of the American University in Beirut, a great friend of Mr.
Wadsworth and myself. I have worked closely on the board of trustees for the past ten
years, so I am fairly familiar with the organization and its problems, and I think with that
background, on the background of my family, – my aunt who was the first and only
woman ever allowed to practice medicine in the Turkish Empire before the war; she used
to travel all that Arab area east of Damascus, and was able to work and get in and know
the people to a degree which no man ever at that time have been allowed to do – I think
those are the sort of connections that we can and must capitalize on while they are still
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good.
Hoskins laid out the complexities of potential obstructions, starting with
coordination within the existing agencies involved. “Despite the fact that such a mission
would be coming at such a late date, it does seem if it were definitely worth the effort;
and the amount of American personnel, the amount of supplies and funds required, we
could go over this morning. The results of such a group might be substantial; particularly
if it had the approval of the Chiefs of Staff and the State Department. I think it has that
from the State Department. Also, if we may work out before we go the basic things that
may absolutely prevent us from being successful – first, is within our own setup, the
relationship of this setup and how it will operate with such an organization as the Office
of War Information, so that the propaganda story that is told, the psychological war for a
story that is told, will be correlated and the same. You can’t tell one story in Saudi
Arabia, another in Iran, another in Palestine, and have the damn thing altogether.
“The second thing is to have a clear understanding with the War Department or
with the American general in that area, who may or may not – I don’t know – be
interested or familiar with the possibilities of psychological warfare in the Arab world,
and the necessity for it.
“Third, to have a clear and understanding as possible with our British and French
allies as to what we are doing and why we are doing it. Obviously, there are possibilities
of conflict with the policies which some, at least, of the French and the British, hold as
regards Syria and the Near East. On the other hand, if we can get that cleared, if we can
make them understand, hear, and sell the story out there, that we are not opposing the
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British and the French, we are doing something which ought to have their support to help
us win the war, that this work is needed, and that the independence, the assurance of
independence for those areas after the war is a necessity for holding that against losing it
to the Axis – if we can get those things cleared here before we go, then I think we can do
a job out there.
“I have copies of this and specifically the personnel, the tons of articles,
ammunition, and explosives, the transportation that is required, and the secret funds
which will be needed, at least to a certain extent, in doing a job in that area. It is not an
idea of going in and doing a wholesale bribery job, but there are uses to which secret
funds can be put in working with those key people in these different areas that we ought
to have.
“I think one final thing,” Hoskins concluded, “is that if we are going to function at
this late date, we must be able to take with us the basic supplies that we need,
ammunition, arms, explosives we must have on the ground out there, transportation
supplied from those areas, so we can go to work immediately when we get there, and not
be held up for weeks and months after that. It we can get that, we can move pretty fast.
We have part of our organization already set up, and if the approval is here for the plan as
a whole, I think we ought to be able to begin at least some of us get off, within the next
10 days or two weeks.”
Donovan asked if there were any questions. Lt. Col. C.C. Blakeney aimed his
with the skill of a sharpshooter, getting right to the vital point: was this a military
operation? If so, why is there not much military personnel incorporated in the mission?
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Donovan replied that the only idea was to have it not strictly in the sense military “but as
I have the people and leaders working with these people and organize their resistance,
having them there to set up a proper kind of an organization.”
Blakeney disagreed. “I get the impression from what Col. Hoskins said that it
would be military.”
“Not all the men in uniforms, no,” said Donovan.
“The reason I ask,” said Blakeney, “is it the proper answer to send out a person in
uniform on a mission which is not at all primarily of a military nature? What I am getting
at is that in the main the function of this mission is the establishment of a subversive
organization in the event the Middle East falls to the Axis, the establishment of a
subversive intelligence organization in any event, and the distribution of military and
economic and political propaganda. If such is the case, and it counts in its membership a
military function, does it lose part of its basic responsibility?”
Donovan could see that Blakeney was having trouble sorting out traditional
military honor and responsibility from clandestine warfare’s use of psychological
warfare, sabotage, and assassination. He avoided the deeper question of responsibility by
shifting the emphasis to a pragmatic functionality. “I think it would depend on the things
they were to do, but I will let Col. Hoskins answer that question if he cares to.”
“If you are going into a neutral country, of course it would have to be,” said
Hoskins. “But the S.O. Organization, the corresponding organization of the British, is
military, and the leader of the British S.O. Operation in the Middle East Command is an
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officer on the staff of the commanding general of the Middle East Area.”
“All through that area particularly,” offered Donovan, “subversive work is done
under the direction of the officers in uniform.”
“As a matter of fact,” interjected Blakeney, “I feel it is important that on the staff
of the commander the actual head of such a unit should be, but not the active head in the
area.”
“It does not mean it would be in uniform in the area,” Donovan said. “He could be
an officer.”
“I think it has a psychological importance in the Near East,” said Wilson
Donovan did not want to argue over the psychological value of wearing a uniform
among tribesmen, although he knew that officers engaged in espionage might have to
wear civilian clothes on missions, and thereby be deprived of the protections offered
under international law to men in uniform. A man carrying out a mission in uniform, if
caught, had rights as a prisoner of war. A spy without uniform has no such protections
and can be shot.
“I know that an officer has a much greater effect,” Donovan conceded. “I noticed
that myself all through that area in dealing with that problem. It is a power, and it is
important.”
“It is a theater of operation,” offered Wadsworth, “and military authorities are in
direct control everywhere.”
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“For instance, Mr. Wilson,” said Donovan, “if he would go out there, probably he
would be viewed with suspicion and wouldn’t get anywhere at all. The uniform would
speak for the power of the United States to these people. I think this mission will
certainly effectuate the work normally done that most of us are trying to do.”
“I realize military thought,” said Blakeney. “The only thing that reaches the Arab
mind is power. The only other thing that reaches them is money.”
“And something in the way of assurance,” added Wadsworth, “that these national
organizations of his are going to be realized.”
“Yes, power, money, and independence,” said Hoskins. “Those three of the ones.”
“Yes, independence; he wants it,” said Wadsworth. “It is the bread of life. He
must have it. They talk it everywhere, independence.”
Capt. R.H. Redfield, USN, raised the subject of the elephant in the room, “How
did the British feel about that?”
“They are apparently in favor of it for Syria and Lebanon,” said Wadsworth.
“They are very hesitant about making any pronouncement about Palestine.”
“I think that the first point is whatever arrangements we can make with the British
as to the line to follow,” said Donovan. “Then, having determined that, we have to see
what lined the Free French are prepared to follow. Those two questions are at the very
threshold. This is involving mostly what shall be done in the way of speaking to these
people, the means that we take of proclaiming our idea. Apart from that, I think there is
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another function, and that is the assumption that the Middle East would go. Then it is a
serious problem for us to put out any kind of assistance of any sort we can. Certainly,
during this period now where we just got to watch that, we ought to do something more
than weight. That is to get people of influence in there who could arouse these people to
the ultimate winning of the war. I think that is the thing that has to be brought in on the
Arab, or he won’t go anywhere. If he would accept what he sees before him, why
wouldn’t he want us to be in. If he is willing to see beyond and recognize our potential
ability will mean the winning of the war, then he may go with us. In that period, we have
to get organized within the country, right in the hills or whatever it is necessary. That, I
assume, is the real reason that you are prepared to come in here and make them fight,
because you believe people will go to the hills with you.”
“That is right,” said Hoskins. 165
The Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee, with the understanding that
Wadsworth would leave immediately for Beirut, resolved that a group of about twentyfive civilians and officers “would be established in Syria for two general purposes:
a. To establish an intelligence organization.
b. To organize resistance groups of Syrians and Arabs in the event of a
German invasion. These groups would also exert counter efforts against
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the Axis fifth column that is now understood to be very strong in
Syria.” 166
Two days later, Colonel Donovan requested Mr. Mowrer to report on the
instructions which had been given by O.W.I. to the three representatives for their
operations in Syria, as well as for conforming to the orders of the British Theater
Commander. Mowrer agreed to obtain this information and submit it to the
Subcommittee at its meeting next Tuesday,
Colonel Hoskins supplemented his previous report by pointing out:
1. That the loss of the Near East will involve the oil supply of Iran and Iraq.
2. That even if the Near East is held, action must be taken to counteract the
increasing pro-Axis feeling of the Mohammedans.
Colonel Donovan requested that Colonel Hoskins to attend next Tuesday’s
meeting. He had also arranged for Col. Bonner F. Fellers to attend that meeting. 167 Fellers
was soon on his way to Cairo as a military attaché 168 assigned to the embassy of
Ambassador Alexander Kirk, whose diplomatic responsibilities were now expanded to
the court of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia.
“The only thing which we can put [in],” said Donovan, “is some American force
which is still trusted. It may not be within another six months because our fish position is
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slightly deteriorating. Mr. Wadsworth said 90% trusted. We used to be 100% trusted. We
can put that American force in between the nationalist who want their independence and
are opposed to the occupying force, characteristically British, and the others. I think he
said that. I just wanted to underline it. I think the important thing is Col. Hoskins’s
statement.”
Col. V. H. Connor raised the problem of “convincing the Arabs that you have the
power to give them these things that you promise them in the face of the British and
French occupation; that is a very difficult problem.”
Wadsworth was well aware of this problem He was accredited to both Lebanon
and Syria, third rails that could easily end the career of any veteran diplomat. But
Wadsworth was not any veteran diplomat; he was probably the man most fitted to the
task. Sympathetic to Arab sentiments for ending European colonialism, as were most
Americans traditionally, Wadsworth cultivated the Arab political, cultural, and business
elites as an indigenous wedge between the French and the British.
Hoskins did likewise, and not only in Beirut and Syria. During his mission, he
took trips to Palestine and Iraq, far beyond the regional limits the State Department had
ascribed to with the British, infuriating local British colonial authorities and London
officials who worried if this was the beginning of an American incursion into the Middle
East. Roosevelt, taking up previous British invitations, assigned General Maxwell to the
oversight committee of the Cairo-based Middle East Supply Center, which controlled all
imports of U.S. Lend-Lease supplies and exports. While the Center would often be
depicted by official historians as a shining example of Allied cooperation during the war,
208

it should be emphasized that the arrival of Maxwell and the American staffs at the Center
effectively ended Britain’s monopoly of control over wartime support for the economies
of the Middle East. With American industries rapidly growing again by the stimulation of
war orders, a flood of American Lend-Lease goods had begun to permeate the Middle
East in dimensions far beyond what the British could provide. The British and the French
were quite aware that this could lead to a postwar American standardization of engine
parts and consumer products if, as was evident, Middle Easterners got used to American
goods. But given the needs of the war effort, and the shortage of British exports and
capital, there was little that could be done to prevent the growth of American influence in
the streets, business offices and indigenous government circles.
This was especially so in the Mediterranean port of Beirut where a long history of
Asian commercial trade with Europe and Northern Africa had given rise to a wealthy
merchant class that now saw an opportunity through independence to augment its
political power and commercial prospects. A trading relationship with the powerful
United States could develop into a political alliance more powerful than they had ever
had. The inability of French and British patrols along Syria’s borders to prevent
smuggling to and from Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Turkey was the subject
of study by the State Department’s CFR–influenced Advisory Committee on Postwar
Economic Relations, particularly the Territorial Subcommittee headed by geographer
Isaiah Bowman. Bowman’s anti-Semitism, exposed during his presidency of Johns
Hopkins University by his refusal to hire Jewish scholars for the faculty, may account for
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his hostility to Zionist ambitions in Palestine, as argued by Philip J. Baram. 169 AntiSemitism was not uncommon among the diplomats who hailed from upper class AngloSaxon society in America. This was reflected in the State Department’s reluctance to
increase immigration quotas adequately to respond to the known Nazi policy against
Jews, especially after the atrocities at the concentration camps were revealed to the public
in 1942, 170 professions of ignorance notwithstanding. 171
Three years earlier, President Roosevelt had appointed Bowman as head of
commission to search for an appropriate refuge for Jewish emigrants from Europe. A
leading academic in the then-exclusive Council on Foreign Relations, Bowman had
served in The Inquiry and at the territorial sessions of Allies’ peace conference in Paris
after World War I, and played a major role in the carving up of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire into ethnic states and enclaves, so he knew a lot about settling displaced people.
Accepting Roosevelt’s charge in 1939, Bowman's team investigated allegedly
uninhabited or sparsely settled land on five continents, but not in the United States. 172
Bowman's opposition to accepting Jewish refugees into the United States allegedly
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stemmed from his anti-Semitism. After returning to the full-time presidency of Johns
Hopkins University after the war, when other leading universities were dismantling their
Jewish quota systems, he established an anti-Jewish admissions quota in 1945, on the
grounds that Jews were an alien influence on American culture.
This is not to say, however, that all resistance to Zionism in the State Department
was based on anti-Semitism. Some members of the State Department’s Postwar Advisory
Committee worried about how a U.S.-sponsored migration of European Jews to Palestine
would be accepted by Palestine’s Arab majority. The long era when a Jewish minority
lived more or less peaceably with their Arab neighbors was over; the collapse of
feudalism in Eastern Europe with the rise of cheap imports from industrialized western
Europe eroded feudal economic and political structures and mutual obligations, releasing
peasants from the land before capitalist development could take off in Eastern Europe.
Social unrest and violent pogroms inspired Jewish migrations to Western Europe and the
Americas, where competition for jobs, crafts and professions gave rise, in turn, to a
backlash of intensified discrimination exemplified by France’s Dreyfuss affair and
Germany’s nationalistic xenophobia culminating in the assassination of the Weimer
Republic’s Jewish Foreign Minister and the rise of the Nazi movement.
So long as the Middle East was depicted in the West as poor lands where once
great civilizations had disappeared into ruins beneath the sand and were subsequently
under the 1000-year rule of the “Terrible Turks,” there was little interest by Washington
in the region. That changed somewhat with the discovery of oil and the Department’s
efforts after World War I to get around obstacles against American participation erected
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by the victorious European powers. But the gusher spudded in Saudi Arabia by Standard
Oil of California in 1938, a year before world war erupted, while arousing interest in
official Washington, did not convince President Roosevelt to violate Britain’s assertion of
the Middle East as within its sphere of influence. The University of Chicago’s Professor
Philip W. Ireland, who had taught at the University at Beirut, could write a scholarly
book on Iraq before World War II but its influence did not reach much beyond
specialized academia. Nevertheless, it was scholastically impressive enough to gain
Ireland appointment as Chief of the Near East Division of the State Department at the
outbreak of World War II and by 1943 Ireland was considered one of the chief experts on
the Middle East. What had happened?
By 1943 American oil stocks were rapidly being depleted by the war. Despite
reassurances by the Standard Oil expert Walter Pratt that America had plenty of oil and
that technology would open new oil fields in the future, 173 Harold Ickes, U.S. Petroleum
Administrator for War (PAW), was convinced that, as he titled an article later published
in December 1943 by The American Magazine, “We’re Running Out of Oil!” The Navy,
the largest consumer of oil, agreed. Admiral Andrew Carter, chief of the Navy’s
petroleum division, raised his concerns in a memorandum that he circulated in the War
Department. Soon the Army joined in. Together they called for the creation of a
Petroleum Reserves Corporation (PRC). After some wrangling over who would lead the
new organization, State or PAW, President Roosevelt signed the executive order
establishing the PRC with Ickes as Chair and Secretary of State Hull as Vice Chair. The
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specific object was to secure for the United States the huge oil deposits that oil geologist
Everette DeGolyer 174 had confirmed for Ickes’ Petroleum Reserve Corporation existed

Everette DeGolyer was originally associated as a geologist from 1909 to 1919 with Britain’s Weetman
Pearson, 1st Baron of Cowdray, a competitor of John D. Rockefeller, who had enjoyed lucrative engineering
contracts from the long dictatorship of Mexico’s Perfirio Díaz. Pearson’s Mexican Eagle Oil Company
discoveries in 1910 and 1911, resulting from DeGolyer’s geological studies, has often been described as a
precipitant factor in the Mexican Revolution, and it is worthwhile briefly reviewing his career and its
intercessions with the human costs that oil prospecting has had in the underdeveloped nations in patterns now
all too familiar.
Mexico is but one example. As British and American oil companies backed rivals for the Mexican
presidency after Díaz was overthrown in 1911 by Francisco Madero, a large land-owning reformer backed
by Rockefeller’s Standard Oil and Cleveland H. Dodge’s Phelps-Dodge Corporation. Percy N. Furber,
president of Oil Fields of Mexico, described the American oil interests behind Diaz’s downfall to journalist
C.W. Barron in 1919. H. Clay Pierce, who owned 35% of the stock of Pierce-Waters Oil Company in
partnership with Standard Oil’s 65% holding, had demanded that Diaz remove taxes on oil imports to allow
Standard Oil to enter the Mexican market with its products at a more competitive price. Diaz, however, would
not break with his British oil backers and refused, whereupon Pierce, backed by Standard Oil, threw his
support behind Francisco Madero, a large land-owning reformer.
British oil interests struck back by backing Victorianio Huerta, who overthrew and executed Madero
in 1913. U.S. President Wilson, newly elected as a liberal reformer, at first refused to recognize the Huerta
regime and informed the British government that he would never do so. But the revolution by now had
deepened, arousing opposition to Huerta by large landholders and ranchers in the north and mestizo peasants
in the north and south. In the north, constitutionalists led by José Venustiano Carranza, another wealthy
landowner, and his ally Francisco “Pancho” Villa, a leader of a peasant army in the northern mountains,
rebelled.
More ominously for rich landholders, so did Emiliano Zapata, a mestizo leader who had resisted
land grabs by sugar companies and who offered Plan Ayala, the only program for serious land reform and
the return of Indian village lands (ejidos) taken from the peasants during the Diaz era. President Wilson soon
received a letter, approved by Phelps-Dodge Company (which had large copper holdings in Mexico), the
Greene Canancea Copper Company, and Edward L. Doheny of the Mexican Oil Company and delivered to
Wilson-advisor Col. House through Julius Kruttschmitt, president of the Southern Pacific Railroad (which
railed Phelps-Dodge’s ore to refiners and markets). The letter called upon President Wilson to reverse course
and recognize Huerta. The motive was obvious: a safeguard against the spread of the Mexican Revolution
by Villa and now, in the south, the charismatic Zapata. Deliberately provoked by cross-border raids by Villa
to bring an American invasion that Villa hoped would arouse a nationalistic revolution against Huerta,
President Wilson obliged. In April 1914, Wilson invaded Mexico with a land expedition across the southern
border under General Pershing (and including an ambitious young William J. Donovan) in pursuit of Pancho
Villa, and a naval invasion from the Gulf of Mexico, seizing Veracruz and ordering a gunboat bombardment
of Tampico allegedly for the failure of the Mexicans to salute the U.S. flag and apologize for an arresting an
American sailor. If the invasion of Tampico only coincidentally stopped the delivery of Mexican-bought
munitions from Germany, which was courting the Mexicans, the oil fields Pearson (now Lord Cordray) were
also occupied.
Both Villa’s army and Carranza’s Constitutionalists Army survived the invasion handsomely and
two months later, Huerta, deprived of revenues, reinforcements and resources from the north by the
Constitutionalist and from south of Mexico City by Zapata, fled the capital city in June. Zapata and Villa
jointly entered the capital in December, eventually letting Carranza assume the presidency. In 1917, having
defeated Pancho Villa’s army in 1916, Carranza consolidated his power further by drafting a new constitution
that promised land reforms inspired by Zapata’s Plan of Ayala. The constitution also nationalized Mexico’s
subsoil resources, including any undiscovered oil deposits, while honoring Lord Cordray’s and PhelpsDodge’s holdings. But when Carranza, financed now by Standard Oil’s and Phelps-Dodge’s favorite bank,
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beneath the sands of Saudi Arabia. DeGolyer, after being sent to Saudi Arabia by the
PRC to survey Arabia’s oil prospects, returned predicting that the center of gravity of the
world’s oil production would soon move to the Middle East.
This finding carried a huge political obstacle: Britain was in control of most of the
Middle East’s oil and as such controlled supplies to the world market whose lower prices

National City Bank, failed to implement the promised land reforms, Zapata refused to recognize Carranza’s
government and continued to institute the Plan of Ayala’s land reforms in his home state of Morales, which
were successfully providing Morales with food while other states were starving. Carranza’s Constitutionalist
Army attacked with scorched earth tactics, massacring and burning villages, instituting forced dislocations
to what would later be called “strategic hamlets,” and impressing Morales male peasants into his army—all
of which only sowed hatred and won recruits into Zapata’s guerilla forces. Another attack by Carranza failed,
and Carranza only succeeded in April 1919 by deception, luring Zapata into an assassination.
By then, Lord Cordray and DeGolyer, having made a fortune selling Mexican oil to the Allies during
World War I and rejecting buyout offers from the Texas Oil Company (Texaco) and Rockefeller’s Standard
Oil, had decided to sell Amerada in 1919 to Royal Dutch Shell. Subsequently enriched beyond his dreams as
a boy born in a Kansas sodhouse, DeGolyer became the major financer behind the 1926 founding of
Geophysical Research Corporation, an oil prospecting firm that was the pioneer of reflecting seismographic
analyses now used throughout the oil industry. In 1936 DeGolyer and a partner organized DeGolyer and
MacNaughton, a company that soon earned a global reputation for its consulting services in petroleum
geology and engineering. In the (Balwin 1990) (Wamack 1970)Roosevelt administration, he served as a
technical advisor to the National Recovery Administration and, when the war broke out, served as director
of conservation with the Office of The Coordinator for National Defense.
In 1942, Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes, having been appointed Petroleum Administrator for War
by President Roosevelt, asked DeGolyer to come on board as the assistant to Deputy Administrator Ralph
Davies, formerly a vice president of Standard Oil of California. The following year, 1943, DeGolyer headed
up the Petroleum Reserves Corporation’s mission to the Middle East that confirmed, based on reflection
seismology techniques which he helped pioneer, Saudi Arabia’s huge subterranean oil deposits, a finding
that would have the most significant impact on Roosevelt’s Middle East policy. In 1946, working on behalf
of the Central Intelligence Group, the immediate forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency, DeGolyer
recruited Dallas oilman Jack Crichton to operate a group of companies which frequently were given new
names, presumably to make it more difficult to trace their operations. Crichton became a prominent oil and
gas industrialist and was the 1964 Republican gubernatorial nominee in Texas. By then, DeGolyer had
become a major force in Texas’s new oil wealth, building an estate across the lake from H.L. Hunt and
becoming a director on the boards of numerous national corporations, including Dresser Industries, Louisiana
Land and Exploration Company, Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation, Southern Pacific Railroad,
Republic Natural Gas, First National Bank of Dallas and, following on his prolific writings, Saturday Review
magazine. For an overview of the Mexican Revolution, see: John Womack, "The Mexican Revolution" in
Mexico Since Independence, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991). Friedrich
Katz, The Secret War in Mexico (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). For an interesting account of
the roles of American corporations in the evolution of President Woodrow Wilson’s policy toward Mexico,
see Ferdinand Lundberg, America's 60 Families (New York: Halcyon House, 1939). Deborah J. Baldwin,
Protestants and the Mexican Revolution, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990). John Womack, Zapata
and the Mexican Revolution New York: Vintage, 1970). Alan Knight, Mexican Revolution, vol. 2. Counterrevolution and Reconstruction (Lincoln: (Knight 1986) University of Nebraska Press. 1986).
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could hurt Socal’s bottom line. Even the exclusive American concession in Saudi Arabia
was not safe, according to presidents of Texaco, Socal, and the California Standard Oil
Company (Casoc). The oilmen were counting on Casoc’s James Moffett, an old and
trusted friend of Roosevelt, whom the president had relied on as an unofficial oil advisor.
A British locust-control mission ominously included a geologist, the oil men claimed, and
Britain’s decision to open a branch of Barclay’s Bank in Jedda to provide credit for King
ibn Saud was viewed as an effort to draw the king into reliance on the British Empire’s
sterling bloc. Should Socal be unable to satisfy the king’s need for funds and credit, the
king might transfer the concession to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which had lost the
original bidding contest in 1932 to Standard Oil of California.
The only solution, the oilmen argued, was to protect the concession by the
President reversing his 1941 policy and removing Britain as the go-between for U.S.
Lend-Lease aid even though Saudi Arabia was still not officially an ally in the war. The
British should not be allowed to continue leaving the impression that aid to the king was
coming from London. Direct financing from Washington, a policy that would unify the
current fragmented policy toward Saudi Arabia and came to be called “solidification,”
was the only sure way to effect “the continuation of purely American enterprise there
after the war.” 175 That statement was significant in that the oilmen emphasized the value
of American control of the Saudi oil fields not just to the current war effort in the Pacific,
but to the expected new world order after the war. If Roosevelt cooperated with direct
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financial aid, the oil companies would offer the U.S. government an option on Saudi oil
to secure a postwar reserve to meet wartime needs as well as provide the government
with a valve shared with the companies to control supplies on the world market and
thereby world oil prices.
The oil men had allies in the government. The drain on Western hemisphere oil
by the war had driven the State Department’s economic advisor, Herbert Feis, to the
conclusion that foreign oil needed to be obtained outside the Western hemisphere.” In all
surveys of the situation,” he later said, “the pencil came to an awed pause at one point
and place – the Middle East.” 176 Navy Undersecretary William Bullitt expressed his
worry that London would “diddle” the American companies “out of the concession and
the British into it.”177 Such diehard opponents of the New Deal as Republican Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge, the Boston Brahman who led the charge against Senate ratification
of Wilson’s League of Nations, conceded that “history does not give us confidence that
private interest alone would adequately safeguard the national interest.” 178On February
16, Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes followed up on the oilmen’s visit by emphasizing
the value of Saudi Arabia over lunch with President Roosevelt, calling it “probably the
greatest and richest oilfield in the world.” He warned that the British were trying to “edge
their way into it.” Never a friend of the British Empire, Ickes, a former Progressive
populist. warned the President that the British “never overlooked the opportunity to get in
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where there was oil.” 179
Two days later, Roosevelt responded by reversing his 1941 policy of reliance on
the British, issuing an executive order finding that Saudi Arabia was now vital to
America’s national security and thereby eligible for Lend-Lease aid. At the end of May,
obtaining Saudi oil was given added urgency by a report by the Vice Chief Of Naval
Operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warning the petroleum reserves in the Americas
had reached a critical stage. 180 Discovery of new oil deposits had not kept up with
estimates of future demand, and the projections of oil supplies for 1944, warned the
Army Navy Petroleum Board, raised serious concerns that shortages would jeopardize
military operations. The head of the Board, Admiral Andrew Carter relayed this threat
directly to the President as Commander-in-Chief, as well as to the secretaries of the
Army. Navy, State, and Interior (who was also the Petroleum Administrator for War).
It was this recognition of the task of securing Saudi oil from alleged British
incursions that inspired the creation of the Petroleum Reserves Corporation as a joint
governmental venture by the Departments of the Navy, Interior and State. Signed into
law by President Roosevelt, the PRC was not a secret organization, but its target, Saudi
oil, was. Ickes, the Petroleum Administrator for War, allied with the War Department and
the Navy, soon dominated the PRC with his arguments for following the British
government’s lead in the region by proposing that the U.S. government, through the PRC,
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buy the entire Saudi concession from Socal. Meeting at the White House in June 1943,
Ickes conferred with Navy Secretary Frank Knox, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and
James Byrnes, Director of the Office of War Mobilization, to form a united front to have
PRC buy the Saudi concession against the only voice raised in opposition, the State
Department. Urged on by State’s petroleum advisor, Max Thornburg, the former vice
president of Standard Oil of California, Secretary Hull explained to President Roosevelt
that taking direct ownership from the oil companies could enkindle “intense new
disputes,” and not just between the companies and the government, but also between
nations scrambling for oil. “In many conferences after the last war the atmosphere and
smell of oil was almost stifling” 181
President Roosevelt, however, as a wartime president was more impressed by the
Pentagon’s needs. In July, Roosevelt at a White House meeting announced his decision
with “a boyish note of enjoyment.” His talk and nod was described as jovial, “as usual
when it had to do with the lands of the Near East.” 182 Roosevelt had taken a keen interest
in the Near East since at least World War I, when he served as Wilson’s Assistant
Secretary of the Navy and read reports of the British difficult campaigns to protect its oil
holdings in Iran and to conquer oil-rich Mesopotamia (Iraq). He also followed news of
First Sea Lord Churchill’s disastrous invasion of Gallipoli to capture Istanbul and the
Dardanelles and Bosporus straits that linked the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the
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ports of their Czarist Russian allies. The Armenian round-ups at Istanbul and Armenian
massacres throughout Anatolia that accompanied the British invasion had prompted
Roosevelt to join the board of Near East Relief. Now, if reports of Saudi oil held true, the
United States was on the verge of an acquisition promising to be even greater than
Mesopotamia’s oil, the prize of World War I. Having already sent former Secretary of
War General Patrick Hurley to the Middle East and received Hurley’s glowing report on
his visit to Bahrain and Casoc’s Dhahran oilfield in nearby Saudi Arabia, Roosevelt
approved the PRC’s acquisition of 100% of Casoc’s Saudi oil.
Summoned to Secretary Ickes’s office at the Department of the Interior, the
presidents of Socal, Texaco and Casoc thought there would be a discussion on the
government’s acceptance of the oilmen’s offer of an option for Saudi oil in return for
government taking on the financial burden of keeping afloat King Ibn Saud’s autocratic
regime. Instead, they were stunned by the government’s wanting to purchase the entire
Saudi oil field. Ickes’s proposal was a “tremendous shock” to Socal President Harry
Collier and Texaco’s W.S.S. Rodgers. The United States Government entering the oil
business, possibly in competition with the oil companies and foreign entities, was
crossing a line that had hitherto never been violated since the founding of the
Constitution: control of vital and lucrative resources was reserved for the businessmen of
the upper class, euphemistically described as “private enterprise.” The oilmen had
crossed swords with the Interior Secretary before, over his intervention against the glut of
unregulated “hot oil” from the newly discovered East Texas oil fields distributed in the
marketplace by companies cooperating with “wildcat” drillers for oil. Although Ickes’s
conservation intervention did restore stability in oil prices, many oilmen suspected
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Ickes’s Progressive Republican political roots and were convinced that his populism was
aimed at public ownership of the nation’s oil wealth.
The oilmen argued Ickes into a retreat to government ownership of 51% along the
lines of the British Government’s share of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Ickes even
suggesting that Casoc’s name be changed similarly to the American-Arabian Oil
Company. That was impossible, the oilmen countered. Putting “American” at the front of
the name might well alienate the Arabs and selling 51% to the federal government would
still leave Washington with a controlling interest, an unacceptable precedent. Finally,
Ickes reached a compromise at 33⅓% for $40 million to finance a new larger refinery
north of the Dharan field at Ras Tanura on the Arabian Sea. In return, the government
gained the right to purchase 100% of Casoc’s production during wartime and 51% during
peacetime.
Why had the oilmen agreed? Because with the U.S. Government as an invested
partner Washington would be more inclined to protect Socal and Texaco’s Casoc holding
against threats from either Britain, Rommel or the Russians or, for that matter, Ibn Saud
or his less predictable successors after he died (in fact, he did die within a decade).
Satisfied, Ickes’s PRC made plans to send geologist Everett DeGolyer to make a
thorough analysis of just how much “black gold” was in Saudi Arabia. Ickes, meanwhile,
charged ahead into testing the political waters for another project for Saudi oil: a 1000mile pipeline from Saudi Arabia to some point on the Mediterranean Sea, the largest
project in history up to that time, its estimated $120 million to be financed by the PRC.
Ickes hoped to include oil from Kuwait, where he had also tried to strike a deal with Gulf
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Oil, the company controlled by the Mellon family in Pittsburgh. But by the time
DeGolyer returned to America and filed his enthusiastic report on Saudi oil and other oil
potentials in the Middle East, Rommel, thanks to new Sherman tanks from America, had
been stopped and defeated at El Alamein, Egypt, recalled to Italy, and was no longer a
threat. With Rommel went Socal and Texaco’s interest in PRC buying into Casoc.
Backed by a coalition of smaller companies that feared Saudi oil competition against
their domestic oil holdings, as well as by opposition from Standard Oil of New Jersey and
Standard Oil of New York, which now wanted to enter the Saudi field without
encumbrances from either Washington or their Near East Development partners in the
1928 “Red Line” agreement, Texaco and Socal led a strong public relations and lobbying
campaign in Congress against public ownership of their properties. By December 1943
Ickes surrendered the Saudi fields to the oil companies. Ickes’s government-owned transArabian pipeline suffered a similar fate after he announced the new project in early 1944
with the full backing of the War Department. Exclusive private ownership again trumped
public ownership.
That left only the British as serious contenders. British officials, both
governmental and corporate, were worried about the Americans’ intention to greatly
increase Saudi oil production. They were concerned about the pipeline’s projected route
to the Mediterranean, which obviously meant that Saudi oil would be sent ultimately to
postwar Europe, threatening British oil companies with competition. An oil glut would
drive down prices, perhaps enough to bankrupt British oil firms that brought in a
considerable amount of revenues backing up the British pound already under siege by
wartime expenditures, Lend-Lease debts, and inflation. Accordingly, the British sought to
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reach an understanding with Washington over oil policy, but their suggestions for a
meeting had repeatedly been rebuffed. Now, however, that powerful American oil
companies, not the U.S. Government, planned a vast investment in Saudi Arabia,
Washington saw things differently and switched gears to protect that investment from a
postwar oil glut. Contrary to what the Americans believed, the British actually liked the
growing presence of the Americans in Saudi Arabia, if for no other reason than giving the
Americans a greater stake to use their power to protect British holdings in the Middle
East from the growing power of the Russians to the north. The British took sharp notice
of the Russian military occupation in northern Iran and the Russians’ clear intension to
build their diplomatic strength throughout the strategic oil-rich region. Standing in the
Russian’s way was the Saudis’ fundamentalist Islamic faith which did not provide a
welcome to representatives from the professedly atheistic Soviets, and Soviet interests
were not diplomatically protected anywhere in the Muslim world.
In the fall of 1943, however, friction between the Free French, the British, and
Arab nationalists exploded into a major crisis in Lebanon that aroused the Kremlin’s
interest in Lebanon, particularly in more cosmopolitan Beirut. Could this crisis produce
the entering wedge for local communists in entering Lebanese government and for the
Russian Soviets in the Muslim world?

Crisis in Lebanon.
Tensions had been growing since the Free French replaced the Vichy French as de
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facto rulers of Lebanon under a League of Nations mandate to prepare the Syrians and
Lebanese for democratic self-rule. The Free French had shown signs of intending to stay,
at least until their preferential trading rights and privileges in Lebanon and Syria were
accepted by the Allies. The British, having spent money and blood to overthrow the
Vichy French, were not sympathetic to any hope by De Gaulle to restore the French
Empire in the Middle East. The Americans were also unsympathetic but watched warily
as the tensions between the two colonial powers mounted. As for the Lebanese, they saw
as an opportunity to push for the removal of French resistance to their full independence.
In September, the French decided to nip this nationalism in the bud by arresting
the Lebanese parliament’s leaders, including the prime minister and the president. That
they had overplayed their hand was immediately evident. Unrest poured through the
streets. The French called out their Lebanese gendarme, the Troops Especial, and British
General Edward Spears, worried about both the French and the Lebanese, moved to do
likewise with his British and Commonwealth troops.
Into the midst of this dilemma walked U.S. Minister George Wadsworth. A
seasoned diplomat, Wadsworth’s status had recently been upgraded from Chargé
d’affairs to U.S. Minister as part of the Roosevelt administration’s recognition of the
growing importance of the Middle East. Like Roosevelt, Wadsworth had little taste for
European colonialism and sympathized with the Lebanese and Syrian calls for the Allies
to live up to their professed support for Wilsonian self -determination as enunciated in the
Atlantic Charter. While they suspected that Churchill’s signature on that charter did not
reflect his own views or the British Empire’s intentions, they nevertheless believed that
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the Americans were sincere. The Americans’ history in the Middle East did not include
colonies, only Christian missionaries who had brought Western education in the physical
and social sciences, hospitals, and philanthropy to support medical services, agricultural
reforms in the fertile Bekaa Valley east of the Druse mountains, and advanced
universities, particularly the well-regarded American University of Beirut that hosted
students from elite families throughout the Middle East. Even the name of the University,
changed from the Syrian Presbyterian College, reflected a growing sensitivity to Islam
and its dislike and resistance to Christian proselytizing. Nevertheless, a history of
Christian Crusades to conquer the Holy Lands with the accompanying massacre of the
Faithful of Jerusalem, subsequent centuries of Turkish rule, and, in more recent times, the
cruel imposition of French occupation under a mandate by the League of Nations despite
British promises of independence and Arab bloodshed in the British-inspired Arab Revolt
against the Ottoman Turks during World War I and a personal plea by its Arab leader,
Emir Feisal, to the League of Nations’ Supreme Council, had all taught the Arabs to be
wary of Western promises.
Wadsworth had worked hard to preserve America’s reputation among the Arabs
of both Lebanon and Syria. Secretary of State Hull, a committed anti-colonialist, gave his
minister his full support. And now that the French had shown their hand, the United
States had a rare opportunity to demonstrate its support for Arab independence while also
serving as a strategic wedge between the contending French and British Empires.
The story of Hull’s formal protest to the French and Wadsworth’s successful
intercession to effect the release of the Lebanese political leaders has been told many
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times. What has not been told is the full extent of Wadsworth’s report to President
Roosevelt during his early December stop at Cairo on his return from the Allied summit
at Teheran. This was probably because the September 1943 crisis in Lebanon had already
passed by December and the momentous decisions taken in Teheran to reject Churchill’s
Eastern Mediterranean strategy in favor of the invasion of France, agreement on creating
a postwar security organization (the United Nations) and the Allied Declaration on
Iranian sovereignty. Drafted in Tehran by General Patrick Hurley, the Declaration had
many purposes, including, in accordance with the Atlantic Charter, a joint Allied
Declaration on Iran’s sovereignty and pledge to end occupation within six months of the
end of war This demonstrating to the world (and particularly the Muslim world) respect
for the self-determination of sovereign nations and their borders. For the Americans, it
was also the creation of a diplomatic instrument carrying Stalin’s signature that could—
and would—be used against any Soviet Russian attempt to renege on its promise.
By December 1943, while the Pentagon focused on preparations for the
Normandy invasion, the State Department planners focused on preparations for the
postwar launch of the United Nations and the conferences in Washington (at Dumbarton
Oaks) and in New Hampshire (at Bretton Woods). These conferences would establish,
respectively, the World Bank (the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development) and the International Monetary Fund, key institutions for a stable postwar
economic order.
Meanwhile, both General Strong’s Military Intelligence Division (MID) and the
General Donovan’s Office of Special Services (OSS) were preparing themselves also for
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establishing a permanent presence in the Middle East. To President Roosevelt, the heavy
American presence in Iran could be the basis for using Iran as a model for economic
development along the lines of his Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) that could then be
adopted to Egypt’s Nile Valley, Ethiopia’s Blue Nile Valley, and the Syrian link to Iraq
via the Euphrates River Valley. Perhaps because it had already launched industry and
irrigated agriculture through Jewish private financial sources such as the Rothschilds, and
because of its controversial political status and contentions between European Jewish
settlers and indigenous Arabs over its future, Palestine was not included and left on a
back burner only until, Roosevelt pledged, the war was over. Ironically, German military
reversals in North Africa and the Russian Front only made Adolf Hitler and his Nazi
killers more intent than ever on speeding up the “Final Solution” for Europe’s Jewish
population so that regardless of the war’s outcome there would be no Jewish survivors
after the war.
Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory.
Lend-Lease was not only, as Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius would
term it, the “Weapon for Victory;” 183 it was also spearhead of American corporate
advance into the Middle East during the war. From its inception, it had been thought of as
a way of not only supporting the Allies, but as a way of stimulating foreign markets for
American products and services after the war. Moreover, most of the money spent by
Britain for arms, munitions, airplanes, tanks and vehicles, as well as for fuel, ore and food
purchases, even for the expansion of the Abadan refinery in Iran, was spent in the United
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States. When Allies ran out of sterling and gold, the Americans advanced them credit,
guaranteeing loans made by American bankers. American factories, shipyards, and farms
poured supplies into war zones, and U.S. government agencies arranged for purchases
and shipment of goods from around the world to the battlefronts and to keep the flow of
supplies to civilian areas. In the British Empire, control of the functions was carried out
by Commonwealth agencies. In the Middle East, supplies were handled by the LendLease Administration working with other American, British and Free French agencies,
but most control over estimating country needs was controlled by the Middle East Supply
Center based in London and Cairo. Pan-American Airways, headed by Juan Trippe,
increasingly handled air cargo under contract with the British, and American diplomats
assisted in negotiations for air routes and airports for the trans-African route to the
Middle East.
As war orders increased, bottlenecks became more frequent for shipping and
procurements. Tensions rose between Vice President Henry Wallace, who oversaw Lend
Lease as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, and Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones
to the point that the disputes spilled over into the press. Roosevelt warned both men to
keep their quarreling out of the public eye and protect the image of a unified, efficient
government; but when the disputes threatened to cause delays and affect morale, the
President intervened at the suggestion of James Byrnes, Director of the Office of War
Mobilization. Byrnes, advised Roosevelt to relieve both men of all Lend-Lease
responsibilities and centralize the Office of Economic Warfare, Lend-Lease, OPEC and
OFFRO into one entity. Roosevelt did so with an unusual public reprimand that probably
played a role in Roosevelt’s reconsidering whether Wallace should be his running mate in
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the 1944 elections. 184 The Board of Economic Warfare was abolished and the Foreign
Economic Administration was born, headed by nother recommendation of James Byrnes,
a more conservative businessman named William Crowley.
Roosevelt then turned his attention to a strategic region becoming increasingly
important for the war’s oil needs and air supply to China: the Middle East. Again at
Byrnes urging, he moved Edward Stettinius, the former head of U.S. Steel Corporation
and a partner in J.P. Morgan & Company, from his work as head of the Lend-Lease
Administration and appointed him Undersecretary of State to replace Sumner Welles;
within a year Stettinius would be leading the delegation to London for Middle East oil
talks with British officials. 185 He appointed, also at Byrnes recommendation, the Dean
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unfortunate controversy and acrimonious public debate which has been carried on between you in the public
press conference concerning the administration of foreign economic matters make it necessary, in the public
interest, to transfer these matters to other hands. In the midst of waging a war so critical to our national
security and to the future of all civilization, there is not sufficient time to investigate and determine where
the truth lies in your conflicting versions as to transactions which took place over a year and a half ago. My
action today is not intended to decide that question. The important thing is to clear the decks and to go on
with the war at home. To do this requires a fresh start with new men, unencumbered by interagency dissension
and bitterness. I am persuaded that the present controversy indicates that future cooperative action between
your two agencies is impossible, and that without full cooperation between you the program of economic
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President Roosevelt had reluctantly discharged by Roosevelt for homosexual advances to black railroad
porters whom some charged had been sent as plants by Welles’s enemy, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. The
main losers as a result of this firing of one of the State Department’s most experienced leaders were not only
Roosevelt, the State Department, and Welles, but also former ambassador to Russia and France William
Bullitt, whose homophobia and persistent attacks on the able Welles was not appreciated by Roosevelt.
Welles was the President’s friend and closest advisor at the State Department, whose access to the President
became fuel for Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s brooding resentment. Moreover, J. Edgar Hoover was
known to leak to journalist Drew Pearson, a frequent critic of Roosevelt. With Hoover confronting the
President with the FBI file on Welles alcoholic indiscretions, Roosevelt felt he had no choice but to quickly
remove the cloud of possible scandal gathering over the White House. Thereafter, however, Roosevelt left
Bullitt out in the cold when it came to White House deliberations. Realizing he had lost his influence with
the President, Bullitt stepped back as a roving ambassador and subsequently offered his services to the
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of Harvard Law School, James Landis, , to head up the U.S. Economic Mission to the
Middle East. Landis had been working part time advising the Export Controls Office as a
consultant to the War Department and then, successively, as a Regional Director and
National Director of the Office of Civilian Defense. All these appointments and the
concentration of power a new Foreign Economic Administration were the direct result of
recommendations of James Byrnes. 186

Landis Speaks His Mind.
While stopping at New Delhi on his long air trip to Cairo, Landis sent President
Roosevelt his secret analysis of the situation in the Middle East and his preliminary
recommendations. A frank and critical analysis, it was probably the most comprehensive
and sharp of any analysis of the Middle East of the Second World War: 187 “I have
reached this point on my way eastward and I'm expecting to proceed another day or so. I
feel, however, that you are entitled at this time to a written expression of some of my
present views on the Middle East.

Department of the Navy, where Undersecretary Forrestal shared many of Bullitt’s concerns about the Soviets.
Nevertheless, concerns about homosexuals’ susceptibility to Soviet blackmail rested on the homophobia then
prevalent in American society. Without such discrimination, blackmail by agents of foreign powers solely
based on homosexuality would have been very difficult, if not impossible. It would take over half a century
for this vulnerability
Memorandum, James F. Byrnes to Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 21, 1943, President’s Secretary
File, Byrnes folder, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
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“I have spoken to you previously in personal conferences concerning the
administration of lend lease in the Middle East. I’ve also discussed with you the
controversies that the administration of lend lease has caused between the Americans and
the British. I have been reluctant to make a written report to you on the subject. We
should hesitate to put criticism of ourselves or the British in writing as long as there is a
possibility that, by proper action, the defects in our relations may be corrected…” Landis,
however, had clearly felt that option had passed.
“British influence in the Middle East has traditionally been imperialistic. This
means that one of its aims has been to dominate those positions in the area that to it have
had strategic importance. These areas center about the Suez Canal, the straits of BobiMandeb, and Persia. The control of these areas has incidentally necessitated the control
of the great river valleys that are their means of support, namely the Nile and the Valley
of the Tigris and Euphrates. Thus, England was forced to reach out for the Sudan and
Iraq.… Today from the standpoint of air strategy these subsidiary areas have acquired
new significance, as witness the present British effort to bring the Italian colonies into the
Empire.
“But British imperialistic policy is not only strategic in nature. A second phase of
it is economic and commercial. As such it treats these Middle Eastern nations as potential
markets and as sources for capital investment, providing both a return from that capital to
British investors and also profitable jobs for numerous British nationals.
“These aspects of British policy demand law and order in the Middle East nations
as a prime condition. This has meant that Britain has supported whatever ruling class
could achieve law and order. Thus, British policy generally has not favored either liberal
or independent movements. Instead it has either maintained its own officials in power or
frequently other corrupt and conservative regimes. Today, despite a possible desire to get
away from these earlier tendencies, Britain seems to be caught in the net of past events. It
does not withdraw the support that it has given these regimes because of fears that a new
and liberal government might make difficult the maintenance of its existing political and
economic controls.
“This support by Britain of the feudalistic economies of these countries is
frequently not recognized. The fact that British objectives have rarely gone beyond these
crass imperialistic lines is evidenced by almost total neglect by Britain in the Middle East
of such things as the promotion of education and public health.
“These imperialistic features of earlier British policy are intensified today, rather
than otherwise. Strategically the area is more, rather than less, significant. It remains the
sea route to India, China and Malay. But it is the air route to these areas as well. It is, for
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example, inconceivable for any nation to plan an around-the-world air route and not have
bases in the quadrilateral bounded by Cairo, Baghdad, Aden and Khartoum.
“Economically Britain's interests have, since the war, increase in this area and will
increase a great deal in the near future. There is not only the new significance of oil, but
in the light of diminishing world supplies the Middle East reserve has acquired a new
importance. There are also new and rich discoveries of oil in northern Iraq, Kuwait, Iran,
and Dakar. There is the vast agricultural development in the Sudan. There is the Aswan
dam project, on which negotiations are now substantially complete that give the
engineering contractor the British and provide British management (Imperial Chemical
Institute) for the nitrate plant. There is the British stake in working out the 2 billion
pounds of sterling obligations owed by Britain in this area. There is the vast increase
proportionately in British trade that has come as a result of the drying up of Axis and
other sources of supplies.
“But the resources of the Middle East as Britain sees them are still possible of
greater exploitation. More oil is to be had in Egypt, in southeastern Persia, in Ethiopia,
Somalia lands, and possibly in Syrian nuclear. Unnumbered square miles of arable land
or still to be developed in the suit. There is order in Egypt and more excellent land that
can be developed to the growing of cotton. There are minerals in Persia and probably in
Ethiopia. There is arable land in Syria and in Iraq in quantity. There is also the great asset
of cheap manpower that can be used to promote industrialization in Egypt, Palestine,
Lebanon and the Persian Gulf and a greater quantity of raw materials which were hitherto
thought to be available.
“British policy, therefore, must move along these lines:
(a) Maintaining its political controls as firmly as possible and expanding
them wherever the forces of war have created the vacuum such as in the
Italian colonies, Ethiopia and the French mandate. This political objective
means discouraging liberal elements from becoming effective.
(b) Maintaining its strategic dominance in the area. This means solidifying
its position in the Suez, solidifying its military controls as set forth in the
Anglo-Egyptian treaty, weakening the French control in Syria and
Lebanon, keeping the Russians away from the Persian Gulf, and
maintaining a clear predominance in the air throughout the entire area.
Britain will thus resist the effective development of air traffic by other
nationals in this area.
(c) Supporting the existing ruling classes on economic grounds, so as to
permit the Middle East still to be source of goodly livings for a goodly
portion of British people.
(d) Using every avenue to promote British exports to this area.”
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Landis’s found Russian policy more difficult to grasp, primarily due to the fact
that it was “in the process of formulation:
“ Certainly, the Russians viewed with alarm any increase of British
influence in this area. Their counterattack, however, is thus far, with the
exception of Persia, limited to steering up conceptions of liberal and semicommunistic ideas to the peoples of these areas. If trouble ensues, they
have nothing to lose and much to gain. The Russians have their difficulties
in this connection and only with the ruling classes, but with the fact that
liberal and semi communistic ideas are not palatable to Islam. On the other
hand, the extreme poverty of the country makes this approach possible.
The Middle East needs agrarian reform as no other area does.
"Russian eyes in Persia are definitely on the Persian Gulf. This
access to the sea that hitherto had only been a dream now has been made a
reality as a consequence of the activities of General Connally and the
Persian Gulf Command. Russia can never permit this back door that has
been so successfully opened to be closed.…Russian policy presently
deems it best to keep the Persian government weak. Russian occupation in
the North is complete and exclusive. As soon as military exigency permits,
Russia will certainly make efforts to demonstrate that the standard of
living in the Russian zone outdistances the standard elsewhere in Persia.
Once this demonstration is made and accepted, Russia will fall like I ripe
apple into the orbit of Russian influence." 188

Landis reviewed the position of the United States in the Middle East, starting with
its missionary legacy in education and medicine and broadening this humanitarian
heritage to encompass support for Zionism, and then outlining the strategic interests in
the area, including world air routes and “new oil interests in Saudi Arabia and Egypt….
As an export market and as a market for American investment, the Middle East is
important, provided that certain handicaps are overcome.” Prominent among the political
handicaps was “the constant problem of Jew and Arab [sic.], which can be posed upon a
larger canvas of the constant tension between Moslem and Infidel [sic.], but also there is
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the nascent possibility of economic revolution within the counties themselves. They are
ripe for communism. There is again the potential conflict of interest between Russia and
Britain. The Middle East, except for the Balkans, is possibly the sharpest area for that
conflict. Amid these wartime pressures, we must work for peace.”
Landis then laid out a blueprint of general objectives that should guide United
States policy: lifting the subsistence levels of Middle East peoples, “because it will help
counteract the political disturbances that arise from poverty and disease. The
accomplishment of this objective will partly come from the promotion of American trade,
if it is well handled.” He called for The efforts of the American religious and charitable
organizations to be "Guided by the United States Government more effectively than they
have been. Not only would it be wise to have educational programs affording
scholarships to study and universities in the United States in the Middle East, but actual
subsidization of certain aspects of work in the Christian universities might be undertaken.
A survey of the work of the Universities of Beirut and Cairo with that in mind should be
undertaken. Similarly, some adequate person should be debited to break the impetus now
existing in Persia that keeps the missionaries there from reinstituting their schools. Also,
a definite public health program should be developed and attached either to an institution
like Beirut, or to a governmental institution. In the field of education and health we
should operate independently of the British. Their standards and objectives different too
widely from ours."
To further this cultural campaign, Landis encouraged sending out experts to the
Middle East governments on an ad hoc basis or on a semi-permanent basis. “But they
should not be ‘advisors’ in the British sense. We must not repeat the mistake of the
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Millspaugh Mission and put Americans in to run these countries. The chances of failure
are great, the consequences of failure serious to the prestige of America, and the pattern
is to distinctly a British imperialistic pattern in the minds of the Middle East." 189
Accordingly, Landis encouraged making the political independence of Middle
Eastern Governments as a second objective of American policy.
"We have said publicly that we favor the independence of a round,
and the world understands that we want the independence of Saudi Arabia
and Ethiopia 190 maintained. But I know of no public statement along these
lines with regard to Egypt or Iraq. Perhaps we think it unwise to make
such a statement because theoretically these nations are already
independent. Actually, the world, especially the Moslem world, knows
that Egypt and Iraq are dominated by the British. As to Syria and
Lebanon, the answer is again that of independence, still the question there
is admittedly complicated by the French Mandate. The Sudan also might
gain a greater measure of independence.... "In Egypt war – time controls
have placed the British in a far stronger position than they were before.
The relaxation of these controls, for example in the fields of martial law
and censorship, seems call for. Why not ask the British to take the
appropriate steps? Also, we should enlist in this connection that no
political action of the significant kind should be undertaking by the British
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British control of Ethiopia, gained by the British defeat of Italian forces in 1941, was already targeted
for U.S. intervention as early as August 1943 when Yima Deressa, Vice Minister of Finance, approached
Secretary of State Hull after a Food Conference with a letter to the President from the Emperor Haile Selassie
asking for technical expertise in developing the natural resources of Ethiopia. Hull arranged a meeting with
Roosevelt, who assured Deressa of his interest and desire to be of assistance. Deressa’s problem was handled
by State’s Near East Division, which assembled three missions for a mining engineer to survey the mineral
wealth of the country, a civil engineer to help develop roads, and an agronomist to modernize agricultural
methods. The program was being reviewed by the Bureau of the Budget with no decision yet. Deressa had
hoped for Lend-Lease funding but was told that was impossible. General Donavan said he would take up the
Emperor’s request with the President or James Dunn, hoping that the President’s secret Discretionary Fund
could be tapped. This, of course, required a banker to head up the Bank of Ethiopia and a lawyer trained in
international law to assistant in the negotiations with the British over the treaty which was due to expire.
Emperor also requested a physician for himself and his family. The three positions would be paid by the
Emperor. Seeing an opportunity to penetrate a British sphere of influence, the Roosevelt administration
moved in, including Donovan’s OSS “to gain the maximum coverage of the territory.” Donovan assured the
OSS’s Africa Division that Roosevelt need not be consulted about the men chosen. “I see no harm in it.” R.
Boulton, Director, Secret Intelligence, Africa Division OSS to William J. Donovan, August 11, 1941 (with
Donovan’s handwritten reply at the bottom). R. Boulton to William J. Donovan, August 28, 1943. OSS
Classified Sources and Methods Files “Withdrawn Records,” WN13077-WN13100, WN13251-WN13275,
WN13401-WN13409, Declassified Documents: WN 13200-13215, Box 330, RG 226.
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without prior consultation with us. Twice in the past two years the King of
Egypt has been sent an ultimatum by the British, actions of which we were
apprised, but as to which we were not consulted." 191

Landis felt that the acquisition of air rights and airbases needed to
be pushed as the third policy objective. “The present situation is very
unsatisfactory to my knowledge no analysis of our rights in existing
installations has been made.…. No plan for the disposition or retention of
our air installations to my knowledge has been devised. Nowhere right
seem to have been acquired. No American airline has had much
encouragement to get going. American support for indigenous airlines has
been feeble. And this is the situation despite the fact that the Middle East
has learned from Americans what air transport can really be. It is
American planes flown by the American Transport Command, and
American planes piloted by the British Overseas Airways Corporation that
have been the lifelines linking Tehran, Baghdad, Abadan, Bahrein,
Damascus and Cairo with London and Washington.” 192

This logically led Landis to his fourth policy objective for the
Middle East: “The Promotion of Law and Order.” Of his first three
options to accomplish this— leaving security to the British or Russia, or
joining Russia and Britain to maintain it, or placing most of that
responsibility on the Middle East Governments—all presented a problem
that could be broken down to “adequate protection of the great sea routes
and air routes and that of maintaining order in the rest of the area. As
regards the Suez Canal, the transit of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the
Arabian pipeline when it comes into being, and important air installations,
the responsibility for the security of these cannot well be left to indigenous
forces. In might, perhaps, be assumed by a world police force. If not, some
means or to be worked out not to leave that entire responsibility on the
British. Leaving it Governments too dependent on the British.” 193

James Landis to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 7, 1943. Papers of Harry Hopkins, Box 332,
Sherwood Collection, Book 8: Tehran – Book 9: 2nd Québec Conference, Folder: Interest in Middle East,
Franklin D Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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Landis advised that other than the British colonies and mandates, including Palestine,
law and order should be left to the indigenous governments.
“We are beginning to pursue a policy along this line by furnishing certain
arms and equipment to these governments and by the military missions we
have sent to Persia and to Saudi Arabia. But the equipment programs to
date have been quite inadequate, especially in Ethiopia, and the record of
our military missions and not be regarded as too successful.”
As for the Levant,
“The situation in Syria and Lebanon is different and difficult. It is
complicated by the fact that the French have not discharged their
mandatory responsibilities for the preservation of order by the fact that the
British have assumed them, using the war as a reason. Nevertheless, the
position we should take here is to insist, in view of the mandate and the
likely independence of these two countries, that the French and not the
English must take the responsibility for seeing that the Syrians and
Lebanese provide themselves with adequate security forces.” 194

Landis’s Blueprint for Roosevelt’s New Middle East Policy.
For liberals like Landis who had been awakened to the plight of the Christian
Armenians in Ottoman Turkey, the protection of minorities had to be the fifth goal of
American policy in the Middle East:
“This is a most troublesome problem, for the basic doctrines of
Islam make discrimination against minorities— an article of faith.
Moreover, a sharp division between spiritual and temporal action cannot
well be maintained due to the fact that Moslem law, that in essence
overrides national laws, govern so much of the daily life of Islam. Matters
of marriage, divorce, legitimacy, inheritance, for example, are governed
by Moslem law when Muslims are involved in discrimination against nonMoslems is a principal of Mohammed in law.
“The chief minorities are the Christians and the Lebanon and the
Jews in Palestine and Iraq. With reference to the Jews in Palestine we have
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immensely complicated our problem by supporting the general doctrines
of Zionism. That support means that we have subscribed to two ideas: (1)
Increasing the immigration of Jews to Palestine and thereby creating
heavier economic pressures against the Arabs in that region, and (2) The
concept of a ‘Jewish state’. The lateral is particularly unfortunate, as it
seeks to make of jewelry and nationality. Our effort so far as the Arabs
generally are concerned should be to substitute ties of nationality and
economic unity for the political-religious bonds of Islam. But our Zionist
stick policy is out of tune with our policy to the Arabs. It is out of tune
with our policies elsewhere as well. Our best hope is to substitute for mere
Zionist support a policy that will deal with minorities in a political, as
distinguished from a religious, framework, and insist upon their
protection, as well as their incorporation into the existing political order.
We cannot in the eyes of Islam or the rest of the world favorite particular
minority, such as Jewry— offering them privileges denied to other
minorities.” 195

In this approach toward Jews in the middle of the Holocaust, Landis was not far
from the general opinion of the State Department diplomats. How it would go over with
Roosevelt, however, was another matter entirely, given that 1944 was an election year
Roosevelt was already under significant pressure from the Jewish community to do
something to save the Jews of Europe from extinction. Nevertheless, weighing like an
Alp on the scales against increased Jewish immigration into Palestine was the firm
opposition of King Ibn Saud, who at that very time was being futilely sounded out about
reversing his position by a secret mission of Col. Harold Hoskins sent by the President to
Saudi Arabia.
Landis, on the other hand, hope d for a change of attitude towards liberal political
doctrines among the Arabs and recommended a policy to encourage this as a sixth
political objective. He was not worried about the influence on the Middle East’s ruling
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classes by semi-communistic propaganda which, he predicted, “will soon gain
considerable momentum in the Middle East. Russia will be responsible for this, or, if not,
other elements will be. The promises of the Atlantic Charter to such a backward
economic society as the Middle East to the ruling classes and to the traditional British
officials will seem to them the propaganda of Communism. Their advocacy will be
resented and punished.”
He was more worried about the United States inadvertently playing into the
hands of the communists by supporting openly that resentment in order to curry favor
among the ruling elites:
“We dare not support such an attitude of resentment, for what the
peoples of these areas seek is simply alleviation from poverty and disease
and a modicum of freedom. We must beware of not interfering with
internal developments and yet maintain the ideals of democracy as we
have learned them. It is easy to put ourselves too much upon the side of
what is, and to forget that what should be is, in the Middle East, only a
minimum of what we have fought for in this war. The British are certain to
make this mistake. We dare not and thus array ourselves both against the
needs of the Middle East and the promises that Russia will inevitably hold
out to them.”
This was exceptionally wise advice, given the economic objectives that he
proposed Middle East policy which he next took up:
“B. Economic Objectives.
The Promotion of American Trade. The promotion of American
trade American investment is an obvious end of American policy. To do
this effectively one needs an organization, and nature which is set forth in
an Appendix to This Memorandum. The broad objective of this nature has
to be made more concrete.
(1) Discriminatory Practices
In the first place, it means doing away with whatever petty discriminations
are made against American trade…
(2) Abolition of War-time Controls
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Secondly, it means doing away with war-time controls as quickly as
possible.” 196

Landis focused on shipping, licensing and financials:.
“The need for shipping control of a kind remains, but there is no
such shortage of shipping as justifies existing limitations to import
requirements to the Middle East.… But, though the standard of ‘essential
needs’ is elastic, British opposition to any true liberalization of that
standard is adamant. Britain through its controls contracted imports to bare
essential needs. We are now trying to expand them, but to increase the
quantity of goods going to the Middle East from the United States from
the British standpoint has two difficulties:
1. It increases the dollar outflow from the Middle East and thus increases the
drain on the London dollar pool.
2. It permits American trade, at a time when supply conditions are easier in
the United States than in England at a time when England is handicapped
by the White Paper [on the Middle East, including Jewish immigration
into Palestine], to move into great vacua in the Middle East trade caused
by the absence of Axis trade and the long, lean years of scarcity.
“Inasmuch as the volume of dollars in the London dollar pool can
be controlled by the handling of Lend-Lease, first British action would
have no validity whatever if we were handling Lend-Lease on a theory
that paid adequate attention to dollar accumulations by the British. Though
we happen not to be handling Lend-Lease with considerations of this
character in mind, the drain placed by an expansion of Middle East trade
on British dollar accumulations could be so easily alleviated if the British
really wished us to do so, that we cannot take the British excuse of the
unavailability of dollars as an adequate reason for their refusal to permit
the expansion of United States trade with the Middle East. Their reason
thus for opposing the increase of import requirements is a trade and not a
financial reason and is governed by the crass consideration set forth above.
This point is essential to any clear thinking in this field; the British want to
preserve their commercial hegemony in the Middle East and will advance
many excuses to this end.
“Under the present arrangement formalized by our participation in
the Middle East Supply Center concurrent action is essential to increase
James Landis to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 7, 1943. Papers of Harry Hopkins, Box 332,
Sherwood Collection, Book 8: Tehran – Book 9: 2nd Québec Conference, Folder: Interest in Middle East,
Franklin D Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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the requirements for imported goods into the Middle East. This means that
the British have a veto on any liberalizing action we may suggest. It is true
that point after point can be won against British resistance, but this is a
hopeless and endless method of attacking the problem. The real answer is
to withdraw from the mechanism of joint control and ship whatever we
feel we can ship to the Middle East.
“To take the latter step does not mean doing away with the Middle
East Supply Center. It does mean that, instead of joint requirements
spelled out on the basis of ‘essential needs’– a technique that still has
validity for materials in very short supply – an overall tonnage allocation
for the United States should be made for the Middle East. Releases would
then be made in the United States against these tonnage allocations for
whatever goods might be ordered and the United States might choose to
ship. The MESC system of joint requirements and MESC approval and
licensing can be retained for so- called bulk commodities and goods in
critical short supply. But neither present shipping nor the supply
considerations justify the present cumbersome and discriminatory MESC
programming of some 2000 commodities and having them under
individual license. Import licensing procedures in the territories can then
be liquidated to the greatest extent possible.
“Again, it is essential to liquidate the financial controls of the
Sterling area system. An individual country may benefit as a result of the
system and some Middle East countries may have benefited thereby, but
as a whole it works against the interests of the United States. It is true that
the world is short of dollars, but the London dollar pool does not correct
that situation. At its worst, it is a device for confining the expansion of
American trade in chosen areas. Its only excuse has been that it marshaled
the dollars of the Empire and its satellites for Britain’s war effort. But to
continue it after the war is to marshaled dollars for a pattern of British
trade which will work greatly against our interests.” 197
To promote this expansion of American trade in the Middle East, Landis called
for “a thorough survey of the potentialities of these countries. They should be surveyed
not only as markets in which to sell but also as markets in which to buy. Missions,
generally along the lines of the present Ethiopian mission, should be organized for that
purpose. We cannot afford to leave our penetration in these countries develop as it has in
the past by the accidents of private initiative.”
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Landis next tackled the potential negative attitude among the British-backed elite
and indigenous nationalists toward American investment:
“We need an attitude as to the protection of American trade in American
investment as against measures that may be taken by the Middle East
countries. It is difficult to envisage American armies being used for this
purpose, as British armies have in the past. Military protection, however,
is necessary only as against either sporadic action of a bandit nature or as
against definite national action that seeks to confiscate assets belonging to
another. If a world police force comes into being [as Roosevelt had
suggested], protection against pure banditry will be accorded by that force.
If not, we simply have to take our chances.
Protection against confiscation is more difficult because
confiscation is more subtle. It may consist in outright confiscation or in a
series of discriminatory acts that destroy the worth of an investment or a
connection. Diplomatic pressure backed by the threat of force against the
nation guilty of such action has been common in the past. We can, of
course, use diplomatic pressure backed by economic sanctions. But our
best policy is to pursue a course that will tend to avoid confiscatory action
coming into being. The reasons that lead to confiscatory action of this
character by a nation stem from its belief that it is being robbed of its
resources. It is, of course, being robbed when the profits to the exploiting
nation are unjustifiable. And these have been high under the British
system. If American attitudes were stated as being that the resources of a
nation belong to that nation and that American enterprise, if it is to
develop them, is to be compensated only for the energy and the capital that
it employs in that development, it is likely that these confiscatory
measures would not tend to develop. We are learning in America rightly to
curb the making of immense fortunes. We should not object when another
nation tries to achieve the same end; indeed, we should assist it to do
so.” 198
Landis concluded this 14-page memorandum with a final objective of American
policy: promoting the development of trade by the nations of the Middle East:
“… A certain desirability attaches to making the Middle East
more self-sufficient. Economic depression is certainly going to
characterize this area when they war ends for those countries that now
have disposable surpluses will shortly be unable to get rid of them.
Surpluses will exist with regard to foodstuffs and certain raw materials –
cotton and possibly hides. Our work in improving agricultural production
198

Ibid.
241

and increasing the land under cultivation may prove not to be an unmixed
blessing. To deal with this problem of Middle East surpluses we must
encourage the regional approach at every opportunity and discourage tariff
barriers that now work against inter-territorial trade. The promotion of
inter- territorial trade is complicated by the great inflation that has taken
place in the Middle East. Every Middle East country has suffered from it;
the rise in the cost of living runs from a low of 250% in Egypt to a high of
1300% in Syria and Persia. No ready answers to dealing with inflation can
be made, but we can at least put the concentrated thought of some expert
on how to alleviate the consequences of the situation, for which, in the
main, England and the United States have been responsible.” 199

James Landis to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 7, 1943. Papers of Harry Hopkins, Box 332,
Sherwood Collection, Book 8: Tehran – Book 9: 2nd Québec Conference, Folder: Interest in Middle East,
Franklin D Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Landis’s memorandum contains two pages of
endnotes. In this regard, five endnotes should be pointed out for their insight into Landis’s thinking and his
recognition of not only the global scope of problems of trade with the British Empire’s sterling bloc, but how
these problems might be approached through regional policy on the part of the United States:
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6/ "Increasing the Jewish population of Palestine means inevitably decreasing Arab ownership of land in
Palestine. Whether the Arabs are brought out or driven out has moralistic implications, but the fundamental
fact will remain that they are, like the Okies of Oklahoma, dispossessed."
7/ "Actually the Middle East, according to the best intimation available, is at present a dollar-producing,
rather than a dollar-consuming territory. This reversal of the normal trend of exchange comes as a result of
heavy military expenditures by the United States in these areas. Syria and Ethiopia and, until recently, Iraq,
are an exception to the above generalization.”
9/ "The delay and confusion caused by import licensing justifies its continuance only under extreme
conditions. These delays are enhanced in the Middle East by the fact that their governments are generally
inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies. Egyptian import licensing procedure takes a minimum of two months.
The Persian procedures have produced indescribably large backlogs, and it is beyond imagination to consider
the system at work in Saudi Arabia. The fashioning of a commodity index setting forth the areas from which
merchants can get particular supplies. That fight should have been begun when America first consented to
participate in the MESC. As it is, the winning of this battle upon which much energy has been spent has come
much too late to be of value.
10/ "Admittedly, this is a global, as distinguished from a Middle East, problem but there are presently
several ways to attack it from the Middle Eastern standpoint. Both Egypt and Iraq seem anxious to get out of
the Sterling area. We should support them in their desires and open up conversations with them with this end
in mind. Ethiopia also has protested the way in which Aden has deprived it of dollars that it acquires from
exports to the United States. We should support Ethiopia in its position also.
11/ "It may well be that if the Sterling area were wiped out some Middle East countries would be short of
those dollars that they now acquire from London to finance a certain modicum of US trade. But, still for a
time this shortage may hurt American trade interests, in the long run it will advantage us. For it will force us
to look for imports from these countries in order to finance our exports and not permit our trade to rest upon
a basically false foundation. Ethiopia is a case in point. Today she has no dollars and, hence, no way of
financing American trade. Either we must buy effectively from that country or else give up the idea of selling
her anything. The situation as it has developed in Ethiopia has fortunately made us think furiously and
realistically about the problem."
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On August 30, 1944, the day after he sent this memorandum to Harry Hopkins for
the President, he sent also two annexes detailing his recommendations on the Middle East
and on a specific task that “could be done in a couple of months. If the Department
believed that we should do that task, the two months remaining before I should return to
Harvard could be devoted to this.” 200 The first annex on “Specific Objectives of
American Policy in Egypt” began by repeating his recommendation that American
policy “should be to reduce British controls [ in Egypt] to those required by the necessity
for securing the safety of those parts of Egypt that are of international strategic
importance.” But now he went much further, calling for the removal of “particularly
military law and censorship; …the removal of British advisers and assistants, who are
now planted throughout the Egyptian Government… revisions to the Anglo Egyptian
Treaty… this will involve the reconsideration of the problem of the Suez Canal.”
“ The security responsibility for this and other strategic areas should be
adjusted to whatever pattern of collective security evolves. It cannot be
simply left in British hands, except under some new form of trusteeship
for a world organization. . . . Request the replacement of the present
British ambassador. Lord Killearn 201 historically and temperamentally is

James Landis to Hon. Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 7, 1944. Papers of Harry Hopkins, Box 332,
Sherwood Collection, Book 8: Tehran – Book 9: 2nd Québec Conference, Folder: Interest in Middle East,
Franklin D Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.
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Lord Killearn (originally Sir Miles Lampson) had earned infamy among Egyptians in 1940 by
surrounding the palace of Italian-leaning King Faruok with British tanks to force the king to change the
cabinet to a more pliable Wafdist government, thereby fatally compromising the reputation of the Wafd party
as a nationalist force supporting Egyptian sovereignty. Miles Lampson was the husband of Rachel Phipps,
the daughter of banana trader William Wilton Phipps and granddaughter of president of the Mobile & Ohio
Railroad, William Butler Phipps. Lampson was the grandson of Vermont-born Curtis Lampson, fur merchant
for America’s first millionaire, John Jacob Astor, and a successful promoter of the lucrative trans-Atlantic
telegraph cable. In the typical fashion of new-wealth Americans acquiring British titles for social prestige,
Curtis Lampson acquired the baronetcy of Rowfant in Sussex County after the American Civil War from
Queen Victoria, thereby renouncing his American citizenship. His grandson, Miles Lampson, was a close
friend of Lord Peel, former High Commissioner to British Palestine, leader of the 1936-37 Royal Commission
of Inquiry that investigated the causes of the Arab Revolt (1936-39) and recommended partitioning Palestine
west of the Jordan River into a small Jewish state and a larger Arab state, which was rejected by the
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associated with British dominance and rule. He is a symbol of the older
policy and will always remain such to Egypt …Insist upon noninterference by the British in the internal affairs of Egypt. Even if some
blood-letting ensues because of this, present policy promises certainly the
blood-letting of British soldiers and civilians, which will have more
serious implications. If ultimately interference is necessary, it should be
undertaken only after conference with us and other interested
governments. ... Development of the Nile Valley.… Some mechanism like
the Tennessee Valley Authority is the obvious answer. That would require
international cooperation between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, and it
would be a good thing to bring about that type of collaboration….
Immediately negotiate for adequate air rights for ourselves and our
nationals in Egypt. We should also try to secure for ourselves the
permanent use of Payne Field in Cairo, and landing rights at Alexandria,
Port Said, Suez, Luxor and Aswan…
“.... The British also have important installations, many of which
consists partly of Lend-Lease materials. A plan for the disposition of these
should be worked out with the British…. Egypt is full of surplus war
materials. Most of this is in British hands, but much of it is of Lend-Lease
origin. A plan for the effective disposition of these should be worked out
with the British. the UKCC [United Kingdom Commercial Corporation]
and the USCC [United States Commercial Corporation] can be used as
necessary corporate instruments for such purposes of the plan as will
require governments corporations …
“...The industrial development of Egypt is absolutely essential. The
average landholding of the farm population is seven-tenths of an acre. This
agrarian population must be thinned if any general prosperity is to result.
America has a part to play in this coming industrialization. The first tests
Egypt is rehabilitation of the existing industrial plant…The second task of
Egypt is to expand both its municipal services and its industries,”
requiring sewers, housing, and more roads. It can and spend profitably its
textile industries. It has raw materials that can be the basis of the following
industries – steel, chemicals, ceramics, food dehydration, irrigation and
mechanized agriculture.
“To see our part in this program we ought to have an adequate
picture of Egypt’s potentialities, see how our industries fit into that, and
urge them to get active. As an implement to promote American trade, an
Palestinian Higher Council led by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. After World War II broke out, Lampson
joined the Privy Council in 1941 and in 1943 was raised to the peerage as the 1st Baron of Killearn in the
County of Stirling as a reward for diplomatic services for the Foreign Office. These services included being
Acting High Commissioner in Siberia in 1920 during the British military intervention supporting Russian
monarchists against the revolutionary government of Lenin’s Bolsheviks, and between 1926 and 1933
serving as British Minister to China during the beginning of Japanese aggressions. In 1934 he was appointed
High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, taking the British ambassadorship to Egypt after the 1936
Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. A graduate of Eton, Lampson was, indeed, a member of the Imperial old school.
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American bank is essential. It would be helpful also to have an AmericanEgyptian Chamber of Commerce organized, which could do a better job in
providing American contacts than our Commercial Secretaries. Again, we
could promote in Cairo and industrial exhibition of American or both
American and English products usable in the Middle East. The Japanese
did this before the wall with enormous success.
“The possibility of Egyptian exports must also be explored a one-way
trade is impossible.
“Finally, Egypt must be gotten out of the sterling area or else she
will be dragged down to the inevitable lower standard that, as witness the
Caribbean today, will characterize the sterling countries.
“The American oil interests in Egypt are likely to be of great
importance. With reference to them we have two tasks. The first is to see
that they are not discriminated against in favor British oil interests and
thus be forced into a cartel operation. The second task is to safeguard
against discrimination directed generally against foreign interests. But I
have the suspicion that both we and the British are even now trying to take
more out of the Egyptian market than we deserve. That policy is continued
will inevitably arouse retaliatory measures.
“We should not resist the ending of the capitulations. Egyptian
justice, I am confident, will be able to discharge these new
responsibilities… We should assist by the transfer of equipment the
adequate development of the Egyptian Army and Air Force.… From 1870
to 1890 United States Army officers were active in this work in Egypt. It
will be enough military unemployment after this war for our Army offices
to become similarly active again.… Egyptian claims to Cyrenaica [eastern
Libya] deserve thorough exploration. The fact that Egypt did not declare
war on the Axis, nor the fact that pro-Axis elements existed in the country,
should not be decisive of this issue.”
Landis called for assistance by the United States in replacing Egyptian shipping
lost in the war, and for more studies at large American universities on the Arab world
including more scholarships for Egyptian students and more exchange professors.
The second appendix, Appendix D, described the details for an American policy
in the in Saudi Arabia, starting first with a review of U.S. policy in the past.
“... they [the British] were acting independently of us. They did
not consult us as to the nature or extent of their subsidy. On the other
hand, they insisted upon the fact that we should consult them before
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extending any aid to Saudi Arabia’s. Suspicion of each other was rife. At a
certain competition with reference to aid and ‘projects’ increase the
existing ill will. The Saudi Arabians, on the other hand, played us against
each other, and when that failed put pressure against the oil company.
“We were losing out on this earlier policy. The British were
subsidizing Saudi Arabia to the tune of six dollars to one dollar that we
sent into Saudi Arabia by way of Lend-Lease. The supply missionary was
in their hands. They had complete control over the pilgrimage, the present
single largest source of revenue to the King. They had manpower in Saudi
Arabia and sources of information far beyond ours. They also had great
resources in the immediate vicinity which they would not have hesitated to
employ it any further competition that would ensue.
“Thus, it was essential to agree to cooperate with them. That
agreement has ‘boxed’ the Saudi Arabians to the sense that they have
nowhere to go for further largesses if they are turned down by us and the
British. The Russians are still too far away. The oil company thus can say
‘no’ to any further large demands that may be made upon it
“The new Anglo-American agreement on Middle East oil reached
in London by Undersecretary Edward Stettinius “has further advantage. It
enables us now to judge what British objectives truly are. The British have
always claimed that they had no interest in handicapping American oil
interests in Saudi Arabia. This may or may not be true, but we have no
means of knowing now. But if the British failed to live up to the
agreement they have made, we can then be certain that they have other
objectives than those they professed to have. The agreement has another
virtue British policy as exemplified by the Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia
seemed directed towards driving Saudi Arabia into bankruptcy and then
stepping in and through ‘advisors’ taking over the conduct of Saudi Arabia
and affairs upon the ground that they could not be handled competently by
the Saudi Arabians themselves. This policy, if it did exist, has been
checked by the [recent Anglo-American Agreement] for the Saudi
Arabia’s no or should know now that we will not let them down in that
fashion.
“The agreement had one defect, however. It requires us to act in
unison with the British in the process of getting agreement is always long
and tedious.” 202
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Landis then examined the nature of the British-American subsidy to Saudi Arabia
which consisted of cereals, miscellaneous commodities, sovereigns and silver riyals. He
suggested a change in the way the subsidy estimates were calculated:
“taking into consideration not only normal budgetary calculations,
that is, estimates of expenditures and revenues, but also by judgments on
three other important matters. The first is the subsidy program for the
country as a whole. The second is the estimate as to the quantum of the
supplies that can be expected to arrive to commercials channels. The third
is the amount of subsidize goods that the government is expected to sell
the third matters of great importance. In impediments of King Ibn Saud to
maintain law and order is the free distribution of goods to persons so poor,
who otherwise would resort to banditry. This policy can, of course, be
abuse and probably has been. But to force too rapid a curtailment of free
distribution is to invite disorder and even threatened the position of the
King.”
Statistics, moreover, were unavailable or else unreliable.
“Our objective must be to see that the country is adequately
supplied that expenditures are kept with reasonable minimum. If we do
this adequately, it will be no reason for the King to borrow elsewhere and
he must be discouraged from doing so. Thus, we must insist that neither
the oil company will large British trading concerns make loans to the King
without consultation with us.… We must get Saudi Arabia out of the
subsidy and back on her own feet. A reasonable increase in the pilgrimage
and oil operations will do so at the presently proposed rate of expenditure.
But if expenditures increase, this hope will never be realized.…
“...The prime objective of American policies to retain the
friendship of the King and to keep the Saudi Arabia and Government in a
position to maintain law and order. The subsidy policy properly pursued
will achieve the first. The second is more difficult. The king is getting old.
The session will present its problems and invite opportunities for discord,
and discord threatens our position far more than that of the British. Time is
thus of the essence in furthering the program sketch below. Due to the
war, and due to the ineptitude and vacillation we have lost too much time
already. But during the short time that is left we want to do those things
that will promote the stability of the government in Saudi Arabia so that
the death of the king will not destroy the kingdom Betty created.” 203
Landis now got to the vital consideration:

203

Ibid.
247

“the production of oil is essential. Oil represents Saudi Arabia’s
main hope of keeping from starvation. Production by the lessee is always a
condition on an oil-lease. It is implicit condition of the concession in
Saudi Arabia. Without adequate production the government would rightly
be entitled to look for some other person to entrust with the concession.
The new refinery will be helpful but will not assure the necessary
production. This can only be assured if the pipeline is put through, was
otherwise due to the Suez Canal tolls Saudi Arabia and oil cannot
effectively enter European markets or the eastern coast of the United
States.”
Landis concluded by recommending more aid to the Egyptian Misr Airlines and a
new air route servicing Saudi Arabia “from Bahrein to Dhahran to Riyadh to Jidda to
Cairo,” improvements on road conditions, maintenance facilities, training of mechanics
by the American Army, development of a motor transport system and a bold but practical
alternative: air transport using American planes development of Jidda and introduction of
women from the United States to “provide the nucleus for social life,” expansion of
military aid including a general training program, currency reform, public health
programs and expansion of the American legation and Jidda with an adequate staff,
including an economist.
In Annex E the third country that Landis put great emphasis on was Ethiopia,
which was:
“the source of the Blue Nile and thus must be part of any overall
planning of the Nile Valley. It is the source of wealth also for those coastal
strips, Eritrea, French Somaliland, and the expanded British Somaliland.
These strips economically cannot exist, except with reference to the richer
hinterland of Ethiopia. The possession of Eritrea thus almost inevitably
calls for the next annexation of Ethiopia, unless one is content to play the
minor will that the French played in Djibouti and the British in
Somaliland. Thirdly, Ethiopia is about the one territory in East Africa
north of Mozambique today is not under British domination. It thus has a
peculiar consolidating appeal to the British in Africa. From the standpoint
of air traffic Ethiopia as such is not too important. The coastal regions,
however, are; for they, like Asmara and Massawa, dominate the western
Red Sea roots. And Ethiopia will dominate will be dominated by them.”
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Reviewing British policy in Ethiopia, Landis commented that
“It is extraordinary that the British who ‘liberated’ Ethiopia are
today cordially hated by the Ethiopians. The reasons for this are many.
The unfairness of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaty is only too patent. Many of
the British advisers sent to Ethiopia were incompetent. More were
dominated by crude concepts of Empire. British trading firms followed
closely behind the Army were given was seized preferences. Considerable
looting followed occupation with the effort to remove Italian materials to
Kenya. Aden branched out again to seize even more firmly than before
upon Ethiopian trade.
“The Ethiopians believe that British policy is directed toward
absorbing them. With the Italians gone, they see no enemy now save the
British.
“An examination of British policy convinces that either seeking to
swallow up Ethiopia or is extremely unintelligent. Relationships with
Ethiopian officials are bad. No effort is made to help the country develop
itself. The British have been suspicious of every interest that we have
exhibited in Ethiopia. Through the Aden control they have made
impossible the development of commerce between us and Ethiopia.”
The prescription given by Landis was familiar: independence for “almost the last
island of independence and the growing area of British domination of Eastern and
northeastern Africa;” and enforcement of law and order. “The failure of the Ethiopian
government to do so, particularly along its borders, will give the British an excuse to take
over.” The U.S. should send more equipment for the well-trained and disciplined 5000man Imperial bodyguard. “The fact that the British oppose our lend-leasing this
equipment to the Ethiopians is not without interest.” Educated persons were a great
deprivation in Ethiopia under the Italians.
“Persons with even the rudiments of education were shot for that
very reason by the Italians. The Emperor has only a handful of educated
people with whom to govern. This is a tremendous handicap… more
American missionaries should be induced to go there. Agricultural
education and the elementary subjects are those upon which emphasis
should be placed.”
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And Amharic (not to be confused with Ameraic, the ancient language spoken in
the Fertile Crescent including the Galilean Jesus), was written phonetically and had,
according to Landis, “a needless number of symbols…The romanization of Amharic is a
project deserving of study and the adoption of a Romanized form of writing would break
down one of the barriers that exist between Ethiopia and the outside world.” Would
Landis had made a similar proposal for the languages of China or Arabia? Or was this
just another example of what Edward Said would later call “Orientalism” and Douglas
Little “American Orientalism?” 204 All this cultural change, as profound as language,
would be accompanied by assistance to the Ethiopians in their negotiations with the
British for a new Anglo-Ethiopian treaty.
“Our avenue here is the American advisor to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Simpson.
“Aden Exchange Control absorbs all dollars made by Ethiopian
merchants out of shipping their products to the United States. No
commercial trade with the United States can develop. This is, perhaps, the
unfairest and most discriminatory act of the British in Ethiopia,” Landis
wrote. “The country was subjected to all the burdens of the sterling area
and none of its benefits.
“We have made one effort to cure the situation, that is, to request
the British to make available sufficient dollars to finance MESC approved
requirements in U.S.A. To date they refuse to do so with reference to
categories of Lend-Lease theretofore furnished Ethiopia on credit. This is
the great bulk of goods which we wish to see Ethiopia import
commercially. The balance is truly negligible. We must overcome this
resistance of the British Treasury.
“Ethiopia is also reported to have requested a return of the dollars
thus taken from Ethiopia by Aden. This position of Ethiopia should be
strongly supported by us.… The only instrumentality for private American
trade in Ethiopia today is the American Eastern Corporation,’ (Little
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2009) 205 [which was then seeking a tobacco-growing concession in
Ethiopia]. “Unfortunately, it has little experience with the territory and has
exhibited only a slight insight and initiative today. It competes against
very competent British traders, chief among whom is Besse and
Company. 206
“The Saudi Arabian subsidy program will call for off-shore
purchases of cereals and supply areas near Saudi Arabia. One of these is
Ethiopia. Off-shore purchases in Ethiopia should be handled by the
Americans, and the dollars thus spent conserved for the benefit of
Ethiopian trade with the United States.”
Landis recommended a unified and competent management of the Djibouti- Addis
Ababa Railroad, in American hands:
“Politically British, French or Ethiopian management of the entire
road seems out of the question. American management would seem to be
acceptable. If an agreement could be reached between the French [of the
Djibouti colonial government] and the Ethiopians for such a management,
talent for that purpose might be had in the United States or from among
the personnel of the Persian Gulf Command. In any event, the Railroad
requires rehabilitation, and this means capital that Ethiopia does not now
possess. That capital will be difficult to secure privately. The United
States may feel it wise to assist, but any judgment on that score must
remain in suspense until we know more about Ethiopia’s economic value
to us.
“… Oil is reputed to exist in portions of Ethiopia The Department
may have some knowledge on the subject. I have none.” In fact, within
three years Sinclair Oil of 1920s Teapot Dome infamy, would be seeking
exploratory rights in southern Ethiopia’s Ogaden region with the
assistance of the State Department.” 207
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Landis later in this memorandum describes this agent for Shell Oil thus: “Besse is the most powerful,
persnickety and unscrupulous trader in Ethiopia. He is persona non-grata to the Emperor and the Government.
But every effort to have him replaced has been in vain.”
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Significantly, Landis’s memorandum to the President became, overall, a blueprint
for Roosevelt’s Middle East policy. Most of his recommendations ended up being
implemented.
Landis arrived in Cairo in December 1943 and took a seat on the Middle East
Supply Center’s board as Deputy Director. With his hand on the throttle of Lend-Lease
aid, Landis’s arrival signaled the beginning of the end of British domination of the
Middle East. Patrick Hurley had warned Roosevelt that the British were engaged in
irregularities with Lend Lease, including reselling armaments to their colonial proteges.
Within six months, Landis put a stop to it.
With the Hitler’s panzer attack against the oil-rich caucuses checked, the
successful invasion of U.S. and British forces in French North Africa in November 1942,
and the British successful attack against Rommel’s oil-deprived Afrika Korps at El
Alamein, the need for Col. Hoskins’s plans for a stay-behind Arab Bureau for sabotage
behind German lines were scuttled, but not the other aspects of the Near East Mission,
particularly the building up of espionage networks. After a futile mission in 1943 for
Roosevelt to Saudi Arabia to try to convince King Ibn Saud to meet Zionist leader Chaim
Weismann and reverse his opposition to renewed Jewish immigration into Palestine,
Hoskins was ordered to go to Teheran to oversee Lend-Lease supply operations in Iran,
where the American supply operations to Russia were in full swing. The new commander
for the entire Persian Corridor, General Donald Connally, was responding diligently to
Russian requests for crucial high-octane aviation gasoline.
To Iraq, Roosevelt also sent a new ambassador, Loy Henderson, in 1943.
Henderson’s persistent opposition to Soviet Russia had strained the Grand Alliance and
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persuaded the President to have Secretary Hull remove him as Chief of the European
Division of the State Department. Nevertheless, Henderson, a long-time career officer
and a Russia expert, was a much respected figure in the Foreign Service, and Roosevelt
was inclined to grant him his first choice of an alternate assignment. Henderson chose
Iraq, placing him at the very location that had been identified as carrying a high residue
of pro-German feeling and mounting tensions with the Russians in the region, exactly
where Henderson believed he would be most useful. Reflecting growing unease at State
about Soviet intentions in Soviet-occupied northern Iran and in Eastern Europe as the
Red Army pushed steadily westward toward the Balkans and Poland, both Roosevelt and
Hull agreed to send Henderson to Iraq as a watchdog for both Iraq and Iran, where G-2,
in deference to Russian suspicions, was absent.
The origin of this deference is illustrative of the Admiration’s difficulties with
implementing the Soviet alliance in the field. During the planning period in Washington
before the Persian Corridor had been fully set up, Harriman had suggested to the
Strategic Planning Division of Army Services and Supply that the new command for the
Persian Gulf should possess “a good G-2 in the headquarters [to] keep in touch with the
military situation and also with the sabotage situation.” This recommendation was
passed on to General Strong, Commander of the Military Intelligence Division in
September 1942, who then in October sent instructions to General Connally that he was
to assume command of all War Department intelligence personnel in Iran and Iraq and of
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the southern shores of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, leaving to the War
Department’s discretion the selection, location, transfer, and administration. 208
It took some time, but finally on March 26, 1943 Gen. Connally felt obliged
because of the continuing tense situation with the Russians to warn Gen. Marshall, the
Army Chief of Staff, that “experience has shown that this is not compatible with my
primary mission and Russians very suspicious of our G-2 activities as they see no need
for such activities in furthering our mission. This suspicion of our motives is hampering
our obtaining the operational data we must have in order to carry out efficiently our plan
primary mission. As our operations increase in volume it will be come of even greater
importance that the Russians have confidence in our sincerity of purchaser’s. Under
decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, British have full responsibility for security our
operation south of the vicinity of Tehran inclusive, which necessarily includes collection
of necessary intelligence. If the situation ever develops that we do any operating north of
the vicinity of Tehran Russians will have full responsibility for our sincerity. Thus the
PGSC as such has no need for military intelligence.” 209
G-2 was not sent in. The President was firmly convinced that keeping the
Russians fighting Hitler’s armies on the Easter Front was vital for Allied victory. He did
not want to irritate Stalin or to send any message that the U.S. did not trust the Russians
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or might, as they knew Stalin was wondering, be tempted by the separate peace that
Hitler was seeking.
This did not mean, however, that General Strong agreed. In fact, G-2 was
undergoing a transformation in geopolitical education for its top officers, led by future
academic leaders of the Cold War gathered by the head of G-2’s Plans and Analysis
Section, Lt. Col. William S. Culbertson.

Chapter Four
Geopolitics and the Imperial Dream
Maturing U.S. Intelligence with a Longer View.
Geopolitics was a term that was considered anathema in many America academic
circles during the 1930s and early 1940s because of its endorsement and misuse by Adolf
Hitler and Nazi theoreticians. Founded as an academic discipline in Germany and
elaborated in the interwar years by Carl Schmitt, it was an attempt to look beyond the
aristocratic aggrandizement approach toward war that was the legacy of feudalism in the
latest incarnation of the Teutonic knights, the Germany’s aristocratic Junker caste. At the
same time, it was also a strategic approach that was beyond the balance-of-power strategy
that bourgeois politicians of the Western powers played against each other. World War I
had revealed the weaknesses of both approaches toward modern warfare. Instead, a
geopolitical approach was a new strategic theory to ostensibly answer the perceived
needs of a modern army in the industrial age.
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This Weltanschauung (worldview) was based on the geographic location of
Germany as the core power of Central Europe and its implication for a comprehensive
regional and global context that took into account such critical factors as economics,
politics, ethnicity, religions, and languages. Although similar concepts had been
recognized since the Napoleon’s turning the French army into a mass-based civilian
army, World War I had taught the more aggressive members of the German General Staff
that “total war” meant mobilization of the entire German population for a war that
accepted nothing conditional between Freund und Feind (Friend and Foe) and nothing
except unconditional surrender of the enemy, occupation of his land, and the
Niederwerfung (prostration) of his entire society to the victor’s reshaping totalitarian
demands. This, of course, required more modern means: rapid mobility capabilities by
rail, trucks, and armored vehicles, modern field-to command communications and
coordination with warplanes, industrial and transportation capacities (including
improved roads and pontoon bridges for crossing rivers where fixed bridges are
unavailable or held by enemy forces, and other economic, political, and cultural factors,
including an understanding and manipulation (through propaganda) of the enemy’s
historical and religious beliefs and practices. It also included the centralization of
command and analysis that could achieve the maximum concentration of military and
civilian resources focused against the enemy’s most vulnerable weaknesses among all its
factors or components of national life.
After Germany’s defeat in World War I, ultra-conservative German strategists did
not blame only bourgeois politicians, Communists and Jews for undermining the fighting
will of the German people; they also interpreted their defeat strategically as the result of
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the British sea blockade that cut off Germany’s vital imports of food and supplies. This
sea blockade, they argued, could only be overcome by increasing Germany’s Lebensraum
(living space) into fertile foreign lands that would increase food production. The
geopolitics of German General Karl Haushofer, the former professor of Rudolf Hess,
Hitler’s deputy in the Nazi party, soon was transmitted to Adolf Hitler and incorporated
into Hitler’s book, Mein Kamp (My Struggle), targeting more fertile Poland and Eastern
Russia (particularly the Ukraine, the region’s breadbasket and once Poland’s colony) for
this purpose.
This geopolitical assumption that the East, not the West, was the direction that
Germany’s survival depended upon was the strategic reason beyond ideology for Hitler’s
decision to attack Russia after the Luftwaffe’s defeat over the English Channel made
invasion of England impossible. Hitler’s attack on Russia had always been his real goal,
but this was not simply a continuation of the Kaiser Wilhelm II’s “Drive to the East” as
part of Imperial Germany’s Weltpolitik (world politics) striving for prestige as a world
power. By 1941, Haushofer’s geostrategy had been taken to extremes by the racial
ideology of Hitler’s Nazi regime. The German Junkers’ secretly expanding and
modernizing the Weimer Republic’s limited 100,000-man Reichswehr (Realm Defense)
during the 1920s found with the Nazi electoral victory a new ally in Adolf Hitler. The
price the Prussians exacted on Hitler for President Hindenburg’s appointment of Hitler as
Chancellor was Hitler’s agreement to sacrifice Gregor Strasser and Rohm’s unruly SA
stormtrooper right-wing revolutionaries to the murderous violence of “the Night of the
Long Knives.” Thereupon, Hitler relied on his own personal guard, the SS, and the
rearmaments program and unification of the armed services into a centralized Wehrmacht
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(Defense Force) by 1936 was underway.
Once he gained legal power, Hitler’s new Nazi regime quickly gained prestige
through formal diplomatic recognition by the Catholic Vatican (the first sovereign state to
do so). After the death of General Hindenburg, Hitler took over Hindenburg’s presidency,
instituted a personal loyalty oath to him as Führer (Leader) for all soldiers, gradually
undermined the power the professional Junkers in the Army to increase the influence of
the Nazi Party in the Army, leading to the eventual dismissal in 1938 of the more prudent
anti-expansionist Prussian Chief of the German General Staff, General Ludwig Beck. But
Hitler never had any intention of stopping there. He implemented a social revolution
against the institutions of Germany’s privileged traditional ruling class by propagandizing
social equality and German brotherhood in the New Germany, persecuting liberals,
socialists, and communists alike; penetrating labor through the replacement by the Nazi’s
Labor Front of not only traditional labor leaders but also independent unions, destroying
one of the pillars of democracy; penetrating Catholic Bavaria, Hitler’s failed original
political launching pad for the 1923 Munich “beerhall putsch”, through the a Germanywide Catholic Concordat negotiated by the Vatican Secretariat headed by Cardinal
Eugenio Pacelli (the future wartime Pope Pius XII) assisted by Monsignor Giovanni
Batista Montini (the future Pope Paul VI) ; penetrating mass communications through
terror attacks on opposition press, using emergency powers and war scares to impose
censorship and eventual control over radio stations, newspapers and magazines by Dr.
Josef Goebbels’ Ministry of Propaganda; 210 penetrating the Depression-and-large-
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business-wracked small business base by Nazi attacks on German Jewish competitors
and through laws requiring the expulsion of Jews from all professions; and penetrating
even the big businesses that had supported his rise through new laws requiring the
Nazification of corporate boards such as that of I.G. Farben. 211
By 1941, Hitler, buoyed by acclamation from the German population for his lucky
blitzkrieg military adventures in Western Europe in 1940, rejected the advice of his top
geopolitical expert, Gen. Karl Haushofer, and turned on his major resource ally, Soviet
Russia, opening the two-front war dreaded by Haushofer and many of the senior officers.
Lebensraum (a term first used by a German biologist reviewing Charles Darwin’s Origins
of Species in 1860 and applied to physical geography by German geographer Friedrich
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Ratzel in the late 1890s and early 1900s, had been adopted by the Kaiser’s Second Reich
to argue for Germany’s need for “living space” for settlement of settlers into more fertile
lands across Germany’s eastern borders. This concept took root in German circles before
World War I, was pursued during the war, and survived in the German imagination after
the war despite the loss of German colonies in Africa and the Pacific, which were far
remoter than the humiliating loss of lands in eastern Germany to the Poland reconstituted
by the victorious Western Allies.
That Ratzel was also an ethnographer partly explains the influence of the widely
popular eugenics pseudoscience in the development of Nazi ideology after World War I.
Eugenics was easily racialized by Hitler into an extremely aggressive policy of conquest,
brutal occupation, and depopulation to make way for settlers of the Aryan Herrenvolk,
the superior “master race.” To supposedly justify his version of Lebensraum, Hitler
pointed to the earlier migrations that accompanied the building of the British and French
empires and gave special reference to the American experience. Was not the conquering
and displacing of Native Americans to make way for the Anglo-Saxon settlers and
soldiers celebrated by Americans as the “Conquest of the West”? Were not the settlers
who conquered and expanded from the Eastern seaboard into the “new frontiers” justified
taking, in the name of God and civilization, fertile lands supposedly uncultivated by the
indigenous peoples who therefore were devoid of the God-given property rights drawn
from the Biblical command to multiply and possess the earth? If these American lands
had not really been as “empty” as claimed, they could always be made so by force in the
name of Manifest Destiny.
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“There is only one task: Germany’s Asian through the introduction of Germans
and to treat the original inhabitants like Indians,” Hitler told his top Nazi followers at a
conference in October 1941. “… I intend to stay this course with ice-cold determination. I
feel myself to be the executor of the will of History. What people think of me at present
is all of no consequence. Never have I heard a German who has bread to eat expressed
concern that the ground where the grain was grown had to be conquered by the sword.
We eat Canadian wheat and never think of the Indians.” 212 In the same vein, he asked his
High Commanders at a secret meeting at Ostenburg, according to notes allegedly taken
by Admiral Canaris just before the invasion of Poland, “ Who, after all, speaks today of
the annihilation of the Armenians?” 213
Ratzel grafted Darwin’s scientific thoughts on evolution onto nation-states, seeing
them as organisms that naturally grew and expanded or shrunk in the competition for land
and resources. Swedish political scientist Johan Rudolf Kjellén took this one fateful step
further in his argument that the State was a life-form functioning under geopolitical
conditions with problems determined by the racial character of the State. Kjellén had
devised the term geopolitik to describe how a geographic location can influence the
difficulties facing a state. in a location. Earlier, the metaphor of the State as a living being
had been elevated to a higher spiritual form by Hegel, the highly influential German
philosopher who saw the State as a manifestation of the thought of God and whose
dialectical method of becoming (a triage of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis) had been
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adopted but “turned on its head” by the historical materialism of Karl Marx, another
German doctor of philosophy, economist and sociologist. But. Ratzel’s concept of
Lebensraum as a racial struggle for survival was more comfortable and appealing to the
Prussian aristocrats than Marx’s class-warfare interpretation of human social
development. To Prussian generals like General Friedrich von Bernhardi, author of
Germany and the Next War (1911), Eastern Europe was earmarked for German
expansion and the crushing of its Slavic peoples as a necessity of natural law; otherwise,
the German people would be choked by the population growth of these racially inferior
beings (Untermenschen).
Hitler, as evidenced in the chapter titled “Eastern Orientation or Eastern Policy”
in Mein Kampf, 214 resolved to regain the Eastern lands (Ukraine, Belarus, the Baltic
states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, the oil-rich Caucasus, and much of the arable land
of European Russia) that had been ceded by the desperate Bolsheviks to Germany by the
1918 peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk and then lost along with much of Eastern Germany
when the Kaiser lost the war. But by 1941, he was flying by the seat of his pants.
Opportunism, rather than serious thought-out planning, now ruled much of
German political and military strategy, characterized by overreach, by the drain on
manpower and resources by military occupation over vast conquered lands, and
exemplified in the Middle East theater of war by General Rommel’s bold but hopelessly
undersupplied panzer attack on Egypt.
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Nevertheless, in spite of its poor reputation through General Haushofer’s
association with the Nazis, geopolitics’ benefits to an imperium centered at the core
regional power were the subject of serious academic study in England by Sir Halford J.
Mackinder, a driving force behind the creation of Oxford’s geography department and a
founder of the London School of Economics, where he taught geography while holding
degrees also in biology and modern history. An advocate of teaching physical geography
and human geography as a single discipline, Mackinder was the founder of the
“Heartland” thesis that purported a geographic theory to explain the history of human
civilization as affected by location within geographic space.
First expounded in 1904 in a paper, “The Geographical Pivot” that he read at the
Royal Geographical Society and later incorporated into a book with the same title,
Mackinder extended strategic analysis beyond nation-states to vast stretches of the globe.
The thesis identified the “Pivot Area” for Land Power as centered on Eurasia (Russia),
which he called the “Heartland.” This Heartland was surrounded by an “Inner (or
“Marginal”) Crescent” of lands stretching like a belt from Ireland and the British Isles
through Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, Indian subcontinent and Southern Asia to
China. Beyond that were the lands of the “Outer” (or “Insular”) Crescent” called the
“Rimland” by Nicholas Spykman, which stretched from the Americas, across the Atlantic
through sub-Sahara Africa, the Indian subcontinent, Southern Asia, Japan and Pacific
isles and Australia, and across the Pacific back to the Americas. Within both the Inner
and Outer Crescents the struggle for control was distinguished by Sea Power, as
evidenced by the Great Powers’ reliance on large navies to defend homelands and project
power to distant lands. Here, again, we can see the influence of Mahan.
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The following year Mackinder published in the National Review an article he
titled “Man-power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength,” claiming he had
been first to give vogue to the term “man-power” as a measure of not just “the idea of
fighting strength but also that of productivity, rather than wealth, as the focus of
economic reasoning.” 215 In 1919 he published his next major work, Democratic Ideals
and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, 216 arguing that his geopolitical
views were more realistic and stood in contrast to Woodrow Wilson’s alleged idealism at
the Paris Peace Talks. He urged the negotiators in Paris to recognize the importance of
Eastern Europe as the gateway to Russia and the greater Eurasian Heartland.
Despite his association with Fabian socialists Sidney and Beatrice Webb and the
influence on them of Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinist ideas about “survival of the
fittest” in evolution (including the evolution of human civilizations), Mackinder’s
optimism about the prospects of Western civilization was cut in the mold of an
Edwardian enthusiast for the British Empire and he rejected the dark pessimism of many
German histories like Oswald Spencer’s The Decline of the West (1919, 1923). As a
member of Parliament from 1916 to 1920, Mackinder advocated Imperial unity. A
Liberal Unionist, he was appointed British High Commissioner for Southern Russia from
late 1919 to early 1920 during the Russian Civil War and was an active supporter of the
pro-monarchist White Russians fighting to overthrow the Soviet government. In 1943 he
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published his last major work, “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace” in
Foreign Affairs, 217 the magazine of New York’s Council on Foreign Relations, where he
had a wide following.
Mackinder’s thesis was very influential in Britain and the United States and was
adapted into theories abased on geographic space and its key role in positing a grand
strategy for national security based on a Homeland as a core with its economic and
political bloc of close allies, competing with other homelands for control over the Inner
and Outer Crescents. The assumption was that this international struggle is universal and
the norm in human affairs, not an aberration nor the result of mistakes, nor one that could
be abolished by wishful-thinking passivists or dreaming liberal internationalists like
Woodrow Wilson; nor could this international struggle be interpreted as just the result of
the influence of great men (the so-called Great Men theory of history), although the Great
Man thesis would be grafted officially on German, Italian, Russian, and Japanese
geopolitics in the celebration of dictators and the Japanese emperor as expressing the
Will of nations, and unofficially in Britain and the United States in the wartime
personages, respectively, of the history-writing Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the
United Nations-crafting President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
Mackinder’s theory attracted American strategists already familiar with Captain
Mahan’s theory about Sea Power, which seemed to complement it, and influenced the
views of and inspired studies by Yale’s Nicholas J. Spykman, Princeton’s Edward Mead
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Earle and Harold H. Sprout, Pennsylvania’s Robert Strauze-Hupé, Harvard’s Derwent
Whittlesey, and Georgetown’s Edmund Walsh and William S. Culbertson.
In late May 1942 Edmond Walsh, at William Culbertson’s suggestion, wrote to
Secretary of War Henry Stimson in his formal capacity as Regent of Georgetown
University’s School of Foreign Service, recommending that the U.S. Army teach its
strategic officers geopolitics. Previous to World War I, U.S. strategic plans had been
heavily influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan’s emphasis on Sea Power modeled after
England’s rise as an island nation through maritime power to the status of a global British
Empire. The expeditionary experience in the trenches of France during the world war had
been quite unlike anything the American Army had faced before. The modern welldisciplined and well-officered German army with rifled artillery, machine guns, and,
while limited, warplanes and armored mobility backed by modern railways and large
industries was quite unlike the Native American horse warriors of the American Plains or
the demoralized troops of a second-rate colonial Spain on the decline. Understanding
modern Land Power strategy became crucial, especially modifying the traditional
assumption that liberalism and free markets were associated theoretically with Sea Power
rather than the Land Power associated traditionally with more conservative regimes of
Continental Europe, the Second French republic notwithstanding.
In that context, to Culbertson, Walsh, and particularly Spykman, the strategic
standpoint of the American Army had to be upgraded by geopolitics stripped of the
ideological and racial mysticism of the Nazi regime. The problem, of course, was
political: how do integrate into official U.S. strategy geopolitics, admittedly a strategic

266

theory employed mostly to the benefit of and by Great Powers in empire building,
without seeming imperial or worse, German. Congress and American public opinion
would never accept, it was assumed, anything that smacked of the totalitarian enemy the
democracies were fighting against, no matter what the military requirements of total war.
Total war, of course, involved total economic mobilization, and Culbertson,
beginning in 1940, was already teaching a course at Georgetown’s School of Foreign
Services on “economics of wartime and after,” later retitled “The Political Economy of
Total War.” In 1942 his course lectures were published by Georgetown University as a
“syllabus for two courses of study of one term each on the political economy of total
war,” with the contributing essay on geopolitics by Walsh. “Under the emotions of war,
the word ‘geopolitics’ was associated with German strategy and condemned without
examination in almost all quarters,” Culbertson later recalled in his memoirs, Ventures in
Time and Space. “A few scholars, including Father Walsh, saw the significance for our
strategy and for our national power of the concepts underlying the misuse of geopolitical
practices by the Germans. I decided that I would try to introduce these concepts into the
everyday thinking of the American Army.
“The first problem was to convince the War Department that geopolitics should
be included in its intelligence program. No one person can be credited with this result. A
group of able scholars, who later became consultants of my Geopolitical section, were
influencing public opinion by their writings; they included Harold Sprout, Nicholas J.
Spikeman, Edward Mead Earle, Robert Strauez-Hupé, and Derwent Whittlesey and of
course earlier, Sir Halford J. Mackander. Nevertheless, Edmund A. Walsh, S. J. was
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directly associated with the founding of the Geopolitical Section.” 218
On May 30 1942 (coincidentally the same day that Culbertson was called up as a
member of the Federal Army Reserve for active duty in the Office of the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2 219), Father Walsh wrote a strong letter to Secretary of War Henry Stimson,
recommending that Army Intelligence formally adopt geopolitics in its strategic planning
and attached a memorandum on the subject. Walsh mentioned that the War Department
had been carrying on work closely related to geopolitics for many years (in fact, this
work, done in the Military Intelligence Division and at the Army War College as well as
at West Point and Harrisburg, was not branded as “geopolitics”, perhaps because of the
discipline’s association with the Nazis). Walsh argued that the War Department was best
suited to take the lead in this work.
In a subsequent June 6, 1942 War Department memorandum to General Strong,
the issue was boiled down to one of control: “These [university] committees, whose
imagination has been fired by the publications of the German Institute of Geopolitics, are
capable of bringing considerable influence to bear upon our national policy in regard to
the eventual peace settlement. Without military control, these committees may become a
dangerous hindrance to our military effort. Since these committees are already active and
are not only seeking, but in a fair way of obtaining, Federal recognition, it is believed that
the War Department must seize the initiative now to direct and control the subject will be
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faced with another civilian government agencies which may well become one more
confusing element in the prosecution of the war in the settlement of the peace.” 220
Stimson agreed, issued orders for the establishment of a Geopolitical Section in
Strong’s Military Intelligence Division, 221 and informed Walsh of his decision: “…I fully
agree with you that, of all the Government agencies, the War Department is best suited to
take the lead in this important work, and to this end a geopolitical section has been set up
in the military intelligence division of the General Staff I am greatly appreciative of the
splendid work which you have been doing for the War Department on your lecture
tours.” 222
Culbertson commenced duty at the Pentagon on June 13, 1942, and on June 18, in
compliance with oral instructions from General Strong, the Geopolitical Section, Military
Intelligence Service was set up, stipulating that the section would conduct its studies
under the immediate supervision of the War Department General Staff, G–2.”
“Almost immediately after the preliminaries, I became Chief of the Geopolitical
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Section operating in the Pentagon under the General Staff.” Culbertson explained in an
introductory memorandum to his staff of seven that the section’s “object was declared to
be to make geopolitical analyses and evaluation, ‘in order to advise on measures of
national security and assurance of continued peace in the post--war world, as well as to
conduct such studies as may be demanded by the immediate prosecution of the war.’
“This section will not attempt to duplicate the research work being done by other
agencies nor for the time being would even undertake to assemble the detailed
information which is available. It is assume[d] that other existing agencies, particularly
M.I.S., will assemble and reduce to surveys and index the detailed information which is
available on geographical, economic, political, and other phases of each and every area of
the earth.” Culbertson described how the section would organize the filing system “with
maps and charts for each subject studied or for each geopolitical unit of the world which
has the power, actual or potential, to implement strategic plans and/or which will have
claims to make or influence to exert on the making of terms of surrender, armistice, or
peace. These folders will be designed to provide high-ranking officers and officials,
vested with the po[w]ers” of decision, with concise considered estimates based on
geopolitical analysis of each area of the earth in their relation to the needs of any nation
under consideration.”
Culbertson, in a nod toward the likelihood that the geopolitical work may
encounter criticism, argued that he was presenting “the American approach to
geopolitics. It is believed that the appropriation of geopolitical methods and analysis by
the Nazis for their end is no reason for avoiding them or even for apologizing for using
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them. It’s geopolitical knowledge and even techniques were common in the formation of
the early state policy of the United States. An understanding of position, space, and
power is found in many writings of Hamilton, Jefferson, Munro, John Quincy Adams,
Madison and other American statesmen. Mackinder, the Britisher, emphasized
geopolitics as a systematic study in Great Britain as early as 1904. For the United States
today geopolitics has a peculiar and urgent value. It is not the only point of view which
should be weighed in determining policies of strategy and security. But it is a point of
view, and albeit an important point of view.” 223
Culbertson brought Yale’s Nicholas Spykman, author of the recently published
America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power, (New

York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1942), to the Pentagon to address the General Staff
and explain, with illustrations, what this geopolitical point of view was and how it could
be useful to them. But the resistance was palpable, one of the generals admitting to
Spykman afterwards: “We are not yet ready for your guidance!” 224
Culbertson apparently took the hint, at least for the time being, and put his show
on the road, tapping his academic colleagues for conference sites at universities and
private institutions like the Brookings Institution. In September 1942 his G-2 Geopolitics
Section held a conference at Yale on “the Moslem World”, which Spykman dominated,
according to Culbertson. This was followed on September 25, 1942 by another G-2
conference on “Military Man Power and American Policy” at Princeton University. The
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leading scholar was Princeton economist Frank Notestein, who, following in the footsteps
of sociologist Warren Thompson’s earlier studies on international population trends that
accompany the transition to industrialization, applied economics to demographic
analysis. 225 Notestein was a eugenicist who had enthusiastically endorse Nazi Germany’s
sterilization law for the “unfit.” “The German sterilization program is apparently an
excellent one,” he confirmed as secretary of the American Eugenics Society in 1937.
“Taken altogether,” he continued, “recent development in Germany constitute perhaps
the most important social experiment which has ever been tried.” 226

Warren S. Thompson’s works included the influential Danger Spots in World Population (1929), an
article "Population" published in the same year in the American Journal of Sociology, and the classic
textbook, Population Problems, first published in 1930 with successive editions as late as 1965. Backed by
newspaper tycoon Edward Scripps (on whose yacht he toured Asia to formulate his Malthusian theory),
Thompson founded the Scripps Institute of Population Research at Miami, Ohio, which became the base for
his thirty years of studies and policy recommendations on countries. In the prewar period, this included newly
industrialized Japan. Interpreting Japan’s social problems as a result of rapid population growth rather than
structural economic disparities, Thompson concluded that Japan’s only solution was "to expand by the
acquisition of more territory" (Thompson, Danger Spots in World Population, p. 43). Although that
recommendation was anathema to Washington in its mounting alarm about Japanese imperialism during the
1930s, such Malthusian views nevertheless found currency among corporate elite families influenced by
geopolitics, particularly the Rockefellers. The career of Frank Notestein, a founder in 1936 of Princeton’s
Office of Population Research, was initially backed by a fellowship from the Social Science Research
Council headed by Rockefeller close associate Beardsley Ruml (a director of the Laura Spelman Rockefeller
Fund and by the Milbank Memorial Fund, a prestigious health research think tank founded and endowed by
an heir of the Borden Company, supported by grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and overseen by a
board that included partners of the Rockefellers’ Milbank, Tweed law firm as well as Frederick Osborne,
secretary of the American Eugenics Society and a defender of Nazi Germany’s sterilization of people “not
fit to breed.” (See Barry Alan Mehler, “A History of the American Eugenics Society, 1921-1940," Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1988. http://www.ferris.edu/isar/dissertation.htm;
Barry Mehler, 'Eliminating the Inferior: American and Nazi Sterilization Programs,” Science for the People
(Nov-Dec 1987), pp. 14-18.)
Following World War II, in response to worldwide revulsion at revelations of the Holocaust,
Osborne moved away from racism and adopted “positive” eugenics, encouraging beneficial genetic traits
rather than elimination of those with unbeneficial genetic traits as advocated by his previous “negative”
eugenics.) Notestein ended his long career as president of John D. Rockefeller III’s Population Council,
which advocated birth control methods in the non-communist “Third World,” including abortions and, in
Puerto Rico, sterilization, a practice on minorities by eugenics advocates in many universities, including the
University of Vermont (which after protests has recently struck from the façade of its main library the name
of Guy W. Bailey, a former president of the university and a supporter of eugenics studies along with Vermont
zoologist chair Henry F. Perkins.) Coincidentally, Notestein’s brother had been Culbertson’s English teacher
at the College of Emporia, Kansas.
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In his opening address for Culbertson’s conference on September 25, 1942,
Edward Mead Earle asserted that “The continuation of theoretical studies of a military
character during the war is of primary importance; the more so, has the usual service
schools – for instance, the Army War College in Washington and the Staff And
Command School at Fort Leavenworth – have had to shut down because of the
exigencies of the situation which confronts us. In this respect, academic institutions might
prove helpful by arranging conferences in collaboration with the Armed Forces, under the
auspices of such agencies as the new Geopolitical Section of the Military Intelligence
Services, headed by Lt. Col. Culbertson. The first conference of this kind, dealing with
the problems of the Moslem world, was held at Yale several weeks ago. The present
conference will deal with military manpower. Incidental reference will be made to
indispensable concomitants of effective man power such as natural resources,
industrialization, morale, education and aptitudes.” 227
In an effort to construct a clear Americanized definition of Geopolitics, Culbertson
turned to his national security colleagues to help him draft a statement for the War
Department. Participating were Spykman, Earle, Sprout, Whittlesey, Munro, Walsh,
Strauss-Hupé, as well Princeton’s Stefan Possony, Eric Archdeacon, Yale cultural
historian Ralph E. Turner, and two fellow G-2 officers, Col. Percy E. Black and Maj.
Henry H. Cummings. Noting their contributions at the bottom of the first page to give
academic weight to the statement, Culbertson took up the Germanic emphasis on the
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State in Geopolitics’ origin by asserting at the beginning that “Geopolitical analysis is a
primary servant of state policy.
1.

In war, this service consists of providing overall studies of power
situations so that physical violence, economic and psychological warfare
may be used to the best advantage of the state. These studies may bear on
both strategy and operations. Obviously, they should exhibit the strength
and weakness of the state vis-à-vis an enemy (or enemies) in all their
phases.
2. In the transition from war to peace geopolitical analysis should provide
guidance for the organization of favorable power relations by the state,
especially as regards territorial changes, frontiers, strategic positions, and
areas essential or valuable for the economic support of its power.
Population, natural resources, modes of transport, means of production,
and systems of economic and political organization must be considered in
this last connection.
3.
Peace is not a condition without the use of power. The power struggle
continues as can be seen from the competition and armaments. Peace is
merely a condition in which the power struggle is fought without physical
violence.
Geopolitical analysis therefore should keep abreast of all developments
contributing to increasing tensions in the world power structure.…” 228
Nevertheless, on April 14, 1943, the Pentagon’s generals, perhaps alarmed by
Culbertson’s sponsoring public conferences “under the auspices of the Geopolitical
Section, Military Intelligence Services,” arbitrarily changed the name of his group to the
nondescript “Analysis Section.” Culbertson was clearly annoyed: “The change was
merely a concession of emotional alarm which arises in the minds of some people when
the word ‘geopolitical’ is mentioned, and to an unfortunate willingness on the part of
certain critics with other purposes to serve who insist upon reading into the word
‘geopolitics’ concepts which are not there in so far as the work being done in the War
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Department is concerned. Explanations are not called for so frequently under the less
challenging designation ‘Analysis Section’.” 229
Undeterred, Culbertson answered this resistance by protecting his back with a
show of support to General Strong for the Army taking the leading role in armistice terms
when the Axis, now reeling from defeats in Russia and North Africa, sought peace. “It is
the Army’s job to prepare armistice terms,” Culbertson wrote in a secret memorandum to
Strong on December 16, 1942. “The armistice terms of this war will include not only
revisions usual in former wars but additional provisions made necessary by the total and
global character of this war; such as control and punitive measures, relief and medical
administration, police regulations and, in general, a wide range of transitional provisions
providing for the effective occupation of enemy territory. Recognition of the Army’s
responsibility in this enlarged field should be promptly of obtained from the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and then, under the Chairmanship of the
Army, other branches of the government may be consulted to a series of committees. The
next step then should be consultation and agreement so far as possible with the British
General Staff and later with the Russians and Chinese General Staff’s. Separate armistice
terms, with supporting memoranda and reports on old provisions, should be prepared for
Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania and Japan.
“Mere prudence and foresight urged prompt in continuing work in
this field. To try to draft armistice terms hurriedly at the moment when
they are in needed might be ineffective, if not dangerous. Certainly, at the
end of this war armistice terms cannot be prepared ad hoc out of the books
overnight. In immediate advantage resulting from a discussion of armistice
terms would be to require the United Nations to formulate their war aims
229
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in relation to the practical problems which they will ultimately have to
solve. We know that there are issues which may divide, for example,
Great Britain and the United States and Great Britain and Russia. The
danger of disagreement should be faced squarely at this time because of
the advantages of agreement will be enormous. In the way in which the
Army formulates and carries out the armistice terms will appear the shape
of things in the post--war world. When hostilities cease, social and
political life will be fluid throughout the world and the course of events
will be influence for good or ill. For this responsibility the Army should
now plan and prepare.” 230
To Culbertson, this unsolicited memorandum to the head of the Military
Intelligence Division must have seemed good advice. It wasn’t. The President and the
State Department, not the Army, had the presumed constitutional responsibility of setting
the parameters for making peace and negotiating its terms, and to the dismay of many
American military leaders, the President had already set the terms at the Casablanca
conference with Churchill: not armistice, but unconditional surrender.
In another much longer report, Culbertson analyzed the chances of Soviet Russia
making another separate peace with Nazi Germany, as it had done before launching its
joint Russian-German 1939 attack on Poland which triggered the second world war in a
century. In his analysis of the Soviet Union in 1943, Culbertson’s training in the social
sciences is evident. He did not just reflect the political conservativism common among
his military superiors, nor the ideological shallowness of what would later be called Cold
War liberalism. He explained, perhaps uniquely for his time within his military milieu,
that the Soviet Union, while founded as the seat for hopefully a world revolution seeking
the overthrow of international capitalism, was under Stalin no longer seeking an
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international communist-led revolution of workers and peasants; it was, instead, seeking
the foreign policy goals common among all Great Powers: security and access to needed
trade and resources. “What occurred in 1917 was not the first stage of the world
revolution but the rise of a new class in the Russian nation-state,” Culbertson wrote in a
section analyzing ideological factors.
“As the influence of the older, orthodox communists was replaced
by that of men whose chief interest was the promotion of Russian
economic development, this national character of the Revolution became
apparent. Trotsky gave way to Stalin. As The New York Times in an
editorial of January 12, 1943, put it, the latter trend in Russian foreign
policy can be described as ‘the nationalization of the Bolshevist
Revolution.’ The swing toward nationalism, however, has not been
complete. Traces of the former internationalism still exist. As the Times
points out the temptation remains to use communist groups in other
countries ‘as tools of Russian power politics.’ Despite changes the
communist ideology remains important in Russian politics and foreign
policy. It is the communism of the Stalin regime rather than that of
1917.” 231
Culbertson’s analysis of economic factors, including statistics on trade between
Russia and the Rimland states on its borders, confirmed his opinion that a separate peace
between Russia and Germany was unlikely. “Trade between the countries has been of
imperative importance to Germany and has caused her to reach out for industrial and
political control and Russian territories. This trait has not been a matter of such urgency
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Russia; and, in fact, the commercial relationship has been full of threats to Russian
economic and political independence.” 232
Examining the Soviet Union’s ethnic factors, Culbertson traced the change in
Soviet policy from that which reflected its early declarations that “class, not nationality,
was the basic reality of human relations and that Russia was to function in the
international world not in terms of a national state but in terms of the cosmopolitan and
universal idea. During the last ten years, policy has deviated more and more from the
original doctrine. Nationalism has been recognized as a necessary instrument in the
building of political cohesion and the creation of state loyalty. This means that Russia
operates once again as a national state. The inevitable result is that the historical
opposition between Slav and Teuton is once more an important factor in Russian life
German relations. It opens the possibility that a pan-Slavic orientation will replace a panproletarian orientation and a war objective not limited to the liberation of Russia but one
that involves Central and Eastern Europe as well.”
Countering this was the rise of nationalism in Slavic areas of Central and Eastern
Europe. “The people of this territory have traditionally looked to Russia for moral and
diplomatic support in their struggle against German domination. In the years following
the first world war when the Soviet Government denied the Slavic character of the
Russian state, Moscow lost the role of friend and protector. The spirit of the people of
central Europe became anti-Russian…” 233
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The United States, itself, was a factor in influencing Russian foreign policy
toward cooperation or suspicion. “Russians remember the antagonism of the capitalist
countries in the past and the disposition to let Russia become involved alone in a war
with Germany. They distrust the Allied postwar plans,” 234 Culbertson warned. But the
survival of the Russian nation, as Hitler’s attack and its devastating effects on the
population had made clear, was directly tied to the survival of Russia’s existing Soviet
state, and probably would remain so as long as Germany was a threat.
“Germany is the only neighbor of Russia with a very high
industrial potential which is the prerequisite of modern mechanized
warfare, the only state so situated that it can strike the vital areas on which
Russian power is based. But Germany is not only the most dangerous
neighbor, it is also the state which aspires to control the one region
without which Russia would be forced to forfeit her own status as a great
independent power. The Ukraine will inevitably remain at bone of
contention between them. Germany cannot achieve even an approximation
to liberation from the pressure of maritime blockade unless she controls
the fertile regions north of the Black Sea. For Russia, the area will remain
the one region within her domain that produces a net surplus of cereals
and fats. There are possibilities of substitute industrial centers far east
beyond the Donets Basin but climatological limitations prevent an Eastern
compensation for the loss of the Black Earth region. German-Russian
opposition, in terms of geographic elements, is not limited merely to the
problem of the Ukraine. It also arises in connection with Russia’s
traditional search for access to the sea and the use of open water ports
notwithstanding the apparent renunciation of the traditional objective by
the communist government in earlier years, it is well to keep this aspect of
Russian foreign policy in mind. The extraordinary difficulties involved in
providing the Soviet government with Lend-Lease material as a result of
the strategic pattern of the present world war is bound to give the desire
for access to the sea a renewed significance. On a global scale, and
specifically in relation to Asia, Russia’s attempt to find an adequate see
outlet has created a whole series of conflicts with Great Britain and
Japan.” 235
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By the same token, Russian military successes could result in the
recovery of the Ukraine and the Crimea. And the development of the
rivalry (already incipient) between Russia and Great Britain for the
domination of conquered Germany would also increase tensions. “The
British do not want a strong Russia or any more than a strong Germany on
the [English] Channel. Stalin knows this.” While concluding that Russia
was militarily strong enough to continue the combat, Culbertson still
feared that developments could change in such a way that a GermanRussian alliance could emerge in the future. “General Haushofer has held
that in the relationships between these two countries— space, position and
physical geography— are more determining than ideological or ethnic
factors. The geographic considerations, he has forcefully contended, favor
unity between Germany and Russia. In 1913 he wrote:‘A community of
interest between Japan, Russia at the Central European imperial powers
would be absolutely unassailable.’
“German geopolitical writers generally have dreamed of the
peaceful collaboration between the two countries or both forceful conquest
by Germany. Here was their ‘Heartland,’ their ’Geographic Pivot of
History,’ which, attached to Germany, would create a power reservoir
from which the ‘world Island’ (Europe, Asia, Africa) then the whole world
could in time be subdued. When the pact of 1939 was announced General
Haushofer was elated. It was to Haushofer and his followers, says
Derwent Whittlesey, ‘the vindication of their basic contention. The ideal
of union with Russia may very well be behind some of the rumors of
peace which have from time to time come out of Berlin.
“From the Russian standpoint, however, we obtained a different
picture. If Russia knows that in a partnership with Germany, she would be
a junior and severely dominated partner. Proposals for union do not
harmonize well with the rising German psychology of nationalism which
rejects emphatically the prospects of domination by Germany… As Russia
sees the military power of Germany and its ability to sweep over vast
spaces, she cannot but feel that a truce with the Teuton will only permit
German recuperation which would at times lead to invasions of Soviet soil
on a larger scale than those of 1941 in 1942.” 236
Culbertson was quite aware of how much Soviet goals in foreign policy were a
continuation of traditional Russian goals: access to warm water ports for its Navy,
security for its borders through buffer states between it and Germany and France to the

236

Ibid., p. 10.
280

west, and maintaining its hold on Siberian resources to the east against Japanese or
Chinese incursions.
In seeking these goals, great powers commonly use diplomatic pressure through
their embassies and their central foreign policy agencies, through cultural exchanges,
espionage, and the threat and use of restrictions on foreign trade, credit and investment,
and, when considered important enough as a last resort, subversion and the threat and use
of military power. The use of these factors was not unique to Stalin or to communist
states or any states, no matter how loud or eloquent states pledge to mutually respect
national sovereignty.
Culbertson’s views were not a mere echo of pro-Soviet sentiments in vogue
among New Dealers during the wartime Soviet-American alliance. Culbertson and his
colleagues in the Analysis Section of Strong’s Military Intelligence Division were hardheaded military men not typically subject to such sentiments. Their analysis was based on
the empirical evidence of the evolution of Soviet practice, not its professed ideology,
which Culbertson had also studied, including its early Comintern proclamations calling
for a world revolution of workers and peasants against the rulers and institutions of
capitalist systems. It was also based on practical military realities, including the need for
military alliances with rival nation-states with extreme differences, and the political
expediencies offered by the tangible reality of the Soviet armies’ occupation of
conquered lands as it advanced westward toward Berlin, the Allies’ ultimate wartime
goal.
That occupation, not communist ideology per se, was the major threat to the
Western allies’ plans for a reinvigorated postwar Europe, Culbertson argued. This was
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because the Soviet Union, in its postwar need for capital and industrial machinery, would
likely establish a preferential trade system within its occupied lands as closed as the
French and British empires were, and quite possibly even more restricted against any
foreign trade and investments that could stake a claim to status as legitimate stakeholders
that could threaten the control by Stalin’s state bureaucracies. Culbertson was also aware
that this was not just a defensive “buffer-land” security posture by the Soviet Union, as
many liberals thought; the war mobilization and the erection of a huge industrial complex
safely situated behind the Urals had awakened the Soviet leadership to Soviet Eurasia’s
massive military strength and its huge economic potential, raising their global ambitions
as leaders of a great postwar superpower.
Looming over all of this was Washington and Wall Street’s fear of renewed
economic depression that, after the war was won, might very well accompany
demobilization, the closing of wartime production factories, and the inevitable layoff of
workers. They feared a renewal of huge unemployment and destabilizing social unrest
before the peacetime industrial conversion could take effect and achieve stabilization
through renewed and expanded markets and predictable balances between productivity
and wages and production and consumption of goods and services. This prospect of
renewed worldwide depression worried many thoughtful leaders of American corporate
society, including Dean Acheson, the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and
the State Department’s liaison to the Lend-Lease program. 237 The Soviet Union’s
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beginning of the thirties, without having the most far–reaching consequences upon our economic and social
system. When we look at the problem, we may say it is a problem of markets. You don't have a problem of
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command economy might be able to sustain economic self-sufficiency, as it had during
the Great Depression of the 1930s, but the rest of the world’s market system would not
enjoy such apparent immunity. As the talks at the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks
conferences would reveal in 1944, American top leaders were aware that if another
crippling depression was to be avoided, corporate trade and private capital investment
had to be renewed and extended as quickly as possible into new markets, including those
of what would later be called in Cold War parlance the “Third World.” This explains the
urgency pressed upon the Culbertson Mission by Secretary of State Hull to eliminate
wartime restrictions in North Africa and the Middle East as soon as possible as a first step
toward eliminating Western European colonialism’s imperial preferential trading and
investment systems.
As a member of the then-exclusive Council on Foreign Relations (CFR),
Culbertson was aware of its influential war and peace studies program. Some of his
advisors and academic collaborators were involved in both the CFR’s War and Peace
studies as well as the studies of the State Department’s Postwar Advisory Committee.
Even Culbertson’s superior within the War Department’s General Staff, Assistant Chief

production. The United States has unlimited creative energy. The important thing is markets. We have got to
see that what the country produces is used and sold on the financial arrangements which make its production
possible…. My contention is that we cannot have full employment and prosperity in the United States without
the foreign markets." Quoted in William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New
York: Dell Publishing Company, second revised and enlarged capital Delta book edition, 1972), p. 235. Also
cited in Lloyd C. Gardner, Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 1964), p. 283.
Three years later, in support of the Truman Doctrine and the projected Marshall Plan, Acheson made the
same argument using many of the same words in his testimony before Congress in 1947: “We cannot go
through another 10 years like the ten years at the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties, without
having the most far–reaching consequences upon our economic and social system…. When we look at that
problem, we may say it is a problem of markets. . .We have got to see that what the country produces is used
and sold on the financial arrangements table make its production possible. . .You must look to foreign
markets." Quoted in William Appleman Williams, The Contours of American History (Chicago: Quadrangle
Paperback edition, Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1966), pp, 371-372.
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of Staff for Intelligence Major General George V. Strong, had participated in the CFR’s
War and Peace seminars and the State Department’s postwar studies meetings. 238 It is not
unreasonable to surmise that Culbertson, a longtime confidant of Secretary of State Hull
with a top-secret clearance, may well have been aware of Hull’s incorporation of the CFR
studies’ leaders into the leadership of the State Department’s postwar studies committees
and their resultant conclusions. In any case, Culbertson shared the global perspective of
the Council’s members and their concern for controlling the prospects of the postwar era
through a U.S.-sponsored international organization pledged to mutual security and
peace. “In a world without adequate international controls,” he warned, “the policy of
nations is influenced largely by thoughts of self-preservation. Rapprochements, alliances,
separate peace pacts, armaments programs, and other foreign policies are products, at
least to a large extent, of shifting comparative power potentials, changes in geographic
positions and attitudes and policies of other states. Loyalties and sentiments are relatively
unimportant in comparison with power and the ability of the state to survive.” 239
This perspective had grown beyond the peace and security goals voiced vaguely
by President Woodrow Wilson in arguing for a League of Nations that, in effect, would
protect the world status quo from revolutions. CFR/State Department planners had
already concluded that the goals of peace and mutual security could not be achieved

Major General George V. Strong participated in the Security and Armaments subcommittee of CFR’s
War and Peace seminars in 1940 and the State Department’s postwar studies meetings in 1942 and again in
1944.
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Political Offensive Designed To Break Up United Nations Coalition,” February 26, 1943, p. 5. Papers of
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without accompanying economic and social goals and the international institutional
means to achieve them. The postwar planners were convinced that what happened after
World War I, when the victors’ demand for punitive reparation payments from the
defeated belligerents led to the economic chaos in Germany and Austria that gave rise to
Hitler’s Nazi party, should not be repeated.
Since at least the early 1920s, when he was Vice Chair of the U.S. Foreign Trade
Commission, this was a consistent theme in Culbertson’s advocacy of normal trade
relations to replace punitive reparations that were economically unfeasible and
destabilizing not only to Germany and Central Europe, but to the world. He testified for
that end before Congress when it was considering restoration of Germany’s diplomatic
recognition and trade rights in a formal peace treaty. Now, with a war being raged
throughout the world, Culberson was not blind to the contribution the West had made to
the destabilization of Europe by its diplomatic vacillations when confronted by Hitler’s
aggressions. “On August 23, 1939, Russia was a member of the League of
Nations…Due in part to shabby treatment at Munich, she signed…a nonaggression pact
with Germany… It may be pointed out that the surprising change in the alignment by
Russia in August 1939, was due in part to the vacillation of the democratic countries,
particularly Great Britain. Nevertheless, this fits into a picture of inconstancy in foreign
relations that [goes] back to the 18th century.” 240 Russia, Culbertson argued, because of
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its geographic position isolated from Western Europe, had a “disposition toward
independent action.” 241
According to Culbertson’s papers at the Library of Congress, Culbertson planned
to hold what he termed a “Colonial Conference” with representatives from the Board of
Economic Warfare, the Office of War Information, the War Production Board, the
Department of Agriculture and OSS. Due to classified restrictions still in place as of
2020, it is not known to the general public whether this conference was ever held. But
Culbertson did confirm that conferences were held on strategic raw materials at the
Brookings Institution that held wide appeal. There were nine conferences titled Energy
Minerals (“(chiefly oil”), Ferrous Metals and Minerals, Non-Ferrous Metals and
Minerals, Light Metals and Minerals, and Industrial Chemicals. In these conferences
“participants were both scholars in minerals and metals and also leading business
executives in these products.” His memorandum of December 15, 1943 stressed the
practical application of the results. “….. The views of participants in the conferences
have been preserved verbatim and supplemental statements prepared after further
discussion and thought have been reproduced in full. The report, therefore, is not a
produce of bookish research but results from discussions among businessmen,
government officials, and technical students.” 242
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These words were written after Culbertson had already left General Strong’s G-2.
Rumors to this effect had been circulating and reaching Culbertson’s ears and he tried to
bolster his position by an appeal to Secretary of War Henry Stimson, whom Culbertson
had known when he was an ambassador and Stimson was Hoover’s secretary of state. His
long memorandum on the Analysis Section, sent on June 3, 1943, is worth reviewing for
both its comprehensive explanation of the Analysis Section and its importance to
effective national security policies.

Culbertson’s Plea for an Institutionalized Ongoing Geopolitical Analysis in the
Pentagon.
In a typical lawyerly approach, Culbertson started like he was writing a legal brief
before an appeals court, establishing the Secretary of War’s responsibilities to the
President in order to establish the Secretary’s jurisdiction on the matter. He argued that it
was the Secretary’s duty “to insure that the country’s diplomatic frontier does not extend
to far behind its military or strategical frontier. In addition, The Secretary of War may be
called upon at the close of the war to give advice on the military provisions of the peace
settlement.”
Culbertson approached his analysis with an “evaluation of the total power
position of other countries as well as our own.” Without even a a nod to the
Constitutional obligations to obtain the advice and consent of the Senate ,Culbertson
insisted that decisions as to the future political relations with any Great Power rested with
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the President and the Department of State. Culbertson gave as an example the change in
the global power position of Great Britain:
“Half a century ago, that country was the outstanding world
power. Since then England’s global power, which in 1890 seemed as
permanent as the Rock of Gibraltar, has undergone a more or less
continuous decline. For a long time, the gradual changes taking place went
virtually unnoticed. England still maintained a great navy. British
influence was still immense. British prestige continued high. Only the
most searching periodic analyses would have fully revealed the insidious
deterioration in progress. Such analyses would have had to embrace more
than purely military factors such as the rise of new weapons and the
development of new tactics. The changing power position of England has
been the result also and quite as much of world population trends, new
means of communication, advances in metallurgy and manufacturing
technology, the uneven growth and spread of industrialization, changes in
the structure and social policies of states, and such human factors as
health, literacy, discipline, and morale.
“Much of this non-military data is more commonly associated with
political and economic than with military policy. Government departments
concerned with the conduct of foreign and commercial relations, for
example, have constantly to deal with such information. But their concern
is not the same as that of the military analyst. The latter’s concern is with
the measurement, evaluation, and exercise of a state’s military power in a
given strategical situation. To this end he must himself correlate
geographical, technological, industrial, demographic, and other nonmilitary factors, and deduce for himself their military meaning and
significance.”

As the days of postwar settlements were fast approaching, Culbertson called for
the “the redefinition of national military policy.” He was emphatic about this. “If the War
Department does not build up its own file of basic studies on military potential and
international power relations, periodically revised in the light of changing conditions,
there is little ground for hope that the work will be done at all, or at least in such form as
to have appreciable value for the government’s responsible military authorities.
[Emphasis in the original.]
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Culbertson then went on to explain how the Analysis Section was established to
carry on precisely this type of work. After reviewing the Analysis Section’s staff
structure, contacts and functions with other government departments, he listed its
accomplishments, including the conference at Princeton on military manpower that
“provided the basis for an extensive report analyzing the military implications for the
United States arising from current and prospective population trends in Europe.”
Turning to a series of conferences on colonial areas, Culbertson explained that a
final report on the military aspects was now in preparation.
“This Section has sponsored another series of conferences on strategic raw
materials, attended by industrial executives, engineers, government
officials whose discussion of prepared agenda will also provide the basis
for forthcoming reports. The Section has prepared, or has in preparation, a
variety of fundamental military studies based not only upon conferences
but also upon the research of its own staff and consultants. The following
are representative samples of the studies already completed:
‘Some Trends in the Development of Sea, Land, and Air Power’
‘The United States and the Power Cycle’
‘The Indian Ocean’”
Culbertson concluded by reemphasizing that the program of the Analysis Section
was “intended to fit into the larger research and analysis activities of the war Department
as a whole.” He pointed out that that it was not his intention to say that the Army and
other responsible war Department officials had not given long and serious thought to the
broad question of policy or to the many and interrelated factors bearing on the problem of
American security.
… It is submitted, however, that a gap has hitherto existed between
the repositories of information and responsible officials charged with
making decisions. This does not seem to have been adequately bridged,
especially with respect to the various categories of non-military data
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involved in the analysis of our military power and international power
relations. Within the limitation of its size and situation, the Analysis
Section is attempting to perform this service. To be most effective,
however, such an agency should be so integrated within the War
Department that fundamental studies of military potential and of changing
power relations are brought automatically to the attention of offices and
officials responsible for the formulation of military policy. It is especially
important that this Secretary of War have the most adequate possible basis
for advising the President on the changing military situation of other
nations and on the bearing of such changes on the security of the United
States.” 243

Culbertson backed up this appeal by having Edward Mead Earle of Princeton’s
Institute for Advanced Study write a personal letter to Stinson. “I am much impressed
with the work which has been accomplished and with the program for the future which
has been outlined in its broader aspects,” wrote Earle. “Much of the success of the
Section has been due to Col. Culbertson’s unique qualifications for this post. As you
know, he was something of a scholar (having written an excellent little study of
Alexander Hamilton, and has been in the public service for over 30 years As a Member
the Tariff Commission and of the Diplomatic Service, and more recently has been
engaged in the practice of law in the teaching of International Relations at the School of
Foreign Service at Georgetown University.” Earl emphasized Culbertson’s ability “to
interest the personnel of the Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and
others in the work in which he is engaged. I know of no one who could do this equally
well, and it needs to be done in Washington which sometimes overlooks the possibilities
of effective inter-departmental operation. Studies of Col. Culbertson’s are those in which

William S Culbertson, Lt. Col., G.S.C., Chief, Analysis Section, M.I.D. to Secretary of War [Henry
Stimson], June 3, 1943. Ibid.
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you yourself are and have been interested – namely, those of the gathering and analysis of
data upon which the formulation of military policy may be based.” 244
Stimson responded to Earle with a letter and to Culbertson by ordering the
Adjutant General to send Culbertson a letter of accommodation. Yet, he also acceded to
Strong’s letter axing Culbertson’s Analysis Section altogether. Strong’s letter was
definitive, stating that the scope of the Section’s studies had gone beyond what could be
defended in the Military Intelligence Division’s budget:
I write to express my regret that the pressure of events has forced
the discontinuance of your Section as part of the War Department’s
Military Intelligence System. As you know, the exigencies of the war
require that the Department’s intelligence effort be concentrated on what
may be termed intermediate rather than short range or very long-range
objectives. The senior of the Analysis Section Natalie lay in the very long
range field but also tended to transcend the scope of this Division. In
consequence, it has proved impossible to defend the allotment of
personnel to the Section and its dissolution is mandatory.
I know that this action comes as a great disappointment to you. It is
especially so in view of the care and skill you have shown in the Section’s
orientation, organization and operation. You are entitled to great credit in
this regard.
As I consider the record, I am convinced that the activities of the
Analysis Section had been well worthwhile. You have pioneered
effectively in the field of the relationship between our military power and
the total power of the nation as equated against foreign power potentials. I
hope sincerely that some means can be found to continue your work under
appropriate conditions.
With kind regards, I remain very sincerely,
General Strong. 245
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The day before, Culbertson had received another disappointment. He had
contacted Donovan, inquiring if the Analysis Section could be moved into the OSS.
Donovan’s Deputy Director, James Grafton Rogers, answered negatively:
Dear Bill,
I have your letter and just now the later papers. The transfer of the
Section, its personnel, records and work is, as I told you, beyond our
contemplation. I spoke to Gen. Donovan again about your wishes and he is
firm about it. This office has a mission defined by its directive and no
other activities. We have a budget already exhausted and it fixed military
and civilian personnel quota. I would try hard to work out for you some
work which will interest you and use your great experience and
capabilities in our defined scope. Meantime until you get the have a place
in office with my own office household, although even this is difficult as I
am jam for space. I am sorry we cannot do more.
As ever, Jim Rogers. 246

This answer may have come as a surprise to Culbertson, as his diary notes his past
association “when Rogers was Acting Secretary of State during a critical incident
involving ships to Chile when I was ambassador there.” 247
One of Donovan’s most influential aides, Col. James Grafton Rogers actually had
a more negative attitude toward Culbertson than his letter showed. He had been making
disparaging remarks about Culbertson’s work and, in fact, about the whole Analysis
Section. Culbertson and Rogers attended a dinner party in early June 1943 hosted by the
recently elected Senator Eugene Milliken of Colorado (where he was president of
Kinney-Coastal Oil). “Chief Justice Stone and wife and Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge and

James Rogers to William S Culbertson, June 23, 1943. William S. Culberson, Ventures in Time and
Space, Chapter XXVI, op. cit.
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wife, and Lieut. Col. Culbertson and wife,” also attended, Rogers wrote in his diary.
Rogers thought Culbertson beyond his depth among the other guests. “Culbertson is as
empty headed as he was when I first knew him, a kindly dumb bell.” In contrast, he felt
Lodge “alert and well informed. He wants a Secretary of Defense to combine Army,
Navy and Air. Praised O.S.S. (He is a chum of Bill Donovan.)” Likewise, “Gene was
awake. We talked military technique mostly, the bombing was really home-wrecking,
amazing progress against submarines, the practical deterioration of the theater
commanders’ control principle [a sore spot for OSS since the Joint Chiefs’ insistence on
placing OSS special operations under the control of theater commanders], elite vs citizen
troops. Lodge feels as I do [that we] must turn to the elite corps as a solution. Lodge
seems to me a possibility for President…” 248
Among Rogers’s biggest concerns was Britain, especially in the Middle East.
“The British resistance to giving the U.S.A. any authority, or even intelligence in the
Middle East while wanting troops and supplies from Cairo to Mandalay, at last disturbs
me,” Rogers confided in his diary. “We are getting strong at last and I think can and
should ask more of Russia and Britain for our help—more in the way of cooperation. It is
unworkable to pour treasure into a European war and be refused an ear or a tongue of our
own.” 249 As for the French, Rogers opposed De Gaulle and was pleased that “The

James Grafton Rogers, Diary of James Grafton Rogers (hereafter, Rogers, Diary), Friday, June 4, 1943.
(Hewett 1959)Folder 145, Entry 9A, Box 11, RG 226, (Office of Strategic Services), U.S. National Archives,
College Park, Maryland. See also Entry # UD 141-A: Washington Personnel, Projects and Research Records,
Box 13, RG 226 (Office of Strategic Services), U.S. National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

248

249

Rogers, Diary, Monday, March 22, 1943.
293

Giraud visit was a great success and we are at last moving to suppress De Gaulle in spite
of liberals’ support.” 250
Rogers’s frustrations were not only with foreign allies and New Deal liberals, but
also with General Strong’s “endless criticisms, carping and jealous bullying.” Rogers
blamed Strong for much of the low morale in the Intelligence Service. According to
Rogers, Strong had even manipulated Admiral King’s office to send a memo drafted by
Strong ordering the dissolution of OSS; fortunately, the ruse was discovered and the
President assured Donovan that no such order had been issued. 251 He wanted Strong court
marshaled. “Sometimes I think I could serve my country best,” Rogers wrote, “by
resigning and publicly attacking him in Congress as a war impediment.” 252 He was not
alone. “Ellery Huntington (head of OSS [special] operations) … is discouraged by our
military policy leaving us to the mercy of Theater Commanders. He wants to go
home.” 253
Rogers resented Strong’s effort to place Culbertson inside OSS. “The War
Department is pressing me to take Bill Culbertson (The Very Honorable William S) off
their hands and I object. Its geopolitical plans are incompetent.” 254 Nevertheless, the War
Department could not be ignored. In early June Rogers had “a long talk with Goldthwaite
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Dorr 255 on Culbertson –more political pressure from the War Department in a cellophane
cover.” 256 By July 20 Rogers’s resistance to Culbertson’s being given an assignment had
collapsed. Rogers had a “…talk with [ Charles K.] Leith and [Donald B.] Keyes over
continuing Culbertson’s work on post-war strategy as respects minerals.” Culbertson had
stoked this fire, writing Col. Betts that “we have had the active cooperation of Dr. C.K.
Leith, Chief of Metals and Minerals Branch, Office of Production and Development,
WPB [War Production Board] and a member of the Chemical Referee Board [Keyes]. It
would seem to be desirable to continue the follow-up work in connection with these
conferences and to complete the report and summarize the conclusions. In addition to the
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Goldthwaite Dorr was the father of Russell Dorr, a member of Donovan’s law firm who had followed
him into the OSS. A graduate of the exclusive Milton Academy and Harvard, Goldthwaite Dorr had been an
assistant to Secretary of War Henry Stimson and assistant director of munitions during World War I, an
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Guthrie & Alexander the law firm associated with Richard Nixon and John Mitchell during the 1960s before
Nixon’s election to the U.S. presidency and Nixon’s appointment of Mitchell as attorney general.
Goldthwaite Dorr died in 1974, the year both Nixon and Mitchell were pushed out of office in disgrace over
the Watergate burglary, with Mitchell subsequently going to jail. (See: “Memorial for Goldthwaite Dorr,
Former Member of Mudge, Rose,” The New York Times, December 13, 1977, p. 46.)
His son Russell Dorr, after his OSS feats in World War II in North Africa and Europe (including
leading the OSS operation that flew to Bucharest to recover German records before the Russians could and
to survey bombing damage to the former Standard Oil and other refineries at Ploesti), became chief
administrator of the Marshall Plan mission to Turkey in 1948. Dorr then became the World Bank’s resident
representative in Iran four years after the 1953 CIA-directed coup, arranging loans in the Middle East and
Asia before ending up as vice president of the foreign lending arm of David Rockefeller’s Chase Manhattan
Bank in Washington, D.C. that financed the Shah of Iran. A graduate also of Milton Academy and Harvard,
he was an assistant to Henry L. Stimson when Mr. Stimson was United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York in 1904 and Secretary of War in World War I. He was Stimson’s assistant director of
munitions during World War I and a member of President Harry S. Truman's Cabinet Committee on Palestine
in 1946. He had also been chairman of the trustees of Robert College in Istanbul.
Sources: Who’s Who in America, Vol. 23, 1944-1945 (Chicago: The A.N. Marquis Company, 1944); R.
Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (Berkeley: That
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valuable results which might thus be obtained it will forestall criticism which frequently
results when a government activity is discontinued and the active cooperation of business
interests is lost. It is therefore suggested that correspondence relating to these conferences
and telephone calls relating thereto be referred to me with the understanding that I will
follow them up in cooperation with Dr. Leith and Dr. Keyes and with the Brookings
Institution.” 257
These were heavy names to drop on Rogers. The University of Wisconsin’s
Charles Leith was one of the world’s foremost economic geologists, having explored and
analyzed mineral deposits in South America, China, Cuba, and North America,
particularly the Lake Superior region’s deposits of iron and zinc (from which he made a
modest private fortune through private mining businesses merged as the Ozark-Mahoning
Company with zinc mines, production of sulphuric acid, and fluorite holdings in
Oklahoma and southern Illinois 258). He had served as an expert minerals advisor during
World War I to Bernard Bruch’s powerful War Industries Board and later the U.S.
delegation to the Paris Peace conference. Now, in World War II, Leith was Chair of the
Mineral Advisory Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board. The University of
Illinois’s Donald Babcock Keyes was also someone not to be ignored. Keyes was a
consultant for the War Production Board and since January 1943 was Chief of the
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Chemical Industries Branch of the WPD’s Office of Production, Research and
Development.
Apparently with Donovan’s blessing, Culbertson was invited to attend the
meetings of OSS’s powerful Strategic Planning Group. 259 Rogers, who chaired the
Planning Group, accepted Culbertson’s presence as the result of “political pressures from
the War Department” 260 and viewed Culbertson as an interloper. A Republican critic of
President Roosevelt and an admirer of Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Rogers had been
born into a prominent family in Denver, had attended all the “right” schools of the
Eastern Establishment (St. Paul’s preparatory academy in New Hampshire and then Yale
University), returning to Denver to take his doctorate. After a short stint as a reporter, he
took a law degree and began the typical social climb of an ambitious young Republican,
practicing law and being appointed Colorado’s assistant attorney general, before taking
up the teaching of law, ending up as the dean of the Denver University Law School and
the dean of law at the University of Colorado.

In 1942 the original official members of the OSS Strategic Planning Group, besides Col. Rogers, were
General William Donovan, General John Magruder, Hugh Wilson, Walter O’Meara, Donald McKay, and
Col. Atherton Richards. James Grafton Rogers, Diary, December 18-19, 1942.
In January 1943, when the Army added Major General G.P. Smith and the Navy added Capt.
(Wright 1942)Grosskopf and Lt. Commander Coggins, the Planning Group’s membership was reorganized
with Lt. Col. Cruchank as secretary, and James Dunn representing the State Department, rounded out by
(now General) Bonner Fellers, Hugh Wilson, and Rogers. This left two OSS seats vacant. By January 13,
Donovan had stepped in, “already asserting power over the Planning Group, directing its work. It won’t do,”
Rogers complained. “It will rouse the soldiers and sailors and someday Bill will be quietly transferred
elsewhere and a new O.S.S. chief appointed. I must cushion it. Again, the grasp for power! The Washington
disease!” James Grafton Rogers, Diary, Jan. 13, 1942.
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Elevated to the office of Assistant Secretary of State in the Hoover administration
(when he worked with Ambassador Culbertson on saving the Guggenheim mining
interests from the threat of nationalization by Chile), Rogers returned to private life after
Hoover’s defeat by the Roosevelt in 1932. Offered a professorship in law at Yale, he
turned to teaching and became a trustee of St. Paul’s and joined organizations that
enlarged his political connections, such as Boston’s World Peace Association, New
York’s Council on Foreign Relations 261 and the Century Club before being tapped by
Donovan in 1942 to become OSS’s Deputy Director. 262 He also dined at the Cosmos
Club.
So did Culbertson, but not with Rogers. Rogers traveled in higher social circles,
dining regularly with Donovan, powerful senators like Robert Taft, wealthy socialites

After World War II, Rogers was associated with the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, Inc., and
was very active in the Council on Foreign Relations 1948 studies project on Western Hemisphere policy
along with former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-America Affairs Nelson Rockefeller, former
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Adolf Berle, Jr., former assistant to Undersecretary of State
Dean Acheson, Edward G. Miller, Jr., now with John Foster Dulles’s Sullivan & Cromwell law firm, William
A.M. Burden of Smith Barney & Company, Juan Trippe of Pan American Airways, General Stanley Embick,
Dana Monro of Princeton University, Laurence Duggan of Rockefeller-supported Institute of International
Education (a CIA-funded organization that helped the State Department’s screen foreign students for its
exchange programs), Leo Welch of Standard Oil of New Jersey, former Ambassador to Argentina Spruille
Braden, Douglas H. Allen of Otis Astoria Corporation, Frank Tannenbaum, noted liberal historian of Mexico
at Columbia University, and former CIAA general counsel John E. Lockwood, now of the Curtis, MalletPrevost, Colt & Mostle law firm, one of the largest and oldest corporate law firms in New York City and
long associated with Latin American business. During the Inter-American studies project, the CFR (which
then has Rockefeller lawyer John J. McCloy as Chairman of the Board and David Rockefeller as Vice
President) held a dinner on Inter-American Affairs to which all of the above were invited along with Andrew
Fletcher of St. Joseph Lead Company, Andrew J. Shea of W.R. Grace & Company, R. McLean Stewart of
the South American Development Corporation, Warren S. Swingle of Culbertson’s old client the National
Foreign Trade Council, and former members of Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-America
Affairs (CIAA): former CIAA Financial Director James H. Drumm, now of National City Bank, and former
CIAA Special Assistant Berent Friele, now of Rockefeller’s International Basic Economy Corporation
(IBEC). Former Ambassador William Culbertson was not invited to the dinner nor to join in the CFR’s
deliberations despite being a long-time member. Paper of Adolf Berle, Council on Foreign Relations, 194853, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.
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College Park, Maryland.
262

298

like Alice Roosevelt Longworth (eldest daughter of President Theodore Roosevelt and
wife of House Speaker and Ohio Congressman Nicholas Longworth), Boston Brahmins
like the Bundys and the Cabot Lodges, and foreign dignitaries. He easily took his
pedigree across the social boundaries beyond his official status as Donovan’s Deputy
Director. Yet, the role of intelligence in international investment banking was later
underscored when Rogers, while still OSS’s Deputy Director, became president of the
Foreign Bondholders Protective Council, which rehabilitated more than $1‐billion worth
of defaulted foreign‐government bonds. Mr. Rogers, with Kenneth M. Spang, negotiated
settlement of the German debt in London in 1952. He retained the Council’s presidency
until assuming the chair of its executive committee in 1953. In 1946 he would be
appointed by President Truman to the Allied Electoral Mission to Greece with the rank of
minister, personifying the continuity between the OSS and what became one of the
opening salvos of the Cold War.
Despite his storied legal background, however, Rogers was not immune to the
anti-Semitism then rife among the American upper class, commenting in his diary about
colleagues being “a New York Jew” (January 3, 1943) and (“New Deal Jews” (July 12,
1943) and even his secretary as “my brilliant but unattractive Refugee Jew lawyer” (Sept.
8, 1943). During the OSS’s struggle with Elmer Davis’s Office of War Information over
the control of psychological warfare (which Davis thought should be in civilian hands),
Rogers wrote in his diary that one of the Planning Group, Lt. Col. Coggins, insisted that
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“O.W.I. is full of communist spies.” Rogers disagreed. “It is really full of international
left wing Jews, but I doubt real spies.” 263
In their meetings, the Planning Group studied mountains of intelligence reports,
grappled with drafts of plans for strategic countries around the world, and heard
intelligence briefings by officials recently returned from abroad, including General
Patrick Hurley on his December 1941-January 1942 visit to the Russian front, the first
American to do so. On December 18-19, 1942, for example, Rogers recorded in his diary
that “We talk of some ‘Psych-War’ project…. lots of Italian prisoners of war…. Venice,
kidnapping Abd-el-Krim, [the Moroccan Berber leader of the Rif War (1921-26) against
Spanish and French colonialism, then in exile at the French island colony of Réunion in
the middle of the Indian ocean] or disposing of Darlan.” 264 In early 1943, Rogers, with
good reason, was troubled by Allied prospects in North Africa. “I wish we had 1,000,000
men instead of 200,000, but we cannot provide the ships until next year. They seem to
require 12 tons [of supplies] a man to start, 3 tons a month. Spain makes me uneasy if we
cannot take Tunis promptly.” On December 23 he recorded that “Africa goes badly. The
Germans smashed us in Tunis. The Laval deal is bad business. There is trouble ahead.
Darlan has bought our souls—a dreadful error.” 265
The error was soon corrected by General Darlan’s assassination by a reputed De
Gaullist who had been trained in an OSS camp run by Carlton Coon, the OSS’s top
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Rogers, Diary, Friday, February 19, 1943.
Rogers, Diary, December 18-19, 1942.
Rogers, Diary, December 20, 1942.
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intelligence officer among the rebellious Berber tribes in the mountains of the Rif, where
he had been an anthropologist before the war. OSS’s William Eddy hid Coons from the
French police and sent him off to Algiers, while the assassin was hurriedly executed.
For Rogers, the bumbling of the Torch landings in French Algeria and the sordid
deal with Darlan to continue Vichy’s anti-Semitic policies in French North Africa marred
the Torch’s overall strategic success, and he was critical of the job Strong’s Military
Intelligence Service had done and of General Eisenhower’s slow start in moving his
forces eastward. By June of 1943, with the German-Italian armies still in North Africa
and Allied preparations underway for the invasion of Sicily scheduled for only a month
later, Strong had his hands full and turned against the criticisms he suffered from the
intellectuals in OSS and anyone in G-2 associated with them. Culbertson, despite being
on good terms with Strong, soon was faced with the dissolution of the Analysis Section.
But before closing shop, Culbertson held another conference—this time in the
Pentagon building, bringing in governmental and academic experts directly to the
Pentagon for a two-day conference. For this first conference at the Pentagon building in
July 1943 Culbertson threw a spotlight on a region that had recently climbed in
importance for President Roosevelt’s Grand Strategy for the postwar world: the oil-rich
Middle East. The target of German armies in Russia trying flutily in the last year to race
south through the Caucuses to seize Azerbaijan’s Baku oilfield and break through to the
British-controlled oil fields in Iran and Iraq, it was now facing the General Staff with new
urgency. Now that the German drive toward Baku had been stopped and Rommel’s
panzer attack on Egypt was thoroughly defeated for lack of reinforcements and fuel, the
way was clear for an enhanced American economic presence in North Africa and the
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Middle East.
Culbertson explained that the purpose of the conference was “to exchange
information and views regarding the people, politics, and resources of the Near East in
order to evaluate correctly their relationship to the world’s power system.” Titling the
two-day (July 12-13, 1943) conference “The Mohammedan World,”, Culbertson made it
clear under the title that the conference was “Focusing Principally in the Eastern
Mediterranean.”
The seminar leaders included some of the leading lights of the OSS’s Near East
Mission, keeping the seminar leaders within the government and did not include
academics like Earle or Sprout or Spykman (who had died in June 1943). OSS’s Donald
Webster led the first day’s seminar on Turkey, examining its government and economic
system and its place in the postwar world, including how its expansionist ambitions
affected its relationship with Arab countries. The seminar on Iran’s position with respect
to Russia and Great Britain was led by G-2’s Capt. Harry Snyder.
Lieut. Col. Harold Hoskins, about to leave on another secret mission to the
Middle East, this time to Arabia’s King Ibn Saud, examined Syria and Lebanon’s
possibilities of independence and the relationship of the two countries to each other. The
State Department’s William Yale led the seminar on Palestine and the nature of Zionism,
and the Department’s Philip Ireland, author of a new book on the Near East, oversaw the
seminar on Iraq and its relationship to neighboring countries. The seminar on Egypt came
under the leadership of John Badeau of the Office of War Information. And Saudi
Arabia’s government and economic system was examined along with its problems in
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foreign relations by a seminar overseen by a leader who remained unidentified in
Culbertson’s conference schedule. 266
It should be noted that Phillip J. Baram, in his critical view of how the Near East
and Africa Division of the State Department tended to view the entire region, including
Palestine, as an Arab World, would later direct some stinging barbs at Hoskins, Yale, and
Ireland for their lack of support for Jewish nationalism as espoused by political
Zionists. 267 How much this influenced their presentations at the conference is difficult to
assess, as transcripts of their presentations and reportage of the content of the discussions,
if existing, have yet to be found in either Culbertson’s papers or War Department records
at the National Archives.
The next day’s conference examined “General Considerations Affecting the
Politics, Economics, and Strategy of the Near East” and followed the classic geopolitical
analysis of breaking down the region in terms of its racial, religious, cultural, economic,
political and strategic factors. OSS’s Henry Field covered the racial factors, OSS’s
Harold Glidden analyzed the political factors, G-2’s Capt. R.F. Ogden oversaw the
religious factors, and Dr. Ralph Turner of the State Department’s Cultural Relations
Division handled cultural factors.
The State Department’s planners at Foggy Bottom, however, were focusing not
on the Middle East in the second half of 1943 but on preparations for the Bretton Woods
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and Dumbarton Oaks talks on postwar trade as a foundation for turning the Allies’
wartime United Nations military alliance into a world organization for mutual security
and sustained peace. But in Roosevelt’s hopes for the United Nations, the oil of the
Middle East had become a keystone of his vision of a postwar new order. Where the State
Department’s postwar planners left off on the Middle East, therefore, other powerful
agencies took up.
The White House, the War Department and the President’s Petroleum
Coordinator for War (Interior Secretary Harold Ickes) took up the Middle East because of
secret confirmations in 1943 by the U.S. Petroleum Reserve Corporation’s top geologist,
Everett DeGolyer, of Saudi Arabia’s vast oil holdings and what that would mean for the
postwar world, including the reconstruction and revival of European capitalism. Because
of the war’s huge drain on American-dominated Western Hemisphere oil, control of
Saudi oil, assuring thereby American dominance of postwar oil exports to Europe, had
emerged as a serious national security concern for President Roosevelt and his postwar
global strategy.
In this state of affairs, it is not surprising that Culbertson’s superiors in late 1943
moved his unique talent of combining reciprocal economic policy and practical military
savvy to where they believed his skills would have wider and more geopolitical effect:
Donovan’s Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Although formally attached to the War
Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Donovan enjoyed direct access to President
Roosevelt, who had known Donovan at Columbia University Law School and was the
Assistant Navy Secretary’s and President Wilson’s secret agent sent to Siberia in 1919 to
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gauge the effectiveness of the pro-Czarist White Russian armies seeking to overthrow the
Soviet government.
For Culbertson, however, OSS was not an easy fit. Moreover, he had not even
been consulted by the commander of the Army’s reorganization, General Joseph Taggart
McNarney. An early advocate of aviation since World War I, McNarney was a much
decorated rising star in the Army Air Force. But has was not an intelligence officer.
McNarney acted on his own initiative to assign Culbertson to OSS. 268
Culbertson worked on completing the follow-up on his conferences on strategic
minerals for war, including oil, but his heart was still with Army Intelligence. By the
spring of 1944, he again pressed the War Department for a decision on his proposal for
setting up
“in the Office of the Secretary of War a small group, consisting of
civilians as well as military personnel, which will extend on a permanent
basis the analysis in which I have already made some progress and thus

In October 1944 McNarney was appointed Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean
Theater and commanding general of the U.S. Army Forces, Mediterranean Theater. In September 1945
became Acting Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean Theater with the rank of full general, and
then was appointed military governor of the American zone in occupied Germany. He retired on January
31, 1952 with many decorations and held executive positions with General Dynamics, a major war
contractor, and later served on the Draper Committee appointed by President Eisenhower to review
“independently and objectively” the effectiveness of the U.S. Military Assistance Program. He died
February 1, 1972 in La Jolla, California. But his posthumous reputation has recently been marred by
scandal when it was revealed that while serving as the military governor of the American zone from 1945
to 1947, McNarney refused to allow any African-American soldiers on his staff, commenting that it would
take 100 years before “the Negro will develop to the point where he will be on a parity with white
Americans.” (Alexis Clark, “After Fighting Nazis, Black G.I.s Faced Racism in U.S. Military,” The New
York Times, February 19, 2020.) McNarney has since also been implicated in the repatriation to the of
Russian POWS of the Germans who fought for and against the Nazis with the Allies in northern Ital. In the
Soviet Union, most were charged with aiding the Nazis and sent by Stalin’s regime to perish in prison
camps. Most never returned. See Julius Epstein, “Repatriation: Threat to America,” The American
Mercury, 1945. Julius Epstein, Operation Keelhaul (Old Greenwich, Connecticut: Devin-Adair, 1973).
Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, "Operation Keelhaul—Exposed", San Jose State University ScholarWorks. pp. 4–
9. Nikolai Tolstoy, The Secret Betrayal (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 360. Aleksandr
Solzhenitsyn, The Gulag Archipelago (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 85.
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provide a continuous body of information, useful to the Secretary of War
and of the members of his Secretariat in defining the place which the
Armed Forces and our national power potentials are to play, during war
and during peace, and our foreign relations. In one of its phases, my
proposal would bring into official status the sort of work which Edward
Mead Earle and his colleagues have been doing at Princeton.
“I am convinced that this work is not being done systematically
[emphasis in the original]; that it is essential in our system of government;
and that it should be done in the Office of the Secretary of War.” 269

By the spring of 1944, therefore, Culbertson decided to make one last appeal to
John J. McCloy, the Assistant Secretary of War and the one man he knew had great
influence over the aged Stimson. After reestablishing his credentials by sending him the
Metals, Minerals, and Chemicals classified final reports in booklet form, 270 he
approached McCloy directly. Getting a negative response in a conversation with McCloy,
he persisted, writing to McCloy on May 25:

“I am not sure that I have emphasized sufficiently the reason why
the function of government which we have discussed is particularly a
function of the War Department.
“During war, – now, for example, – the State Department and the
War Department are likely to have the same general approach to problems
of national security. During war the State Department turns, as it is now
doing, to studies of armistice terms and military policy, partly because in
such periods the cleavage between military and diplomatic policy is less
evident and partly because the War Department has been slow to assume
this responsibility.
“But in peacetime the cleavage, always there, becomes more
evident. The President and the State Department turn their thoughts and
acts to domestic policies and to aspects of foreign policy which do not
269
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always give adequate consideration to national security. This tendency
develops especially in democracies. Quincy Wright says on this point:
‘Constitutionalism and democracy tend toward decentralization of
authority, liberty of the individual, deliberation in reaching decisions,
control of policy by public opinion (often oblivious to the injury inflicted
on others) and dominance of domestic over foreign policy. In foreign
policy, though willing to fight when interests regarded as vital are
obstructed, democracies hesitate to intervene in foreign quarrels, neglect
military preparations until faced by crisis, and anticipate respect for law by
others.’ 271
“It is one of the peculiar functions of the War Department to advise
the President on measures and policies of defense and security, not only in
war but in peace, when it may be unpopular to do so. It is then that
profound and detailed analysis is necessary to support recommendations,
for in peacetime the State Department may throw its influence the other
way. My confidential studies on Cuba and Panama revealed clearly from
the secret official correspondence the conflict during peacetime between
the State Department on the one hand and the War and Navy Departments
on the other over the security of American interests in the Caribbean.
“During peace, the problems of national security, while less
dramatical, are nevertheless real and vital. If they are probably studied and
dealt with from year-to-year, the possibility of resort to arms is
diminished. Nicholas J. Spykman makes these observations:
‘Strife is one of the basic aspects of life and, as such, an element of
all relations between individuals, groups, and states. A world without
struggle would be a world in which life had ceased to exist. An orderly
world is not a world in which there is no conflict, but one in which strife
and struggle are led into political and legal channels away from the clash
of arms; are transferred from the battlefield to the council chamber and the
courtroom.’ 272
“The War Department has two responsibilities: (a) to perfect our
fighting machine so that, if we go to war, we will have the maximum
chance of victory; (b) to analyze the long-run trends of power in all its

Quincy Wright, A Study of War, Vol. II, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 764. Philip
Quincy Wright was an outstanding authority on international law, war and the legal tests for identifying an
illegal aggressive war. A political scientist based at the University of Chicago, Wright founded the first
international relations program and war studies with an interdisciplinary approach for graduate students.
Wright served as an advisor to Justice Robert Jackson at the postwar Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals.
OSS’s William J. Donovan was also an Assistant Prosecutor until he resigned in disagreement with
prosecuting Nazis who could be helpful to American Intelligence’s Cold War with the Soviet Union.
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forms and in all areas so that political measures may be taken in time to
render the resort to war unnecessary.
William S Culbertson
Lieut. Colonel, GSC” 273
McCloy, while acknowledging the need for such a national security studies group
in the War Department as Culbertson had strongly suggested, was unable to be helpful in
the immediate circumstances, writing on May 30:
“As for the other underlying proposition which you have always
advanced, I am more and more convinced of the necessity of having such
an organization function in connection with our national defense system .
the idea here is sound and we have a hiatus in our defense organization if
we do not have it. I have thought that perhaps in connection with the
proposed consolidation of all the Departments we could make provision
for it at a high level. In the meantime, or until some other reorganization
of the Department takes place, as I told you the other day, I see no
immediate possibility of setting up such an organization. Certainly there
is no place at the present time within the Department where I feel I could
place it. I’m sorry to be so negative about your idea, particularly since I
feel it covers so necessary a field.” 274

Culbertson was deeply disappointed, interpreting the record of correspondence
with his superiors over the issue as revealing “the firmness or inflexibility of the
bureaucracy. Colonel Betts said to me one day: ‘The Military will catch up with you
someday.’ John McCloy consoled me by saying: ‘The trouble, Culbertson, is that you are
too damn’d right.’” 275
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At his request, Culbertson was transferred by General Donovan on July 5, 1944 to
the staff of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, serving as Deputy Director of
Research. 276 Happily, it had been suggested that he should revive the work of the
Geopolitical Section. “General R. L. Maxwell, with whom I had worked in 1941 in
Export Control, influenced this new development. I laid out a program 277 but it was
dropped when I was selected by Cordell Hull to head the Middle Eastern Mission.” 278
Ironically, Culbertson left OSS’s plans and analysis group at the very time that
the OSS was building up its intelligence networks of spies in the Middle East. The first
large OSS mission outside North Africa was in Istanbul, where the steady flow of
shipping and proximity to Europe had attracted some 17 different countries’ intelligence
organizations. An American businessman recruited in New York during a furlough was
given the code-name “Rose” before returning to Istanbul. Rose had excellent contacts in
the Rumanian oil industry and a contact in the Rumania Embassy relayed important
documents sent by pouch to and from the Rumanian Foreign Ministry. But the majority
of his information came from a newspaperman, whom OSS judged was unreliable.
A year later, in April 1943, another OSS officer, this time a former Chicago
banker, was sent in under cover as a Lend-Lease representative. By 1944 the OSS
contingent had ballooned to 43 officers under FEA, State Department, press, business and

William J, Donovan, Director, OSS to Lt. Col. William S. Culbertson, July 5, 1944. Williams S.
Culbertson Papers, Unbound Correspondence, 1943-44.
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other covers. The targets were not just in Europe, but through the merchant marine the
Far East as well.
In December 1943 a special OSS mission began discussions with the Bulgarian
Minister in an attempt to extract Bulgaria out of the Axis. These negotiation were still
going on a year later when they were preempted by Soviet Russia’s demand that Bulgaria
expel the Germans and end its participation in the Axis; Bulgaria refused, and in
September 1944 Russia declared war and invaded Bulgaria.
Another chain of agents was established in Europe by a Czech engineer who had
worked for the British and was handed over to the new OSS mission. Code-named
“Dogwood”, he ran the CEREUS network of prominent figures in Istanbul including the
president of an Istanbul company, a German professor with contacts among the German
Junker families, a Hungarian Nobleman who managed an American oil company in the
city, an rich Austrian with many social contacts in Austria., even another German
professor who was a friend of German Ambassador Franz von Papen. But Dogwood
would not hand over the names of his agents, resulting in a poorly trained network and
subsequent arrests throughout Europe by the Gestapo, creating hostilities between OSS
and British Intelligence. Double-agents easily penetrated the OSS networks, even in
Turkey, until, after some 700 reports by CEREUS between the latter half of 1943 , in
early 1944, the Chicago banker was relieved as OSS station chief by an a 32 year-old
who had already proven to have imaginative solutions at his last Middle East posting,
Frank Wisner. Soon, Istanbul sported a sound OSS organization and a new effective
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network into the Balkans. 279 But the damage already done to OSS’s reputation was
considerable.
OSS had better luck in other Middle East countries. Headed in Cairo by former
American University of Beirut professor Stephen Penrose and assisted by Kermit
Roosevelt (grandson of President Theodore Roosevelt), by September 1944 OSS had
been beefed up its presence in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, and Afghanistan. 280 Because Cairo was the headquarters of General Maxwell's
U.S. Military Mission to the Middle East and all OSS operations were subject to theater
commanders, and because the Middle East was originally accepted as a British sphere of
influence with its seat, including its intelligence services, in Cairo, OSS established its
regional headquarters there, eventually expanding from its original reliance on Military
Attachè William Eddy to the Hoskins Mission and then the appointment of still another
son of missionaries as chief of Secret Intelligence in Cairo, Stephen Penrose.
In the winter of 1942, agent "Stallion" had arrived in Syria and by the following
year he obtained a job with an American commercial company which allowed him to
travel through the area making contact with his network of subagents. That year he hired
another's OSS agent as his business assistant and built a second network, bringing the

Anthony Cave Brown, ed., The Secret War Report of the OSS (New York: Berkley Publishing
Corporation, Berkley Medallion edition, 1976), pp. 296-300. Cave’s book is based on OSS’s Kermit
Roosevelt’s official history of the OSS, completed after the war and subsequently declassified in a sanitized
version. See also Smith, OSS, op. cit., p. 126. Wisner moved on to Bucharest until expelled by the Russians.
He ended up in the postwar CIA, serving as chief of the Office of Policy Coordination from 1948-52, as
Deputy Director of the Plans Division from 1953-58, and London station chief before he committed suicide
in 1965. His son, Frank Wisner, Jr., served as a distinguished ambassador and trouble-shooter for the State
Department, and was instrumental in the Iran-U.S. nuclear deal during the Obama administration that was
subsequently scuttled by President Donald J. Trump.
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total of 60 spies into the OSS who provided information on smuggling and espionage,
including uncovering contacts between Syrian nationals and Italian submarines prowling
the Eastern Mediterranean.
"Carat" arrived in Beirut in early 1944 as Cultural Attachè, one of the few OSS
agents in the region that the State Department deigned to allow its name as a diplomatic
cover. A former Arab scholar at Harvard, Daniel Dennett, Jr., had taught at the American
University of Beirut during the early 1930s. Through an association from his mother's
years as a missionary to Ottoman Turkey, he developed a close relationship with the
well-connected former Irish-born wife of an Ottoman prince who gave him an entrée to
Druse leaders and Lebanese high society. In a secret 1943 OSS report by Carlton Coon
on the potential for building a top-drawer covert operation in the Middle East to protect
American “oil, airbases and future markets,” Dennett was among those singled out as the
core agents. 281 In recognition of this unusual potential for developing important
information from people of influence, including the AUB faculty in choosing students for
scholarships to study in the United States, Dennett was made station chief for both
Lebanon and Syria. He was assisted in Beirut by an Army public relations officer and by
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other personnel in Aleppo and Damascus. But above all, Dennett was an X-2 officer, in
charge also of counter-intelligence in both Lebanon and Syria.
Of the two Levant sovereign states, Lebanon was considered the more difficult
assignment, because the presence of the ever-watchful French made it dangerous for
agents to carry sensitive material. His reports on the Syrian Nationalist Party and the
difficulties they faced with separatist unrest in the Alawite territory led to his discovery
that the French were behind the disturbances. With the decision of the Soviet Union to
establish formal diplomatic relations with Lebanon and Syria in 1944, sending a young
Minister to head up an Embassy staff, Carat turned his focus on this new competitor. He
was the first in the region to write increasingly lengthy reports on Soviet sponsorship of
local Communists. These so impressed Ambassador Wadsworth that he passed them on
to Washington, where they were well received by an increasingly worried State
Department, especially after communist expert Loy Henderson was summoned back from
Iraq to head the Near East and Africa Division.
"Squirrel" arrived in Damascus in April 1944 with a Military Observer cover and
eventually developed a chain of 100 informants, some witting and some unwitting,
recruiting six paid agents. His reports included studies of the Druse and Jezireh
territories. Maintaining good relations with both the French and the Syrian military,
Squirrel filed valuable reports on military and political developments. And two other
OSS agents, one a female clerk in an American war agency and the other a businessman,
sent in valuable reports on industrial installation, the Syrian and Lebanese press, political
and economic developments, and harbor plans for ports in both countries.
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In all, Lebanon and Syria hosted seven Secret Intelligence agents and three X-2
Counterintelligence agents, including Carat. Five SI and one X-2 agents were sent into
Trans-Jordan and Palestine, reporting on both Arabs and Jews. One of them was Rabbi
Nelson Glueck, whose distinguished career as an archaeologist with the American School
for Oriental Research at Jerusalem was used as a cover for the creation of a network of
Arab spies in Trans-Jordan. 282
While Henderson was there as Ambassador, Iraq’s OSS mission grew. Four
Secret Intelligence agents were sent in. Two agents, “Bunny,” a commercial dealer in
American goods, and his teammate “Buffalo,” who was hired by the Iraqi government. In
1944, the FEA was providing cover for OSS agents in the Middle East under Operation
SOPHIA. 283 In Iran, this was complemented by the work of the Lend-Lease director in
the country, Lt. Col. Harold Hoskins, now ostensibly transferred from OSS to FEA.
In Iraq, however, Bunny’s cover was compromised by British trade regulations
that created a dollar shortage and priorities that made it impossible for Buffalo to
generate any trade in American wares. Nevertheless, both Buffalo and Bunny worked
closely with Minister Henderson and British Security Intelligence in breaking up what
remained of several Nazi spy rings and passed on a detailed report by a neutral diplomat

282

Smith, OSS, op. cit., p.125.

OSS’s Operation Sophia, using as a cover for its agents the Foreign Economic Administration, the
administer of Lend-Lease aid, apparently came into being in 1944 after Roosevelt appointed William
Crowley as director of the new agency. See Stephen S.L. Penrose, Jr. to T.F. Bland, Subject: Financial
Arrangements for Pvt. Kermit Roosevelt, April 2, 1944. “If you wish to have a project number to which
expenditures can be assigned, it is Near East Project No.27, also known as SOPHIA Project.” OSS Personnel
Files, 1941-45, Roncoli, Vincenzo to Roper, Mark A., Box 0658, ARC ID 1593270, Entry 224, RG 226
Records of the Office of Strategic Services, National Archives. See also: “Prospectus for Near East Project
No. 27, SOPHIA, April 18,1944, 55 “History of OSS Cairo,” RG 226. Ashley Jackson (Editor), Yasmin
Khan (Editor), Gajendra Singh (Editor), An Imperial World At War: The British Empire, (Ashley Jackson
(Editor) 2016) 1939-45 (London: Routledge, 2016),
283

314

who revealed that Allied bombing of Berlin never struck when most Berliners were
working from 2 and 5 pm. The information changed the Allied bombing schedule and
won Bunny a special White House commendation.
Eight agents were also sent into Iran, originally to collect geopolitical information
in in preparation for the German advance on the Caucuses’ oil fields, starting in the
autumn of 1941 and another in 1942 under cover of their previous academic research in
the country. Both filed reports on Soviet and British policy, local press, and description
of roads and popular sentiment. Later, when the tide had turned against the Axis, they
turned their attention to economic and political intelligence. Soon they were joined by
other OSS agents, including two who were planted in the Persian Gulf Commend as
officers with the permission of the U.S, military commander despite the prohibition of the
Military Intelligence Division G-2 agents for fear of raising Soviet suspicions. The OSS
agents tried to build a network of spies among the Polish refugees in Azerbaijan, failed,
and turned to economic reporting. But one of two other OSS agents planted in the Iranian
government succeeded in building a chain in Azerbaijan that successfully reported on
Soviet intentions and the growth of the leftist Tudeh Party, the only American source of
information on what was happening in the Soviet zone of occupied Iran.
Finally, there was Saudi Arabia, the most difficult nation because of
communications problems. Two OSS agents were sent in but despite the arrival of former
OSS officer William Eddy as the first American minister in residence, they were too
hampered by lack of communications to be successful; even the few reports that were
received had to be hand-carried to Cairo.
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As late as June 1944 a report by War and Navy Petroleum Board took a dim view
of the wartime value of the Petroleum Reserve Corporation’s proposal to spend
government money for Saudi oil development and the trans-Arabian pipeline. 284 The
reasons were obvious: by then they knew the pipeline’s benefits would come too late to
help the Western Front recently opened by D-Day, and a Senate investigating committee
headed by Sen. Harry Truman, despite having already handed in its report, was still
scrutinizing the wartime spending of taxpayers’ money for any signs of wasteful projects;
those designated as postwar projects, as the trans-Arabian pipeline was now designated
and had been designed to relieve postwar European needs further draining Western
Hemisphere reserves, was clearly outside Lend-Lease’s legal time-line as a war
measure. 285 But that was precisely the point to Roosevelt, underscored by the fact that the
pipeline’s projected route was pointed toward the postwar European market, not the Far
East. Roosevelt had approved the pipeline with an eye to postwar European
reconstruction, not the Pacific war.
In the spring of 1944, reflecting that Roosevelt indeed had taken a decision about
the pipeline opposite to what the Pentagon would recommend, Donovan’s OSS Research
and Analysis branch began to look at the topography and political conditions along the
route west from the Riyadh oil fields from the point of view of security in northern Saudi
Arabia. That month, Lebanese financial officials traveled to Riyadh and secured King Ibn
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Saud’s pledge “to use his influence in an attempt to procure the installation of a pipeline
for Lebanon as the terminus.” 286 The terminal on the Mediterranean was still undecided,
but there was no reason to put off surveying the expected route through northern Arabia
from the aspect of potential tribal opposition. Despite Ickes’s fear of British “difficulties”
which were shared by the OSS in February, 287 the April 1944 discussions of technical
issues had gone along smoothly in Washington as preparatory to Stettinius’s talks that
fall in London over an Anglo-American Oil Agreement.
This OSS’s security concern real. Even though Ibn Saud had consolidated his
control over the tribes of northern Arabia by the 1920s, they were restless. The same
applied to his erstwhile allies in Ibn Saud’s bloody conquest of Araba, the fiercely
fanatical Ikhwan. In 1929-30, to avoid a confrontation with the British over the Ikhwan’s
challenge to the winter grazing rights he had granted tribes who had migrated to Britishcontrolled Tran-Jordan and Iraq, Ibn Saud had defeated the Ikhwan challenge to his rule
in two separate campaigns. Although settled in 180 agricultural villages heavily
subsidized by the King and his British and then American backers, they were still
resistant to the modern machinery of the West that was crucial to Ibn Saud’s plans for a
modern Arabia. Moreover, some the leaders of the northern tribes still harbored
resentment against Ibn Saud’s centralized rule. It was not clear, to Washington at least,
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that the new king actually had control. Ibn Saud had appointed governors from his
extended royal family, but how reliable were they, especially when succession to the
throne of the aged king whetted ambitions?
This was what the OSS Research and Analysis branch was ordered to learn.
Besides each tribe’s size, structure, affiliation and loyalties ties, they also examined the
tribes’ levels of work skills as potential oil workers, levels of literacy, and cultural
customs. To find out, since they were in Washington, not Arabia, they combed military
intelligence reports and special manuals and perused the studies of Bedouin tribes written
by such scholars as Max von Oppenheim, Carl von Raswan, Alois Musil, Louis
Massignon, Fuad Hamrah, Mahmud Shukri al-Alusi, Haifiz Wahbah, F.K. Peake Pasha,
even former British Intelligence officer and Arabia explorer Harry St. John B. Philby,
author of the Heart of Arabia (1923), The Empty Quarter (1933), A Pilgrim in Arabia
(1943), and until recently the king’s closest Western confidante. They assembled profiles
of the Arabian governors, judging which were loyal to the king and which had shown
indications or rumors of ambition for the throne. The OSS concluded by recommending
that the ARAMCO officials stay clear of the governors and rely on the central
administration in Riyadh. In that way, the Americans tied their fate to that of Ibn Saud’s
court and Ibn Saud’s fate, in turn, was tied to the Americans. 288
Interior Secretary Ickes’s and the Navy’s idea of a government-owned pipeline to
the Mediterranean was scuttled and replaced by corporate initiative to take on the project,
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the largest such project in history up to that time. They would be quietly assisted by the
State Department and the OSS, as well as by OSS’s successors, the caretaker Strategic
Services Unit housed in the War Department, and in 1946 the Central Intelligence Group,
the immediate predecessor of the agency that finally reunified the OSS agencies, the
Central Intelligence Agency.
In the closing year of the war, securing the vast oil deposits of Saudi Arabia from
the threat of encroachments, whether British or Russian, was a strategic goal. OSS
leadership, following General Donovan’s growing focus on the Soviet Union as a
potential postwar rival, increasingly became preoccupied with the Russians. Many of
them assumed communists to be controlled by Moscow regardless of their identity as
nationalist patriots who led partisan struggles against German and Japanese occupations
of their homelands in Europe, North Africa, Korea, China, Vietnam, Malaya, the
Philippines, and Indonesia. There were dissents from the ranks against the Cold War
mentality, especially from those who had worked with the underground partisan
movements in Europe; but they found themselves distrusted by the State Department
professionals and seldom listened to. “We felt most of the time as though we were firing
our memoranda off into the void,” H. Stuart Hughes, a veteran analyst from OSS’s
Research & Development Division, recalled of the year he spent in the State Department
under General Alfred McCormick before McCormick resigned in disgust, “The
atmosphere was that of Kafka’s Castle, in which one never knew who would answer the
telephone or whether it would be answered at all.” 289
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Preventing the Soviet Union from gaining access to Middle East oil now became
a major objective. This was not seen as a diversion from the traditional Atlanticist
orientation of the Euro-Americans, but, considering how much the postwar restoration of
European capitalism in the face of growing Soviet Russian power figured in strategic
projections that would later give birth to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, was
seen as a necessary step toward Atlanticism’s fulfillment. As an analysis by OSS
counterintelligence (X-2) agent Daniel Dennett (Carat), written when he was about to be
sent to Beirut under a diplomatic cover approved by Hull, made clear, “The probable
extant of these oil deposits are so great that we must control them at all costs.” 290

The Culbertson Mission to French North Africa and the Middle East.
Culbertson’s next major assignment, approved by President Roosevelt in response
to a request by Secretary Hull, was to the Middle East in mid-1944, exactly when the
region was rapidly fading as an active theater of war. Culbertson was instructed to
explore possibilities for postwar expansion of American corporate trade and investment
in the region. Everyone among Wall Street’s leaders and Washington’s analysts was
aware that in any postwar competition with the war-ravaged industries and depleted
banks of Britain and France, physically unscathed American industries were alone in
their production capacities, productivity, and global scale of their potential reach. The
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major banks, especially the investment and commercial banks in New York, held much
of Britain’s former gold hoard, and even though the British gold mines in South Africa
were still producing and exchange receipts from the Empire’s colonies and dominions
kept pouring in, the war continued to drain Britain’s treasury. London was no match for
Wall Street huge financial power and reach. What better time had ever existed to push
this advantage by arguing for the replacement of Britain and France’s imperial
preferential trade and investments policies with “free” trade and investments by powerful
American corporations without wartime and imperial restrictions? Lend-Lease had
already breeched the walls of the Empire’s markets, although London still exercised
control of distributions and quotas. James Landis, now based in Cairo as head of the
Middle East Economic Mission, had already penetrated the MESC’s leadership as
MESC’s deputy director and was now preventing the British from selling American
Lend-Lease military supplies to their colonial governments, leading to Landis taking full
control over American supplies.
Culbertson, however, like most of his colleagues, was skeptical of his chances for
success when Hull first approached him for this assignment in July 1944, a month after
D-Day. France and Britain had always fiercely defended imperial preferential trading
systems they imposed on their colonies and League of Nations’ “mandates.” But Hull and
other top officials also knew that France, still suffering from Germany’s occupation of
much of northern France, would have been hard pressed to resist diplomatic pressure
from her expected liberator, the United States. And like Hull, Culbertson knew the
stronger obstacle was Britain. He suggested first taking up the postwar trade matter with
Britain. But Hull, against a series of British delays, was then wrapping up the
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preliminaries for Undersecretary of State Edward Stettinius’s trip to London in
September to negotiate an agreement on dividing up Middle East oil and deciding what
the postwar global oil markets would look like. Hull also did not want Culbertson to push
the British yet on imperial preferences. It was too much a hot button for Churchill, who
knew that ending London’s control over its colonies trade would mean the end of the
Empire he had sworn to protect and preserve. Hull wanted Culbertson only to press for
the lifting of wartime restrictions on trade as a first step. Hull promised Culbertson he
would go to London for talks after his Middle East mission was completed. With his
appointment as President Roosevelt’s temporary personal ambassador, Culbertson
acquiesced, focusing on the French empire in North Africa and the Middle East for
eventual trade talks with the Free French government in a hopefully liberated Paris.
The State Department was careful in the selection of the men who would
accompany Culbertson on the mission. The four titular representatives of the Foreign
Economic Administration were actually private businessmen with established import and
export businesses, or represented the drug and chemicals industries, along with the
producers of automotive equipment: John Gillis, a former vice president of Monsanto
Export Company and now an offer of Johnson and Johnson International, representing
the National Foreign Trade Council; William L. Freidlaender, Partner in F. & O. Cedar
Works, representing the National Council of Importers; Victor Bowman, Executive Vice
President of American Steel Export Company; and Richard C. Thompson, Export
Manager of the Prestolite Battery Company and Electric Auto-Lite. All had been
members of Culbertson’s old client, the National Foreign Trade Council. The fifth
representative of the FEA was from its own staff, Van Lear Woodward, Vice President of
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the U.S. Commercial Company, Lend-Lease’s buying arm and the American counterpart
to the United Kingdom Commercial Company. These men were the original members of
the Culbertson Mission, but soon it was rounded out by representatives of governmental
agencies: Homer Fox of the State Department’s Division of Commercial Policy, Office of
Economic Affairs; Ray Miller, an early graduate of Georgetown Foreign Service School
and now Assistant Director of Commerce Department’s Bureau of Foreign and Domestic
Commerce; and Donald S. Gilpatric, of the State Department’s Office of Wartime
Economic Affairs, Division of Liberated Areas and Assistant Economic Advisor of the
North African Joint Economic Mission based in Algiers. Fred Winant, of Landis’s staff,
also joined Culbertson later to accompany him on his scheduled visits to each country in
the Middle East.
For Culbertson, the Middle East held a special charm. “... For some reason the
Middle East – the Muslim world – has held a special place in my life. During the 1920s I
was on two occasions virtually on my way to carry out a mission to the Middle East. On
May 29, 1920 Secretary of State Colby actually named Stanley Hornbeck and me to visit
and investigate the petroleum areas of the Middle East. My selection was confirmed With
the Tariff Commission which I was a member; then the Cabinet called the mission off.”
His next chance came in 1924, when Charles Evan Hughes was Secretary of
State. Hughes was considering sending Culbertson to Iran as Financial Advisor to the
Persian government, “but that he had objected to my designation on the ground that he
desired my services on the Tariff Commission. On July 7 Hughes told me that I was his
choice for the Persian post but that the President in vetoing the appointment had said that
I was ‘too good a man to let go.’
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“My life-long study of the Bible, especially his history and its archaeology, was
probably the chief reason for my continuing interest in the geography and life of the
people in Bible lands.” 291 It was the Christian missionary impulse, alive and well.
Culbertson reached Algiers by crossing the Atlantic on a flying boat of the
American Export Airlines, one of his clients, stopping at Newfoundland and Ireland
before landing at the seaside airport at Port Lyantey (today, Kinitra), Morocco, which had
been seized during Torch and was used as an anti-submarine base by PTY Catalina
planes and K-class blimps with secret first-generation Magnetic Anomaly Detection
(MAD) gear for patrolling the Atlantic entry into the Strait of Gibraltar. From there he
took a freighter to Algiers, then the seat of the French government-in-exile, where he met
with the French Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, M. René Massigli. Asked how long he
intended to stay, Culbertson replied, “Your Excellency, until we reach an agreement.” 292
Culbertson soon found that assumption was presumptuous. The French would not
discuss even the possibility of an early resumption of normal trade. D-Day had passed
successfully only the previous foreign traders until they knew what Metropolitan France
needs first. On September 6, Robert Valeur, spokesman for the French Committee of
National Liberation, declared that private trade would not resume until a new government
was elected in France. 293 Culbertson tried to reason informally with all the top French
officials, some of whom he knew from his ambassador days in Rumania and Chile—
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Jean Monet, Druin, Paul-Bonceur, François Georges-Pecot (the signer of the Sykes-Picot
Agreement whereby France and Britain secretly carved up the Ottoman Middle East
during World War I while making promises of independence to Arab leaders) , René
Pleven and Pierre Mendés-France, even General Georges Catroux, the Governor General
of Algeria, but besides being polite and gracious and throwing luncheons in his honor,
they were not going to discuss opening their colonies to the American enterprise; rather
than the Americans’ Open Door policy, for the French their policy remained the Closed
Door of colonialism. They claimed to be studying the question, but never responded to
invitations for serious talks, even on technical matters attending to resumption of normal
trade. American embassy officials, including Chargé d’affairs Seldon Chapin, were
chagrined at how Culbertson was treated. “They were always looking out the window,”
Culbertson observed. Their minds were on France and as soon as it was safe, they
terminated all chances for dialogue be returning to France. “It was evident,” he wrote in
his report, “that the traditional closed door of the French was assumed if not expressed.”
It now was clear to him “that the premises on which the Mission was created and
instructed are not acceptable to the majority of the French rulers who now have been
transported to France.” 294
Culbertson and five members of the Mission tried their luck with French Morocco
next, leaving Algiers on August 20 and flying to Rabat, the capital. But by the next day,
when he was presented to M. Puaux, the French ambassador and Resident General of
France and Morocco, whom Culbertson has known in Rumania as a fellow minister,

William S. Culbertson, “Report of the Special Economic Mission to North Africa,” September 11, 1944,
Boxes 970, 975, RG 166, National Archives.
294

325

Culbertson was bewildered. “I don’t know what the French are trying to do to me. Their
profuse their interest and attentiveness.... I am afraid the distinguished representatives of
France in the Protectorate wished I had stayed home. Some sabotage seems to be going
on. Perhaps Algiers has told Maroc [Morocco] to see that I get nowhere.” 295
He was right. On August 19 the French official at Rabat received a telegram from
Algiers marked “Very Urgent”:
An American Economic Mission has recently arrived Algiers to
examine with the Provisional Government what may be the mode
of exchanges between the U.S. and French North Africa when the
wartime regime terminates, and to investigate in the meanwhile, if
it would not be possible to re-establish a certain amount of private
business. The Provisional government has not yet been able to
adopt a policy.
While the question is being studied here, the Mission has declared
its intention of spending a week in Morocco. Its President, Mr.
Culberson, former Ambassador, and five of its members expect to
leave by plane on Sunday the 20th, the four other members leave
today, the 18th, by auto.
While extending to Mr. Culbertson and to his colleagues, the most
cordial welcome, and while giving them every help, it is desirable
to observe great reserve on the purposes of the Mission, and
especially to avoid, under present conditions, all exchange of
views on the subject.
Massigli 296
In a conference with the French official in charge of economic affairs for French
Morocco, Marchal, on the morning of August 22, Culbertson again faced a stone wall.
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“The Moroccan regime who do nothing without Algiers’ approval,” 297 he recorded. The
next day he and U.S. Chargé d’Affaires James Rives Childs 298 drove to Casablanca and
visited the site where American troops had landed in Operation Torch. Suddenly sirens
and bells announced the liberation of Paris. There they were received by the top official
in Casablanca, the “controller civil,” attended one of the many luncheons given by the
local chamber of commerce and industries, and attempted to fulfill a packed itinerary
prepared by Robert Schneider of the U.S.C.C. that included a French textile plant, a
French brewery, a French steel factory, a French ice plant, and French dairy, a French
Department store, a French canning factory, the French syndicates for vegetable fiber,
oils and seed exports, the French soap industry, a French shoe factory, the President of
the French farm machinery syndicate, a French cereals company, a French auto
distributor and the manager of the local transport system. They stayed at the Villa Mas,
called the “gold braid house” because it hosted so many Army generals, and joined the
celebrations for Paris’s liberation, marching with the singing French through the streets
of the city.
The next day they rode to Safi to visit a phosphate mine and a fish canning plant,
and then on to Marrakech on the evening of August 25. After lunch with the governor the
following day, Culbertson visited an irrigation project and dam that was “partly a social
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experiment to give the Arabs a chance at a living. Cotton seem to be the chief crop
planted. It is a going concern.” 299 Then they toured the mines and installations of the
Office Cherifien des Phosphates. It was the grand tour, but Culbertson got nothing
tangible for the trade Mission out of the French Committee of National Liberation. He
did get, however, much information. The French in Morocco apparently had ignored
Massigli’s warning.
After returning to Algiers, Culbertson sent, with the assistance of Donald
Gilpatric, his official report on Algeria-Morocco. It recommended a firm hand with the
French National Committee, stating that since French North Africa was no longer a
theater of war it was appropriate to eliminate government wartime controls, decried that
French monopolies were becoming permanent, that the U.S. government must take a
direct intervention to insure American enterprise enjoyed a fair share of the postwar
trade. To accomplish this, he recommended an extensive reduction of Lend-Lease
assistance and its complete elimination by June 1945 and suggested using the
negotiations for aid in French reconstruction as a lever.
His report did not include his encounter with Massigli for diplomatic reasons but
he wrote Secretary of State Hull a personal letter which did, and of the uncooperative
attitude of the French Committee of National Liberation. He wrote that at Rabat he had
obtained from “an inside contact” a copy of the telegram sent by Massigli. “The advice
given by Massigli was not taken by the French authorities in Morocco. We exchanged
views freely with both officials and private individuals. (Puaux, the Government General,
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and I had our Romanian contacts in common.) Openly in Morocco and less openly in
Algeria, local interests are sympathetic with our objectives. Their influence is not
inconsiderable. apart from the fate of our recommendations, which I hope will be a
happy fate, I believe that the work of the mission has had a real educational value. Most
people matter in North Africa have heard again our economic philosophy and even the
nervous and hopeful members of the Committee was showered before their departure
with liberal economic ideas imported from the U.S. (not lend leased).” 300 It was a brave
showing, but Culbertson’s disappointment with the French National Committee was
evident.
The entire Mission then proceeded to Tunis, the capital of French Tunisia, where
Culbertson had reason to believe Massigli had also sent his telegram. He held
conferences, toured the ancient ruins of Carthage and then, suffering from a back injury
during the trip, proceeded to Cairo, where he conferred with U.S. Minister Pinckney
Tuck and with Commercial Attaché Karl L. Rankin. To cover the Middle East in the
short time he had, Culbertson distributed the countries among the members of the
Mission as advance research parties. He stayed in the house that was occupied by Sir
Edward Gray, another old friend from Bucharest, when he was in Cairo, and again was
wined and dined before he left for Ankara alone in a C-47 arranged by Military Air
Transport on September 23. At the time, preliminary meetings were being held at
Alexandria for the first Arab League conference in which the British hoped to play a
major role.
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Culbertson’s trip included stops at Lidda, Palestine, and Beirut, Lebanon, where
he was met at the airport by the U.S. Minister to Lebanon and Syria, George Wadsworth.
By coincidence, the new Russian Minister to Lebanon and Syria was just arriving in a
U.S. Army plane also. M. Daniil Solod was, despite his youthful appearance, a rising star
in Soviet diplomacy. He cut a slender look in his modern-cut suit, a far cry from the
rumpled appearance of older Russian diplomats. Handsome, with a shock of brown hair
swept back from his forehead and sporting modern horn-ribbed glasses, he was a polished
Russian diplomat of the new school, very professional. Obviously the Soviets were trying
to make a good impression in opening the new Russian legation in Beirut. Assuming the
cordialities of the diplomatic corps, Wadsworth and Culbertson even had their picture
taken with him. Within two years, OSS Counterintelligence agent Dennett, under cover
as Wadsworth’s cultural attaché, would have his hands full keeping up with the increased
activities of Solod as he met Syrian communists and nationalists and conferred regularly
with the head of the recently revived Communist Party of Lebanon, the only Communist
party allowed to function legally in the Muslim world. 301 But Lebanon, more than Syria,
would remain as the reliable western anchor for U.S. Saudi oil policy in the Middle East,
confirming, despite the occupation of Lebanon in 1957 by U.S. Marines, the assessment
of an OSS expert in July 1945 that:

“Since the Arabs of the Levant States have reached a
comparatively high degree of literacy, it is believed that American
capital will go further in those two countries toward raising the
standard of living of the working than any other area. This is an
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important consideration since communism has a fertile field in
countries where the internal economic structure is so delicate that it
can support only a small ruling class.” 302
From Beirut, Culbertson flew to Adana in southern Turkey where he picked up a
flight to Ankara. Ambassador Steinhardt met them at the airport and hosted the party at
the Embassy. After a day of rest with a picnic in the countryside, he called calling on the
Hasan Saka, Turkey’s Foreign Minister, and his Undersecretary, M. Cevad Açikalin, and
then paid a visit to the famous Citadel “to recall the history and culture of the Hittites, the
Crusaders, the Romans, and the Turks.” That night the Steinhardts gave a formal dinner
which included diplomats, officials, the Minister of Commerce, Celal Soit Siren, the
British Chargé d’Affairs, and the Russian ambassador, the last two constituting the
traditional Great Power rivalry of the Great Game in the Middle East. The next day
Culbertson began his conferences, meeting with a delegation from the Turkish
Parliament, most of whom had been educated in the United States and were
economists. 303 They addressed him as Dr. Culbertson, apparently familiar with his
writings. “It is very gratifying to me to find in your Parliament,” he wrote to the Turkish
ambassador to the U.S., “a group of men who are familiar with the American point of
view and American conditions.” 304 That evening Mr. Kelley of the Embassy gave a
dinner for Culbertson at which were invited the top Turkish trade officials.
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The following day the Minister of Commerce gave a luncheon attended by
Turkish and American officials, and Culbertson set about writing his report. It was the
most extensive of all his reports, although most of it were documents written by the
embassy staff attached as exhibits and crafted to give Washington insight into just how
British imperial controls worked in the Middle East. The first was an analysis of the
Turkish currency, calling for an unusual solution: deflation, followed after the war by
devaluation. The author was fully cognizant that Turkey’s major exports were
agricultural and that peasants were stubborn about parting with their produce unless they
got enough remuneration so they could buy what they need. “If Turkey cannot import
sufficient consumer goods and raw materials for manufacture to meet her requirements,
prices of consumer goods will remain high and the peasant will have little incentive to
increase production. Devaluation, potential or real, will in fact lead to a flight from
Turkish currency into goods which, in turn, will create a shortage in a check to deflation.
There are already signs of price reduction in those goods which Turkey formally sold to
the continent. There will be should be encouraged, but it should also be controlled if we
are to carry out our undertaking to support the Turkish economy. Once prices begin to
drop, goods will come on the market again unless merchants are frightened off by talk of
the evaluation.
“My very tentative conclusion in this, and it carries me a
considerable distance beyond the conclusions I reached more academically
some months ago. We should encourage the present deflationary tenancy:
(a) By a graduated reduction of the prices we are prepared to pay for
Turkish products. Our support purchases should be directed to this end. (b)
by reassuring the merchant that there is no likelihood of an acute shortage
of imported goods.... We should not encourage devaluation until after the
war , when (a) The Turkish problem can be treated as part and parcel of
the general Middle East currency problem, and (b) international currency
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problems will be handled by the price world organization whose first task
will be to establish a sound basis for international trade.”

Exhibit II was a simple explanation of dollar letters of credit by FEA
representative C. Robert Moore. These letters were issued by local banks after receiving
approval of the exports license by the Customs Office, the Ministry of Commerce, and by
the Turkish government agency, the Birlik, as the means of control and were supposed to
facilitate trade, with a 35% “premium” charged by the compensation office, the Takas
Office. But according to the rules, the funds put up by the importer, normally 50% of the
line of credit, were tied up by the bank until the transaction was completed. With delays
being what they were, that could take two to six months depending on whether the goods
were shipped through British-controlled Egypt or directly from the United States, putting
a discriminatory onus on American traders. Clearing this bureaucratic bottleneck was
crucial for expanded American trade.
Exhibit III got to the heart of the matter: British goods had a competitive
advantage. The Turkish importer was able to buy British goods through the United
Kingdom Credit Corporation (UKCC) free of the formalities of acquiring foreign
exchange, and payment terms were easier than in the case of most imports from the
United States.
Exhibit IV explained how UKCC’s Department of Export Credit Guarantee
insures up to 75% of losses at a commission as low as 1 ½ % of the total value of the
shipment, capturing 75% of exports from England to Turkey. It gave examples of how
the Ticaret Office (Turkish Commercial Corporation, the trading office that was the
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Turkish equivalent of the UKCC) had used its centralized powers to foster monopolies
where no benefits were made in trade, particularly in tires, steel, and tinplate. In addition,
the Ministry of Agriculture, without the authorization of the Parliament, increased the
capital of the Kurumu, the state agricultural Equipment agency, by 400 million Turkish
lires and centralized within it the purchase of agricultural machinery, bypassing the
dealers completely. The Sumer Bank was using the Turkish Commercial Counselor as a
purchasing agent. “The Eti Bank, which purchases substantial amounts of mining
equipment, has appointed a purchasing agent in New York to which all its purchases are
effected even though much of the equipment could be purchased to representatives in
Turkey of the manufacturers.” In addition, the capital levy tax imposed in early 1943
obliged many non-Muslim businesses and their assets to be sold to Turks. “... while
Turkish officials may not state that they desire to eliminate such firms, one hears and
private Turkish business circles a resentment against these minority firms, which is
claimed, have obtained all of the worthwhile representations.... It appears unquestionable
that Turkish firms will play increasingly important role in the country’s commercial
life.” 305
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Defining Diversity of Reciprocal “Free” Trade within Corporate Norms as “Natural” law,
and Colonial Imperialism and Statist Planning and Command Economics as “unnatural.”

The unscheduled trip to Turkey had a strategic purpose for his mission. Relying
on the skills of embassy staff, he was able to establish British imperialism as an artificial
impediment to regional trade despite the purported goals of the British Middle East
Supply Center and its UKCC. In doing so, he set British policies in bold relief against the
needs of the peoples of the Middle East, regional trade, and, indeed, world trade in the
postwar years. He did this throughout his tour of the Middle East, hammering away at
colonialism’s lopsided preferential trading patterns while taking and pains to avoid
painting the region with a broad brush and giving each country its due specificity. Yet, at
the same time, he gave the tour, perhaps inadvertently, a universalist American
undercurrent by whom he constantly met with in private meetings: oilman and
intelligence agents.
By 1944, Iran was a hot point of contention among the Allies. Standard Oil of
New Jersey had lit the fuse by seeking an oil concession in Russian-occupied northern
Iran that year, triggering responses from the British and Russians also seeking
concessions. Both the Russians and the Americans knew that their governments and
Britain had pledged Iran’s sovereignty in the Declaration of Teheran of the previous
November and had agreed to end their zones of occupation by withdrawing troops within
six months of the end of the war. The Iranian parliament, caught amid this foreign
commercial rivalry, wisely chose to suspend all new oil concessions until the end of the
war. But that did not end the rivalry. Each side tried to stake its claim, the Russians by
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sponsoring a separatist movement in Soviet-occupied Azerbaijan, the British by digging
their heels into their oil fields and giant Abadan refinery in the south, and the American
officials by training Iran’s Gendarmerie under a military mission headed by General
Norman Schwarzkopf, acting as neutral arbiters while trying to implement President
Roosevelt’s schemes for a TVA-modelled development as America’s great experiment in
the Middle East. “I was rather thrilled, “Roosevelt explained to Hull when looking over
the plans for hydroelectric development of Iran, “with the idea of using Iran as an
example of what we could do by an unselfish policy.” 306
Roosevelt hoped to also help Egypt and Ethiopia’s Nile development with dams,
irrigation and hydroelectric projects similar to what the Tennessee Valley Administration
(TVA) had done in the American Appalachia, and plans were already underway for
improvement the irrigation of the dry plains that between Syria and Iraq, with an
improved harbor on Syria’s Mediterranean coast and an upgrading of rail and roads
crossing the plans to open up the interior. Industrialization and a modern economy were
the goals. Dislocation of large amounts of people, as with TVA, would occur but once the
people had sustainable farms and communication with markets to both the east and west,
Roosevelt was confident they would see the benefits and the settle down. Had not that
been the pattern in America? Could not the technological success of America stimulating
agriculture, mining, and trade be replicated in the Middle East? And would not this
provide a solution to poor countries being unable to pay for their purchases of American
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exports of goods and services after the war? He knew the young Shah would take a keen
interest in modernizing his country, if only for the stability of his shaky regime.
Within this context, Culbertson maneuvered carefully, meeting Iranian officials,
always sticking to his assigned mission of seeking opportunities for postwar American
trade. Iranian officials expressed support for the resumption of normal trade. The Turks’
efforts to improve the dams and irrigation looked promising. Roosevelt was anxious to
use Iran as a model for hydroelectric projects along the Nile, and American planners had
reviewed a similar plan that would irrigate the dry plains between Syria and Iraq.
When he next flew to Iraq, he did the same, always the cordial diplomat, sizing up
the local officials and the ever watchful British. But in his reports he showed a persistent
critique of British institutionalized obstacles to free trade, despite eagerness of Iraqi
Prime Minister Nuri al-Said to see increased trade with the Americans. Everywhere the
heavy British hand was evident. Although nominally independent since 1922 (a
concession by the British after a brutal “policing by air” involving machine-gunning and
bombing of rebellious tribes at Churchill’s orders) and a member of the League of
Nations since 1932, Britain had imposed a treaty in 1930 with amendments in 1932
which continued British control. Culbertson spared no words about British domination in
his report to Secretary Hull::
“For example, the British Ambassador is to be the ranking
diplomat in Iraq: Iraqi Naval, Military and Air offices are to be trained
only in Great Britain, and only British officers may be advisors to the Iraqi
forces. Furthermore, Iraq may appoint only British subjects in advisory or
other governmental capacities except when British subjects are not
available for other positions. With the power thus obtained, Great Britain
has been able to pursue a policy of preventing other nations from
becoming substantially influential, either politically or commercially....
British advisors today will be found in the top levels of all Iraqi
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Government offices of any importance in either advisory or executive
capacity. United States, as Britain’s ally in this war, means little or no
open antagonism in Iraq, but, obviously such predominant control in the
more or less a vowed policy expressed above, frequent favoritism to
British commerce are encountered. FURTHERMORE, IRAQ MAY
APPOINT ONLY BRITISH SUBJECT IN ADVISORY OR OTHER
GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITIES EXCEPT THE NORMAL
DOMINATION IN IRAQI AFFAIRS IS ENHANCED BY SUCH
WARTIME DEVELOPMENTS OF WHEN BRITISH SUBJECTS ARE
NOT AVAILABLE FOR SUCH POSITION.” 307 (Emphasis in original.)
The result was obvious:
“...British advisors today will be found in the top levels of all Iraqi
Government offices of any importance in either advisory or executive
capacity.
“United States, as Britain’s ally in this war, meets little or no open
antagonism in Iraq, but, obviously with such predominant control and a
more or less a vowed policy expressed above, frequent instances of
favoritism to the British commerce are encountered. Furthermore, the
normal domination in Iraqi affairs is enhanced by such wartime
developments as the MESC controls.” 308
After examining British control over the imports and exports of agricultural
commodities, Culbertson turned to oil:
“the major source of wealth of Iraq and if and when international
exchange becomes free and normal it should become a source of exchange
for dollar purchases.” The proven and indicated reserve was estimated at 7
billion barrels, and the ultimate potential production was reckoned at 50
billion barrels, But beside the cumbersome bureaucratic controls
machinery that created a hindrance to the free flow of trade, Iraq’s
membership in the sterling bloc meant problems in foreign exchange as
well.”
All costs of production were paid in sterling. Exchange control in Iraq was
administered by a board composed of British and Iraqi officials, the chairman being the
British financial advisor to the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. Dollar and other non-sterling

307
308

William S. Culbertson to Secretary of State, Report No. 5, Supplementary Report D: Iraq, p. 1-2, Ibid.
Ibid.
338

exchanges were subject to licensing by this board, and all dollars at other foreign
exchanges accumulated by Iraq had to be turned into the London exchange pool. Sales to
or drafts on the London pool are credited or debited to the “Iraq dollar pool.” Imports had
to be based upon “essentialies” and dollar exchange was forthcoming only for the limited
volume of imports permitted.
“Even so, there was a heavy backlog of requirements for American
goods and the problem of obtaining sufficient exchange for purchases
when immediate wartime controls are removed is obviously serious. Even
if the United Kingdom decides to refund the credit balances of dollars in
the London pool, these would not last long in the face of the immediate
postwar Iraqi demands; and that unless the British are able and willing to
convert Iraqi sterling balances into dollars, sterling area controls will loom
up as a strong factor for diverting trade from the United States to Great
Britain and the sterling area countries.” 309

There were no tariff discriminations against American goods. With MESC
controls in place and censorship on orders to and from American and Iraqi merchants (as
claimed by American and Iraqi merchants, who blamed them for delays in processing
orders), none was needed. British steering trade toward Britain and other countries with
the British Empire, gave London effective control over Iraq’s economy. As Culbertson
had found in Turkey and Iran, the British hand seemed everywhere.
Except in the Levant.
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The Only Doors Open: Lebanon and Saudi Arabia as Gateways for U.S. Policy in
the Middle East and Permanent Anchors for the Trans-Arabian Pipeline.
Arriving at the airport at Damascus, the capital of Syria on October 19,
Culbertson and Winant were greeted by Minister George Wadsworth. After doing his
usual courtesy calls to Syrian officials, he proceeded to the U.S. Legation for
conferences. Then the two Americans visited the points of interest that Wadsworth had
chosen. “I had no idea that there are so many things of interest in this city,” Culbertson
recorded. Here was where Saul, the persecutor of Christians, became Saint Paul the
Apostle to the Gentiles; here was the Palais Agma of the Middle Ages; here was the
Great Mosque, the center of Omayyad Islam and of its famed mosaics and its adjoining
Tomb of Saladin, the Defender of the Faith and the conqueror of the marauding
Crusaders.
The next day Culbertson met for lunch with Syrian President Shukri Bey Quwatly
at his summer home at Zebdani in the foothills of the mountainous Anti-Lebanon. The
choice of a remote setting for the meeting between Culbertson and Quwatly might have
reflected the need for seclusion in a time of great stress. At the time, Quwatly was
worried about the implications for Syria of the attempt of the French to grab power the
previous September by having Senegalese troops and French Marines seize the President
of Lebanon and arrest the entire Lebanese cabinet. Thanks to the muscle of British
General Spears and strong pressure from Washington, the French had backed down. No
one thought, however, that the French were through or would voluntarily surrender their
power or that De Gaulle would give up privileges and preferential trading and
investment. There was, after all, the matter of French pride and prestige, both carefully
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nurtured by De Gaulle as he sought France’s recovery from the German humiliation. But
there was more than pride.
The Levant was key to preserving not only her position as a Mediterranean power,
but its civil airports were stopping places on the route from France to Indo-China (today,
Vietnam Cambodia and Laos) and other Far East possessions. Historian and scholar
Albert Habib Hourani pointed out that “In 1938, France had imported goods of greater
value from Syria and Lebanon than did any other country except Palestine and she
exported to them goods of greater value than to any other country except Great Britain.”
Fruits and Vegetables went to France and France sold large quantities of iron and iron
products, machinery, chemical products, precious metals and silk goods. Exploiting this
trade in true mercantilist fashion, Paris hosted the Banque de Syrie et du Gran Liban,
controlled by 12 out of 16 directors who were French; the bank had the exclusive right to
issue Syro-Lebanese currency. “In addition, a great deal of commercial banking,
mortgage and land credit business was transacted by the Banque Française de Syrie, the
Crédit Français d’Algérie et de Tunisie, and the Compagnie Algérienne.” 310
And then there was oil, Iraqi oil, piped to the Mediterranean port of Tripoli in
Syria and France’s single largest source of oil. De Gaulle was quite aware that although
the Americans had no oil facilities in the Levant, they shared with the British and the
French in the revenues gained through sales that this oil generated. Why, the French
wondered, had the Americans and the British conferred on Middle East oil without
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inviting the French, even signing an exclusive oil agreement between them? Would the
Americans honor the Red Line agreement that restricted Standard Oil of New Jersey and
Standard Oil of New York from competing with their French and British partners? Could
the British, given their bloodletting of French blood in 1941, their sending in hostile
General Spears, and their reliance on American aid, be trusted to defend French interests
in the Levant?
And, finally, there was the Communist revival in Lebanon and Syria, which
worried Wadsworth. Its promotion of centralized economic planning as nationalism was
outside corporate norms and had proven in the Soviet model to require increasingly
undemocratic enforcement that led to police states and totalitarianism. According, it had
attracted OSS scrutiny. In April 1943 the OSS speculated that a Communist hand was
behind the food riots in Damascus, although shortages were real enough. 311 But after the
September 1943 crisis in Lebanon, 1944 was a relatively quiet year. The Levant was no
longer threatened by the Axis, and both governments had been recognized by the Big
Four of the United Nations Grand Alliance–United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and
China—as well as other countries. The French wisely avoided any further conflicts with
nationalists in both countries that year, although, despite British urging, they were
reluctant to re-arm the local gendarmerie with anything but 200 obsolete carbines made
in 1907. With 24,000 colonial Troupes Spéciales still controlled by the French, and the
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French ignoring Syrian demands that they be transferred to Syria’s control, tensions
grew. By July, 1944, Wadsworth senrt a cable designated SECRET that “Without
question, Lebanese and Syrian Governments object to the receipt through the French of
Lend-Lease supplies” 312
Cultivating Lebanon and Syria was important to the U.S. Their selection for the
route of the trans-Arabian pipeline was being seriously considered by Standard Oil of
California, and the Roosevelt administration judged that control of Saudi oil and a
quicker route to the Mediterranean than the more costly route around the horn of Africa
to the Atlantic were imperative. So too were the avoidance of the tolls of the Britishcontrolled Suez Canal if Saudi oil was to fuel European reconstruction after the war at a
price per barrel that was economical.
After talks with Quwatly, Culbertson’s party left by car for the drive across the
Anti-Lebanon and drove up the valley between the mountains to Baalbek to see the
magnificent Roman pillars built by slaves. “As evening fell we crossed the Lebanon and
dropped down to Beirut,” ‘the Paris of the Middle East,’ an orange-tiled-roofed city
nestled by the Bay of St. George where Saint George was said to have slayed the dragon.
It looked peaceful enough, but appearances were deceiving. Culbertson’s advisors in
Beirut and Lebanon saw that resentments were seething below the surface. Believing in
his recent rapprochement with De Gaulle, Churchill finally would remove his friend
Spears on the charges of being an unreconstructed Francophone, a belief that was perhaps
unfair. Spears’s warnings about the French went unheeded. The OSS, for its part, was
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relieved to see Spears go. The British Foreign Office had concluded time was running out
for them, too, before the situation exploded. Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was grim,
saying “We really are sitting on a volcano in Beirut.”
That night Culbertson conferred with an OSS officer who used Commercial
Attaché as a cover, Gordon Scott. Lebanon, though technically independent, was still,
like Syria, looked upon by France as within its sphere of influence. As demonstrated last
year, British troops under General Spears were all that held the French back from seizing
control. But the young Lebanese government was intact, despite the differences between
the Christian Maronite majority and the Muslim minority, and that was something
tangible to build on if American trading rights, established in the 1920s and reaffirmed by
the Free French after the successful but bloody victory over Vichy, were to be
maintained. It was clear to the Lebanese that America, unlike France, showed no
territorial ambitions, only commercial ones that seemed fair. In the American planning,
there was room for partnership with Lebanon’s merchants and bankers who ran the
country’s essentially mercantile economy. The accomplishments of the American
University of Beirut gave America a shining prestige. On Saturday, October 21,
therefore, Culbertson conferred with Professor Dodd and his associates at the American
University of Beirut on the economic and financial problems of Lebanon and Syria. He
also met one with Father Sargent of the Jesuit College. After lunch with the British
embassy’s Mr. and Mrs. G.H. Thompson, and a reception given by the men educated in
the U.S. and Beirut, Culbertson was given an evening dinner by the Minister of Foreign
Affairs Jamil Bey Mardam to introduce his fellow members of the newly formed
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government, Prime Minister Fares Bey al-Khoury, Finance Minister Khaled Bey el-Azm,
and Justice Minister Dr. Abdul-Rahman Khayali.
Culbertson followed this up over lunch the next day with Lebanon’s President
Sheikh Beshara al-Khouri, his Prime Minister, and Foreign Affairs Minister, and their
wives. The wife of al-Khouri told the story of the attempted French coup d’état of the
previous November. Culbertson concluded that “that event ended the French in this
country! The French are using the same violence and exploitation in their financial
policy. They have robbed this country of its gold and made its currency and exchange
dependent on the franc.” 313 Culbertson then visited AUB President Bayard Dodge, a
fount of information and son of President Wilson’s confidante Cleveland H. Dodge.
Foreign Service officer Walter Horton Schoellkopf, heir to one of the richest families in
Dallas, Texas, was also helpful. At dinner, Culbertson tried his hand on British exchange
policy with British Minister and Lady Spears when Culbertson suddenly recalled talking
to Spears at the House of Commons over lunch with Sir Edward Gregg and Harold
Macmillan in 1939– about the same subject.
The real test, however, was his conference the next day with the Minister of
France. “These Levant countries are examples of the use of currency and exchange for
political ends,” he remonstrated in his diary. “But the British and the French have raided
their economy and their fate depends on the state of the French franc. I urged the minister
to seek means to break away from the financial blocs and to become independent within
the framework of international finance. I realize that the U.S. will have to help. This
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financial situation is the most serious barrier to American trade. Iraq and Egypt are
independent states whose sovereignty is limited by the terms of treaties. This procedure
represents one phase of British imperial power.” 314
The following morning, Minister George Wadsworth took him to Beirut airport,
where a C-47 sent by General Giles was waiting.
After a survey party sent to the Middle East in November of 1944 had returned
with evidence of instability in Palestine and Lebanon, 315 the company would consider
Egypt as a possible terminus. But Lebanon, with its bent toward the United States,
remained the favorite, including of the all-important Ibn Saud. The British were showing
they, too, could not be trusted. On December 4, the Foreign Office announced Spears’s
resignation. His support for Lebanese and Syrian independence was immediately
recognized as an obstacle to Churchill’s warming up to the French. Hearing the news,
Lebanese President al-Khoury “collapsed and wept like a child” and Syrian President
Quwatly was visibly upset. 316
On the morning of December 10th, Tripoli’s chief Amir, Abdul Hamid Karami, a
strong supporter of the U.S. and a Sunni deputy in the Syrian parliament from the
Lebanese oil port where the French had their refinery and pipeline terminus from Iraq,
was shot along with his chauffeur by submachine gun fire. Both survived. The reaction
was to blame local political rivals of the powerful Karami family, but an initial
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investigation by OSS’s Daniel Dennett suggested that the French were behind the
assault,. 317
On December 20th, Minister George Wadsworth received a frantic visit from
Lebanon’s Foreign Minister announcing that the French cruiser Emile Bertin was
planning an unexpected visit to Beirut. Encouraged to go on with his Christmas visit to
Jerusalem, Wadsworth briefed Dennett. On January 1, Dennett found a note, no doubt
slipped to him by Wadsworth, in which French General Oliva Reget sent to Syrian
Foreign Minister Mardam an accusation that Syrians were launching a vicious press
campaign against the French. Mardam responded that the press report must be the making
of provocateurs, denied any responsibility, and sent him supporting documentary
evidence of 29 incidents involving French troops, directly challenging Syria’s national
sovereignty. As if to confirm this, within days French tanks and troops were heading
toward Damascus. Quwatly sent an appeal to President Roosevelt. It was obvious where
Syria now saw where its immediate interests lay. Culbertson, in his report to Hull, noted
that the 1930 proposal for a joint American-Syrian-Lebanese banking corporation,
approved in principle but shelved during the Great Depression, was being revived by its
promoters. 318 Before the summer was over, French warplanes bombed Damascus
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followed by an occupation by French troops that drew a strong and successful demand by
the United States that they withdraw.
By then, Culbertson had traveled by air safely back in Cairo. Along the way,
flying over Mount Hermon to the upper valley of the Jordan, following the valley to the
Sea of Galilee, his plane entered the lower Jordan valley and the Dead Sea before heading
east. He landed in Jerusalem where he was greeted by Lowell Pinkerton, the venerable
Consul General in Jerusalem., and taken to the ill-fated King David Hotel, where the
British security forces also had their headquarters. (The Hotel was later bombed in July
1946 by Jewish paramilitary forces in one of the first major terror attacks in the modern
Middle East and a major blow to Britain’s presence in Palestine.). The next morning,
October 24, he called officially on the Acting High Commissioner, lunching with him
and his wife and the Pinkertons. He visited the Holy Places, drove to Bethlehem with
Pinkerton, and returned to see the only wall still standing of the ancient Jewish Temple,
the Wailing Wall, where Jews were praying. Besides a brief visit with Dr. Magnus of
Hebrew University, however, he avoided meeting with either Jewish or Palestinian
groups, dreading a confrontation. News of the Holocaust had reached the Jewish
population from refugees and the press, and the more militant Zionists had declared war
on the British that year and started to attack the British security forces that were
enforcing the British immigration restrictions decreed in the 1939 White Paper. Professor
Magnus was still trying to reach a compromise, but the point of no return had been
reached by both the Zionists and the Arab Palestinians. Even the Hagenah, the
underground army of the mainstream Zionists led by Ben Gurion, were said to be
stockpiling arms.
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Culbertson’s Mission had been directly threatened with being caught between the
opposing sides when he received a cable from the State Department on October 19 before
his arrival in Jerusalem warning that “Arab reaction to recent American Statements on
Palestine has been heretofore restricted to rather mild newspaper editorials and private
conversations protesting against them. There have been no organized protests. Yesterday
afternoon however Arab Chamber of Commerce in Jerusalem canceled appointment with
Culbertson Mission members now visiting Palestine and said, ‘We would like this action
of the Chamber to be read as a protest against the President’s pronouncement, and as a
sign of our unlimited disappointment.’ Mission left this morning for Haifa, Tel Aviv, and
Jaffa where it expects to meet Arabs and Arab organizations and upon his return I will
report as to its reception in those cities. Mr. Culberson himself has not yet arrived in
Palestine.” 319
Culbertson “had a long talk with Professor Magnus on ‘the Jewish State’ and
other solutions of this strange situation. Palestine is now almost an armed camp—
fortified police stations, gangster bands of Jews, etc. In [the Garden of] Gethsemane,
Batchelder [Culbertson’s guide from the Consulate General] commented thus on Jesus:
‘Here the fate of the human race was in balance. Jesus here conquered all his mortality;
there was nothing left to die’.”
It was not lost to G-2 veteran strategists like Culbertson that these British troops
were risking death in Palestine to guard the strategic base on the Suez Canal’s eastern
flank and the huge Haifa refinery at the Palestine terminus of the Iraq Petroleum
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Company’s pipeline serving the British East Mediterranean fleet anchored at Alexandria,
Egypt. Palestine was also the British land bridge to the precious British oil fields in Iraq
and Iran. Culbertson decided to accompany his report with an addendum registering his
foreboding over the explosive issue of a Zionist state in Palestine. “The Arabs are bitter
over the campaign declarations by Roosevelt and Dewey in favor of a Jewish State...
Today I was walking across the Temple area. An Arab asked our guide from the
Consulate General who we were. He said, ‘some Americans from Consulate.’ The Arab
spoke to me. That Arab was the President of the Chamber of Commerce who instigated
the boycott of the Mission!”
“I am leaving Palestine more uncertain than ever concerning the
solution of the Jew-Arab problem. The international Jew has apparently
done a great disservice to his people. Unless there is international
protection, the future of the aggressive Jew here is to be murdered! This is
an Arab land surrounded by other Arab lands. Still the campaigner goes on
at home discussing unrealities.” 320
His twin objective attending to Syria/Lebanon, a trip to Saudi Arabia, was also
abruptly cancelled. King Ibn Saud was upset by President Roosevelt’s recent public
endorsement of the Zionist plan for a Jewish State in Palestine. This, despite a joint
American-British mission sent to him in August with a proposed joint supply program
prepared by the MESC, offering a three months’ supply of cereals, tea and sugar for
fiscal 1944, on top of 150 trucks that were already delivered to assist in food distribution,
a subsidy by the British for the expenses of the king’s legation and consulates, and 10
million silver riyals from the Americans on credit lend-lease. The king, however,
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considered the supplies inadequate, pointing out that the Chevrolets had to be divided
between Riyadh and Mecca because there were no spare parts available and that it was
impossible to meet the Allies’ request that the country begin to support itself because the
war had disrupted trade. He noted that 1000 lorries had been provided to Iraq. “He stated
that Saudi Arabia was being discriminated against in the matter of supplies,” reported
Ambassador James Moose, “and that the country had been blockaded like an enemy
country. 321 Ibn Saud wanted a U.S. long-term plan for Saudi Arabia’s development.
The Saudi king also objected to Amir Abdullah of Jordan and Iraqi Prime
Minister Nuri al-Said ‘s advocacy of a Greater Syria project, uniting with Palestine the
Hashemite rulers of Iraq and Trans-Jordan, both sons of Ibn Saud’s arch-enemy and rival
for the crown of Arabi,. The British were said to quietly support the project, although
they were loath to admit that publicly for fear of offending Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud was not
fooled by London’s silence, nor by the support given by the Americans and British to the
founding of the Arab League. Nuri “had loyally served British interests five times prior to
1941, and nine times after the 1941 crisis” 322 that led to British overthrow of his
predecessor, Prime Minister Rashid Ali, and British military occupation. Unconvinced
that Rashid Ali actually had Axis designs and was a victim of British intransigence, Ibn
Saud had given the deposed Iraqi leader refuge at his court in Riyadh.
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Syria’s Quwatly opposed the Greater Syria scheme also. Not for naught was it
rumored that Ibn Saud trusted Quwatly more than any other Arab leader. But when the
French attempted to impose a treaty that would guarantee privileges to French nationals,
and the British supported them as an attempt to buttress their own privileges in Iraq,
Quwatly raised the specter of communism. “I would rather make Syria a Soviet
republic,” he cabled Wadsworth, insisting that such a condition of subservience to France
was a violation of the Atlantic Charter. Churchill’s nightmare about the Atlantic Charter
coming back to haunt him and the threat of losing Syria to communism was enough for
London, and it quickly reversed course when it learned that Roosevelt would not
recognize any treaty that gave France a superior position in the Levant. 323 De Gaulle
persisted. It looked like a bloody confrontation could not be avoided here, too. The
Middle East seemed to be coming apart at the carefully-knit seams.
With Pinkerton, the Mission drove to Tel-a-Viv and Jaffa for lunch on October
26, and boarded a special plane provided by General Giles for the flight back to Cairo,
where the Egyptian Prime Minister had indicated a desire to see him. That day the funeral
of the deposed Shah of Iran took place in Cairo with a long military procession.
Culbertson noted that the current Shah Pahlavi was not in the procession of mourners,
although his brothers were.
The next day Culbertson had a long conference with General Giles. The General
thought Culbertson should go to Arabia and confer with King Ibn Saud. He would
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arrange the air transportation. But the State Department had already made clear that,
given Ibn Saud’s joining in the protests throughout the Arab world against Roosevelt’s
electioneering support for the Zionist cause, it was not the right time to visit Saudi
Arabia. Instead, Washington wanted him to go to Italy, where a new U.S.-backed
government was expected to be amenable to American investment and trade to
reconstruct the Italian economy, especially in the industrial north, where Communist
partisan activities were seriously beginning to harass the German occupiers and become a
force for the postwar. “I have mixed feelings about this new job,” Culbertson admitted.
The Pan-Arab conference in Cairo still offered opportunities, and, between his work
drafting the final comprehensive report to Secretary Hull, he was able to set up meetings
with Nuri al-Said of Iraq and other delegates. Nuri, whom he called “the wisest Arab I
have met,” told him that forces for the next war were gathering in that part of the world.
“He talked very soundly about Russia, Turkey, Great Britain and the U.S.. Also on the
Arab-Jewish question in Palestine.” 324 The next day he again spent the afternoon at the
OSS office. 325
Following up on Culbertson’s earlier suggestion upon arriving in Cairo for an
exchange of views on technical economic issues, the Egyptian government submitted a
report entitled, “Trade Between Egypt and the United States of America” which
Culbertson sent under separate cover to the State Department. To further discussions on
trade, the Middle East Supply Center sponsored a conference for the Culbertson mission
on October 31. Mission members and the Egyptians conferred as four subcommittees on

324

Culbertson, Diary, October 31, 1944.

325

Culbertson, Diary, November 1, 1944
353

finance, difficulties resulting from the war, cotton questions, and commercial
exchanges. 326
On November 3rd, Culbertson conferred with former Egyptian ministers over a
quiet lunch discreetly held at the home of Dr. Charles Roger Watson, prominent Cairoborn and Princeton-educated Christian missionary and president of the American
University at Cairo, meeting with the legal advisor to the Wafd Party’s delegation to
London, the head of Banque Misr, and Dr. Wendell Cleland, director of the university’s
extension division. That day Culbertson received a confidential memorandum from
Commercial Attaché R. L. Rankin titled “Egyptian attitude toward Foreigners,” pointing
out that American and British businessmen have more access to the Egyptian government
and do Egyptian Greeks. “It should be remembered… That a latent prejudice against
infidels is present in all Muslim countries. In Egypt this is likely to be directed chiefly
against the British, Greeks and Syrians; Americans and Germans may suffer incidentally
but not because there is any prejudice against their nationality. In any event Egypt is now
an important creditor country and has no need for foreign capital. Americans would do
well to bear this in mind along with the fact that discrimination against foreigners is
always possible and may at any time become acute. As long as American business with
Egypt is conducted on conservative lines and involves no large investment of capital
there should be no undue risk involved.” 327
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No doubt influenced by Rankin’s memorandum, Culbertson adopted a firm stance
at the luncheon with former Egyptian officials at Dr. Watson’s home. “I touched on the
attitude toward foreign interests,” Culbertson wrote. “I made it clear that the Egyptians
should try to make it worth our while to come here.” 328
That night Dr. Hafez Afifi Pasha, the Misr banker who also was president of the
Cairo Chamber of Commerce hosted a dinner at Shepheard’s Hotel in his honor with the
members of the Chamber. “The occasion was important,” noted Culbertson, “in our
relations with the Arab world.” 329
The following day Culbertson made an obligatory visit to the King’s farm, posed
for photographs with animals, and returned rested, but the next day was packed with
conferences with the Egyptian representative of an old client, American Export; lunch
with construction, transportation and sugar magnate Ahmed Abbud Pasha, the largest
stockholder of Banque Misr, the richest man in Egypt who had bankrolled the Wafd
Party; a conference with U.S. Ambassador James Landis on economic and political
affairs in the Middle East; and dinner with U.S. Minister Tuck and Lord Moyne, the
British Minister for the Middle East. “I sat beside Moyne,” Culbertson wrote, “and we
had a long talk.” 330
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The next day “Lord Moyne was assassinated by two unidentified Jews,” 331
ambushed outside his villa by two members of the Stern gang. The killing of Moyne
shook the British Establishment. Winston Churchill was furious and began to rethink his
support for Zionism. Chaim Weismann and Ben Gurion denounced the murder and the
Hagenah helped to hunt down the Stern gang, trying to mitigate the damage. The funeral
for Lord Moyne and his aide, Lance Corporal Arthur Fuller, was held at the Episcopal
cathedral on November 8. Culbertson was seated in the front row with Tuck. The next
day Culbertson met with British Minister Shone about the crisis.
Two days later, on November 10, Col. William Eddy, now the U.S. minister to
Saudi Arabia, flew in to see General Giles. “We are trying to do something with that
[Saudi] situation,” Culbertson wrote in his diary. That afternoon, Culbertson went to have
tea with Sheikh Yousef Yassin, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, whom King Ibn
Saud had sent to the Pan-Arab conference after all. “Having in mind the declarations in
our recent electoral campaign, he said ‘You will ask your government to note that we
have kept the Arab world quiet!’” 332 That night Culbertson dined with Gen. Giles and
tobacco heiress Doris Duke Cromwell. The next day Culbertson, accompanied by the
Tucks and the Eddys, took the members of the Mission on a tour of the ancient Egyptian
ruins of the Karnack Temple at Luxor and crossed the river to ponder the tombs of the
Pharaohs Tut, Ramses VI, and Seti I.
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On November 12, Culbertson was shocked to hear of the death of the Turkish
ambassador in Washington to whom he had written at the beginning of his visit to
Turkey.
Another surprise was King Farouk request that Culbertson see him— alone—on
November 14. Tuck sent him to the palace in his car. The King began by expressing hope
that the U.S. representation would be upgraded to an ambassador to reflect Egypt’s status
as a coming major player in the Middle East, and then got to the point. Culbertson noted
that Farouk “showed that he had followed work of the Mission closely. Had evidently
personally urged cooperation by his government. Spoke particularly of domination of
British. Urged freer exchanges and direct dealings with his government in economic
matters. Said he would see oil men tomorrow, Hopes that [the Trans-Arabian] pipeline
will have its terminal in Egypt. Palestine question. Showed concern but said he had urged
patience and his people hoped for a solution without violence. Spoke of Lord Moyne.
Expressions of friendship for U.S.A. and for me.” 333
In September, Culbertson had recommended a “firm, realistic, non-benevolent
policy to the French in Paris in order to achieve the economic policy which gave rise to
the mission,” including the end of Lend-Lease by June 1945.” 334 Since then, witnessing
De Gaulle’s neo-colonial policies in action in Lebanon and Syria and Britain’s lock on
Iraq development and trade in Turkey, Iran and Iraq, he had been given no reason to
change his mind about either empire. But Britain was a more active and stronger
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opponent than was France, whose weakness made it supposedly the easier target for
pressure tactics.
In his final report, Culbertson wrote that “The Great Rivalries of the Middle East
are for control of the oil resources and the routes of communication. Trade is a poor third
in this trio of economic stakes . . . In fact. the stakes played for are more political than
economic.” 335 It was a strange conclusion, considering his view that oil and
communications by air and sea were the great stakes that inspired this political rivalry.
Yet, in asserting the primacy of politics over economics, Culbertson was emphasizing
where agency can be most directly applied in diplomacy, rather than succumbing to a
fateful economic determinism. In the new postwar atmosphere of hope, believing that
America could do anything to reshape the world, Culbertson was merely reflecting the
perennial optimism of American exceptionalism.
After completing his final report to Washington 336 and signing it in Minister
Tuck’s office, the Culbertson Mission left Cairo’s Payne Field on November 16, flying
ten hours to Caserta, Italy, where they were billeted in the palace of the King of Naples.
The next day the Mission was driven by car past the rubble that was all that was left of
the famous Monte Cassino monastery after Allied bombing. “Village after village in
desolation. The people are dazed. They are quarreling over who owns this stone or that.

335
Report of the Special Economic Mission to the Middle East,” 0333.1151R/11-1544, RG 59, Records of
the Department of State, U.S. National Archives.

Report of the Special Economic Mission to the Middle East,” 0333.1151R/11-1544, RG 59, Records of
the Department of State, U.S. National Archives.
336

358

Their ‘homes’ are lying all over the landscape. They are paying the price of the grandeur
that was Rome.” 337
Arriving at Rome on November 17 with “mixed emotions,” the Mission was
lodged at the huge Grand Hotel. Culberson met with American military officers
supervising the American occupation, soon-to-be Ambassador Alexander Kirk
(reassigned from Cairo), Myron Tayler (Ambassador to the Vatican, who arranged a
private audience for Culbertson with Pope Pius XII), and Lord Moyne’s replacement as
British Minister Resident for the Mediterranean, Harold Macmillan 338 (“not very
helpful”). He also met with top Italian officials in the new Bonomi government, including
Italian Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Giovanni Viconti Verosta, and on November 23
with Italian Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi. But there was tension among the British.
After Polish units captured Mount Cassino, General Alexander, the British commander of
Allied forces in Italy, had ordered Generals Lucien Truscott and Mark Clark to advance
east and cut off the northern retreat of the German 10th Army. The American generals,
however, apparently at the White House’s urging, disregarded the order and instead
rushed to capture Rome. Soon a more pliant pro-American government under veteran
Liberal Ivanoe Bonomi was appointed to replace the tainted regime of Marshall Pietro
Badoglio that was waiting to take power. Churchill was not happy with the American
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insistence on setting up a government in the name of self-determination.. “I think it is a
disaster that Badoglio should be replaced by this group of aged and hungry politicians,”
Churchill cabled Roosevelt. “He has been a useful instrument for us from the time when
he delivered the [Italian] fleet, in spite of the enemy, safely into our hands. I thought it
was understood that he was to go on, at any rate so we could bring the democratic north
in and have a thoroughly sound Italian government. . . . I was unaware, at this present
time, that we had conceded to the Italians who have course so dear in life and material the
power to form any government they chose without reference to the victorious powers,
about the slightest pretense the popular mandate. I take a most serious view of the
situation ...” 339
Moreover, Churchill was frustrated about British troops being pulled out of Italy
to support Operation Dragoon in southern France. Churchill was furious about the
arbitrary superseding of the Marshall by the Americans but had no choice but accept the
Americans fait accompli. It was likely that the Americans were anxious to avoid another
Darlan scandal and wanted the control they did not have in French North Africa with
Darlan. Macmillan personally agreed with the American demands for reforms in the
Italian government more in line with Congressional demands. 340 But Churchill could
discern the ultimate result: As long as the French and British Empires were held at bay by
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depletion of dollars and manpower, American control of Italy meant American control of
the Mediterranean.
Failing to convince the Americans to advance their armies north through Italy into
Austria and Czechoslovakia to reach Poland and beat the Russians to Warsaw, and
pressed by Arabs and Zionists in Palestine, and nationalists in Egypt, Churchill was left
in the Eastern Mediterranean with only one large asset, Greece, restoring a deposed and
pliant Greek king with British bayonets to prevent the Communist partisans from seizing
power was a sine qua non. Churchill was depending on Stalin to live up to his personal
promises to the Prime Minister to respect the sphere of influence he and Stalin has agreed
upon in Moscow. As in Italy and France, Stalin lived up to his pledges, in return for a
free hand in Eastern Europe, not to intervene in support of his fellow Communists in their
struggle for recognition and power in Greece. And even there, within two years Britain,
exhausted and all but penniless, would have to turn to the Americans to take over the
Greek civil war Churchill had ignited.
Receiving orders from the State Department on November 25 directing him to go
to France, he worked to finish his report on Italy, noting the resignation of all the Italian
ministers he had just met through Kirk. The situation in Italy was much too fluid, marked
by confusions and the continued German occupation in the industrial north. The
Americans still had to deal in the north not only with Germans but also the Communist
anti-fascist fighters with 10,000 trained guerrillas and another 20,000 irregulars. OSS
infiltration teams would grow to number over 75 by the time of the Nazi surrender in
May 1945. Many of them were sympathetic to the partisans, but after General Karl
Wolf’s surrender orchestrated by OSS’s Allen Dulles in Switzerland, the OSS facilitated
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the disarming of the partisans in line with the Combined Chiefs of Staff order to keep
vigilant for any signs that the Communists’ Committee of National Liberation might try
to set up their own government in opposition to the Bonomi alliance favored by
Roosevelt. 341
After seeing members of his Mission off to the States, Culbertson proceeded to
Marseilles and then to Paris and tried to negotiate with the French to open French North
Africa’s markets and resources. But he got no further on French bulk exports such as
coal, oil, sugar and wheat than he had when he was in the French North African colonies.
The French stubbornly held on to monopoly control over marketing with public
enterprises of the French State with whom American companies could not or would not
compete. The only concession on immediate resumption of normal trade was French
willingness to accept imports from the United States in materials the French needed for
metropolitan France (including the French settler state in Algeria, although the greater
needs were in devastated continental France), such as farm equipment, trucks and
automobiles.
Catching the drift, Washington under the new Secretary of State, Edward
Stettinius, concluded there was little reason to expect Culbertson to be any more
successful with the British and ordered him to return immediately to Washington,
cancelling Culbertson’s planned trip to London, his last chance for pulling out the plum
in the pie.
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Conclusion
With the retirement of Hull for health reasons, Culbertson lost his most powerful
ally in Washington. The new secretary of state, Edward Stettinius, refused to allow him
to go to London, despite Hull’s inquiries on his behalf. What exactly were the reasons
must be the subject of future research, as is the case with so much about America’s initial
steps toward dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Culbertson’s
emphasis on economic development of newly independent states and colonies, a theme
consistent with his earlier arguments against the colonial world, apparently did not fit into
the more mercantile mold of thinking emerging in Washington as Roosevelt’s physical
powers faded. In foreign policy, the increasing need for prospective alliances against
Soviet power forced a recalibration of primary goals away from a promotion of
democratic governments and quick decolonization of European empires toward
accommodation with local dictators and regional spheres of influence in both the Eastern
and Western hemisphere, whether in Greece or Argentina. Arabists and Americanists in
the State Department and intelligence agencies would just have to go along.
Nevertheless, Hull and Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew told Culbertson that
his mission was considered a success, that some of his recommendations were already
being adopted, and that his reports of meetings with American, French and British
officials as well as with local dignitaries and American businessmen during the trip did
have some influence in the development of foreign policy toward the Middle East. In fact,
the early Culbertson report on French North Africa had a direct influence on the State
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Department’s decision the previous fall to end the Lend-Lease program with France and
Britain as soon as the war in Europe was over. 342 “Colonel Culbertson has rendered
outstanding service to the Department and this Government,” Acting Secretary of State
Joseph Grew wrote Secretary of War Henry Stimson on February 12, 1945. “I am
perfectly grateful to you and to the War Department for permitting us to use Colonel
Culbertson’s special qualifications in directing the study of economic conditions in the
liberated areas, the conclusions of which will have an important bearing on our postmilitary civilian policies and relations with our Allies.” 343
Of significance in this regard is the fact that in every capital Culbertson visited in
the Middle East, two types of participants in his private meetings with Americans were
consistently present: oil executives and OSS intelligence agents. Both were already
involved in a symbiotic institutional relationship that deepened during the war and that
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Col. Culbertson, as trade diplomat, military analyst, intelligence officer, and head of a
government Mission that included businessman, uniquely represented.
Perhaps because of these qualifications, it was hard for Culbertson to believe his
governmental career was suddenly over. On January 17, 1945, he gave a talk about his
mission to a dinner in Manhattan at the Great Hall of the Chamber of Commerce of the
State of New York sponsored jointly by the Chamber and the National Foreign Trade
Council. He spoke in praise of the wartime work of the Middle East Supply Center.
“When the war closed the Mediterranean to Allied shipping, the countries of the Middle
East became dependent upon arrangements which could be made to supply food and
other national necessities locally or around the Cape of Good Hope. It was a problem of
distributing articles in short supply, utilizing a limited amount of shipping. It was a
problem of stimulating local production. It was the over-all problem of maintaining
economic and social stability in a part of the world vitally important to the war effort of
the United Nations. The MESC was an outstanding case of economic collaboration
between Great Britain, United States and the governments of the Middle East and it met
effectively his war responsibilities and regulation and control.”
He did not mention his criticism of French and British Imperial control of trade
and investment.
“When the war receded from French North Africa heard from the
Middle East, a new situation arose. The desire to continue the existing
order of things tended to delay this decent mobilization of controls and
restrictions which under the reviving interest in trade and production were
becoming barriers to private enterprise. It was the situation which gave
rise to the Special Economic Mission which was instructed to review on
the ground the problems involved in returning trade to normal travels as
rapidly as wartime conditions permit and to recommend procedures which
would ensure the fullest possible participation of private business in such
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government transactions as may be required in view of wartime
exigencies. The Department of State in the FEA have already made
available to the press statements concerning the extent to which controls,
joint or otherwise, have been relaxed or removed in French North Africa
and in the Middle East. Substantial and concrete progress has already been
made toward the establishment of conditions which permit the resumption
of private trade. I believe that American business will find in these results
a prompt and efficient response to its requests and needs.”
Culbertson then quoted carefully chosen paragraphs from the Mission’s report,
emphasizing that exports to the United States gave the Middle East countries the
wherewithal to purchase American goods.
“The mission has been interested in the broad problem of
the availability of products in the Middle East countries which
might be economically imported into the United States,” he said,
“. . . . It is relevant here to emphasize that healthy foreign trade
consists of imports as well as exports and that undue restrictions
upon the importation of products into the United States constitute,
where they exist, undo barriers to the development of foreign
commerce.
“At the moment there is in the Middle East a pent-up
demand for products of all sorts. This emergency demand looks to
the United States is the most likely producing area. Providing the
existing credits may be converted into purchasing power the
United States, the immediate future will provide an opportunity for
an unusually large flow of American goods to the Middle East. The
demand is stronger than in most areas of the Eastern Hemisphere
because of the early emergence of the Middle East from direct
contact with the war.
“These immediate prospects of large trade should not be
confused with longer-range prospects. Now this should the future
be praised inflexibly in terms of the past.
“The Middle East has become peculiarly conscious of
American goods. Wartime curtailment and elimination of most of
the long established trading centers have introduced new American
products, with consequent advantages in a selling sense. Some of
these new items will hold the market; many of them will
undoubtedly revert to prewar pattern.
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“Prewar trade from the U.S.A. was important but within
limited categories. Almost 50% of the imports were in the
automotive field. Electrical equipment, agricultural machinery,
industrial machinery and equipment, films, radios, apples and other
items made up the balance. The value of the imports in a normally
good year was some $35 million. Granting definite increase in the
future, there is still an apparent limitation in United States exports
to the Middle East, due to the scarcity of Middle East products for
importation by the United States. A flexible international exchange
agreement would be of considerable assistance.
“Physically, the Middle East may be considered of greater
importance to the U.S.A. in the future than in the past. The degree
of increase will depend to a large extent on the ability and
willingness of the United States to accept foreign products as
imports.”

Culbertson insisted that local governments in North Africa and the Middle East
reflect generally in their policies the worldwide tendency toward trade controls,
preferences for their nationals, and the participation of the State in economic activities.
“As I observed that firsthand this tendency, it was clear that the over-all problem is not
solved merely by removing a barrier here and a restriction there. The removal of one
control in one place may result in the imposition of another control in another place. It is
important to emphasize at all times that our objective is freer trade by private firms, that
its attainment is not only in our national interest but also in the interest of peoples of
French North Africa and the Middle East. Our government and theirs should, and I am
sure will, work together to keep restrictions on trade and production and participation in
government enterprises at a minimum.
“It is important for the American people to realize the Renaissance
which is taking place in the Muslim world. These peoples are becoming
increasingly conscious that only of their developing nationalities, but also
their common interests. Definite tendencies toward Arab unity in certain
air matters are underway and leaders are looking to the United States for
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sympathetic consideration for cooperation. The educational and
archaeological achievements of Americans and American institutions have
given to the American nation a deep-seated prestige throughout the Middle
East. We should make every effort to consolidate and extend this
important asset... By dealing directly with the Muslim states, by
emphasizing their independence, and by encouraging the development
both as nationalities and as a cooperating group of peoples.
“The Middle East is a great world highway. The Great Powers
have vital interest in it. United States shares these vital interests with other
powers. The area is particularly important in the development of world
aviation. Underlying this great highway are vast resources of oil which
have great significance both for peace and for war.
“In my opinion, the national interest of the United States requires
that we contribute our influences to the development in that region of
stability and security.” Culbertson warned against temporary commitments
to the region. “If the American trading and producing communities desire
to share in the economic activities of these areas, they must make their
organizations there permanent and apply day in and day out, year in and
year out, a continuous, constructive program. Competition from the
nationals of other states is keen and experienced and it leaves no margin
for a trading or producing program which is a mere by-product of
domestic trade and production. Trading and producing in these areas are
serious businesses. Our report on the Middle East continues:
“Concretely, this program means trading companies, train
personnel willing to live in the countries, banks or banking
connections, adequate credits, goods adapted to the needs of the
people, a willingness to buy the products which the people of the
Middle East have to sell.”
“In like manner,” Culbertson concluded, “it is relevant to
emphasize the necessity of continuity and of affirmative measures in the
economic foreign policy of the United States. My colleagues on the
Mission and I pointed out that the prestige of the American Government
would be greatly enhanced in the Middle East by the purchase or
construction of adequate facilities for embassies, legations, and consulates.
We suggested that our diplomatic and consular representatives in the area
should be encouraged to take a more affirmative interest in the promotion
and protection of American economic interests. We emphasized that, if we
are to share in the opportunities of the Middle East, we must also share its
responsibilities.” 344
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The speech created a stir in business circles. E.P. Thomas, president of the
National Foreign Trade Council, sent Secretary of State Stettinius a copy of the press
statement, noting that “the large audience of members of both organizations was greatly
appreciative of the favor of learning firsthand of the situation generally in those areas.”
Thomas wrote that the selection of Culbertson and the members of his Mission “was
happily inspired.
No one is more competent than the Ambassador to evaluate the advantage of
having both Government and Business represented in work of this kind; none more
thoroughly imbued with an understanding of our foreign commercial problems...The
Ambassador’s statement to the Press has had wide publicity...In this connection I wish
particularly to convey to you the general feeling of satisfaction that private business was
so competently represented on the Mission, indicating the desire of the Department of
State for fullest cooperative collaboration and cooperation with business in the task of
reopening the channels of trade in liberated countries as speedily as militarily and of the
circumstances permit. Your policy in this direction is of the utmost importance and
assuring to business interests that in the promotion of the nation’s foreign trade and
commerce, under your guidance, the closest coordination of government and private
business efforts will be maintained.” 345.
That month, in negotiations in Washington, D.C., the French finally agreed to
remove some restrictions on trade with its North and West African colonies, except for
Algeria, which Paris still considered part of Metropolitan France and had incorporated
this into the French Republic’s constitution. Culbertson gave his final report a positive
spin, arguing in a memorandum to the Department that “The important result is that a
trend was established between the American and French Governments, and that the
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negotiations in Paris constitute a significant development in the pattern of United Nations
post-war relations.” 346
Curiously, he also was requested by the State Department to offer his opinion on
Palestine. He had already given his opinion in his November report and had been critical
of Zionism. Giving Jews authority over all Palestine, he warned, would brew a storm of
protest from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt. He instead recommended that the country be
put under international commission, with special sanctuary for the Jews and a guarantee
of religious and racial freedom. Now, on January 28, he repeated this theme, quoting
from the report:
“Until this question is settled it will remain the serious menace to
the peace and security of the area. Moreover, the situation injures our
prestige among our peoples. Perhaps the price United States pays for the
privilege to hold its widely publicized views on the Jewish State is worth
all it costs. The Mission wishes only to emphasize that the price is
considerable that apparently the American people do not realize how
considerable it is.”
But he went further, claiming that
“in Palestine the view is supported by authoritative opinion that
after the war the number of Jews desiring to migrate to Palestine will
diminish; that in fact many Jews now in Palestine will wish to return to the
countries from which they came; many industries in Palestine would be
uneconomical and peace-time and may not survive when normal trade is
restored. Their decline or removal will bring unemployment in their wake;
that no settlement of the problem can be made until Arabs and Jews and
other interested groups have been consulted in accordance with
commitments.”

William S. Culbertson to State Department, January 2, 1945, Box 464, RG 169. United
States National Archives.
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He did not call for delay in facing the issue. “The problem of Palestine will not
solve itself. Time may lessen one form of pressure but it may create new complications.
More or less indefinite delay itself would arouse opposition. Fighting emotions are
involved. They do not listen to reason.
“I am deeply in sympathy with the suffering persecuted Jews of the
world. But the creation of a Jewish national state in Palestine would not
become an adequate solution of this vexing problem. Indeed, the
propaganda, financing, and threats which support the establishment of the
Jewish national state tend to divert attention away from the real solution;
namely, the world-wide implementation of the principle of racial and
religious freedom. If this principle is reduced to practice, few Jews will
seek participation in the meager life of Palestine.
“If the proposed Jewish national state or national home means
political rule by the Jews in Palestine over all of the territory and over all
of the peoples in Palestine, its proclamation would result in continued
violence in Palestine and serious opposition from the Arab states... And at
least for most, if not all, Christian groups....The opposition of the Lebanon
and of Ibn Saud to the creation of the state comprised of Palestine,
Transjordan, Syria and Lebanon, as proposed by Dr. Mannes, and a
Confederation of States as proposed by Gen. Nuri as Said; the divergent
interests and rival nationalisms of various Arab groups; the attitude of
France and the strategic interests of the British in Palestine and
Transjordan eliminate the possibility of solving the Palestine problem now
by integrating it in an enlarged Syrian state. Although such a state may be
attainable in time, a solution of the Palestine question cannot wait upon its
realization.”

Culbertson argued the first step toward a permanent solution of the Arab-Jewish
question in Palestine should be in line with official assurances given by the British and
the statements made by President Roosevelt that Arabs and Jews be consulted before
settlement is decided upon. He stressed the importance of a compromise settlement,
putting emphasis on the word compromise.
371

Yet, he proposed a top-down settlement dictated by Great Britain, the Soviet
Union, and the United States.
“The representation of Arabs and Jews and of Christians, Jewish and
Muslim religious group shall be given due consideration. The settlement when
decided upon, however, shall be final and will be enforced regardless of whether
or not it meets with the approval of any of these groups...Palestine shall not be
under the political domination of any of these three religious groups... Palestine
shall be neither a Jewish nor an Arab national state, but [shall have] local
autonomy for both Arabs and Jews within the framework of a general
government... Palestine, as a holy land, shall be constituted as a territory under
international trusteeship within the Dumbarton Oaks system of an international
organization. The question of the trustee who will administer Palestine may be
considered in formulating the precise terms of the settlement.” 347

He received only a short note from Stettinius thanking him for preparing and
sending him the memorandum. “This will be very helpful to me,” Stettinius wrote,
signing it “Ed” 348 He never raised it to Culbertson again. There was no hope that either
the Jews or Arabs of Palestine would settle for less than full independence. And Zionists
always believed that Palestine could hold far more Jewish refugees than the British
thought possible, especially with the gains in industrialization they had made during the
war and wanted to keep growing. Culbertson’s recommendations did nothing to alleviate
the crisis, much less solve it.
The stony silence of the Roosevelt administration about his reports, his statements
on the Middle East and his confidential assessment of Palestine puzzled him. Seeking to
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spread the word and provoke a response from Washington, he wrote letters to powerful
business associates, including members of the National Foreign Trade Council, John J.
Hooper of American Machine and Foundry Company, G. Butler Sherwell, vice president
of Manufacturers Trust Company (who informed him that National City Bank had
decided to open a branch in Cairo and wanted “to continue talking to you about Union
Oil of California), 349 J.L. Sheets, chairman of the board of Socony-Vacuum Oil
Company, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, General Giles, retired Admiral H.F. Yarnell,
and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCoy, even to Mrs. Hull while her husband was
ill, but he could get no traction in the administration other than a request by Grew that he
brief British Ambassador Lord Halifax, which he did.
In February, he spoke before the French Chamber of Commerce in New York. He
was asked to testify before Congressman Sol Bloom’s House Foreign Affairs Committee,
and he appeared before the committee on February 28. He wrote an article for the
Department of State Bulletin titled “Principles of Economic Policy,” but it had no
significant effect on his prospects for further government service. 350 In April, he attended
the opening of the Harold Pratt House at 58 East 68th Street as the new headquarters of
the Council on Foreign Relations. In a few years, David Rockefeller would assume
CFR’s vice presidency and then the presidency, marking the passing of financial elite
leadership in the Eastern Establishment from the era of the Morgans to the era of the
Rockefellers.
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Cordell Hull finally answered on May 22:
“I have not been able to find any real cooperation there at the State
Department in relation to your matter. In some way impression has been
created that your official mission in all its work was not all that they were
counting on. This does not at all mean that it was not thoroughly timely
and efficient, but it only means that through some consideration not on the
merits, they are not in a cooperative state of mind. I am most regretful
about the situation, since I know how exceedingly valuable you are in the
combined diplomatic and economic situation we have had and which is
all-important.” 351
That year Cordell Hull received the Nobel Peace Prize for his idealistic struggle to
achieve what Woodrow Wilson, his mentor, could not: American acceptance of
membership in an international organization dedicated to peace and mutual security. He
had helped the world take the first serious steps toward decolonization. He had
championed free trade because he, like many liberals, saw it as the key to unlocking the
secret of peace and avoidance on world war, which with the advent of nuclear weapons
had become unwinnable and threatened destruction of the human species. But he e was
undoubtedly disappointed about the rupture of the Grand Alliance and the promise of
improved relations with Russia. He had served the longest tenure as U.S. Secretary of
State in U.S. history. But now he was old and sick; within ten years he would be dead.
In the early Cold War years, Culbertson, besides a brief trip to Germany, was
locked out of the Washington of the highly partisan Democratic president, Harry Truman.
Culbertson was not the only victim. Nelson Rockefeller was fired as Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs. He had become an embarrassment because of his
support for Argentina’s entry into the United Nations even though the Argentine

Cordell Hull to Col. William S. Culbertson, May 22, 1945. Unbound Correspondence 1945-46, Papers
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strongman, Peron, had refused to join the Allies for years. Rockefeller was succeeded by
his leading critic against Peron, Ambassador to Argentina Spruille Braden, a veteran
diplomat whose charges against Peron’s harboring Nazis and allowing Nazi investments
backfired and helped elect Peron to the presidency with the slogan “Braden or Peron.”
Braden nevertheless was unremitting in his criticism of “amateurs” in the State
Department and New Dealers, later explaining to a Congressional committee that “[We]
resisted this invasion of all these swarms of people. . . mostly collectivists and ‘dogooders’ and what-nots.” 352
John Winant, who as Ambassador had steadfastly supported Britain in its darkest
hour, was also replaced and denied a new post. Coming on the heels of his wife divorcing
him, it proved to be an insurmountable blow and he committed suicide.
Donovan and the entire OSS were sent packing, broken up into parts that went to
the State Department (OSS Research and Development) and the War Department (OSS
Secret Intelligence, Special Operations and X-2 Counterintelligence).
Culbertson’s contribution to establishing a permanent high-level body in the U.S.
Government that would make ongoing studies on national security finally was realized by
the founding of the National Security Council in 1947, but his contribution went
unrecognized. Earlier that year, the Cold War was officially launched to meet perceived

Quoted in Smith, OSS, op. cit., p.364. Braden, the son of an Anaconda mining engineer stationed in Chile,
organized Braden Copper in Chile after working as an attorney for Standard Oil during Bolivia’s Chaco war
with Paraguay (in which Standard Oil was implicated). In 1954, on behalf of United Fruit Company he was
involved in planning the CIA coup that overthrew the democratically elected president of Guatemala, Jacobo
Arbenz, who initiated an agrarian reform that included nationalizing United Fruit’s fallow lands for
distribution to the peasants and was suspected by Washington of being a communist-sympathizer because he
would not sour relations with Soviet Russia. Braden later flirted with the ultra-right John Birch Society. A
member of the Council on Foreign Relations, he also was president of the New York’s exclusive Metropolitan
Club founded by J.P. Morgan.
352

375

Soviet threats to Greece, Turkey and Iran with the Truman Doctrine, giving military aid
to any government in the non-Communist world who wanted to resist Communist
inroads, a wider proviso welcomed by many anti-communist autocrats. In a mistaken
assumption, it was assumed that all Communists were controlled by Moscow;
Yugoslavia, China, Vietnam, Poland, Hungary and even Czechoslovakia would prove
them wrong, but Cold War liberals found it just as inconvenient to admit that mistake as
to break with the dictators they had embraced. The Marshall Plan for Western Europe’s
reconstruction also carried Europe’s fuel base from its traditional dependence on coal
(and Communist-led trade unions in France and Italy) to Saudi oil.
By then, with Italy, southern France, and North Africa secured, and air bases were
successfully negotiated with Franco’s Spain, Morocco, Cairo’s Payne Field in Egypt, and
Dhahran near the oil fields of Saudi Arabia; soon that presence of American airpower
was further extended into an airbase in Libya as well. In Saudi Arabia a military mission
set about the training of Ibn Saud dessert warriors in modern military techniques and
weapons, starting what eventually would become a bonanza for American military
industrial sales.
The U.S. Mediterranean Naval Squadron grew quickly under Navy Secretary
James Forrestal into the huge Sixth Fleet that prowled the Easter Mediterranean. Forrestal
was the former Dillon Read investment banker who brokered Texaco’s 1936 buy-in with
Standard Oil of California’s Bahrain Petroleum to form the Caltex marketing concern
throughout the Middle East, North Africa and the Far East. The entry of Standard Oil of
New Yok and Standard Oil of New Jersey into Aramco brought a waiver of dividends
until $300 million was paid to the original partners, Standard Oil of California and
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Texaco, and $125 million advanced to the now jointly owned Trans-Arabian Pipeline
Company for construction costs. “This, with a 10¢ a barrel royalty to the original
partners, brought the total purchase price up to $500 million. A satisfactory return,”
commented historian Harvey O’Connor, “it would seem, on an investment calculated at
$82 million, all of which had been recovered in 1944-1945 by sales to the U.S. Navy,
according to James Moffett. The oil produced at a cost of 10¢ a barrel, was sold to the
U.S. Government at $1.05 to $1.13 a barrel.” 353
Western Europe was in no shape to compete, its industries ruined and Britain and
France having raised their debts to Middle East countries by holding sterling balances in
London in the governments’ accounts with no money to pay the outstanding balances.
Financially prone, France gave way to the Americans’ free market of unequal capacities,
eventually losing control of 80% of its electronics industry until De Gaulle, restored to
the presidency, mounted a nationalistic campaign to restore France’s control over its own
industries but losing Algeria as a part of metropolitan France to an Algerian insurgency
for independence.
The British also succumbed to the status of an American junior partner, losing
control over Iran’s oil to nationalists until the Eisenhower administration stepped in with
a CIA coup that gave American oil companies the lion’s share of Iran’s oil, with Britain
given a smaller share appropriate to its decline as a major power. It took longer to bring
them into the American financial fold through the General Agreement on Tariffs Talks
(GATT), however, and they did not withdraw from their addiction to Direct Control in
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the Middle East until 1972, thereafter using armed force only in conjunction with the
Americans.
Meanwhile, Russian troops continued to occupy Eastern Europe, carving out
satellite states run by local Communists. Communist partisans in Italy and France,
however, followed Stalin’s orders and voluntarily laid down their arms and sought the
path to power through elections, only to be thwarted by CIA covert operations in Italy
and France and the Marshall Plan for reconstruction (expanding Western Europe’s oil
refineries to bypass Communist-led coal miners by using increasing amounts of Arabian,
Iranian, Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil). Only in Greece was there still fighting, the Communists
partisans, despite Stalin’s lack of support, refusing Churchill’s restoration in 1944-45 of
the Greek monarchy with British bayonets and Roosevelt’s blessing.
By 1948, with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 (with original
drafted references to Doctrine’s application solely to Turkey, Greece, and Iran crossed
out to make the Doctrine apply to countries of the entire world who said they were
threatened by communism), the Mediterranean had become the “Mare Nostrum” of the
United States, guarded by naval and air bases and the Sixth Fleet. The Eastern
Mediterranean was dominated by the Americans, who found a willing partner in Israel for
the protection of the Suez Canal, until that, too, backfired when Israel secretly planned
and carried out with Britain and France the invasion of Egypt in 1956 without informing
Washington beforehand. Such hidebound approach to the Arab world won little sympathy
with the Eisenhower administration when it was more concerned about holding the
allegiance of Arab leaders in the Cold War.
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In Lebanon and Syria, OSS’s Daniel Dennett stayed on in Beirut after Truman
dismantled the OSS, emerging as a master spy for the Middle East, first under the Special
Service Unit of the War Department and then under the Central Intelligence Group (the
immediate predecessor of the CIA). In March 1947, just after secretly helping American
oil men negotiate the route for the Trans-Arabian Pipeline, he and regional Petroleum
Attaché Donald Sullivan were killed in a mysterious plane crash in Ethiopia 354 while
Sinclair Oil officials were negotiating an oil concession in the Ogaden region from
Emperor Haile Selassie, and his Air Ethiopia and American airlines challenged the
BOAC’s domination. Some CIA colleagues thought it was Russian sabotage; others
thought it might be the extreme Zionists of his opposition to the founding of the State of
Israel as Zionists were arming in preparation for a showdown with the Arabs after the
recent announcement by Britain that they were withdrawing from their Near East
commitments they could no longer afford in blood and treasure. Dennett was replaced as
CIA station chief in Beirut by Archibald Roosevelt, a cousin of Kermit Roosevelt, and
the Great Game for oil continued.
In April 1948, Major General Alexander Bolling, the Deputy Director of Military
Intelligence, received an eye-opening memorandum from Colonel W.H. Quarterman,
Military Attaché in Beirut, assessing the strategic importance of Lebanon:
“Lebanon has far greater importance in the Middle East then it’s
geographic size or its population they indicate. It is probably the most
comfortable place in the Middle East to live despite the excessively high
cost of living in mounting prices. This is due to the French mandate
influence and its “Western European” development, as well as the almost
See Charlotte Dennett, The Crash of Flight 3804: A Lost Spy, A Daughter’s Quest, And The Deadly
Politics of the Great Game For Oil (White River Junction, Vermont and London, UK: Chelsea Green
Publishing, 2020).
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50% Christian population with the resulting Occident way of life being
possible as opposed to the Moslem. The streets and buildings are cleaner,
general health conditions better, schools more progressive, and the
acceptance of Americans and other Anglos–Saxon peoples more generous
than elsewhere in the Middle East....
“I believe 1) that Lebanon, and Beirut particularly, is the center
point of Communist activities in the Middle East... 2) Beirut Lebanon, as a
comfortable place to live, is for that reason, in part, selected as a meeting
place for representatives of many Western powers certainly all Middle
East countries for discussion and planning of many political, economic
and military activities. In this connection....
“... The Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company Headquarters, with its
power, its native “hangers-on” and industrial ramifications, is located here.
This will mean, in the event of pipe line construction, great importance
here, not alone in the existence of a great refinery to be built, or the
petroleum products which will be shipped, but a political arena with
political combatants will crowd around, with intrigue, bargaining, and fair
ground for battle...
“The IPC, competing oil company to the America–owned interests,
is largely centered here, now that Palestine is forbidden ground and they
have moved from Haifa to Lebanon.
“The Palestine problem being next-door, with Lebanon, an Arab
League member in riding a fence rail between the Muslim and Christian
religions, makes the country a particularly sensitive and important place in
the determination of the pulse beats of the Arab-Jew fracas. There is
probably no other place where more can be heard, learned or discussed as
determines plans, operations, rumors, or participation on the problem.
“Lebanon is one of the areas on the way to the Saudi-Arabian oil
fields in the case of Russian aggression in that direction undoubtedly is
being thoroughly surveyed by Soviet interests.
“Good airfields exist in Lebanon and a wonderful new airdrome is
being built which will make collection of air intelligence important and
much easier than in many of the other more Moslem countries
“The large Christian population with its many USA relatives and
friends and the wealthy Lebanese with their US financial affiliations make
the country a capital place for the dissemination of US propaganda and the
collection of Middle East intelligence information. These people are wide
travelers, shrewd traders, and know the political and economic trends.
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“All these things build up to the advisability of an effective
working staff for State, Army and Air in Lebanon.” 355

For precisely these reasons, Adolf Berle had negotiated an agreement on postwar
civil aviation in 1944 at an international conference in Chicago, Ambassador to Saudi
Arabia William Eddy negotiated a three-year agreement in 1945 with King Ibn Saud for
the use of the Dhahran aid base, and eventually the CIA would secretly begin subsidizing
Lebanon’s Middle East Airlines.
It would take over three more years after Dennett’s death to finally complete the
Trans-Arabian Pipeline, requiring Standard Oil of California and Texaco to sell a piece of
the now renamed Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) to Standard Oil of New
Jersey and Standard oil of New York to finance the 1000-mile pipeline to European
markets. The Red Line agreement was jettisoned by the Americans as outdated, and after
much wrangling with the French, it became extinct, France having been secretly assured
that it would have access to Saudi oil in the case of an emergency or oil cut off by angry
Arabs. 356
It would also take a military coup in 1949 in Syria for Aramco to get the contract
that avoided Syria’s previously “impossible” transit royalty demands. There is some
debate among historians about whether the hand of CIA’s Miles Copeland was involved,
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but not about his friend Kermit Roosevelt’s masterminding the riots and military coup
that overthrew Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh in 1953. This
CIA-instigated coup restored the deposed Shah to the Peacock Throne and unleashed a
CIA-trained SAVAK secret police on the Iranian people for another quarter century until
the seizure of the U.S. embassy during the 1979 revolution that Ayatollah Khomeini and
his rural clerics subsequently captured. Anglo-Iranian oil, whose holding had been
nationalized by Mossadegh, got back its oil and changed its name to British Petroleum,
but not before losing the lion’s share of Iran’s oil to American oil companies, including
Gulf Oil, with Roosevelt eventually shedding his CIA raincoat and happily joining Gulf’s
payroll as a vice president and even proudly writing a book about his role in the coup.
A Republican and a dissenter against Truman’s policy toward Palestine and an
advocate of development in the Middle East that did not fit Washington’s mercantile
policies in the immediate postwar years, 357 Culbertson predictably was shut out of
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In his report on his mission to the Middle East, Culbertson had followed his State Department and War
Department peers in warning about the price America would pay for supporting the creation by a Zionist
State of Israel. In 1947, in a letter to then-Secretary of State George Marshall, with copies to Senators
Vandenberg, Taft and, Martin, he elaborated on his disagreement with the Truman administration’s policy
toward Palestine:

My dear Mr. Secretary:
The Palestine question offers a perfect case for bipartisan cooperation in
the foreign affairs. I present the two parties, operating separately, not only are
impotent in the face of a crisis
which could give the Soviets the foothold in the Middle East but are also the
victims of minorities demanding even that American troops be sent to the Holy
Land.
Whatever appeared to be the merits of partitioned at one time, it is now
clear that it can be effected only by outside force and that, once effected, it can be
maintained only by outside force. The American people should be told the names
of individuals and organizations advocating the use of American soldiers to
enforce a partition of Palestine. I am convinced that the American people will not
provide the necessary army.
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Truman’s administration. But when General Dwight Eisenhower returned to the national
stage as the Republican candidate backed by many members of the Council on Foreign
Relations, Culbertson tried to renew his 1938 strategy of currying favor by writing a
book. The cover title was Liberation: America’s Mighty Power to Liberate Captive
Nations, To Preserve Our Way of Life, To Build A Just and Prosperous Peace, 358
although the title on the inside of the book was simply Liberation: The Threat and the
Challenge of Power.
Culbertson’s book argued that the West had a moral right to go beyond the
“containment” policy of the State Department’s George Kennan and essentially endorsed

In my opinion, if the international Zionists would relax their highpressure methods, then Jews and Arabs in Palestine would eventually work out in
orderly settlements of the dispute. Time must be allowed, however, for the cooling
off of the passions which have been aroused.
The objective of bipartisan cooperation would be, not only to eliminate
the Jewish-Arab controversy from American politics, but to insist upon a truce in
the Holy Land, - a long truce, if necessary, - which would continue under a United
Nations trusteeship until the Jews and Arabs in Palestine establish a working basis
of cooperation.
In 1944 I was Chairman of a Mission to the Middle East. After my return
to Secretary of State (Stettinius) asked for my comments on the Arab-Jewish
question in Palestine. I attach the memorandum which I then prepared. At least
some of my comments are as applicable to the situation today as they were at that
time.
To meet the demands of international Zionism for a Jewish State and at
the same time to provide for refugee Jews adequate living space (not available in
Palestine), it is suggested that bipartisan support be given to the development of
a genuine Jewish political state in Eritrea or in Northern Rhodesia.
Very respectfully yours,
William S. Culbertson
[William S. Culbertson to Secretary of State George Marshall, March 8, 1948. Unbound Correspondence,
1948, Papers of William S. Culbertson, Library of Congress.]
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Operation Rollback, the attempt to push back the boundaries of the iron curtain through
covert action. But Culbertson again missed in his timing, as Eisenhower, unlike CIA’s
covert operation chief Frank Wisner, had little stomach for risking nuclear war with the
Russians. Eisenhower even searched for a way to escape Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles’s policy of massive retaliation policy (Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD as it
was called in the Pentagon) by pushing in Geneva an “Atoms for Peace” proposal and
renewed negotiations with the Soviets for reduction of nuclear weapons (scuttled after the
downing of a CIA U-2 spy flight violating Soviet Russian airspace. Culbertson’s only
reward was being named to the official delegation to attend the 1953 coronation of King
Faisal II of Iraq. Within six years, Faisal, too, would fall along with his family to a
military take-over, paving the way eventually for the rise of the dictatorship of Saddam
Hussein.
Deflated, Culbertson retreated into his law practice and his increasing preoccupation with
his Presbyterian heritage, raising funds from the Pews of Sunoco and others to construct a
“Great Church” that became the National Presbyterian Cathedral. True to his Calvinism,
he, like fellow Presbyterian John Foster Dulles, held on to a Manichean view that looked
at the world as a struggle between the eternal forces of Good and Evil until the day he
died of leukemia in August of 1966, while the Vietnam War raged. He asserted, looking
through a World War II lens as did many of his generation, that the lessons of Munich
must not be repeated, and that Americans were obliged by the benefits given by their
geographic position to stand up for their traditional principles, gird their loins for war
through preparedness, and fight for the liberation of the world.

384

Predictably, he blamed Presidents Roosevelt and Truman for the division of
Europe, the “loss” of China, and the New Deal for corroding the moral and
entrepreneurial foundations of the Christian Republic. He never looked back in time for
the pattern of leaders relying increasingly on foreign markets to provide the domestic
political stability their limited distribution of wealth could not. There were consequences
in making the choice he did in accepting the fundamentals of a system he tried in reform
though instruments, including the national security state he turned to ultimately to protect
and expand corporate America’s economic empire. He agreed that what was good for
GM or Du Pont was good for America and the world. But there were even greater
consequences in lending his support to the traditional willful blindness of American
leaders’ Great Evasion of accountability and shared responsibility for what they have
wrought.
He held on to the myths of America as did generations before him, including the
vision of a geopolitical imperium. “Under our free institutions,” he wrote in Liberation,
“the industry and initiative of the American people developed the resources of a continent
and built a diversified productive economy which not only yielded the highest standard of
living ever attained but also made available vast surpluses for peace, and when necessary,
for war, cold or hot. The power of our geographical and geological position and of our
intellectual productive prosperity are supported by the intangible elements of power—
psychological, , and moral. With humility and recognizing our failures, I assert that in the
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records of mankind our nation will be written down as finding security not in destroying
and exploiting other peoples but by working with them generously toward liberation.” 359
The missionary vision never left him. “We find that we must assume leadership.
We find that we must formulate and carry out a grand strategy.” 360 America became a
world power not by choice, but reluctantly and by necessity, went the new orthodoxy,
and Culbertson, like most Americans, embraced it with a passion. He continued to place
hope for humanity in the institutions of a toothless abstract human- rights-based law,
including the Charter of the United Nations and its Declaration of Human Rights. He
continued to point to the promises of the Atlantic Charter and interpreted any government
that developed friendly relations with Soviet Russia as betraying the Charter’s pledge of
self-determination, leading to customary rationales for economically undermining states
with crippling sanctions and international boycotts whose people made the mistake of
assuming democratic right to control their country’s own resources. If those instruments
economic and propaganda efforts failed, the American leaders could always turn to the
CIA coups or Pentagon “interventions” that were given the convenient rationale of being
a “Third Force” alternative to nuclear war. Was this an equitable and reasonable choice
with which to saddle the world, coups or nuclear devastation?
But the remarkable quality of Culbertson’s thinking was his commitment to the
democratic ideal even when it was demonstrably and repeatedly lost in cynical
Realpolitik in the course of history. This has always been what historian William
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Appleman Williams termed Americans’ Great Evasion. Building an empire on Middle
East oil as the keystone would lead to endless wars and planetary degradation. The Cold
War was not a fight over oil per se, but a struggle that began with the very creation of the
Soviet Union as an anti-capitalist state that Churchill said should have been strangled in
its crib. Evolving through a horrific world war, foreign intervention spurring civil war,
another world war that destroyed most of European Russia, and a strangling
“containment” strategy, Soviet Russia grew into a brutal authoritarianism of bureaucratic
centralism and gulags. It was a State that challenged the very existence of capitalistdominated democracies that had learned too well the secret crafts of their opponent. In
Liberation, Culbertson came close to approaching the great American dilemma, what
historian William Appleman Williams called “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy”: the
quest for a continued limited democracy through the belief that the it can be built through
an economic empire of constantly expanding markets. The corporation was not tamed;
with unrestricted growth, it will be the instrument of that Weltanschauung until the hot
bitter end, for America and for the planet.
William Culbertson personified— despite his sincere religious commitments and
warning in Liberation of the dangers of power uncontrolled by legal and moral
principles— how striving to make a system work better without looking at its structural
faults can lead to an amoral Realpolitik geopolitics that is mistaken for a mature
pragmatism. His limitations were set by his choices at an early age in his quest for
recognition and identity, accepting the dominant values of his age: Woodrow Wilson’s
“man on the make” in an ever-expanding “New Frontier.” He chose the corporate path to
success, with all its opportunities and its determined ambiguities about justice in the face
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of a misused power. He defended and promoted a system which answered an existential
threat to its power by creating in atomic power and oil existential threats to the entire
planet. William Culbertson was a natural choice for Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull
to head a mission that projected the expansion into the Middle East of an American
corporate empire of trade and investment.
Yet, he straddled two worlds: the age of laissez nous faire of the small town and
small government he grew up in, and the age of combination and centralization dictated
by the competitive needs of the modern corporation. There were others who also lived
through that period of transitions who did not shy from seeing a pattern to American
history, but were ignored by the powerful who chose a convenient comfort zone of
thinking. Not daring to challenge corporate power, indeed by choosing to serve it,
Culbertson perpetuated the very market forces that helped engender the crises and wars
he sought to avoid. In the search for expanding markets, he became a cog in the machine
that made the national security state inevitable. In the unimaginative vision of a very
limited government except for runaway arms expenditures, Culbertson and all Americans
were, and are, left vulnerable not only to war, but to powerful retaliatory natural forces
such as climate change and plagues that only a large and wise government can meet.
Culbertson played a role in the destruction of European colonialism of Direct
Rule only to help erect a neo-colonialism of Indirect Rule. But in the great evasion of a
Great Power’s responsibility, especially in the nuclear age that commercially is structured
interdependently more than ever, to build communication and community instead of
walls and factions, Americans stand increasingly in isolation. In the absence of checks
and balances in governing during an age what historian Arthur Schlesinger called the
388

Imperial Presidency after he, too, served the national security state;, in a culture of mean
competitive individualism and greed rather than brotherhood and sisterhood and
generosity and sharing repeatedly called for by the United Nations General Assembly; in
the resulting absence of a mature self-restraint in national foreign policy since the
presidency of Franklin Roosevelt and the last year of the Kennedy presidency; the
exigencies of empire steadily erode the foundations of democracy and may leave
Americans sooner than they reckon with domestic tyranny.
Culbertson knew democracy of the American republic was at stake, but shied
from the battle for the primacy of human rights, settling instead for corporate power as
natural selection, a confrontationist “roll-back” of Soviet power that quated dictatorship
with public ownership and planning, and a seductive piety that expressed itself in the
powerful architecture of a corporate-funded giant Presbyterian National Cathedral.
Retiring to his beloved Charmain estate in the Blue Ridge Summit of western
Pennsylvania, true government by the people, of the people and for the people steadily
faded as Culbertson’s goal.
That is the true lesson, perhaps with reversed intent but nevertheless just as true,
of Culbertson’s last quote from his mentor, Alexander Hamilton: “It is certainly
pernicious to leave any government in a situation of responsibility disproportioned to its
power.” 361
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